Gao v. Snyder et al
Filing
53
OPINION by U.S. Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore: Plaintiff Jinrun Gao's Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories 43 and his Motion for Extension of Time 47 are ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part; his Motion to Compel Production of Document s 44 and his Motion to Renew Portion of Motion to Compel Production of Documents 46 are DENIED. See written order. The Defendants are directed to provide the additional response as directed in this Opinion by 9/30/2011. (Copy of this Opinion sent this date via U.S. Mail to pro se Plaintiff at his listed address.)(LB, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 20 September, 2011 11:17:11 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, PEORIA DIVISION
JINRUN GAO,
Plaintiff,
v.
SNYDER COMPANIES and
BRICKYARD APARTMENTS
BY SNYDER, LLC,
Defendants.
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No. 10-CV-1025
OPINION
BYRON G. CUDMORE, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Jinrun Gao’s
Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories (d/e 43) (Motion 43); Motion
to Compel Production of Documents (d/e 44) (Motion 44); Motion to Renew
Portion of Motion to Compel Production of Documents (d/e 46) (Motion 46);
and Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time (d/e 47) (Motion 47). For the
reasons set forth below, Motions 43 and 47 are ALLOWED in part and
DENIED in part, and Motions 44 and 46 are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jinrun Gao alleges that he and his wife Shengju Rong
rented an apartment in Bloomington, Illinois, from Defendant Brickyard
Apartments by Snyder, LLC (LLC), from January 25, 2007, to February 29,
Page 1 of 14
2008. Amended Complaint (d/e 19), ¶¶ 6. Gao alleges that he and his
wife Rong are of American Chinese and Chinese origin. Id. Gao alleges
that Defendant Snyder Companies owns LLC (collectively Snyder). Id. ¶
5. Gao alleges that in January 2008, cigarette smoke started seeping into
his apartment. His wife, Rong, developed asthma because of the smoke.
Gao alleges that Rong became handicapped, as that term is used in the
Fair Housing Act (Act), as a result of her asthma. Id. ¶¶ 5, 9, 13(c); 42
U.S.C. § 3602(h). Gao alleges that he and his wife complained and were
discriminated against in violation of the Act because of their Chinese
ethnicity and also retaliated against because of their assertion of their
rights under the Act. Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 10-15; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604,
3617. Gao also alleges that Snyder refused to accommodate his wife’s
asthma in violation of the Act. Amended Complaint, ¶ 13; 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f). Gao alleges that the discrimination and retaliation was intentional
and willful. Amended Complaint, ¶ 15. Gao alleges that he is seeking
damages for himself and Rong. Rong did not sign any pleadings and has
not made an appearance as a party in the case.
On July 6, 2011, Gao served Plaintiff’s Second Set of Interrogatories
and his Second Request to Produce to Snyder. Motion 43, attached
Plaintiff’s Second Set of Interrogatories to Defendants; Motion 44, attached
Plaintiff’s Second Request to Produce to Defendants. Snyder responded.
Page 2 of 14
Gao believes some of the responses were inadequate. The parties
conferred to resolve their differences. Gao still believes Snyder’s
responses are insufficient and has brought Motions 43 and 44.
Gao filed Motion 46 in response to this Court’s Opinion entered
August 17, 2011 (d/e 45) (Opinion). Gao had asked the Court to compel
Defendants to produce “documents that show Defendants barred JoAnne
Teal and Joseph Kennedy from common facilities (clubhouse and office), if
Defendants did so.” Motion 46, ¶ A. The Court denied the request
because Snyder stated that they had produced all responsive documents.
Opinion, at 9. The Court stated that Gao could renew the request if he had
evidence that Snyder possesses such documents. Id.
Gao renews request in Motion 46 based on the deposition testimony
of Snyder’s Assistant Manager Lindsay Thacker. Gao and Thacker had the
following colloquy regarding Teal and Kennedy:
Q. . . .
Next question. Joanne Teal and Joseph Kennedy,
were these persons, Joanne Teal and Joseph Kennedy,
banned from the clubhouse and the office in 2005?
....
A.
I don’t know– they were banned, but I don’t know what
year they were banned. Yes.
Q.
Your answer is yes?
Page 3 of 14
A.
I don’t know what year they were banned, but they both
were banned from the clubhouse at one point.
Q.
Just make sure. Do you have a document to prove that?
A.
Yes. Documents, is that what you’re asking?
Q.
Yes.
A.
Yes.
Motion 46, attached, Excerpt of the Deposition of Lindsay Thacker, at 1718. Based on Thacker’s responses, Gao renewed the request for
documents regarding Teal and Kennedy.
