Bach v. Ehrler et al

Filing 55

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Stipulation for Dismissal 54 is GRANTED. All claims against Tony Liford and Teton County are dismissed with prejudice, with each party bearing its own costs and fees. Motion for Sanctions 51 is DEEMED MOOT. Motion for Extension of Time 52 is DEEMED MOOT. Alva Harris and Sapient Trading, LLC's Motion to Dismiss 46 is GRANTED. Motion to Substitute Real Party in Interest on Claims Against Teton County and Tony Liford 53 is GRANTED. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

JOHN N. BACH,

Case No. 4:14-cv-00469-BLW
Plaintiff,

v.
PAULA EHRLER, et. al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Defendants.
1. Stipulation
The Court has before it the Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice (Dkt. 54),
asking the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Tony Liford and Teton
County. Good cause appearing, the Court will grant the stipulation. In turn, the Court will
deem moot defendants Liford and Teton County’s motion for sanctions (Dkt. 51) and
motion for extension of time (Dkt. 52).
2. Motion to Substitute
R. Sam Hopkins, Chapter 7 Trustee, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) and FRCP
25(c) asks the Court to substitute Mr. Hopkins as the real party in interest on the claims
against Teton County and Liford to carry out the terms of the settlement (Dkt. 53). No
response to the motion has been filed, and the deadline for filing a response has passed.
Bach filed a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 on February 9, 2016 in the
United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho. Thus, his claims in this proceeding

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became property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). The Trustee may
substitute as a party in place of Bach under FRCP 25(c).
On April 29, 2016, the Trustee, Teton County, and Tony Liford, filed a stipulation
for settlement in the bankruptcy proceeding, agreeing that Teton County and Tony Liford
would pay the Trustee $5,000.00 to compromise all claims in this proceeding against
Teton County and Tony Liford, and all claims against Teton County and Tony Liford
would be dismissed with prejudice. On July 7, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court entered the
Order Approving Settlement with Teton County and Teton County Sheriff Tony Liford.
Dkt. 53, Ex. A.
On July 7, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court entered the Order Allowing Trustee to
Abandon Federal Lawsuit, authorizing the Trustee to abandon his interest on all claims
against the remaining Defendants besides Teton County and Tony Liford. Dkt. 53, Ex. B.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion.
3. Motion to Dismiss
The Court also has before it defendants Alva Harris and Sapient Trading, LLC’s
motion to dismiss (Dkt. 46). The motion asks the Court to dismiss the complaint against
these two defendants because the complaint is unintelligible. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

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motion to dismiss “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must set forth “more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Id. at 555. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. at 557.
The Supreme Court identified two “working principles” that underlie Twombly in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First, the court need not accept as true, legal
conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Id. Rule 8 does not “unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 67879. Second, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a plausible claim for
relief. Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.
Providing too much in the complaint may also be fatal to a plaintiff. Dismissal may
be appropriate when the plaintiff has included sufficient allegations disclosing some

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absolute defense or bar to recovery. See Weisbuch v. County of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783,
n. 1 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “[i]f the pleadings establish facts compelling a decision
one way, that is as good as if depositions and other . . . evidence on summary judgment
establishes the identical facts”).
A dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the
complaint “could not be saved by any amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728,
737 (9th Cir. 2009) (issued 2 months after Iqbal). The Ninth Circuit has held that “in
dismissals for failure to state a claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if
no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could
not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v.
Northern California Collection Service, Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). The
issue is not whether plaintiff will prevail but whether he “is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims.” Diaz v. Int’l Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 13, 474 F.3d
1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider matters that are subject to judicial
notice. Mullis v. United States Bank, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court
may take judicial notice “of the records of state agencies and other undisputed matters of
public record” without transforming the motions to dismiss into motions for summary
judgment. Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866,
n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court may also examine documents referred to in the complaint,

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although not attached thereto, without transforming the motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005).
Even as a pro se litigant, Bach’s Complaint is evaluated under the Iqbal/Twombly
pleading standards. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). As explained
earlier orders in this case dismissing the claims against other defendants, in his complaint
Bach alleges a RICO violation, as well as violations of the Federal Civil Rights Act
(specifically, sections 1983, 1985(2), 1985(3), and 1986). However, Bach fails to
describe how the alleged improper sheriff’s execution sale violates either the RICO
statute or otherwise violates his constitutional rights. Accordingly, these claims fail
to state cognizable causes of action. Just as the Court found that Bach pleaded
insufficient facts against previously dismissed Defendants, again here, he has failed to
plead sufficient facts to support claims against Alva Harris and Sapient Trading. Bach’s
complaint consistently makes legal conclusions asserting that the defendants violated the
law, yet Bach does not offer an explanation of how they violated the law. A recitation of
the criminal elements of a crime will not satisfy the pleading requirements. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. Furthermore, the complaint must set forth “more than labels and
conclusions.” Id. It is simply not enough to allege “all of said defendants have violated
the aforesaid constitutional rights and privileges of Plaintiff John N. Bach and have
perpetrated, committed and egregiously inflicted upon [] Bach” constitutional violations.
Compl., ¶ 31, Dkt. 1 (emphasis deleted). Bach asserts claims ranging from abuse of legal

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process, theft, and defamation, yet he does not spell out how and why the Dawsons are
liable for any of these claims.
The Court is again unconvinced that an amendment would cure the pleading – the
claims do not simply leave out a few necessary facts; they are wholly without substance.
As such, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 46) with prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice (Dkt. 54) is GRANTED. All claims
against Tony Liford and Teton County are dismissed with prejudice, with each
party bearing its own costs and fees.
2. Liford and Teton County’s Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. 51) is DEEMED
MOOT.
3. Liford and Teton County’s Motion for Extension of Time (Dkt. 52) is
DEEMED MOOT.
4. Alva Harris and Sapient Trading, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 46) is
GRANTED.
5. Motion to Substitute Real Party in Interest on Claims Against Teton County
and Tony Liford (Dkt. 53) is GRANTED.

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DATED: September 12, 2016

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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