Price v. Mike & Tristan Geddes Dairy, LLC. et al
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Ronald E. Bush. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
Case No.: 4:16-cv-00015-REB
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
MIKE & TRISTAN GEDDES DAIRY, LLC,
MIKE GEDDES an individual, and TRISTAN
GEDDES, an individual,
(Docket No. 13)
This Order resolves Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 13). The
decision turns upon whether Idaho’s “open range” law is implicated by an August 24, 2014
automobile accident near Banida, in Franklin County. At approximately 9:54 p.m., Plaintiff Ed
Price (“Price”) was operating a vehicle traveling southbound on U.S. Highway 91. His vehicle
struck two cows owned by Defendants (collectively,“Geddes”) just north of milepost 20.
Because of injuries resulting from the accident and related property damage, Price filed this
lawsuit asserting a negligence claim. Geddes, in turn, now move(s) for summary judgment,
arguing that Idaho Code § 25-118 – Idaho’s open range law – applies to bar Plaintiff’s claim.
According to Defendants, “Idaho Code § 25-2118 relieves Defendants of the duty to keep
their livestock off the highway, and ‘grants absolute immunity from liability for any damages
stemming from a collision between [a] vehicle and the animal.’” Mem. in Supp. of MSJ, p. 4
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
(Docket No. 13, Att. 1) (quoting Adamson v. Blanchard, 990 P.2d 1213, 1218 (Idaho 1999)).
Idaho Code § 25-2118 reads:
ANIMALS ON OPEN RANGE – NO DUTY TO KEEP FROM HIGHWAY.
No person owning, or controlling the possession of, any domestic animal running on
open range, shall have the duty to keep such animal off any highway on such range,
and shall not be liable for damage to any vehicle or for injury to any person riding
therein, caused by a collision between the vehicle and the animal. “Open range”
means all uninclosed lands outside of cities, villages and herd districts, upon which
cattle by custom, license, lease, or permit, are grazed or permitted to roam.
I.C. § 25-2118. Hence, the liability issue in this case hinges first on whether the accident
occurred within “open range,” pursuant to Idaho Code § 25-2118. Said another way, is Banida,
Idaho (where the accident took place) considered “open range” under Idaho law – that is, is
Banida a part of those “uninclosed lands outside of cities [or] villages . . ., upon which cattle by
custom, license, lease, or permit, are grazed or permitted to roam.” See id.1 Defendants contend
that the answer is yes, which, if correct, immunizes them from liability. See generally Mem. in
Supp. of MSJ (Docket No. 13, Att. 1). Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that “the accident in question
occurred within the ‘city’ or ‘village’ of Banida, Idaho” which, if correct, allows the action to
proceed (and, Plaintiff further argues, establishes liability as a matter of law under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur). See Opp. to MSJ, p. 2 (Docket No. 19).
Various reported appellate cases in Idaho have construed the open range law, but none
specifically addresses the precise question before this Court, which requires a ruling upon the
meaning of “city” and “village,” as those terms are used within Idaho Code § 25-2118. The
obvious starting point is how one characterizes whether a particular locality, such as Banida, is
either a city or village. Price points out that there are residents, a post office, a school, a church,
Plaintiff does not contend that the accident was within a “herd district.” See Opp. to
MSJ, p. 2 (Docket No. 19).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
organized streets, a park with an historical monument, and a welcoming sign for travelers on
U.S. Highway 91, all associated with a locality known as Banida. See Opp. to MSJ, p. 6 (Docket
No. 19). But, as Geddes describe(s), there has never been an incorporation under Idaho laws
dealing with such things, of a locality known as Banida. Banida is an unincorporated area of
Franklin County. It has no mayor. It is not platted. No local taxes are levied or collected. See
Mem. in Supp. of MSJ, p. 2 (Docket No. 13, Att. 1) (citing Geddes Aff., ¶¶ 4, 6 (Docket No. 13,
Att. 3) (Franklin County Clerk stating: “I am familiar with the area of Banida. Banida is not an
incorporated village. It is also not recognized in the community as a village. . . . . [The accident
location] is outside of any cities or villages and herd districts in Franklin County and is thus
considered to be open range.”); see also Reply in Supp. of MSJ, p. 2 (Docket No. 23). In other
words, there appears to be no definitive understanding of Banida’s status as a municipality.
