Wells v. Altenburg et al

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 32 is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. The motion is granted as to Wellss claim for retaliation under the ADA and IHRA. The motion is denied as to Wellss remaining claims. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 34 is MOOT. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
SHAWNA WELLS,
Case No. 4:14-cv-00450-BLW
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
SKYNET DIGITAL, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company, d/b/a
MEDICAL SPECIALTIES OF IDAHO;
AARON J. ALTENBURG, M.D.,
individually; and AARON J.
ALTENBURG, M.D., P.C., an Idaho
Professional Corporation,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Aaron J. Altenburg, M.D., and Aaron J. Altenburg, M.D., P.C. (Dkt. 32), and a Motion to
Strike filed by Plaintiff Shawna Wells (Dkt. 34). The Court will address each motion
below.
BACKGROUND
Shawna Wells started working as Dr. Aaron Altenburg’s medical assistant in
2008. Wells Aff. ¶ 2, Dkt. 33-19. In 2012, Dr. Altenburg contracted with Skynet Digital,

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LLC (Skynet) for office space and staffing services. Def. SOF ¶ 5, Dkt. 32-1. That
contract entitled Skynet to 8% of Dr. Altenburg’s collections. Pl. SOF ¶ 6, Dkt. 33-1.
Though Dr. Altenburg’s contract with Skynet precluded him from controlling Skynet’s
office space and staffing services it provided under the contract, he requested that Wells
remain his medical assistant and that any benefit waiting periods for her be waived. Id. ¶
2. Skynet agreed to Dr. Altenburg’s request and hired Wells while also waiving her
benefit waiting periods. Id. ¶ 3.
Wells worked almost exclusively with Dr. Altenburg at Skynet. Dr. Altenburg
called Wells his “office wife,” explaining that when Wells was away, “[i]t doesn’t flow
as efficiently as when she’s there.” Altenburg Depo. 73:7-8, Dkt. 33-4. Given their close
working relationship, Wells recalls that Dr. Altenburg promised her she would “have a
job with [him] as long as she want[ed] it.” Wells Depo. 79:18-20, Dkt. 33-11.
In December 2013, Dr. Altenburg initiated a separation proceeding against
Tammy Chavarria. Pl. SOF ¶ 9, Dkt. 33-1. A key issue in the separation proceeding was
whether the two were actually married. Id. ¶ 10. Dr. Altenburg contended they were not
married, while Chavarria argued they were married by virtue of common law. Id. Dr.
Altenburg asked Wells to testify in the separation proceeding. Id. ¶ 11. Wells, who had
become friends with both Dr. Altenburg and Chavarria, agreed to testify. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.
But, in January 2014, when Wells told Dr. Altenburg’s attorney how Dr. Altenburg had
called Chavarria his wife several times, Dr. Altenburg’s attorney responded that, “Well,
we can’t use that!” Id. ¶ 11.

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In January 2014, Wells grew concerned that Dr. Altenburg’s separation
proceeding was beginning to compromise his work performance. Id. ¶ 12. She
specifically noticed that Dr. Altenburg “was not spending time with his patients,
cancelled appointments at the last minute, and had lost his focus on patient care.” Wells
Aff. ¶ 17, Dkt. 33-19. These concerns, in turn, exacerbated Wells’s pre-existing
depression and anxiety. Pl. SOF ¶ 12, Dkt. 33-1.
Wells discussed her concerns and symptoms with Dr. Altenburg in or around
March 2014. Id. ¶ 13. He indicated he would try to refocus his priorities, but Wells
alleges his performance never improved. Id. In fact, after discussing her concerns with
Dr. Altenburg, Wells claims he stopped communicating with her unless absolutely
necessary, “making it incredibly difficult for Wells to do her job and causing Wells’ preexisting depression and anxiety to further escalate, causing Wells problems with sleeping
and working.” Id. ¶ 14. On several occasions in March 2014,Wells also discussed her
concerns and symptoms with Amy Parslow, Skynet’s manager, and Lori Kitzmiller,
Wells’s immediate supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Wells told them that her depression and
anxiety “had gotten so bad that she had been suicidal.” Id. ¶ 17. At Parslow’s request,
Wells documented her concerns to be placed in her employee file. Id. ¶ 18.
On April 1, 2014, Parslow removed Wells from her normal workstation and
assigned her to work at a reception desk. Wells Aff. ¶¶ 24, 26, Dkt. 33-19. Parslow
explained Wells had been moved because Dr. Altenburg wanted to enhance efficiency by
improving the “flow” of his clinic. Def. SOF ¶ 28, Dkt. 32-1. According to Wells,