Finally, Gao asks for an extension of time to complete discovery
because several requests remain outstanding. Snyder objects to any
extension of the time to conduct discovery.
DISCOVERY PRINCIPLES
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) allows parties to obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
claim or defense of any party. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears to be reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The rule gives the district
courts broad discretion in matters relating to discovery. See Brown-Bey v.
United States, 720 F.2d 467, 470-471 (7th Cir.1983); Eggleston v. Chicago
Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union 130, U. A., 657 F.2d 890, 902
Page 4 of 14
(7th Cir.1981); see also, Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir.1985) (on review, courts of appeal will
only reverse a decision of a district court relating to discovery upon a clear
showing of an abuse of discretion).
[I]f there is an objection the discovery goes beyond material
relevant to the parties’ claims or defenses, the Court would
become involved to determine whether the discovery is relevant
to the claims or defenses and, if not, whether good cause exists
for authorizing it so long as it is relevant to the subject matter of
the action. The good-cause standard warranting broader
discovery is meant to be flexible.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 Amendment.
The federal discovery rules are to be construed broadly and liberally.
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979); Jeffries v. LRP Publications,
Inc., 184 F.R.D. 262, 263 (E.D .Pa. 1999). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1) provides that the “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party,”
but “[f]or good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant
to the subject matter involved in the action.” Id. The party opposing
discovery has the burden of proving that the requested discovery should be
disallowed. Etienne v. Wolverine Tube, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 653, 656 (D. Kan.
1999); Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co. Inc.,
132 F.R.D. 204, 207 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Flag Fables, Inc. v. Jean Ann’s
Country Flags and Crafts, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1165, 1186 (D. Mass. 1989).
Page 5 of 14
District Courts have broad discretion in discovery matters. Packman
v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 646 (7th Cir. 2001). A party must be
diligent in pursuing the perceived inadequacies in discovery. Packman at
647. However, even an untimely filed motion to compel may still be
allowed if the party demonstrates actual and substantial prejudice resulting
from the denial of discovery. Id. Remember, we are talking discovery, not
admissibility at trial.
ANALYSIS
I.
Motion 43
Gao asks the Court to compel responses to Interrogatory Numbers 2,
6, and 7. The Court addresses each in order.
A.
Interrogatory 2
This interrogatory asked,
Did Defendants ever bar white tenants from the clubhouse and
office? Did Defendants ever bar white tenants from the
clubhouse and office since January 1, 2005?
Motion 43, at 1, quoting Interrogatory 1.
Snyder responded,
The Defendants did bar JoAnn Teal and Joseph Kennedy from
certain parts of the property. Those documents evidencing
such have already been provided to the Plaintiff. Both JoAnn
Teal and Joseph Kennedy are white.
Page 6 of 14
Motion 43, attached Answers to Plaintiff’s Second Set of Interrogatories to
Defendants, at 1. Gao complains that the interrogatory calls for a yes or no
answer, but Snyder did not provide such. Gao also complains that the
response says Teal and Kennedy were barred from certain parts of the
property, but the interrogatory asked whether white tenants were barred
from the clubhouse and office.
Gao is correct that Snyder did not answer directly “yes” or “no” to the
question; however, Snyder stated that Teal and Kennedy were white and
were barred. Snyder further stated elsewhere in its discovery responses
that they were barred from the from the clubhouse. Motion 44, attached
Answers to Plaintiff’s Second Request to Produce to Defendants ¶ 2 (“[Teal
and Kennedy] are the only white tenants barred from the clubhouse in a
relevant time frame.”). Because Snyder has provided the information
sought by the interrogatory, the motion to compel is denied with respect to
this request.
B.
Interrogatory 6
The interrogatory asked,
Who got the police to the office of Brickyard Apartments on
February 2, 2008? Who said that Lindsay Thacker called 911
and the Bloomington Police Department responded to the
apartment complex on February 2, 2008?
Motion 43, at 2, quoting Interrogatory 6.
Page 7 of 14
Snyder responded,
The maintenance man, Leo Baker, is the representative of the
Defendant that called 911 and the Bloomington Police
Department. Defendant has already supplied to Plaintiff
recordings of that 911 telephone call. It is unknown to the
Defendant who represented that Lindsay Thacker call 911.
Lindsay Thacker did attempt to call 911 and the Bloomington
Police Department, but the Plaintiff’s wife prevented her from
doing so.
