Longee v. Armstrong
Filing
26
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. Josh Tewalt, the Director of the Idaho Department of Correction, is SUBSTITUTED for Warden Armstrong as the Respondent in this case. The Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 10 ) is DENIED, andthis entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice. A certificate of appealability will not issue. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (alw)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
NICHOLAS J. LONGEE,
Case No. 4:18-cv-00272-DCN
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
v.
IDOC DIRECTOR JOSH TEWALT,1
Respondent.
Pending before the Court is an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed
by Idaho prisoner Nicholas J. Longee (“Petitioner” or “Longee”). The Amended Petition
challenges Petitioner’s Twin Falls County convictions of grand theft by possession of
stolen property, unlawful possession of a firearm, and solicitation of grand theft by
disposing of stolen property. See Dkt. 10. The Amended Petition is now fully briefed and
ripe for adjudication.
The Court takes judicial notice of the records from Petitioner’s state court
proceedings, which have been lodged by Respondent. Dkt. 17, 20; see Fed. R. Evid. 201(b);
1
Petitioner has been released on parole. Therefore, the Director of the Idaho Department of Correction is
the appropriate respondent in this case. See Adv. Cmte. Notes to Rule 2 of the Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases (“Habeas Rules”) (stating that, if a petitioner is on probation or parole, the proper respondents
in a federal habeas corpus matter are “the particular probation or parole officer responsible for supervising
the [petitioner], and the official in charge of the parole or probation agency, or the state correctional agency,
as appropriate.”) (emphasis added).
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Dawson v. Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006). Having carefully reviewed the
record in this matter, including the state court record, the Court concludes that oral
argument is unnecessary. See D. Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.1(d). Accordingly, the Court will enter
the following Order denying habeas corpus relief.
BACKGROUND
Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1),
the following facts of Petitioner’s case, as described by the Idaho Court of Appeals, are
presumed correct:
In 2012, a home was burglarized and five guns, jewelry, and a
pillowcase were taken from the residence. After an
investigation, Longee was charged with burglary, grand theft
by possession of stolen property, unlawful possession of a
firearm, solicitation of grand theft by disposing of stolen
property, and a persistent violator sentencing enhancement
which was based upon two prior burglary convictions. At a
preliminary hearing, the magistrate found that the State failed
to meet its burden of proof on the burglary charge, and Longee
was bound over only on the remaining charges.
State’s Lodging E-5 at 2. Petitioner was found guilty. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed
Petitioner’s convictions but remanded for resentencing, finding the evidence insufficient
to support the persistent violator enhancement. State’s Lodging B-4.
Petitioner later obtained state post-conviction relief and was granted a new trial. The
prosecution refiled the burglary charge, which was consolidated with the other charges for
the second trial. State’s Lodging E-5 at 2.
At trial, “there were competing stories presented through various witnesses as to the
events surrounding the burglary.” Id. The prosecution argued that Petitioner committed the
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burglary and then gave the stolen property to Omar Padilla and Kenneth Worth to sell.
Petitioner, however, claimed that Padilla or Worth committed the burglary, that Padilla
tried to get Petitioner to sell the guns, and that Padilla and Worth then framed Petitioner
for the burglary. Id.
Padilla testified at the second trial, but Worth invoked the Fifth Amendment and did
not do so. Worth had testified at the preliminary hearing and the first trial, however, and
this testimony was read into the record at the second trial. A police interview of Worth was
also introduced at the second trial. Padilla testified, and Worth had previously testified,
consistently with the state’s theory of the crime—that Petitioner had stolen the guns and
then gave them to Padilla and Worth to sell them.
The trial court excluded, as inadmissible hearsay, the testimony of Jason Ward and
certain testimony of Donald Gurley, two inmates who had been incarcerated with Kenneth
Worth. These inmates would have testified as to statements that Worth purportedly made
to them, statements that inculpated Worth and Padilla in the burglary, but not Petitioner.
State’s Lodging E-2 at 5–13.
Following the second trial, Petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to concurrent
unified terms of twenty years with five years fixed. State’s Lodging D-8 at 32–40.
Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding
Ward’s and Gurley’s testimony about Worth’s statements, thereby violating his right to
present a complete defense as guaranteed by the Compulsory Process and Due Process
Clauses of the United States Constitution. State’s Lodging E-2. The Idaho Court of Appeals
rejected this argument and affirmed the convictions and sentence, and the Idaho Supreme
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Court denied review. State’s Lodging E-5, E-8.
DISCUSSION
In the instant Amended Petition, Petitioner asserts the same claim as he did on direct
appeal—that the exclusion of the hearsay testimony of Ward and Gurley violated
Petitioner’s right to present a complete defense. For the reasons that follow, the Court will
deny habeas relief.
1.
Habeas Corpus Standards of Law
A federal court may grant habeas corpus relief when it determines that the petitioner
“is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a). If the state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, habeas relief is
further limited by § 2254(d), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under AEDPA, federal habeas relief may be granted only where
the state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claim:
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “Deciding whether a state court’s decision involved an unreasonable
application of federal law or was based on an unreasonable determination of fact requires
the federal habeas court to train its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and
factual—why state courts rejected a state prisoner’s federal claims and to give appropriate
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deference to that decision.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191–92 (2018) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Deference is required under § 2254(d) even if the highest state court denied the
petitioner’s claim without expressly addressing it. In such a case, the Court must “‘look
through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that ... provide[s]
a relevant rationale.” Id. at 1192. The Court then presumes that “the unexplained decision
adopted the same reasoning,” though this presumption can be rebutted. Id.
When a party contests the state court’s legal conclusions, including application of
the law to the facts, § 2254(d)(1) governs. That section consists of two alternative tests: the
“contrary to” test and the “unreasonable application” test.
Under the first test, a state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established
federal law “if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in
[the Supreme Court’s] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court]
[has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694
(2002). Under the second test, to satisfy the “unreasonable application” clause of
§ 2254(d)(1), the petitioner must show that the state court—although identifying “the
correct governing legal rule” from Supreme Court precedent—nonetheless “unreasonably
applie[d] it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). “Section 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which a
state court unreasonably applies [Supreme Court] precedent; it does not require state courts
to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error.” White
v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426 (2014) (emphasis omitted).
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Because AEDPA is designed “to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a
guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means
of error correction,” a federal court cannot grant habeas relief simply because it concludes
in its independent judgment that the state court’s decision is incorrect or wrong. Greene v.
Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Rather, the
state court’s application of federal law must be objectively unreasonable to warrant relief.
If there is any possibility that fair-minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the
state court’s decision, § 2254(d)(1) precludes relief. Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 508–
09 (2013).
The Supreme Court has emphasized that “even a strong case for relief does not mean
the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. To be
entitled to habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1), “a state prisoner must show that the state
court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.
“Clearly established federal law” means the governing legal principles set forth in
the holdings—not the dicta—of the United States Supreme Court, as of the time the state
court rendered its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. The habeas statute does not require
an identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. To the contrary, state courts
must reasonably apply the rules squarely established by the Supreme Court’s holdings to
the facts of each case. See White, 572 U.S. at 427.
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On the other hand, if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to
the facts at hand, then by definition the rationale was not clearly established at the time of
the state court’s decision. Id. at 407. A federal habeas court “may not overrule a state court
for … holding a view different from its own” when the precedent from the Supreme Court
“is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003). Although circuit
precedent may be persuasive authority for determining whether a state court decision is an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d
597, 600–01 (9th Cir. 2000), a federal court may not refine or sharpen a general principle
of Supreme Court habeas corpus jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that the Court itself
has not announced, Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 7 (2014).
If no Supreme Court decision confronted the specific question presented by a state
prisoner’s federal habeas petition—that is, if the circumstances of a petitioner’s case are
only similar to the Supreme Court’s precedents—then the state court’s decision cannot be
“contrary to” any holding from the Supreme Court. Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 317
(2015) (per curiam). By the same token, a state court cannot unreasonably apply established
federal law that does not exist. See, e.g., Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008)
(per curiam); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006).
To be eligible for relief under § 2254(d)(2), the petitioner must show that the state
court decision was based upon factual determinations that were “unreasonable ... in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” A “state-court factual
determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have
reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301
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(2010); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (“The question under
AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect
but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.”).