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however, working at the reception desk made her job “nearly impossible.” Pl. SOF ¶ 22,
Dkt. 33-1. Due to patient privacy concerns, Wells “could not return patient phone calls . .
. [or] call in prescriptions” from the reception desk. Wells Aff. ¶ 28, Dkt. 33-19. She “had
no access to [her] faxes or a fax machine.” Id. And she “did not feel comfortable setting
up surgeries because of the detailed information that was necessary from the patient, and
[she] could not get surgery packets put together.” Id. Faced with these difficulties, Wells
struggled through her first two days at the reception desk, crying off and on. Id. ¶¶ 25-29.
Thus, the move to the reception desk, along with Dr. Altenburg’s now distant demeanor,
caused Wells’s depression and anxiety to “skyrocket.” Pl. SOF ¶ 23, Dkt. 33-1.
Wells highlights two events that occurred on April 4, 2014. First, Wells alleges
Dr. Altenburg met with Parslow to recommend Wells be terminated. Id. ¶ 26. Jamie
Campion, whose workstation sat close to Parslow’s office, testified that Dr. Altenburg
and Parslow had an uncommonly long meeting that day, after which Dr. Altenburg asked,
“So, is that thing we talked about going to be taken care of?” Campion Aff. ¶ 7, Dkt. 3320. When Parslow indicated “Yes,” Dr. Altenburg requested he be notified when “that
thing” was done. Id. Campion understood Parslow and Altenburg were planning Wells’s
termination. Id. ¶ 8. Also on April 4, 2014, Wells executed an affidavit for Chavarria in
the separation proceeding. Pl. SOF ¶ 29, Dkt. 33-1. In the affidavit, she testified that Dr.
Altenburg had introduced Chavarria as his wife during social events Wells had attended.
Id.

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On Monday, April 7, 2014, Chavarria filed Wells’s affidavit. Id. That same day,
Parslow terminated Wells, explaining that “[d]ue to problems with you and Dr.
Altenburg, we can no longer have you work here.” Id. ¶ 30. Dr. Altenburg maintains he
was unaware that Parslow planned to terminate Wells. Def. SOF ¶ 27, Dkt. 32-1. Wells
disputes that fact and brings claims against Aaron J. Altenburg, M.D., and Aaron J.
Altenburg, M.D., P.C. (collectively Defendants) for (1) disability discrimination under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA); (2)
retaliation under the ADA and IHRA; (3) wrongful termination in violation of public
policy; and (4) intentional interference with economic expectancy. Defendants now move
for summary judgment on all claims.
LEGAL STANDARD
A principal purpose of summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims . . . .” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
Summary judgment is “not a disfavored procedural shortcut,” but instead is the “principal
tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented
from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private
resources.” Id. at 327. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

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The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and must not make credibility findings. Id. at 255. However, the Court is not
required to adopt unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v.
Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001)
(en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative
evidence, like affidavits or deposition excerpts, but may simply point out the absence of
evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson,
212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2000). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
produce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor. Id. at 256-57. This
requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and show by “affidavits, or by
the depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file” that a genuine issue of
material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

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DISCUSSION
1.

Wells’s Claims under the ADA and IHRA
A.

Coverage of the ADA

Defendants first argue Wells cannot bring ADA claims because Defendants are not
“employers” under the ADA.1 The ADA defines “employer” according to its definition
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); 42
U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Thus, to establish the ADA governs Defendants, Wells must show
Defendants were a single or joint employer with Skynet.
(1)

Single Employer Test

The Ninth Circuit “treats two entities as one if they have (1) interrelated
operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4)
common ownership or financial control.” Morgan v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 884 F.2d 1211,
1213 (9th Cir. 1989). “None of these factors are dispositive, and all four need not be met
in each case.” Thompson v. C & H Sugar Co., 2014 WL 1266804, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
24, 2014) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Triumph Curing Ctr., 571 F.2d 462, 468 (9th Cir.1978)).

1

That the IHRA governs Defendants appears undisputed. The IHRA defines “employer” as “a
person, wherever situated, who hires five (5) or more employees for each working day in each of twenty
(20) or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year whose services are to be partially or
wholly performed in the state of Idaho . . . .” Idaho Code § 67-5902(6). Wells notes that Defendants
employed seven staff members. Pl. Opp. Br. at p. 6, fn. 3, Dkt. 33. Since Defendants have not disputed
that fact, the Court will treat Defendants as an employer under the IHRA.

