Corbett v. Remington Arms Company, LLC

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. If Mr. Corbett chooses to file an amended complaint, it must be filed within 21 days of this Order. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

Case No. 4:15-cv-00279-BLW

RICHARD CORBETT,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

v.
REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, LLC,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Defendant Remington Arms Company, LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. 6). The motion is fully briefed and at issue and would not be aided by oral
argument. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss,
though it will allow Plaintiff Richard Corbett an opportunity to amend.
FACTS
In June 2014, Corbett purchased a Remington R51 pistol from a sporting goods
stores in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Shortly after he purchased the pistol, Corbett was shot in the
abdomen when the gun “unexpectedly and unintentionally discharged without a trigger
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

pull.” Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 11. Corbett was in the hospital for around a month after the
injury, and he has undergone multiple surgeries and other treatment. He says the
Remington pistol was defective and alleges three claims: strict products liability,
negligence, and breach of warranty.
Remington moves to dismiss the third claim, for breach of warranty. In
responding to the motion to dismiss, Corbett did not confine himself to allegations of his
complaint. Instead, in an effort to shore up his warranty claim, he submitted an affidavit
stating that when he purchased the pistol, he received an owner’s manual and a warranty
registration card from Remington. Mr. Corbett says he is confident he filled out the
warranty card and returned it to Remington. See Corbett Aff., Dkt. 12-1, ¶¶ 9-12.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must set forth
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Id.
The Supreme Court identified two “working principles” that underlie Twombly in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First, the court need not accept legal
conclusions that are couched as factual allegations as true; the trial court “can choose to
begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Rule 8 does not “unlock the doors of discovery
for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79. Second, to
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at
679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Id.
A dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the
complaint “could not be saved by any amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728,
737 (9th Cir. 2009) (issued 2 months after Iqbal). The Ninth Circuit has held that “in
dismissals for failure to state a claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if
no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could
not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v.
Northern California Collection Service, Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). The
issue is not whether plaintiff will prevail but whether he “is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims.” See Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006).
ANALYSIS
1.

Consideration of the Corbett Affidavit and Related Materials
Preliminarily, the Court notes that it will not consider materials outside the

pleading in determining whether warranty claim should be dismissed. The Court could
consider the materials plaintiff submitted (the affidavit and exhibits) and convert the
motion into one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under
Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by
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the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”);
Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1207 (9th Cir. 2007) (trial
court, within its discretion, may exclude the extrinsic materials or convert the proceeding
to a summary judgment motion.). In this case, however, the Court has determined that
the better course is to focus on the complaint as it was originally drafted and filed. The
Court will consider the extraneous materials only in determining whether to grant Corbett
an opportunity to amend his complaint.
2.

The Breach of Warranty Claim
In his third claim, Corbett alleges that Remington breached express and implied

warranties. He alleges that, because of these breaches, he has suffered “damages,
including incidental and consequential damages, . . . .” Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 42. The factual
allegations, however, reveal that Corbett is seeking personal injury damages. See id. ¶ 11
(alleging that Corbett suffered a serious gunshot wound and that he has undergone
multiple surgeries and other treatment as a result of the gunshot injury).
In Oats v. Nissan Motor Corp., 879 P.2d 1095 (Idaho 1994), the Idaho Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff may pursue UCC breach of warranty claims for personal
injuries only if: (a) the plaintiff is in contractual privity with the manufacturer or seller,
or (b) the plaintiff qualifies as a third party beneficiary of the underlying sales contract.
Id. at 1102 (“UCC breach of warranty actions for personal injuries are available only to a
limited group of potential plaintiffs who are either in privity of contract with the
manufacturer or seller, or who qualify as third party beneficiaries of the underlying sales
contract, as defined in I.C. § 28-2-318.”). If plaintiffs do not fit within this limited group,
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they may pursue their claim for personal injuries under Idaho’s product liability action –
not the UCC. Id. at 1105. As the Idaho Supreme court explained in Oats, the plaintiff’s
“breach of warranty action to recover for personal injuries is essentially a strict liability
claim in tort, and it should be governed by the provisions of the ILPRA, . . . rather than
the provisions of the UCC.” Id.; see also Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 979 P.2d 1174, 1183
(Idaho 1999) (in a product liability action, “UCC warranties apply only to those in privity
of contract with the manufacturer and those who qualify as third party beneficiaries of the
underlying sales contract . . . .”).
Corbett’s warranty claim, as presently drafted, is foreclosed under Oats because he
has not alleged any facts demonstrating that he falls within the limited class of plaintiffs
identified above – i.e., plaintiffs in contractual privity with the defendant or plaintiffs
who are third party beneficiaries of the underlying sales contract.
Regarding privity, Corbett has not alleged that Remington sold or contracted to
sell the pistol at issue to anyone other than C-A-L Ranch Store. Privity of contract thus
exists between C-A-L Ranch Store and Remington – but not between Mr. Corbett and
Remington. And Corbett has not even argued that he qualifies as a third party beneficiary
plaintiff. His warranty claims are therefore subject to dismissal under Oats. Accord
Wilson v. Amneal Pharms., LLC, No. 1:13-cv-333-CWD, 2013 WL 6909930, #15 (D.
Idaho Dec. 31, 2013) (dismissing breach of express and implied warranty claims in a
personal injury action arising from an allegedly defective drug); Elliott v. Smith &
Nephew, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-70-EJL-MHW, 2013 WL 1622659 at *8 (D. Idaho Apr. 15,