State court factual findings are presumed to be correct and are binding on the federal court
unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1); see Kirkpatrick v. Chappell, 926 F.3d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding
that § 2254(e)(1) “appears to apply to all factual determinations made by state courts”).
If a petitioner satisfies § 2254(d)—either by showing that the state court’s
adjudication of the claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent or by establishing that the state court’s factual findings were unreasonable—then
the federal habeas court must review the petitioner’s claim de novo, meaning without
deference to the state court’s decision. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 778. When considering a habeas
claim de novo, a district court may, as in the pre-AEDPA era, draw from both United States
Supreme Court and circuit precedent, limited only by the non-retroactivity rule of Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Even under de novo review, however, if the factual findings of the state court are
not unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2), the Court must apply the presumption of correctness
found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) to any facts found by the state courts. Pirtle v. Morgan,
313 F.3d 1160, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2002); Kirkpatrick, 926 F.3d at 1170 (“Unlike §
2254(d), § 2254(e)(1)’s application is not limited to claims adjudicated on the merits [by a
state court].”). Conversely, if a state court factual determination is unreasonable, the federal
court is not limited by § 2254(e)(1) and may consider evidence outside the state court
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record, except to the extent that § 2254(e)(2) might apply. Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d at
1000.
2.
Factual Basis of Petitioner’s Claim
The State’s theory at trial was that Petitioner stole the guns and later transferred
them to Kenneth Worth and Omar Padilla to sell. At trial, Petitioner sought the admission
of testimony, offered by two inmates, regarding statements that Worth made while he was
in custody.
Jason Ward would have testified that he had a conversation about the burglary with
two inmates, one of whom wore a nametag reading “Kenneth Worth.” According to Ward:
He, Kenneth Worth, said that Longee was saying bad things
about him, calling him a rat, and he didn’t understand why
because he, Kenneth Worth, was the one that did the burglary
with a Mexican guy named Omar Padilla, and Omar Padilla is
the one that ended up with the guns.
I asked why Longee would say that about him, and he said that
Longee was telling people that Kenneth Worth was saying that
Longee did the burglary and had the guns. Worth then said that
that wasn’t true.
State’s Lodging D-5 at 549–50 (emphasis added).
The other inmate witness, Donald Gurley, also would have testified as to statements
made by Worth. Worth purportedly told Gurley that, once Padilla had blamed Petitioner
for the burglary, Worth had no choice but to go along with that story. Id. at 595. Worth
also told Gurley, “Those were ours, and we took them,” meaning that Worth and Padilla—
not Petitioner—stole the guns. Id.
Petitioner sought admission of this hearsay testimony under Idaho Rule of Evidence
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804(b)(3), a hearsay exception for statements against the interest of the declarant. That rule
permits the admission of hearsay statements if the declarant is unavailable and if
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.2 See
Idaho R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
The state objected, arguing that there were not sufficient corroborating
circumstances to support the admission of Worth’s hearsay statements to Ward and Gurley.
The trial court initially agreed, but gave the parties time to research the issue. State’s
Lodging D-5 at 552–53, 596–601. After further argument, id. at 635–46, the trial court
again concluded that the statements were not supported by sufficient corroborating
circumstances:
Well, it’s a well-argued and well-presented point, and it is a
close point. I didn’t see, before, the clearly corroborating
circumstances, and I don’t at this point, and I’ll abide by the
[earlier] ruling; although, I acknowledge that it’s very—it’s
closer in light of the decisions that have been cited.
Id. at 647. The court excluded Ward’s and Gurley’s hearsay testimony as unreliable under
Rule 804(b)(3).
3.
Clearly Established Law
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a complete defense,
whether that right is “rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment[] or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth
Amendment.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). But that right “is not absolute
2
Because Worth invoked the Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination and did
not testify at the second trial, he was unavailable for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3).
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and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the
criminal trial process,” including restrictions imposed by evidentiary rules. Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 296 (1973).
State courts unquestionably have the power “to exclude evidence through the
application of evidentiary rules that … serve the interests of fairness and reliability.”
Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The accused—just like the prosecution—“must comply with
established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability
in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
State evidentiary rules “may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of
justice.” Id. However, because “rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to
establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials,” only rarely is “the right to present
a complete defense … violated by the exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of
evidence.” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 509 (2013) (per curiam) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The right to present a defense as discussed in Chambers is clearly established federal
law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Christian v. Frank, 595 F.3d 1076, 1081 n.7
(9th Cir. 2010). From Chambers, then, the clearly established law on the right to present a
defense is this: The exclusion of evidence under a state evidentiary rule does not violate
the constitutional right to present a defense so long as the rule is designed to ensure, and
the exclusion of the evidence promotes, the “fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of
guilt and innocence.” 410 U.S. at 302. But, if the evidence at issue is “competent, reliable
… [and] central to the defendant’s claim of innocence” or other defense, then it may not
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be excluded under a state evidentiary rule absent a “valid state justification.” Crane, 476
U.S. at 690.
Rule 804(b)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence “serves the important role of
excluding testimony that lacks significant indicia of reliability.” Rhoades v. Henry, 638
F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit has held that excluding a
statement against interest as unreliable under Rule 804(b)(3) does not violate the
Constitution if the statement (1) is unsupported by other evidence, (2) is not probative, or
(3) is not central to the defense of the accused. Id. (“Of course a confession may have great
probative value, but it also may not, and if not—as here—it may be excluded. With nothing
to back up [the declarant’s] confession, it was unreliable … [and] could not realistically
have been a major part of Rhoades’s defense ….”) (internal citation omitted).
4.
Petitioner Is Not Entitled to Habeas Relief
A.
Decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals
The Idaho courts have determined that, where relevant evidence is excluded under
the Idaho Rules of Evidence, the right to present a defense is violated only where the trial
court abuses its discretion in excluding the evidence. State v. Self, 85 P.3d 1117, 1121
(Idaho Ct. App. 2003). A trial court does not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence if
it reasonably concludes that “other legitimate interests,” such as the ensuring that the
evidence is reliable, “outweigh the defendant’s interest in presenting the evidence.” Id.
Whether to admit evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) depends on
“whether evidence in the record corroborating and contradicting the declarant’s statement
would permit a reasonable person to believe that the statement could be true.” State v.
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Meister, 220 P.3d 1055, 1061 (Idaho 2009) (emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted). If not, the evidence should be excluded. Idaho courts apply a seven-factor
balancing test in determining whether to admit evidence under Rule 804(b)(3):
(1) whether the declarant is unavailable; (2) whether the
statement is against the declarant’s interest; (3) whether
corroborating circumstances exist which clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the exculpatory statement, taking into
account contradictory evidence, the relationship between the
declarant and the listener, and the relationship between the
declarant and the defendant; (4) whether the declarant has
issued the statement multiple times; (5) whether a significant
amount of time has passed between the incident and the
statement; (6) whether the declarant will benefit from making
the statement; and (7) whether the psychological and physical
surroundings could affect the statement.
State v. Meister, 220 P.3d 1055, 1061 n.7 (Idaho 2009).
The Idaho Court of Appeals applied these principles to Petitioner’s claim that the
exclusion of Ward’s and Gurley’s hearsay testimony violated his right to present a defense.
State’s Lodging E-5 at 3–4. Relying on the seven-factor test set forth in State v. Meister,
the appellate held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding insufficient
corroborating circumstances to render Ward’s and Gurley’s testimony reliable:
Longee asserts that the district court abused its
discretion in finding insufficient corroborating circumstances
and refusing to admit [Worth’s] hearsay statements.
