Bates et al v. 3B Detention Center et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the defendants motion for reconsideration 33 is DENIED. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
DANIEL BATES and BRENDA
BATES, individually and as parents and
natural guardians of C.B.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 4:14-cv-359-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

3B DETENTION CENTER,
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, BINGHAM
COUNTY, BUTTE COUNTY, and
JOHN DOES I-X,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it defendants’ motion to reconsider. The motion is fully
briefed and at issue. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the motion.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs – Daniel and Brenda Bates – are the parents of juvenile C.B. who
was injured while incarcerated at the juvenile detention facility known as the 3B
Detention Center, operated by three counties: Bonneville, Bingham, and Butte. To
recover damages for C.B.’s injuries, the Bates have sued the 3B Detention Center and the
three counties. The Bates’ complaint alleges § 1983 claims along with state law claims
for negligence and failure to train.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss all
claims. The Court granted the motion in part, dismissing the state law claims and most of

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 1

the § 1983 claims, leaving for resolution the single claim under § 1983 that a delay in
obtaining pain relief for C.B. violated her constitutional rights.
The Bates now ask the Court to reconsider that portion of the decision dismissing
the state law claims.
ANALYSIS
The Court held in its earlier decision that the Bates’ state law claims were
governed by the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA). See Sherer v. Pocatello School Dist. No.
25, 148 P.3d 1232 (Id.Sup.Ct. 2006). The Bates has the burden of showing that “no
exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged misconduct from liability.” Id.
at 1236.
The ITCA creates an exception to liability for a governmental entity that is sued
for acts arising out of its medical care for those in its custody. Specifically, Idaho Code
§6-904B states in pertinent part as follows:
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and
scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without
gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in
section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which:
....
5. Arises out of any act or omission providing or failing to
provide medical care to a prisoner or person in the custody of
any city, county or state jail, detention center or correctional
facility.
While the Idaho Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to address the meaning
of this particular statute, it did interpret almost identical prefatory language in Idaho Code
§ 6-904(3). That language reads as follows: “A governmental entity and its employees
while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or
Memorandum Decision & Order – page 2

criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which . . . [a]rises out of assault, battery .
. . or interference with contract rights.” The Idaho Supreme Court held that “[t]he plain
language of the first clause of that section exempts governmental entities from liability
for the torts it lists, whether or not there has been an allegation of malice or criminal
intent.” Hoffer v. City of Boise, 257 P.3d 1226, 1228 (Id.Sup.Ct. 2011). In essence, the
court read the prefatory language as if parentheses had been inserted around the phrase
dealing with the employees: “A governmental entity (and its employees while acting
within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent)
shall not be liable . . . .” The result of this interpretation is that Idaho governmental
entities had complete immunity for the listed torts even if their employees committed the
tort with malice or criminal intent.
The first clause of § 6-904B is worded essentially the same, merely adding “gross
negligence or reckless willful and wanton conduct” to the list of exclusions from the
exception. The Idaho law on statutory interpretation holds that “portions of the same act
or section may be resorted to as an aid to determine the sense in which a word, phrase, or
clause is used, and such phrase, word, or clause, repeatedly used in a statute, will be
presumed to bear the same meaning throughout the statute . . . .” St. Luke’s Magic Valley
Reg. Med. Ctr. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm. 149 Idaho 584, 589 (2010). Thus, one phrase in the
Idaho Torts Claim Act that is repeated throughout the Act will be presumed to bear the
same meaning throughout.
Applying this standard to § 6-904B, the Court held in its earlier decision that if the
Idaho Supreme Court was confronted with the language of § 6-904B, it would apply
Memorandum Decision & Order – page 3