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2013) (dismissing plaintiffs' breach of express and implied warranty claims in a personal
injury action arising from an alleged defective medical device).
Corbett advances two related arguments to avoid this difficulty.
First, he says Oats is inapplicable because Mr. Oats did not purchase the allegedly
defective product in that case – a Nissan automobile – whereas Mr. Corbett did purchase
the allegedly defective pistol. Yet nothing in Oats suggests that the Idaho Supreme Court
would have reached a different holding had Mr. Oats purchased the Nissan himself.
Granted, lack of privity was undisputed in that case, so the court did not tackle the issue.
But still, the overriding point in Oats is that a non-privity breach of warranty action
against a manufacturer to recover for personal injuries is governed by Idaho’s product
liability act – not the Uniform Commercial Code. 879 P.2d at 1105. Further, as
Remington correctly points out, other Idaho case authority supports the notion that an end
consumer, such as Corbett, who buys from a retailer is not in contractual privity with the
manufacturer. See, e.g., Am. W. Enters., Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 316 P.3d 662, 670 (Idaho
2013) (“It is generally recognized that an authorized dealer is not an agent of a
manufacturer absent some quantum of control.”).
Corbett next argues that he will be able to establish privity of contract –
presumably for both express and implied warranties – by alleging that he filled out a
warranty card and returned it directly to Remington. Corbett says such an allegation
would definitively establish privity, yet he does not cite a single authority supporting this
proposition. See Response Br., Dkt. 12, at 2 (asserting that the “written warranty
provides the privity of contract between Plaintiff and Remington . . . .”). Nor does
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Corbett explain how the existence of a warranty card would somehow dispense with the
basic proposition that contractual privity is linked to the underlying sales contract. See
generally 1 White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 12:2 (6th ed.) (explaining
that a plaintiff who purchases a product, but does not buy it directly from the defendant,
is not in privity with that defendant). Further, as Remington points out, if Mr. Corbett
wishes to allege an express warranty claim, he would need to allege the terms of that
warranty. See In re Sony PS3 “Other OS” Litig., 551 Fed. Appx. 916, 919 (9th Cir.
2014) (unpublished decision) (“‘A manufacturer’s liability for breach of an express
warranty derives from, and is measured by, the terms of that warranty.’ A plaintiff must
allege ‘the exact terms of the warranty.’”) (internal citations omitted).
Under these circumstances, the Court will dismiss Corbett’s claim for breach of
implied warranty with prejudice. The complaint, as drafted, does not state a claim for
breach of implied warranty, and the Court is not convinced that he will be able to allege
any facts supporting such a claim. At best, the existence of a warranty registration card
might support an express warranty claim, but Corbett has not convinced the Court that
any such warranty would include implied warranties.
The Court will allow Corbett an opportunity to amend his complaint in his effort
to establish a claim for breach of an express warranty based on the existence of the
warranty registration card. The Court has some reservations as to whether Corbett will
be able to either allege facts showing that he falls within the class of plaintiffs that may
pursue such actions, or, alternatively, that privity is not required in such an action.
Additionally, it seems unlikely that an express warranty would extend to the personal
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injury damages plaintiff seeks here. Finally, the Court cannot see any particular
advantage plaintiff gains by pursuing a claim for breach of an express warranty when he
is already pursuing a strict products liability claim for personal injuries. See Oats, 879
P.2d at 1105 (“we fail to see how, in a personal injury product liability action not
involving a commercial relationship between the manufacturer and the injured person,
Oats’s warranty allegations add anything to his other allegations of strict liability and
negligence); see generally 1 White, Summers, & Hillman, Uniform Commercial Code
§ 12:4 (6th ed.) (observing that “[p]ersonal-injury plaintiffs in most jurisdictions will thus
seek recovery on a theory of strict tort liability under 402A,[ 1] under the local tort variant
of 402A, or under the successor to 402A . . . .”). Nevertheless, in an abundance of
caution, the Court will grant Corbett leave to amend his complaint to allege an express
warranty claim.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED THAT Remington’s Motion to Dismiss Corbett’s third claim
for relief is GRANTED.

1

See Restatement Second, Torts, § 402A, entitled “Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer.”

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Corbett may file an amended complaint
alleging an express warranty claim. If Mr. Corbett chooses to file an amended
complaint, it must be filed within 21 days of this Order.
DATED: May 2, 2016

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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