Hollist v. Madison County et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting 14 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

PAMELA HOLLIST,
Case No. 4:13-cv-00139-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
v.
MADISON COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, and
ROY KLINGLER, in his individual and
official capacity,

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Plaintiff Pamela Hollist’s Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint (Dkt. 14). The motion is fully briefed and at issue. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court will grant Hollist’s Motion.

Memorandum Decision and Order - 1

ANALYSIS
This is an employment case. Hollist has sued Madison County, her former
employer, and Roy Klinger, her former supervisor, for various constitutional violations
arising from her alleged constructive discharge.
On August 9, 2013, less than a week after the deadline for amending the pleadings
passed, Hollist filed a motion to amend her Complaint to add two new causes of action:
1) wrongful termination in violation of Madison County’s “for cause” termination policy
and 2) violation of procedural due process.
1. Hollist Has Shown Good Cause to Amend the Scheduling Order.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure16(b) a movant must show good cause for
not having amended her complaint before the time specified in the scheduling order.
Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08. (9th Cir.1992). The focus
of Rule 16(b)'s good cause standard is the diligence of the moving party. Id. at 608.
“When determining whether to grant a motion to amend scheduling order, a court may
also consider ‘the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the
modifications.” Id.
Here, the Court cannot find Hollist displayed a lack of diligence by filing her
motion to amend the Complaint less than a week after the deadline for filing amendments
passed. According to Hollist, Defendants did not produce the Madison County Personnel
Policy, which served as the basis for amending the Complaint, in the initial disclosures,
and therefore Hollist was not able to review it until August 7, 2013.

Memorandum Decision and Order - 2

As noted, this is an employment case, and a personnel policy often is a key
document in such cases. It therefore make sense that an employer, which should always
have easy access to the company personnel policy, would produce the policy in initial
disclosures. Indeed, Defendants admitted in their Answer that they relied on the
Personnel Policy in insisting that Hollist end her relationship with her significant other as
a condition of working for Madison County. Compl.¶ 27, Dkt. 1; Answer ¶ 27, Dkt. 5.
Defendants should have therefore produced Madison County’s Personnel Policy in initial
disclosures. Moreover, Hollist maintains that she made every effort to obtain the Policy,
which took a little time, but she eventually obtained it. Such concerted action to obtain a
copy of the Policy does not demonstrate a lack of diligence.
And Defendants will suffer no prejudice from allowing Hollist to amend her
Complaint at this point in the litigation. Defendants had notice of the new claims only a
week after the deadline for amending the pleadings.
2. Hollist’s Proposed New Claims Are Not Futile.
Having overcome the timeliness hurdle, Hollist must also overcome the futility
hurdle. The futility threshold is relatively low, however. A claim is considered futile and
leave to amend to add it shall not be given if there is no set of facts which can be proved
under the amendment which would constitute a valid claim. Miller v. Rykoff–Sexton, 845
F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). Indeed, denial of leave to amend on this ground is rare.
“Ordinarily, courts will defer consideration of challenges to the merits of a proposed

Memorandum Decision and Order - 3

amended pleading until after leave to amend is granted and the amended pleading is
filed.” Netbula, LLC v. Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D.Cal. 2003)
First, Defendants contend that Hollist’s due process claim is futile because she
voluntarily resigned her employment, and therefore she waived her due process claim.
But Hollist alleges that she was constructively discharged. “Under the constructive
discharge doctrine, an employee's reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable
working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes.”
Waterman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 201 P.3d 640, 645 (Idaho 2009)(quoting Poland
v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007)). “Whether working conditions were so
intolerable and discriminatory as to justify a reasonable employee's decision to resign is
normally a factual question for the jury.” Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616,
626 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Although it is not easy to prove constructive discharge, Hollist has sufficiently alleged
she was constructively discharged. And the success of her claim will depend on how the
facts of the case play out. Without the benefit of discovery, therefore, the Court cannot
find Hollist will be unable to establish any set of facts that will show she was
constructively discharged.
Likewise, Hollist has alleged a sufficient property interest to sustain her due process
claim. To state a claim under the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish she
possessed a property interest deserving of constitutional protection. Brewster v. Bd. of
Educ. Of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir.1998). Here, Hollist

Memorandum Decision and Order - 4

cites to the Madison County Personnel Policy to support her claim that she could only be
terminated for cause and thus had a constitutionally-protected property interest in
continued employment with Madison County. While Madison County alleges that
Hollist was an at-will employee, Hollist has alleged otherwise and cited facts to support
her position. Thus, allowing Hollist to amend her complaint to add a due process claim
would not be futile.
Defendants also rely on Hollist’s resignation to support their futility argument against
Hollist’s proposed wrongful termination claim. In Knee v. Sch. Dist. No. 139, in Canyon
Cnty., 676 P.2d 727, 729 (Ct. App. 1984), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff employee, who the district court found voluntarily resigned, could not bring an
action against his employer for breach of contract due to wrongful discharge. Again,
however, Defendants ignore that Hollist has properly alleged that she was constructively
discharged. It is therefore not “uncontroverted,” as Defendants contend, that Hollist
“voluntarily” resigned. Defendants reliance on Knee is therefore misplaced. As already
noted, Hollist may face an uphill battle in establishing constructive discharge in the
context of this case, but this is an issue for a later time. Hollist may amend her Complaint
to add a claim for wrongful termination.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Pamela Hollist’s Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint (Dkt. 14) is GRANTED.

Memorandum Decision and Order - 5

DATED: November 1, 2013

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Memorandum Decision and Order - 6