Shoshone Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation v. United States of America et al

Filing 59

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. The Tribes' Motion to Stay (Dkt. 53 ) is GRANTED, and the case is stayed until the District of Columbia Court renders a decision on the Tribes' motion for clarification. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (alw)

UNITIED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF
THE FORT HALL RESERVATION.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 4:18-cv-00285-DCN
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al.,
Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall
Reservation’s (“Tribes”) Motion to Stay Proceedings. Dkt. 53. Having reviewed the
record and briefs, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately
presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court
finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the
Court will address the motion without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R.
7.1(d)(1)(B). For the reasons outlined below, the Court finds good cause to GRANT the
Tribes’ Motion to Stay.
II. BACKGROUND
The Tribes brought this action against the United States and other Defendants
relating to lands in Pocatello, Idaho. The United States granted easements on these
reservation lands for railroad company use beginning in the late 1800s. The tribes now
want to regain control of this land.
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The United States filed a Motion to Dismiss the Tribes’ Amended Complaint (Dkt.
41), arguing that the Tribes had already waived and released their claims against the
United States through a settlement agreement entered in the District of Columbia as a
Joint Stipulation and Order. Dkt. 41-1, at 12. The parties disagree on the scope of the
settlement and whether the Tribes have waived their current claims. To resolve the issue,
the Tribes have filed a motion seeking clarification on the issue with the D.C. District
Court which retains jurisdiction over the interpretation and enforcement of the settlement
stipulation and order. The Tribes now seek to stay proceedings in this Court until the
D.C. District Court renders a decision on the interpretation thereof.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court “has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to
control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706-707 (1997) (citing Landis v.
N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). “A trial court may, with propriety, find it is
efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an
action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the
case.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979).
Determining whether to grant a motion to stay “calls for the exercise of judgment, which
must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 25455. “When considering a motion to stay, the district court should consider three factors:
(1) the potential prejudice to the non-moving parties; (2) the hardship and inequity to the
moving party if the action is not stayed; and (3) the judicial resources that would be
saved.” In re Micron Tech., Inc. Secs. Litig., No. CV-06-085-S-BLW, 2009 WL
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10678270, at *2 (D. Idaho Dec. 7, 2009).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court is first concerned with the issue of jurisdiction. The United States
argues that this Court has concurrent jurisdiction over the interpretation of the settlement
agreement because the D.C. District court only retained exclusive jurisdiction over the
enforcement of the agreement, not its interpretation. However, the plain language of the
joint stipulation and order says the D.C. District Court would retain jurisdiction “for the
limited purpose of interpreting and enforcing” the settlement. Dkt. 55-1. The use of the
word “and” separating “interpreting” and “enforcing” denotes that the D.C. District Court
retains exclusive control over both interpretation and enforcement. Therefore, according
to the plain language of the Joint Stipulation and Order, the D.C. Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of whether the claims were waived.
Further, both an enforcement action and a request for interpretation of the Joint
Stipulation and Order require the examination and application of the Joint Stipulation and
Order. In other words, as the Tribes point out, “judicial interpretation is enforcement.”
Dkt. 54, at 3. Thus, the D.C. District Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
interpretation—as well as the enforcement—of the settlement agreement. Furthermore,
when a court retains jurisdiction of a settlement agreement in this way, it is exclusive. See
Flanagan v. Arnaiz, 143 F.3d 540 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The context of the retention
jurisdiction, a provision for future enforcement of a settlement order, implies that the
retention was meant to be exclusive.”).

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Defendants1 cite Larson v. Clark County, No. 2:11-cv-879-JCM (PAL), 2012 WL
1900946 (May 24, 2012) in which summary judgment was granted because of a prior
waiver and release of claims. But that case came before the same court in which the
settlement had been brought. Thus, it is easily distinguishable from this case where one
Court—the D.C. District Court—presided over the settlement agreement, and a second,
distinct Court—the undersigned Court—has been asked to interpret that agreement. Next,
Defendant cites Erlichman v. Stater Bros. Markets, NO. 10-cv-01803-CJC (PJWx) 2012
WL 12887512 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012). That case, however, is likewise unpersuasive as
the settlement agreement at issue was a union’s “voluntary quit” settlement, was written
under union procedure, and jurisdiction was not reserved by any court. Finally,
Defendant cites In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 97 C 7709, 2003 WL 1463585,
*2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2003), a case that is not binding authority on the Court and is
otherwise distinguishable. As the Tribes correctly note, in In re Waste Mgmt, “It was the
court where the settlement agreement and judgment were entered that rendered a decision
on whether the settlement agreement precluded prosecution of a lawsuit in a separate
district court case. It was not the [other] district court . . . .” Dkt. 57, at 4. Here, the D.C.
District Court has not decided that question. Thus, the Court finds that the D.C. District
court has exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation of the settlement agreement.
The United States further argues that the doctrine of comity ought to persuade the

1
The “United States Defendants”—i.e., the United States and all agency directors—are the only
Defendants who oppose the Tribes’ Motion to Stay. Defendants City of Pocatello and Union Pacific
Railroad Company do not oppose the Motion. See Dkts. 56, 58.