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Questions of fact surround whether Defendants and Skynet constitute a single
employer. First, Defendants and Skynet had interrelated operations. Skynet provided
Defendants with office space and staff, including “an administrator, clinic manager,
nurse, medical assistant, reception and billing personnel.” Pl. SOF ¶ 7, Dkt. 33-1.
Second, Defendants and Skynet shared common management, with Parslow managing
Defendants and Skynet. Id. ¶ 6. Third, a reasonable jury could find centralized control of
labor relations. For instance, Dr. Altenburg “insisted not only that [Wells] be hired by
Skynet . . . but also that any waiting periods for benefits be waived for Wells,” and
Skynet agreed. Id. ¶ 2. He further told Wells she would “have a job with [him] as long as
she want[ed] it.” Wells Depo. 79:18-20, Dkt. 33-11. Fourth, a reasonable jury could also
find common ownership or financial control. Wells argues Dr. Altenburg had “substantial
control over Skynet.” Pl. SOF ¶ 6, Dkt. 33-1. She points to his lease and staffing services
agreement with Skynet, which entitled Skynet to “8% of Altenburg’s collections.” Id.
Thus, a reasonable jury could find Defendants had at least some financial control over
Skynet. In sum, the Court concludes that there are disputed issues of material fact as to
whether Defendants and Skynet meet the single employer test.
(2)

Joint Employer Test

The Ninth Circuit treats two or more employers as a joint employer “if both
employers control the terms and conditions of employment of the employee.” E.E.O.C. v.
Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 351 F.3d 1270, 1275 (9th Cir. 2003). The joint employer test considers
“all factors relevant to the particular situation.” Id. Those factors include the employers’

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(1) nature and degree of control of the employee; (2) degree of supervision, direct or
indirect, of the employee’s work; (3) power to determine the employee’s pay rate or
method of payment; and (4) right, directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or modify the
employee’s working conditions. Id. (citation omitted).
Questions of fact also surround whether Defendants and Skynet constitute a joint
employer. First, as to the nature and degree of control, Skynet agreed to Dr. Altenburg’s
request for Skynet to hire Wells and waive any waiting periods for benefits. Pl. SOF ¶ 3,
Dkt. 33-1. And, as noted, Dr. Altenburg told Wells she would “have a job with [him] as
long as she want[ed] it.” Wells Depo. 79:18-20, Dkt. 33-11. Second, Defendants
supervised Wells’s work. Defendants argue “Skynet’s supervisory staff supervised Ms.
Wells’ work,” not Defendants. Def. Br. at p. 7, Dkt. 32-2. But the fact remains that
“Wells worked almost exclusively with and for Altenburg,” and since Wells was “so
integral” to Dr. Altenburg, “he referred to her as his ‘office wife.’” Pl. SOF ¶ 3, Dkt. 331. Third, Defendants also had at least some control over Wells’s compensation, as Dr.
Altenburg was responsible for disbursing bonus payments. Id. ¶ 7. Fourth, Defendants
were able to modify the terms and conditions of Wells’s employment. For instance, when
Dr. Altenburg wanted to change the flow of his clinic, Wells contends he arranged for
Parslow to remove Wells from her normal work station and assign her to a reception
desk. Id. ¶ 20. Again, the Court concludes there are disputed issues of material fact as to
whether Defendants and Skynet meet the joint employer test.
B.

Disability Discrimination

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Defendants next argue Wells has no triable disability discrimination claim. A
prima facie disability discrimination claim under the ADA and IHRA requires a plaintiff
to establish that she (1) is disabled; (2) is qualified with or without reasonable
accommodation to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) suffered an adverse
employment action because of her disability. See Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91
F.3d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1996).
Defendants first argue Wells is not disabled. The ADA and IHRA define
“disability” as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The impairment must
“substantially limit[] the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as
compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The
impairment, however, “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the
individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially
limiting.” Id.
Here, Wells claims she suffered from depression and anxiety that “substantially
limited her ability to work, sleep, and function from a mental health perspective.” Pl.
Opp. Br. at p. 11, Dkt. 33. She explains that the symptoms generally emerged once a
month, but that Dr. Altenburg exacerbated her symptoms by excluding her from workrelated discussions after she reported concerns of his work performance. Wells Aff. ¶ 16,
Dkt. 33-19. According to Wells, Dr. Altenburg caused her depression to become “so bad

