Lindstrom v. Bingham County, Idaho
Filing
46
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. The Countys Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Summary Judgment (Dkt. 40 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
RICK LINDSTROM,
Case No. 1:17-cv-00019-DCN
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
v.
BINGHAM COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,
Defendant.
I. OVERVIEW
Pending before the Court is Defendant Bingham County’s Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of Summary Judgment. Dkt. 40. The Motion is briefed and ripe for the
Court’s review. Having fully reviewed the record herein, the Court finds the parties have
adequately presented the facts and legal arguments in the briefs and record. Accordingly,
in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court finds that the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Court decides the Motion
without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(2)(ii). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court DENIES the Motion.
II. BACKGROUND
The County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in this case. Dkt. 27. As part of
its Motion, the County asked the Court to dismiss Lindstrom’s Family Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”) claim, alleging that, as a matter of law, the right to reinstatement expired
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER –1
immediately upon the completion of the statutory 12 weeks of leave. Ultimately, the
Court found that there were disputed facts related to all claims—included Lindstrom’s
FMLA claim—and denied the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 39.
As part of its Decision, the Court found the County’s argument that Lindstrom’s
benefits under the FMLA expired promptly upon completion of the 12 weeks was
somewhat misplaced, as the County based its position upon the premise that Lindstrom’s
failure to provide a fitness for duty form prior to his return foreclosed all benefits
completely. The County filed the instant Motion for Partial Reconsideration based upon
the Court’s holding on this topic.
The County does not cite a particular line of the Court’s Decision that it believes is
fundamentally flawed, but rather asserts that the whole analysis is manifestly unjust and
will lead to unintended consequences for employers. While somewhat lengthy, the Court
will include the relevant paragraphs from its Decision for context, with emphasis on
certain language that reflects the County’s objection.1
The County states that under the FMLA an employee is entitled to 12 weeks
off followed by reinstatement (see 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) and 29 U.S.C.
§ 2614(a)(1)(A-B)) and then concludes that reinstatement is conditioned
upon an employee returning to work immediately after the 12 week period—
anything else would infringe upon the employer. This statement is true and
seemingly self-explanatory: in order to be reinstated, an employee must
return to work. The County, however, appears to be suggesting that this must
take place instantly upon conclusion of the 12 weeks, or the employee has
somehow waived the opportunity for reinstatement. There is no basis for
such a position in case law or under the FMLA and the County has not
pointed to any legal authority that indicates an employee must return to work
at that specific time or risk losing his right to reinstatement. To the contrary,
1
The entire discussion regarding FMLA leave and fitness for duty forms can be found on pages
8-12 of the Court’s prior decision. Dkt. 39.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER –2
there are indications in the FMLA regulations—specifically on point in this
case—that timing is not as rigid as the County suggests.
Section 825.216 of Title 29 of the Federal Regulations outlines that an
employer “may delay restoration to an employee who fails to provide a
fitness-for-duty certificate to return to work . . . .” It does not say that the
employer can fire an employee or that the employee’s rights to reinstatement
have lapsed or ended, but simply that the employer can delay reinstatement.
As will be discussed shortly, this is precisely what happened here. Lindstrom
did not provide the form upon completion of his 12-week leave, the County
requested it, Lindstrom produced it, and then the parties worked towards a
solution.
...
First, there is no requirement in any of these sections that puts a timeframe
on the required fitness for duty form. The employee clearly must provide the
fitness for duty form prior to the employee returning to work—it is after all
the “clearance” that ultimately allows the employee to return. In addition,
while it is logical to assume that in order to avoid any downtime the employee
should provide the form immediately after the 12 weeks, the regulations are
silent when it comes to timing. The Court has trouble accepting the County’s
argument that Lindstrom did not “timely” file his fitness for duty form when
there is no timing requirement; particularly because the County decided to
continue Lindstrom on paid leave while each side got everything in order. It
seems it was acceptable for Lindstrom to turn in his fitness for duty forms
anytime during that period. At a minimum, there is a disputed material fact
on this issue.
