Simmons v. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 21 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
BRIAN SIMMONS,
Case No. 4:14-cv-00294-BLW
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
BATTELLE ENERGY ALLIANCE,
LLC,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is defendant Battelle Energy Alliance’s motion to
reconsider. The motion is fully briefed and at issue. For the reasons explained below,
the Court will deny the motion.
ANALYSIS
Battelle seeks reconsider of the Court’s decision denying Battelle’s motion to
dismiss. See Memorandum Decision & Order (Dkt. No. 19). Battelle claims that this
Court overlooked Idaho case law in holding that plaintiff Brian Simmons is not relegated
to his worker’s compensation remedies at this stage of the litigation.
Plaintiff Simmons is a nuclear operator employed by Battelle. On November 8,
2011, Simmons was exposed to radioactive dust while repackaging radioactive fuel plates
at Battelle’s facility. He sued Battelle, claiming that he was injured by the exposure and
Memorandum Decision & Order – page 1

the subsequent medical treatment rendered by Battelle. He has made claims under the
Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), the Price-Anderson Act (PAA), and various Idaho
state laws.
Battelle responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction because Simmons’ only remedy is through Idaho’s worker’s
compensation system. Generally, that system provides the exclusive remedy for injuries
occurring on the job. See Idaho Code §§ 72-201, 72-209. But there is an exception “in
any case where the injury or death is proximately caused by the willful or unprovoked
physical aggression of the employer . . . .” See Idaho Code § 72-209(3).
Battelle argued that even if Simmons’ allegations were true, they did not rise to
the level of a “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” by his employer. The Court
disagreed, relying on Dominguez ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 121 P.3d 938, 942
(Idaho 2005), to hold that Simmons had at least alleged sufficient facts to overcome a
motion to dismiss.
In Dominguez, an employee filed a tort action against his employer in state court
after he was seriously injured when his employer sent him to work in a confined space
containing cyanide sludge. The employer knew of the sludge and its danger but
concealed that from the employee. The question before the Idaho Supreme Court was
whether “the district court was without jurisdiction to hear Dominguez’s suit because a
worker’s compensation claim was Dominguez’s only available remedy.” Id. at 941. The
court held that “Dominquez has alleged a willful or unprovoked physical aggression by
Memorandum Decision & Order – page 2

his employer, and therefore his claim falls into a statutory exception [for willful or
unprovoked physical aggression] to the exclusive remedy rule.” Id. at 943.
Thus, under Dominquez, Simmons can avoid a motion to dismiss by alleging that
his employer intentionally caused him to encounter a known hazard that would cause
substantial physical harm while concealing the danger from Simmons. Because
Simmons alleged those facts, the Court denied the motion to dismiss.
In seeking reconsideration, Battelle argues that Simmons has failed to match the
allegations in Dominquez. Battelle claims that Simmons is not definitively alleging that
Battelle knew the full risk but is instead vaguely alleging that Battelle knew some
undefined risk. See Defense Brief (Dkt. No. 24) at p. 6. The Court disagrees. The
complaint alleges that Battelle management (1) was well-aware of “the known extremely
dangerous hazard associated with damaged fuel plates,” (2) knew that protective clothing
“did not work properly,” (3) concealed the danger from Simmons, and (4) “intentionally
ignored a known risk from the damaged fuel plates and directed the work to proceed in
spite of the known risks of exposure to and inhalation of radioactive particles.” See
Complaint, supra, at ¶¶ 22, 26 & 91. These allegations place this case squarely within
Dominquez.
Battelle argues next that Dominquez did not deal directly with the aggression
exception, and that the Court should have relied instead on two earlier cases, Kearney v.
Denker, 760 P.2d 1171 (Id.Sup.Ct. 1988) and DeMoss v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 795 P.2d
875 (Id.Sup.Ct.1990). But this argument ignores the statement in Dominquez – quoted
Memorandum Decision & Order – page 3

above – that the complaint’s allegations fell within the aggression exception. That
statement applies directly to this case and cannot be ignored. In contrast, Kearney and
DeMoss were decided on summary judgment, both holding that the plaintiffs failed to
produce sufficient evidence to fall within the aggression exception. This case has not yet
reached that stage – the Court is evaluating the sufficiency of allegations on a motion to
dismiss, and Dominquez controls the outcome.
For all of these reasons, the Court will deny the motion to reconsider.
ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision set forth above,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion to reconsider
(docket no. 21) is DENIED.

DATED: April 12, 2016

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 4