Specifically, Longee contends the district erred by not
expressly applying all of the Meister factors. Longee also
contends that the district court invaded the province of the jury
by “concern[ing] itself with whether it believed the statements
were true” rather than “asking whether evidence in the record
corroborating and contradicting the declarant's statement[s]
would permit a reasonable person to believe that the
statement[s] could be true.” A review of the record shows that
the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of
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discretion, acted within the bounds of its discretion and
consistently with applicable legal standards, and reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Contrary to Longee’s claim,
the district court was not required to articulate its finding on
each factor set forth in Meister, and the failure to do so does
not mean the district court “neglect[ed]” the relevant factors or
abused its discretion. It was also not an abuse of discretion for
the district court to focus on the corroboration requirement,
which it characterized as a “critical factor.” Idaho Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3) precludes admission “unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement” and the factors set forth in Meister inform that
inquiry. Although the district court did not reference
the Meister factors individually, it does not mean the district
court neglected, ignored or disregarded them, particularly
when presented with the factors in conjunction with the parties’
arguments.
We also reject Longee’s contention that the district
court applied a standard of whether it personally believed the
hearsay statements rather than the applicable reasonable person
standard. The only basis Longee offers for this claim is the
district court’s statement that “it’s a well-argued and wellpresented point, and it is a close point. I didn’t see, before, the
clearly corroborating circumstances, and I don’t at this point,
and I’ll abide by the ruling; although, I acknowledge that its
very—it’s closer in light of the decisions that have been cited.”
The district court’s use of the word “I” in its oral ruling, finding
there were insufficient corroborating circumstances to admit
the hearsay, does not translate into a conclusion that the district
court ignored the applicable legal standard. Indeed, the district
court’s comments do not indicate the district court’s belief
regarding the statements. The quoted language only reflects
that the district court found insufficient corroborating
circumstances, which is the correct legal standard the district
court was to apply. The district court understood and applied
the correct legal standard and reached its decision by
exercising reason. Accordingly, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion.
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Id. at 5–6 (emphasis added). By concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion,
the court of appeals necessarily concluded that the exclusion of the evidence did not violate
Petitioner’s right to present a defense. See Self, 85 P.3d at 1121.
B.
The State Court’s Rejection of Petitioner’s Claim Was Not Unreasonable
under AEDPA
Clearly established Supreme Court precedent permits a state court to exclude
hearsay evidence of a third-party confession so long as the exclusion promotes the fairness
and reliability of the proceeding. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. Following this principle,
Idaho courts have determined that a trial court does not violate the right to present a
defense, by excluding hearsay statements as unreliable, unless the court abuses its
discretion. Self, 85 P.3d at 1121. There is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent
that would preclude this interpretation as objectively unreasonable under § 2254(d). See
Woods, 575 U.S. at 317 (“Because none of our cases confront the specific question
presented by this case, the state court’s decision could not be contrary to any holding from
this Court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, the Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision that the trial court appropriately
exercised its discretion in excluding evidence of Worth’s hearsay statements was not
objectively unreasonable. Both the trial court’s decision to exclude the evidence and the
appellate court’s affirmance are fully consistent with Rhoades, 638 F.3d at 1035–36, in
which the Ninth Circuit held that the exclusion of a third-party hearsay confession as
unreliable did not violate the Constitution. This supports the Court’s conclusion that the
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state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim did not unreasonably apply clearly established
law. See Duhaime, 200 F.3d at 600–01.
The Idaho Court of Appeals appropriately analyzed the trial court’s decision to
exclude the hearsay statements, and this Court cannot say that all fair-minded jurists would
disagree with the state appellate court’s decision. Reasonable jurists could conclude that
the exclusion of Ward’s and Gurley’s hearsay testimony promoted “fairness and reliability
in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence” and, therefore, did not violate Petitioner’s right
to present a defense. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. Therefore, Petitioner has not established
that he is entitled to relief under AEDPA.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Idaho Court of Appeals’ rejection of Petitioner’s
habeas claim was not contrary to, or a unreasonable application of, clearly established
Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, the Court must deny the Amended Petition.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
Josh Tewalt, the Director of the Idaho Department of Correction, is
SUBSTITUTED for Warden Armstrong as the Respondent in this case.
2.
The Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 10) is DENIED, and
this entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
3.
The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably
debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C.
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§ 2253(c); Habeas Rule 11. If Petitioner wishes to appeal, he must file a
timely notice of appeal with the Clerk of Court. Petitioner may seek a
certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit by filing a request in that
court.
DATED: March 8, 2021
_________________________
David C. Nye
Chief U.S. District Court Judge
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