Second, as previously noted, the regulations explain that an employer “may
delay” restoration until it receives the requisite paperwork. By allowing a
delay for an employee to get paperwork, the regulations suggest that there is
not a strict timing requirement. Clearly, an employee could not take this to
the extreme, wait many months to file his or her paperwork and still expect
reinstatement. In this case, however, we do not have this extreme behavior.
Lindstrom’s leave ended on December 16, 2014. He got a note from his
doctor on December 31, 2014, and submitted the same to the County on
January 2, 2015. The County then asked for the official fitness for duty forms
and Lindstrom provided two. There is no indication that the County told
Lindstrom that he had to submit the forms prior to December 16, nor is there
any indication that Lindstrom was not diligent in getting the forms that the
County requested.
Dkt. 39, at 8-12 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER –3
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A federal court has the “inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or
modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.” City of Los Angeles,
Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A motion for reconsideration is “appropriate if the district
court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the
initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in
controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,
1263 (9th Cir. 1993). “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent
highly unusual circumstances.” Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th
Cir. 1999). A motion for reconsideration may not be used to raise arguments or present
evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the
litigation. Id.; Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000).
IV. ANALYSIS
Put succinctly, the County asserts that the Court concluded—in error—that (1) an
employee is not required to return to work immediately upon the expiration of the 12week leave period to preserve his rights under the FMLA—thus creating an additional
undetermined period of leave—and (2) that a fitness for duty form can be returned at any
point (also undetermined) after leave concludes and still be valid.
These statements, taken out of context, do appear somewhat erroneous. However,
when considered in the context of the Court’s decision, and in light of the facts of this
case, it is clear that the Court did not reach either of these conclusions—it did not extend
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER –4
FMLA leave beyond the statutory limits, or extend/modify the fitness for duty form
requirements.
The Court’s prior decision resolved a motion for summary judgment. At the
summary judgment stage, the County had the burden of proving that there were no
genuine disputes as to any material facts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In its Decision, the
Court determined that the County had not met its burden and that there were disputes
regarding whether Lindstrom timely filed his fitness for duty forms and was eligible for
reinstatement under FMLA. Importantly, the Court did not extend FMLA leave, alter
statutory requirements, or grant an unlimited time for submission of fitness for duty
forms. FMLA leave is 12 weeks, period. The Court simply found that the County did not
meet its burden in establishing that Lindstrom had to provide his form at (or before) the
exact moment his FMLA leave concluded or risk losing his rights.
The facts of the case reveal that the County told Lindstrom he needed to return the
forms prior to returning to work, but not prior to the expiration of his FMLA leave. When
Lindstrom did not submit the forms immediately upon completion of his FMLA leave,
the County told him that he needed to provide the requisite fitness for duty forms and that
it would give him time to comply. The County did not fire Lindstrom at that time, or say
that it would not reinstate him because he did not provide the forms that very day.
Instead, pursuant to statute, the County “delay[ed] restoration until the certification [was]
provided.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.313(d). The County cannot now say that giving Lindstrom
additional time to comply (which the statute specifically contemplates) somehow negates
the protections Lindstrom had under FMLA. During the short time it took Lindstrom to
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER –5
gather the necessary paperwork, the actual time of Lindstrom’s FMLA leave may have
expired, but his rights under FMLA had not.
The Court has reviewed the multiple cases the County cited in support of its
position. While some are helpful, others are not. Many are unpublished cases and only
two come from within the Ninth Circuit. While the County has accurately quoted
language from each case that appears to limit the rights and benefits under FMLA to the
statutory 12-week period—some even going so far as to say FMLA rights are completely
extinguished after 12 weeks—the context of those cases is extremely important. As will
be explained, each of these cases follows a general theme that is not applicable here.
In the cases cited by the County, the respective plaintiffs had taken FMLA leave,
but upon completion of the statutory 12 weeks, remained on a different type of leave—
either by choice, or because they did not have medical clearance to return to work.
Eventually, each individual returned to work, sought the benefits of FMLA reinstatement,
and were either not reinstated or were terminated all together.
