Bach v. Ehrler et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. Defendant Simpson's Motion to Dismiss 2 is GRANTED. Defendants Jared Harris' and Baker & Harris Motion to Dismiss 6 is GRANTED. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
JOHN N. BACH,
Case No. 4:14-cv-469-BLW
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
PAULA EHRLER, et al.,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it two motions to dismiss – one filed by Defendant Judge
Darren B. Simpson and the other filed by Defendants Jared Harris and Harris & Baker
Law Firm. The motions are fully briefed and at issue. The Court has determined that oral
argument will not significantly assist the decisional process and will therefore consider
the matters without a hearing. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant both
motions.
BACKGROUND
In November 2014, Plaintiff John N. Bach filed a pro se complaint against several
defendants, including District Court Judge Darren B. Simpson, attorney Jared Harris, and
Harris & Baker Law Firm. Bach alleged RICO and Federal Civil Rights Act violations.
Defendants Judge Simpson, Jared Harris, and Harris & Baker filed motions to dismiss.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must set forth
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
alleged misconduct. Id. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557.
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court identified two “working principles” that
underlie Twombly. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). First, the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Id. “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-

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technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79.
Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss. Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.
A dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the
complaint “could not be saved by any amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728,
737 (9th Cir. 2009) (issued two months after Iqbal).1 The Ninth Circuit has held that “in
dismissals for failure to state a claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if
no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could
not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N.
Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). The issue is not whether
the plaintiff will prevail but whether he “is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims.” See Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006).

1

The Court has some concern about the continued vitality of the liberal amendment policy adopted in
Harris v. Amgen, based as it is on language in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), suggesting
that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim . . . .” Given Twombly and Iqbal’s rejection
of the liberal pleading standards adopted by Conley, a question arises whether the liberal amendment
policy of Harris v Amgen still exists. Nevertheless, the Circuit has continued to apply the liberal
amendment policy even after dismissing claims for violating Iqbal and Twombly. See Market Trading,
Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 2010 WL 2836092 (9th Cir. July 20, 2010) (not for publication).
Accordingly, the Court will continue to employ the liberal amendment policy.

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ANALYSIS
Even as a pro se litigant, Bach’s Complaint is still evaluated under the
Iqbal/Twombly pleading standards. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). In
his complaint, Bach alleges a RICO violation, as well as violations of the Federal Civil
Rights Act (specifically, sections 1983, 1985(2), 1985(3), and 1986). These claims fail to
state cognizable causes of action.
The claims again Judge Simpson are barred by judicial immunity. A plaintiff can
overcome such immunity if nonjudicial actions form a judge’s alleged misconduct.
However, Bach’s Complaint does not include such allegations. Instead, when specifically
discussing Judge Simpson, Bach alleged that Judge Simpson incorrectly cited and
incorrectly analyzed the law when he held that “a foreign judgment may be filed in the
office of clerk of any district court of any county of this state.” Pl.’s Compl., Dkt 1, p. 11,
¶ 19. Bach also alleged that “Judge Simpson issued an ORDER GRANTING IN PART
JUDGMENT DEBTOR’S CLAIM OF EXEMPTION” and filed an amended order soon
after. Id. at ¶ 23. These allegations only address judicial actions taken by Judge Simpson.
A plaintiff may also overcome judicial immunity when a judge takes judicial
action when he lacks jurisdiction to do so. In his complaint, Bach alleged that Judge
Simpson improperly denied a change of venue and, in doing so, misconstrued applicable
law and was “untruthful.” Pl.’s Compl., Dkt 1, p. 11, ¶ 19. This allegation is simply
incorrect and implausible. Judge Simpson denied Bach’s motion for a change of venue
when the defendant in that case invoked the general jurisdiction of the state district court

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by filing a foreign judgment against Bach pursuant to I.C. § 10-1302. That statute permits
a foreign judgment to be “filed in the office of the clerk of any district court of any
county in this state.” I.C. § 10-1302. Judge Simpson, therefore, had jurisdiction over the
case. As such, Bach failed to allege sufficient facts supporting his claim that Judge
Simpson took judicial action without jurisdiction to do so. For these reasons, Bach’s
claims against Judge Simpson are barred by judicial immunity.
Bach has also failed to plead sufficient facts to support claims against Jared Harris
and Baker & Harris Law Firm. Bach merely discussed Jared Harris’ representation of a
few defendants, as well as various legal documents that Jared filed against Bach.
Regarding the law firm, Bach merely named Harris & Baker as a defendant. But Bach
fails to plead facts related to his claim that the defendants, including Jared Harris and
Baker & Harris, violated the RICO Act or the Federal Civil Rights Act. Instead, Bach
presents legal conclusions, such as “all defendants and each of them have wrongfully
conspired with those defendants who have legal authority” and “…each and all said
defendants have violated the aforesaid constitutional rights and privileges of Plaintiff
John N. Bach.” Pl.’s Compl., Dkt 1, ¶ 31. The Complaint’s legal conclusions do not state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court is unconvinced that an amendment would cure the pleading. As such,
the Court grants both motions to dismiss.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:

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1.

Defendant Simpson’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 2) is GRANTED.

2.

Defendants Jared Harris’ and Baker & Harris’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 6)
is GRANTED.

DATED: February 26, 2015

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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