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D.C. District Court to defer to this Court’s interpretation of the settlement agreement
because the issue of waiver of claims under the settlement was brought up by the United
States in this Court first (Dkt. 55, at 4 (citing Pacesetter Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
678 F.2d 93, 94-96 (9th Cir. 1982)). The case the United States relies upon is, again,
distinguishable as the two courts in that matter had concurrent jurisdiction. Here, the D.C.
Court has exclusive jurisdiction and so the doctrine of comity does not apply.
The Court will briefly discuss various arguments raised by the parties for, or
against, granting a stay in this case.
A. Judicial Economy
If the D.C. District Court renders a decision on the interpretation of the settlement
agreement, it will simplify this Court’s role in deciding the rest of the case. If the D.C.
District Court rules the claims against the United States are waived, the case is resolved.
If it rules the claims are not waived, it will narrow the issues that this Court must decide
on the pending Motion to Dismiss. Denying the stay might also result in inconsistent
rulings on the settlement agreement, requiring more work from all parties—including the
Court. Each of these factors weighs in favor of granting a stay.2
Still, waiting for a decision for the D.C. District court for an indefinite amount of
time does weigh against granting a stay. “In assessing the propriety of a stay . . . a court
must balance the length of the delay against the justifications for the stay.” Micron Tech.,

2
Ultimately, the Court is governed by Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its mandate to
“secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every actions and proceeding.” Allowing the
D.C. District Court the opportunity to interpret the settlement agreement in this case (irrespective of the
outcome) is in furtherance of this charge.

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2009 WL 10678270, at *2 (citing Yong v. INS, 208 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Generally, the term of a stay should not be indefinite. See Yong, 208 F.3d at 1119 (“If a
stay is especially long or its term is indefinite, we require a greater showing to justify
it.”); Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th
Cir. 2007). However, the Court finds that the D.C. District Court’s exclusive jurisdiction
over interpreting and enforcing the settlement agreement, as well as the simplification of
issues this court would have to address once the D.C. Court renders a decision, provides
sufficient justification for the delay.
B. Prejudice to the United States if Stay is Granted
The United States must make “an initial showing that there is a fair possibility that
[it] will be injured by a stay.” In re Micron Tech., Inc. Secs. Litig., No. CV-06-085-SBLW, 2009 WL 10678270, AT 2 (D. Idaho Dec. 7, 2009). The United States does not
argue this point at length, but simply states that a stay would unnecessarily delay the
proceedings. The United States’ objection is noted, however, as outlined above, the Court
finds any delay is justified because of the D.C. District Court’s exclusive jurisdiction
over this matter.
C. Prejudice to Tribes if Stay is Not Granted
The moving party has the burden to “make out a clear case of hardship or inequity
in being required to go forward.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936).
Notably, simply “being required to defend a suit, without more, does not constitute a
clear case of hardship or inequity.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1112 (9th
Cir. 2005). Here, the Tribes argue that a decision in this Court would harm them because
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the court might render an improper decision and exceed its jurisdictional bounds. Surely
an overstepping of jurisdictional bounds would add clear hardship to the Tribes. And,
insofar as the Court has determined that the D.C. District Court retains exclusive
jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, the Tribes’ concern has merit.
In summary, the Tribes have met their burden in establishing the need for a stay in
this action pending a determination by the D.C. District Court as to the scope of the
previous settlement agreement. United States Defendants have not demonstrated
sufficient hardship, delay, or prejudice to overcome the Tribes’ showing.
V. ORDER
The Court HEREBY ORDERS:
1. The Tribes’ Motion to Stay (Dkt. 53) is GRANTED, and the case is stayed until
the District of Columbia Court renders a decision on the Tribes’ motion for
clarification.
2. The Tribes must submit a status report in this case regarding the status of its
pending motion for clarification in the District of Columbia on the first business
day of each calendar month until the matter is adjudicated in the D.C. District
Court.

DATED: May 29, 2019

_________________________
David C. Nye
Chief U.S. District Court Judge

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