For example, in Hibbs v. Department of Human Resources, 152 Fed. App’x. 648
(9th Cir. 2005) (unpublished), the plaintiffs’ employer terminated him because he failed
to return to work until two months after his FMLA leave expired. The court found that
the protections under FMLA were not available to him. Id. at 649-50. In Hunt v. DaVita,
Inc., 680 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2012), the plaintiff’s doctor had not medically cleared her
even after six months of leave, and the plaintiff’s employer terminated her. The court
ruled that FMLA rights were not at issue because the plaintiff did not return to work upon
the completion of her leave. Id. at 777. In Weidner v. Unity Health Plans Insurance.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER –6
Corp., 606 F. Supp. 2d 949 (W.D. Wis. 2009), the plaintiff sought an additional 12 weeks
of FMLA leave after being out on a 30-week leave, not realizing that portions of her 30week leave were FMLA weeks. Her employer terminated her because she exceeded the
company’s 30-week leave policy. In that case, the court did not dismiss Weidner’s
FMLA claim, but denied the employer’s summary judgment motion on that claim
because there was a factual dispute regarding the number of service hours Weidner
worked each year. Id. at 959. In Mondaine v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 408 F. Supp.
2d 1169 (D. Kan. 2006), the plaintiff was unable to return to work for approximately
three weeks after her FMLA leave concluded and her employer terminated her. The Court
upheld the termination. Id. at 1206. In Dogmanits v. Capital Blue Cross, 413 F. Supp. 2d
452 (E.D. Pa. 2005), the court determined that an employee who returned 14 weeks after
FMLA leave concluded was not protected under FMLA. Id. at 461-62. In Farina v.
Compuware Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Ariz. 2003), the plaintiff relied upon two
letters outlining when her FMLA leave concluded; however, one was incorrect. In that
case, the court found that Farina was not entitled to double FMLA leave under an
equitable estopple argument and that the employer did not violate the law when it
terminated her. Id. at 1057-58. In Beckendorf v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc.,
134 F.3d 369, at *2 (5th Cir.1997) (unpublished), the court determined that because a
doctor had not cleared the plaintiff for work until six weeks after FMLA leave expired,
FMLA protections were no longer available to her. Id. at *2-3.
In all of these cases, the individual plaintiffs did not even try to return to work at
the end of their FMLA leave, remained away from work for extended periods of time,
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returned, and then tried to claim that the FLMA still protected them. That is not what
occurred here. At the completion of his FMLA leave, Lindstrom did not have the fitness
for duty forms prepared, so the County gave him time to get his paperwork together—
which he did.2 As noted, while Lindstrom was aware of the requirement to turn in the
forms before returning to work, he was not aware that he had to turn them in prior to the
completion of his FMLA leave in order to retain those benefits.
Interestingly, one of the cases cited by the County contradicts its position and
opens up a whole different way of looking at this case—through an equitable estoppel
lens. In Santosuosso v. NovaCare Rehabilitation, 462 F. Supp. 2d 590 (D.N.J. 2006), the
Court did—as the County cites—state that “without an employer’s permission for an
extension of FMLA leave, an employee who fails to return to work on or before the date
that FMLA leave expires would lose the right to reinstatement.” Id. at 597. However, this
quote is from another case⸺Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System, LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 767
(5th Cir. 2001)⸺and is cited by the Santosuosso court in rejecting the Hunt court’s
holding as distinguishable. Santosuosso, like the previous cases, had different factual
circumstances than present here today, and ultimately the Santosuosso court found that
the plaintiff was not entitled to FMLA reinstatement because of the insufficient number
2
Lindstrom’s FMLA leave concluded on December 16, 2014. He provided a note from his
doctor on December 31, 2014, and two fitness for duty forms—one on January 8, and one on
January 13, 2015. As the Court noted in its Decision, considering this all happened during the
holidays—a time when government offices (such as the County) and doctor’s offices (such as
Lindstrom’s medical providers) are closed or operating under reduced hours, the timeframe does
not seem particularly concerning. There is nothing in the record suggesting that Lindstrom was
not diligent in getting the required paperwork each time the County instructed him to do so.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER –8
of hours she worked each year. 462 F. Supp. 2d at 598. That being said, the Santosuosso
court’s analysis of the employer’s argument—similar to the County’s argument in this
case—is illustrative. It explained:
Here, the record is undisputed that after Plaintiff’s FMLA leave expired, she
took a longer leave pursuant to Defendants’ EID program and with
Defendants’ permission. The record does not contain evidence showing that
Defendants informed Plaintiff that the extension of her leave was a
revocation of her FMLA rights.
