Putnam v. Boll et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - IT IS ORDERED: 1. Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 16 ) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs federal claims of Wrongful Arrest, False Imprisonment, Taking of Putnams liberty and property without due pro cess, and Excessive Force shall be dismissed with PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs state and federal claims of malicious prosecution are not dismissed. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
JENNIFER PUTNAM,
Case No. 4:16-cv-00013-BLW
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
PETE BOLL, in his official and
individual capacities, and the CITY OF
POCATELLO,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it defendant Pete Boll and the City of Pocatello’s Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. 16). The motion is fully briefed and at issue and would not be aided by oral
argument. For the reasons discussed below, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be
granted, in part, and denied, in part.
BACKGROUND
On May 6, 2013, Boll arrested and charged Plaintiff, Jennifer Putnam for seconddegree misdemeanor stalking. On June 5, 2014, the Idaho District Court granted
Putnam’s Motion to Dismiss the criminal stalking charges, along with the No Contact
Order arising out of the stalking charges. This lawsuit was filed January 8, 2016. The
Complaint alleges various state and federal claims arising out of Putnam’s arrest.
Initially, Plaintiff alleged claims of “false imprisonment,” “wrongful arrest,” “malicious

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prosecution,” “taking of Putnam’s liberty and property without due process,” and
“excessive force” based upon this arrest and the ensuing prosecution. Additionally,
Putnam alleged that the City of Pocatello has failed to properly train and/or supervise
Officer Boll and his practices while serving in his official capacity. However, Putnam has
now conceded that the federal claims relating to her wrongful arrest were not filed within
the applicable statute of limitations.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). While a complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “does not need detailed factual
allegations,” it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556.
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint

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pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. at 557.
The Supreme Court identified two “working principles” that underlie Twombly in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First, the court need not accept as true, legal
conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Id. Rule 8 does not “unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 67879. Second, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a plausible claim for
relief. Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.
In the context presented here, the Court must determine whether “the running of
the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Id. (quoting Jablon v. Dean Witter &
Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.1980) and citing Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States,
68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir.1995) (“[A] complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the
timeliness of the claim.”)).
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), Defendants have filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to file the lawsuit within the
applicable period of limitations for each claim. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
will grant Defendants’ motion, in part, and deny it, in part.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

A.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims arising out of her arrest
is Granted.
As a preliminary manner, the Court must note that Plaintiff concedes that all

federal claims based on her wrongful arrest were not filed within the applicable statute of
limitations, and thus will be dismissed. Pl’s Resp. at ¶ 2, Dkt. 19. This includes Putnam’s
claims of Wrongful Arrest, False Imprisonment, Taking of Putnam’s liberty and property
without due process, and Excessive Force. As such, Defendants’ motion to dismiss these
claims is granted and such claims are all dismissed with prejudice.
B.

Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff’s Federal Malicious Prosecution
Claims Are Denied.
Plaintiff alleges a claim of malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss this claim because it is time barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. Defs’ Bf., Dkt. 16-1. Defendants maintain that the statute
of limitations for a malicious prosecution cause of action under § 1983 accrues upon
commencement of the underlying criminal proceeding. Defs’ Bf. at 5, Dkt. 16-1.
Federal law determines when a cause of action accrues and the statute of
limitations begins to run for a § 1983 action. Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800,
801-02 (9th Cir. 1994); (citing Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th
Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091, 112 S.Ct. 1161, 117 L.Ed.2d 409 (1992).
Generally, in cases of the type before us, the claim accrues when the plaintiff “knows or
has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id.

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The elements of a malicious prosecution claim under §1983 are (1) defendant
prosecuted plaintiff with malice, (2) defendant lacked probable cause, (3) the prosecution
was done for the purposes of denying equal protection or other constitutional right and
(4) that the prosecution terminated in plaintiff’s favor. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368
F.3d 1062, 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004).
Specifically, the prosecution being terminated in Plaintiff’s favor is a necessary
element of a claim of malicious prosecution. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066, 1068 (9th Cir.
2004). Therefore, it is illogical that the statute of limitations begins running on Plaintiff’s
claims long before her claims arose.
This is further supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994). Although the Court in Heck did not specifically decide the statute of
limitations accrual date issue, the Court in that case did state that “a cause of action for
malicious prosecution does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have terminated in
the plaintiff's favor.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90 (1994) (citing 1 C. Corman, Limitation of
Actions § 7.4.1, p. 532 (1991); Carnes v. Atkins Bros. Co., 123 La. 26, 31, 48 So. 572,
574 (1909)). Defendants urge the Court to ignore this rule, and to apply an accrual date
for the statute of limitations as of the Plaintiff’s arrest. Defs’ Br. at 5, Dkt. 16-1.
However, Defendants fail to provide any authority that supports this proposition.
Instead, Defendants urge this Court the analogize the malicious prosecution claim
at issue, to the false imprisonment claim in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007).
There, the Court analogized a claim of false arrest to a claim of false imprisonment

