Brian et al v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et al

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion to sever 23 is DENIED without prejudice to defendants' right to re- file the motion at the close of discovery. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

JOHN D. BRIAN, individually;
WILLIAM L. GOODMAM, individually;
and DEBODEEP SANJU CHOUDHURY,
individually,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 4:14-cv-139-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.

WAL-MART STORES, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and ROBERT PEARSON,
individually,

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it a motion to sever. The motion is fully briefed and at issue.
For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the motion.
FACTS
The three plaintiffs all worked at Wal-Mart’s Chubbuck store. They allege that
they were either fired or forced to quit due to the conduct of defendant Robert Pearson.
Their complaint contains six counts against defendants Wal-Mart and Robert Pearson:
(1) Race Discrimination; (2) Hostile Work Environment; (3) Retaliation; (4) Family
Medical Leave Act Violation; (5) Wrongful Termination; and (6) Americans With
Disabilities Act violation.

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 1

The defendants have filed a motion to sever the claims of the three plaintiffs,
arguing that this single lawsuit should be divided into three separate lawsuits. The
defendants argue that the claims of each plaintiff are sufficiently distinct that the
requirements for joinder cannot be satisfied, and that it would be fundamentally unfair to
the defense to proceed on all three claims at once. This motion requires an analysis of the
claims of each plaintiff.
Plaintiff Brian alleges that Pearson “targeted plaintiff Brian due to his race
[Hispanic] and his disabilities.” See Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 5) at ¶ 15. Brian
alleges that Pearson retaliated against him for taking leave under the Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) for disabling afflictions caused by Pearson’s harassment. Pearson’s
harassing conduct, Brian alleges, eventually led to Brian being fired.
Plaintiff Goodman likewise claims that Pearson retaliated against him for taking
FMLA leave for a disabling illness. Goodman claims he was eventually forced to resign
due to his depression and severe anxiety caused by the “ongoing, ever present, and
growing hostility he felt from . . . Pearson.” Id. at ¶ 50.
Plaintiff Choudhury alleges that he was forced to resign due to the hostile work
environment created by Pearson who was discriminating against Choudhury “because he
was from India.” Id. at 60. Choudhury also alleges that Pearson retaliated against him
for reporting the incidents of racial discrimination.
With these allegations in mind, the Court will now turn to a discussion of the legal
standards governing the defendants’ motion to sever.

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 2

LEGAL STANDARDS
To join together in one action, plaintiffs must meet two specific requirements: (1)
the right to relief asserted by each plaintiff must arise out of or relate to the same
transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) a question of
law or fact common to all parties must arise in the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a); League to
Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir.1977).
Generally, this joinder rule is to be construed liberally in order to promote trial
convenience and to prevent multiple disputes. League to Save Lake Tahoe, 558 F.2d at
917. However, even if parties and claims have been properly joined, a court may, in its
discretion, sever claims to “comport with principles of fundamental fairness” or avoid
prejudice to the parties or jury confusion. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271,
1296 (9th Cir.2000).
Focusing on the first joinder requirement discussed above – that plaintiffs’ claims
arise from the same transaction or occurrence (or series of transactions or occurrences) –
there is no bright-line definition of “transaction,” “occurrence,” or “series.” The Ninth
Circuit has generally explained that this requirement “refers to similarity in the factual
background of a claim.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir.1997). The
Circuit has also suggested that claims arising from “a systematic pattern of events” could
satisfy the same-transaction-or-occurrence requirement. Id. (quoting the district court
opinion).
In Doe I v. Boy Scouts of America, 2014 WL 345641 (D. Id. 2014), a decision
issued by this Court, sixteen plaintiffs sued the Boy Scouts and their sponsoring
Memorandum Decision & Order – page 3

organizations claiming to have been sexually abused by Scout leaders. Four of the
plaintiffs alleged that as members of a Scout troop sponsored by the LDS Church, they
were abused by the same Scout leader on the same night. The other twelve alleged
separate incidents of abuse at different times and as members of different troops. Despite
these differences, there were enough similarities to persuade the Court to hold that the
two requirements for permissive joinder had been met. The first requirement was met
because the plaintiffs’ claims all arose out of the same series of transactions, i.e., the
alleged sexual abuse by Scout leaders with the actual or constructive knowledge of the
sponsoring organization. Id. at *4. And the second requirement – the common question
of fact or law – was satisfied by the allegation from all sixteen plaintiffs that the
sponsoring organization knew about the abuse. Id. at *5.
After finding these requirements satisfied, the Court turned to the issue whether
joinder would nevertheless result in a fundamental unfairness. The Court found that
although there would be no unfairness in joining all sixteen plaintiffs for pretrial
proceedings, it would be unfair to the LDS Church defendant to proceed to trial with all
sixteen plaintiffs. Id. at *5-6. Some of those sixteen plaintiffs had not even sued the
LDS Church, and some were members of troops sponsored by different organizations.
Id. It was asking too much of any juror to “partition” those claims and not let them taint
their judgment as to the LDS Church. Accordingly, the Court only joined the sixteen
plaintiffs for pretrial purposes, and joined for trial only the four plaintiffs allegedly
abused together on a single night. Id.

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 4

ANALYSIS
Applying these standards to the present case, the claims of the three plaintiffs
relate to the same series of transactions and share a common question of law or fact. All
three plaintiffs allege that they worked in Wal-Mart’s Chubbuck store and were either
fired or forced to quit due to the conduct of defendant Robert Pearson. In Counts II and
III of the Amended Complaint all three plaintiffs allege that defendant Robert Pearson
created a hostile work environment in the Chubbuck store, and retaliated against them for
engaging in protected activity. See Amended Complaint, Counts II & III (Dkt. No. 5).
These common allegations are sufficient for joinder under Doe’s analysis even though
Pearson subjected each plaintiff to different acts of harassment. Wal-Mart disputes the
allegations about Pearson’s conduct, but the Court cannot resolve questions of fact at this
early stage of the litigation.
While there is no question that these claims must be joined for pretrial
proceedings, the more difficult question is whether they should be joined for trial. In
Doe, the prejudice to the defendant of joining all sixteen claims for trial was so clear that
the Court granted severance. Here, the issue is not so clear. The facts are in dispute, and
the Court cannot make a definitive determination now that a trial on all claims would
unfairly prejudice Wal-Mart. Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to sever at this
time without prejudice to Wal-Mart’s right to raise the motion again after discovery is
complete, seeking to sever the claims for trial purposes.
ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision above,
Memorandum Decision & Order – page 5

NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion to sever (docket
no. 23) is DENIED without prejudice to defendants’ right to re-file the motion at the
close of discovery.

DATED: July 30, 2015

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 6