...
Defendants had knowledge of Plaintiff’s intention to take a longer than 12
week leave and their employee benefit program allowed her to do so. Thus,
in light of the Congressional encouragement for employers to provide more
generous benefits than mandated by the law, see 29 U.S.C. § 2653, Plaintiff
should not lose her FMLA protection for taking a leave longer than 12 weeks
when her employer gave her the permission to do so.
Id. at 597-98. This analysis illustrates that other courts, like this Court in its prior
Decision, have found that the FMLA regulations are not as restrictive as the
County suggests and that the intent of the FMLA is to protect and help employees
rather than hold them to a rigid standard for benefits and reinstatement.
Lastly, while no circuit court has definitively weighed in on the use of an equitable
estoppel argument to support an FMLA claim, some lower courts have determined that an
employer’s actions precluded them from later terminating an employee—even if
normally the employer would have had the right to do so. See id. at 598; Barone v.
Leukemia Soc. of Am., 42 F. Supp. 2d 452, 463 (D.N.J. 1998) (ruling that “under the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, the [employer’s] conduct in the instant case precludes
them from electing to terminate [Plaintiff’s] employment, a right to which they would
have otherwise been entitled”). To be sure, this Court is not weighing in on the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER –9
applicability of this defense in this case. However, as the Court noted in its prior decision,
it is difficult to rule as a matter of law that Lindstrom’s rights were somehow
extinguished, particularly in light of the County’s own behavior and willingness to delay
Lindstrom’s reinstatement until he provided his fitness for duty forms.
The Court is not trying to split too fine a hair, but even in the FMLA fitness-forduty regulation itself, the language indicates that the forms are to be provided “at the end
of FMLA leave” and “at the time FMLA leave is concluded.” See 29 C.F.R. §
825.313(d). Had congress intended for the rights of an employee on leave under FMLA
to expire the moment the actual term of leave expired, presumably it would have used
explicit timing language such as “on or before the final day” on “the day immediately
following expiration of the 12 weeks.” As written, however, “at the end” and
“concluded” are not so restrictive as to foreclose an individual’s FMLA rights if he or she
has not provided the form at the very moment the 12 weeks expires. Especially in this
case, it is disingenuous for the County to assert that an employer must be extremely strict
under FMLA and cannot work with an employee, when that is exactly what the County
did here. Again, citing the regulation itself, an employer may delay restoration until the
employee provides certification. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.313(d).3
As Lindstrom points out, this is exactly what the County did—it delayed
Lindstrom’s restoration until he provided the forms—and it cannot now shield itself from
its own actions. When Lindstrom’s FMLA leave expired, the County placed him on a
3
This regulation states, “. . . if the employer has provided the required notice (see § 825.300(e));
the employer may delay restoration until the certification is provided.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.313(d).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER –10
different form of leave. During that alternative leave, while Lindstrom was getting his
paperwork together, he still had rights under FMLA. Alternatively, at the very least, there
is a disputed fact concerning this issue that precludes summary judgment.
The Court did not extend FMLA leave, nor even the time to submit a fitness for
duty form, but rather it found that the County, under the specific facts of this case, had
not met its burden in establishing that Lindstrom’s rights had been extinguished.
Finally, even though the summary judgment process is final in many respects,
when denied—as here—the Court’s rulings are interlocutory. Based upon the evidence
presented at trial, the Court is well within its right to alter, amend, or change previous
rulings. The Court, however, declines to do so now based upon the record before it.
Accordingly, the Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.
VI. ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The County’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Summary Judgment (Dkt. 40)
is DENIED.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER –11
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