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that she [became] suicidal.” Pl. SOF ¶ 17, Dkt. 33-1. Defendants counter that Wells’s
depression and anxiety did not substantially limit her ability to work, emphasizing Wells
testimony that she was able to perform her work duties and had in fact “received positive
feedback on her job performance.” Wells Depo. 61:15-18; 69:8-15, Dkt. 32-5.
At this stage, Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, that
Wells was still able to perform her job satisfactorily does not resolve whether she was
substantially limited in doing so. As Wells argues, she continued working even though
she had suicidal thoughts. Pl. SOF ¶ 17, Dkt. 33-1. Second, Wells disputes whether her
performance was actually satisfactory when her symptoms were most severe. She claims
Dr. Altenburg became increasingly distant in or around March 2014 when her symptoms
were most severe, which she felt indicated his dissatisfaction with her performance. Wells
Depo. 69:16-25, Dkt. 33-11. Construing all facts in the light most favorable to Wells
while recognizing that the definition of disability must be construed “in favor of broad
coverage . . . to the maximum extent permitted by the” ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A),
Wells has raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether she is disabled.
Defendants next contend Wells did not suffer an adverse employment action
because of her disability. Parslow testified she terminated Wells due to “personal issues
going on” between Wells and Dr. Altenburg. Parslow Depo. 84:4-10, Dkt. 33-9. Parslow
believed those issues concerned Wells having “befriended [Dr. Altenburg’s] soon to be
ex-wife and they were going through turmoil.” Id. 84:16-18. Nevertheless, reasonable
minds could differ as to whether Wells suffered an adverse employment action because

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of her disability. Wells highlights how Parslow moved her to the reception desk just one
week after reporting concerns of Dr. Altenburg’s work performance and her worsening
depression and anxiety. Pl. SOF ¶ 20, Dkt. 33-1. Wells explains how patient privacy
requirements prevented her from performing many key tasks from the reception desk,
making her job “almost impossible” and exacerbating her depression and anxiety. Wells
Aff. ¶ 28, Dkt. 33-19. After one week at the reception desk, Wells was terminated. Based
on the close timing of events, the Court finds Wells’s allegations sufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact as to whether she suffered an adverse employment action because of
her disability.
Because Wells has raised genuine issues of material fact on her disability
discrimination claim, the Court will deny Defendants summary judgment on this claim.
C.

Retaliation

A prima facie retaliation case under the ADA and IHRA requires a plaintiff to
show that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she was subjected to an adverse
employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the two. Pardi v. Kaiser
Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004). Once a prima facie case is established,
the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions;
the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant’s reason was pretextual. Id.
Summary judgment for Defendants on this claim is proper because Wells did not
engage in a protected activity. Wells argues her reporting of concerns over Dr.
Altenburg’s work performance and reporting her depression and anxiety to Dr.

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Altenburg, both constituted protected activities. Parslow, and Kitzmiller. Pl. Opp. Br. at
p. 15, Dkt. 32. Wells’s argument, however, does not demonstrate that she protested or
opposed any conduct the ADA and IHRA prohibit. Thus, Wells’s discussions about Dr.
Altenburg’s work performance and her depression and anxiety do not establish she
engaged in protected activity. Cf. Jenott v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2009 WL
5200524, at *4 (D. Idaho Dec. 23, 2009) (finding no protected activity where employee’s
reported concerns implicated violations of employer’s leave policy and inadequate
supervision, not unlawful discrimination). Consequently, the Court will grant Defendants
summary judgment on this claim.
2.

Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
Defendants also seek summary judgment on Wells’s claim for wrongful

termination in violation of public policy. Generally, at-will employees may be terminated
“at any time for any reason without creating liability.” Edmonson v. Shearer Lumber
Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 737 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 2003). Nevertheless, if an employer fires an atwill employee for reasons that contravene public policy, the employer may be liable.
Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 272 P.3d 1263, 1271 (Idaho Sup. Ct.
2012). The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that this public-policy
exception must be narrowly construed; otherwise, it could swallow the at-will rule.
Venable v. Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc., 329 P.3d 356, 361 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 2014)
(quoting McKay v. Ireland Bank, 59 P.3d 990, 994 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002)). Thus, the
Court acknowledges that “many activities and interests engaged in by employees benefit