Both parties draw upon other areas of Idaho law – case law and statutory law – to
buttress their respective positions. For example, Defendants point to the fact that when Idaho
Code § 25-2118 was enacted in 1961, a village could be created only upon a petition signed by
125 of its residents combined with an order entered by the county commissioners declaring the
village incorporated, along with a physical property designation of the metes and bounds of the
village boundaries. See Supp. Mem. in Supp. of MSJ, pp. 2-3 (Docket No. 26) (citing I.C. § 50701; quoting Oregon Shortline R.R. Co. v. Village of Chubbuck, 357 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Idaho
1960) (“A village be created only pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code, Title 50, ch. 7. At
the time of its incorporation, its boundaries are established by the order of incorporation of the
board of county commissioners, I.C. § 50-701.”)). That has never happened with Banida.
Therefore, Defendants contend, Banida cannot be a village under Idaho Code § 25-2118, the
result of which, Geddes would argue, means that the accident must have occurred on open range.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
However, as Plaintiff points out, municipal laws in Idaho were recodified in 1967 to
include Idaho Code § 50-101, which provides in relevant part:
The residents of any unincorporated contiguous area (village) containing not less
than 125 qualified electors may present a petition signed by a majority of the said
electors to the board of commissioners of the county in which said petitioners reside,
praying that they be incorporated as a city, designating the name they wish to assume
and the metes and bounds of the proposed city.
I.C. § 50-101 (emphasis added). Hence, Price submits, Idaho law recognizes that it is possible
for an unincorporated contiguous area to be a village, as the language of Idaho Code section 50101 states as much. See Supp. Resp. in Opp. to MSJ, pp. 2-3 (Docket No. 28) (“Section 50-101
has merely redefined what constitutes a ‘village’ or a ‘city.’ Pursuant to the plain language of
§ 50-101, a ‘village’ was reclassified to mean an unincorporated contiguous area. . . . . The fact
that Banida is not incorporated does not render it an ‘open range’ as Defendants argue – rather,
§ 50-101 makes it clear that the unincorporated nature of Banida makes it a village. ”).
The phrase “unincorporated contiguous area (village)” found in Idaho Code section 50101 does create a legislative interpretation gremlin of sorts, for purposes of the open range law.
The phase seems to suggest that any unincorporated contiguous area is a “village,” but does so
without definition of what shape or form that unincorporated contiguous area actually occupies.
Without some form to that “footprint,” so to speak, it is impossible to identify precisely where a
contiguous locality begins or ends, and therefore also impossible to identify whether an accident
that occurred in or within the vicinity of such a locality was in open range.
The most sensible construction of the relevant statutory language, while seeking to
consider the statutes together and give meaning to all of the language, aligns most closely with
Defendants’ arguments. As of 1967, previously-organized “villages” were reclassified as
“cities” and, since that time, the process to incorporate a city under Idaho Code § 50-101 moreMEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
or-less resembles the earlier procedure for a village’s incorporation under Idaho Code § 50-701.
See, e.g., State of Idaho v. Phillips, 794 P.2d 297, 299 (Id. Ct. App. 1990) (“With the
recodification of the laws governing municipalities in 1967, ‘villages’ became reclassified as
‘cities.’ Thus, we conclude that Acequia [(previously incorporated as village in 1952)] was a
duly formed city when the dog control ordinances were enacted and when they were enforced in
this case.”). That is to say, as of 1967 recodification of municipal law, the municipal form of a
village ceased to exist. Instead, an unincorporated contiguous area is either not a city, or – if the
necessary steps are accomplished – a city. To become a city, the procedural requirements for
incorporation pursuant to Idaho Code § 50-101 have to be following.
Accordingly, Banida is neither a city nor a village. Banida never was incorporated under
the once-existing method for incorporating as a village, nor was it ever incorporated under the
post-1967 method for incorporating as a city.
Whether or not the collection of residences, residents, and connected pieces found in
Banida in 2014 meet the general understanding of what constitutes a community, is not the
question the Court must answer. People can live in a community that is not a legally recognized
municipal entity under state law. The status of whether such a community has the designation of
a village (then) or a city (now) is a function of the legislature’s definition of the same, along with
the legislature’s checklist on how that definition is met.
Sensibly then, because Idaho’s open range law is also the legislature’s decision of what is
“open range,” and what is not, the boundaries should be delineated by the same statutory
template that delineates a village, a city, or a herd district. If the meaning of “village” and “city”
under Idaho Code section 25-2118 is connected to the boundaries of localities that are
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
incorporated as a village or a city, then the question of where the open range begins and where it
ends is also answered because the process of incorporating requires that there be action of the
county commission and a metes and bounds description of the boundaries of the village or city.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 13) is GRANTED.
DATED: June 19, 2017
Honorable Ronald E. Bush
Chief U. S. Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
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