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because both torts amount to detention without legal process. The Court held that a claim
for false arrest accrues when the allegedly false imprisonment ends; i.e., when the victim
is released or becomes held pursuant to legal process, such as when the petitioner was
bound over for trial by a magistrate. Id. at 390. That is, the tort accrues after the alleged
tortious conduct was finished.
Application of Heck and Wallace to these facts both lead to the same conclusion.
Applying this reasoning to the facts at issue, the statute of limitations period began
accruing upon the underlying criminal proceedings being terminated in Plaintiff’s favor;
the same time that Plaintiff’s alleged tortious conduct, i.e., the malicious prosecution, was
finished.
The Idaho District Court granted Putnam’s Motion to Dismiss the underlying
criminal charges and ceased prosecution on June 5, 2014. This lawsuit was filed January
8, 2016. Because “§ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions,” a
State's personal injury statute of limitations should be applied to all § 1983 claims.
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). The applicable statute of limitations
regarding tort claims against a governmental entity and officer acting within their official
capacity in Idaho is two (2) years. Idaho Code § 6-911. As such, Plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution claim against Defendants was filed within the applicable two-year statute of
limitation. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss this claim is denied.

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C.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s State Malicious Prosecution Claim is
Denied.
For similar reasons as the federal malicious prosecution claim, Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state malicious prosecution claim is denied. The elements of
malicious prosecution include: (1) that there was a prosecution, (2) that it terminated in
favor of the plaintiff, (3) that the defendant was the prosecutor, (4) that the defendant was
actuated by malice, (5) that there was want of probable cause, and (6) that damages were
sustained. Robinson v. White, 90 Idaho 548, 414 P.2d 666 (1966); Howard v. Felton, 85
Idaho 286, 379 P.2d 414 (1963); Russell v. Chamberlain, 12 Idaho 299, 85 P. 926 (1906).
As Plaintiff correctly points out, these elements of a state law malicious prosecution
claim are virtually identical to a federal claim under § 1983, with the exception that state
law does not require proof of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Badell v. Beeks, 115
Idaho 101, 103 (1988) (identifying state law elements of malicious prosecution).
As a general rule, a claim of relief for malicious prosecution accrues at, and the
limitations run from, the date on which the prosecution was terminated. Myers v. City of
Pocatello, 98 Idaho 168 (Idaho 1977).
Plaintiffs rely on Myers for the proposition that a claim for malicious prosecution
applies a four (4) year statute of limitations. Pl’s Resp. Br. at 6, Dkt. 19-1. While the
Idaho Supreme Court, in Myers, applied Idaho’s four-year catch-all statue of limitations,
Idaho Code § 5-224, to the claim of malicious prosecution. Myers, 98 Idaho at 171 (Idaho
1977). However, the conclusion was superseded by the passage of the Idaho Tort Claims
Act, Idaho Code § 6-901, et al., which imposed a two-year statute of limitations for tort
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claims against governmental entities. The applicable ITCA statute of limitations now
provides that every claim against a governmental entity permitted under the provisions of
this act or against an employee of a governmental entity must be brought within two (2)
years after the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever
is later. Idaho Code § 6-911.
The prosecution was terminated when the Idaho District Court granted Putnam’s
Motion to Dismiss the underlying criminal charges on June 5, 2014. The lawsuit here
was filed January 8, 2016. As such, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against
Defendants is within the applicable two-year statute of limitation. Therefore, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss this claim is denied.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 16) is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part. Plaintiff’s federal claims of Wrongful Arrest, False Imprisonment,
Taking of Putnam’s liberty and property without due process, and Excessive
Force shall be dismissed with PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s state and federal
claims of malicious prosecution are not dismissed.

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DATED: December 8, 2016
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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