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13

the community,” but “not all of them are recognized as falling within the public policy
exception.” McKay, 59 P.3d at 994.
Terminating an at-will employee contravenes public policy only if the “employee
is terminated for engaging in some protected activity, which includes (1) refusing to
commit an unlawful act; (2) performing an important public obligation; or (3) exercising
certain legal rights or privileges.” Id. Deciding if a public policy is sufficient to protect an
at-will employee from termination is a question of law. Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 212
P.3d 982, 991 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 2009). “In order to properly state a claim under the public
policy exception, a plaintiff must specifically identify the public policy in question and
then provide evidence to show a violation of the public policy.” Venable, 329 P.3d at
362. A state’s constitution, statutes, and case law generally dictate its public policy. See
Edmonson, 75 P.3d at 737-38.
Here, Wells contends she was terminated for providing testimony or potential
testimony in Dr. Altenburg’s separation proceeding. Pl. Opp. Br. at pp. 16-17, Dkt. 33.
This contention, taken as true, triggers a sufficient policy under Idaho law. See Hummer
v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981, 280 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1996) (“[T]here exists an overriding public
policy interest in obtaining candid, truthful information for use in court proceedings.”).
Wells executed an affidavit for Chavarria on April 4, 2014. Pl. SOF ¶ 29, Dkt. 33-1. That
affidavit was then filed on April 7, 2014—the same day Wells was terminated. Id.
Defendants argue neither they nor Skynet had any knowledge of Wells’s testimony when
she was terminated. Def. SOF ¶¶ 24-29, Dkt. 32-1. Even so, Wells informed Dr.

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Altenburg’s attorney in January 2014 that she would testify he had called Chavarria his
wife several times. Pl. SOF ¶ 11, Dkt. 33-1. After that discussion, Wells’s and Dr.
Altenburg’s relationship began to crumble. Thus, even if neither Defendants nor Skynet
knew of Wells’s affidavit when she was terminated, questions of fact still exist as to
whether she was terminated for indicating she would be willing to provide truthful
testimony. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants summary judgment on this
claim.
3.

Intentional Interference with Economic Expectancy
Finally, Defendants seek summary judgment on Wells’s intentional interference

with economic expectancy claim. She brings this claim in the alternative, acknowledging
that “[i]f Altenburg is found to have an employment relationship with Wells, this claim
would be moot.” Pl. Opp. Br. at p. 17, fn. 7, Dkt. 33. Because no final legal
determination has been made as to an employment relationship, the Court will address
this claim.
Intentional interference with economic expectancy requires a plaintiff to show:
“(1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the expectancy on
the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the
expectancy, (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the
interference itself, and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been
disrupted.” Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 243 P.3d 1069, 1081 (Idaho Sup. Ct.
2010) (citation omitted).

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Defendants challenge only the third and fourth elements. The third element
requires that the tortfeasor “desire[] to bring it about or . . . know[] that the interference is
certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his action.” Highland Enters., Inc. v.
Barker, 340, 986 P.2d 996, 1006 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1999). The fourth element requires that
the tortfeasor either: “(1) had an improper objective or purpose to harm the plaintiff”; or
(2) “used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business relationship.”
Ernest, 243 P.3d at 1081. Wells argues Defendants arranged for her placement at the
reception desk, intending “to force [her] to resign” by making her job “almost
impossible.” Wells Aff. ¶¶ 28-29, Dkt. 33-19. She further claims she was moved to the
reception desk because Defendants sought to “punish her because [Dr. Altenburg] was
upset with Wells for telling both him and her Skynet supervisors that his practice was
suffering, that her depression and anxiety were aggravated by his conduct, and because
she would not provide the testimony he wanted in his divorce case.” Pl. Opp. Br. at p. 18,
Dkt. 33. In contrast, Defendants contend Wells was moved to the reception desk because
Dr. Altenburg wanted to enhance efficiency and improve the flow of his clinic, not to
interfere with Wells’s employment or otherwise punish her. Def. SOF ¶ 28, Dkt. 32-1.
Wells, however, rebuts that no other medical assistant, including her replacement, was
required to work at the reception desk. Pl. SOF ¶ 20, Dkt. 33-1. At this stage, construing
all facts in the light most favorable to Wells, her allegations are sufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact on this claim. The Court will therefore deny Defendants summary
judgment on this claim.

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4.

Motion to Strike
Wells seeks to strike portions of Dr. Altenburg’s declaration. The Court did not

rely on Dr. Altenburg’s declaration in any way and, therefore, will deny Wells’s Motion
to Strike as moot.
ORDER
1.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 32) is GRANTED in

part, and DENIED in part. The motion is granted as to Wells’s claim for retaliation
under the ADA and IHRA. The motion is denied as to Wells’s remaining claims.
2.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Dkt. 34) is MOOT.

DATED: May 11, 2016

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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