Hoffer, extend its interpretation to § 6-904B, and read it with parentheses added: “A
governmental entity (and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their
employment and without malice or criminal intent and without gross negligence or
reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code), shall not
be liable . . . .” Thus, no matter how the employees acted, an Idaho governmental entity
could not be liable for any claim arising out of “any act or omission providing or failing
to provide medical care to a . . . person in the custody of any . . . county . . . detention
center . . . .” See I.C. § 6-904B. See Memorandum Decision (Dkt. No. 31). Because the
Bates’ state law claims all arise out of defendants’ acts in either providing or failing to
provide medical care to a person in custody at the 3B Detention Center, the Court held
that the defendants – all governmental entities – have complete immunity from these state
law claims.
The Bates now ask the Court to reconsider, citing four cases from the Idaho
Supreme Court in support of their motion. See Mitchell v. State, 2016 WL 825439
(Id.Sup.Ct. Mar. 3, 2016); Grabicki v. City of Lewiston, 302 P.3d 26, 31 (Id.Sup.Ct.
2013); Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 273 P.3d 1266, (2012); Mareci v. Coeur d’Alene Sch.
Dist. No. 271, 250 P.3d 791(Id.Sup.Ct. 2011). The Bates argue that these four cases
show that the Idaho Supreme Court has refused to expand Hoffer’s interpretation of the
prefatory language in § 6-904(3) to the similar prefatory language in § 6-904B.
But three of the four cases – Mitchell, Grabicki, and Ball – offer nothing of
substance on the issue faced here. They do not discuss the prefatory language or Hoffer.

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 4

Each was decided on other grounds and hence the court did not need to face the prefatory
language issue faced in Hoffer.
For example, in Mitchell, the plaintiff sued the State for its alleged negligence in
releasing a mentally ill man who later shot the plaintiff. At issue was the immunity
provided to the State by § 6-904(1) for discretionary functions. The court found
questions of fact over whether the State made a policy decision based on budgets (in
which case the discretionary function immunity would apply) or an operational decision
based on the individual (in which case it would not), and reversed the summary judgment
on this issue. Mitchell, 2016 WL 825439 at *7.
Mitchell never address the prefatory language of § 6-904 but focused entirely on
whether the listed protected act – in that case, a discretionary function – protected the
State. That is entirely the opposite of the issue here, where the Bates’ claim clearly falls
under the terms of the listed protected act (failing to provide medical care to a detainee),
and the only dispute is over the interpretation of the prefatory language. The Bates’
claim makes this case identical to Hoffer where the plaintiff’s claim clearly fell within the
terms of the listed protected act (interference with contract), and the only dispute was
over the prefatory language.
The same analysis applies to Grabicki and Ball. See Grabicki, 302 P.3d at 34-35
(prefatory language not discussed in decision finding questions of fact over whether
claim for faulty sewer design fell within listed protected act of design approved in
advance by legislative body); Ball, 273 P.3d at 1269-70 (prefatory language not discussed

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in decision holding that claim for poor maintenance of sidewalk did not fall under any of
the listed protected acts).
But the fourth case – Mareci – is different from the other three. In Mareci, the
parent of a child injured at school brought an action against the School District for
negligent supervision. The School District sought immunity under Idaho Code § 6904A(2):
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of
their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without reckless, willful and
wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any
claim which:
....
2. Arises out of injury to a person or property by a person under supervision,
custody or care of a governmental entity . . . .
There was no dispute that subsection (2) applied – the child was clearly being
supervised by the School District when the injury occurred. Thus, Mareci was like
Hoffer in that there was no dispute the injury arose from a listed protected act. Mareci
could have read § 6-904A with Hoffer’s parentheses inserted: “A governmental entity
(and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and
without malice or criminal intent and without gross negligence or reckless, willful and
wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code), shall not be liable . . . .” This
would have resulted in a holding that the School District was immunized no matter how
its employees acted.
But instead, Mareci, without discussion, read § 6-904A without the parenthesis.
The decision states that the School District would lose its immunity under this statute if
Memorandum Decision & Order – page 6

“its employee acted with malice or criminal intent or if the employee’s conduct was
reckless, willful, and wanton.” Id. at 794. Ultimately, the court held that because the
record contained no evidence of malice or even recklessness on the part of School
District employees, the School District enjoyed full immunity under § 6-904A.
The Bates argue that Mareci demonstrates that the Idaho Supreme Court has
refused to extend Hoffer to § 6-904A. But Mareci was decided almost three months
before Hoffer, so Hoffer is the court’s most recent pronouncement. Moreover, Mareci
never discusses the prefatory language as it was apparently unnecessary to its holding
extending full immunity to the School District. There is no indication in Mareci that
counsel in that case even argued that the court should read the statute as if parentheses
were inserted, and there is certainly no rejection of such a reading in the decision. It is
only in Hoffer that the court directly addresses the prefatory language issue.
For all these reasons, the Court finds that Hoffer governs here, and that Mareci
does not require reconsideration of the Court’s earlier ruling. The Court will therefore
deny the motion to reconsider.
ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision set forth above,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the defendants’ motion for
reconsideration (docket no. 33) is DENIED.

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 7

DATED: May 2, 2016

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 8