Motion 43, attached Answers to Plaintiff’s Second Set of Interrogatories to
Defendants, at 2-3. Gao complains that the answer is evasive because
Snyder’s initial disclosures indicated that Lindsay Thacker called 911. Gao
wants to know the source of that representation in Snyder’s initial
disclosures. Gao is entitled to that information. The motion to compel is
allowed with respect to this request. Snyder is directed to identify the
person or persons who provided the information that formed the basis of
the representation in Snyder’s initial disclosures that Lindsay Thacker
called 911.
C.
Interrogatory 7
The interrogatory stated,
Who stated that Officer Quinn and Mike Filippini have
knowledge that no 911 call was placed to the Bloomington
Police Department by the Plaintiff on February 2, 2008?
Motion 43, at 2, quoting Interrogatory 7.
Page 8 of 14
Snyder responded,
The Defendant does not know who made any such statement
as identified in Interrogatory number 7.
Motion 43, attached Answers to Plaintiff’s Second Set of Interrogatories to
Defendants, at 3. Gao complains that the answer is evasive because
Snyder’s initial disclosure indicated that Officers Quinn and Filippini have
knowledge that no 911 call was placed to the Bloomington Police by the
Plaintiff. Gao wants to know who is the source of that representation in
Snyder’s initial disclosures. Gao is entitled to that information. The motion
to compel is allowed with respect to this request. Snyder is directed to
identify the person or persons who provided the information that formed the
basis of the representation in Snyder’s initial disclosures that Officers
Quinn and Filippini have knowledge that no 911 call was placed by the
Plaintiff to the Bloomington Police on February 2, 2008.
II.
Motion 44
Gao asks the Court to compel responses to Requests to Produce
Numbers 2, 3, and 6. The Court addresses each in order.
A.
Request No. 2
This request asked for,
Copies of documents that show that Defendants barred white
tenants from the clubhouse and office since January 1, 2005, if
Defendants did so.
Page 9 of 14
Motion 44, at 1, quoting Request to Produce No. 2.
Snyder responded,
Documents concerning request number 2 of the Plaintiff’s
Second Request to Produce to Defendants have already been
provided to the Plaintiff. They include documents in reference
to JoAnn Teal and Joseph Kennedy. Those are the only white
tenants barred from the clubhouse in a relevant time frame.
Motion 44, attached Answers to Plaintiff’s Second Request to Produce to
Defendants, at 1.
Gao complains that the documents produced do not show that white
tenants were barred from the clubhouse. Gao argues that Thacker stated
in her deposition, quoted above, that Snyder had documents that show that
Teal and Kennedy were barred from the clubhouse. Gao, thus, contends
that Snyder is refusing to produce these documents. Snyder responds that
it has produced all the documents it has regarding Teal and Kennedy.
Thacker’s quoted testimony regarding documents is unclear. She could
have been simply clarifying Gao’s question or she may have stated that
such documents exist. Regardless, she does not identify the documents
with any specificity. The Court, thus, cannot identify the documents to
which she was referring or determine whether those documents have
already been produced. Without more specificity, the Court is not in a
position to order Snyder to produce additional documents. Gao may
possibly be able to question Thacker at trial about the existence of
Page 10 of 14
documents to which she referred in the deposition, but this portion of
Motion 44 is denied.
B.
Request No. 3
This request asked for,
Copies of documents that can justify the reason(s) for barring
Shengju Rong from the clubhouse and office in 2008.
Motion 44, at 2, quoting Request to Produce No. 3
Snyder responded,
All documents concerning the barring of Shengju Rong form the
clubhouse and office in 2008 have already been provided to the
Palintiff (sic). They include the letters to the Plaintiff in
February, 2008 concerning that event.
Motion 44, attached Answers to Plaintiff’s Second Request to Produce to
Defendants, at 1.
Gao complains that Snyder has never produced any documents
showing that Rong engaged in any disorderly conduct to justify barring her.
Snyder responds that it has produced all of the responsive documents in its
possession. The Court cannot require the production of documents that do
not exist. The Motion is therefore denied with respect to this request.
C.
Request No. 6
This request asked for,
Names, addresses, phone numbers, and apartment numbers of
the tenants of Brickyard apartments who complained against
Page 11 of 14
second-hand smoke in the “H” building in January or February
2008.
Snyder responded,
The Defendant does not have any documents concerning the
names, addresses, phone numbers, and apartment numbers of
the tenants at Brickyard Apartments who complained against
second hand smoke other than those documents provided in
request number 5.
Motion 44, attached Answers to Plaintiff’s Second Request to Produce to
Defendants, at 2. Request number 5 asked for tenant complaints about
second hand smoke. Snyder produced a work order and a complaint filed
by Gao and his wife. Gao does not challenge the adequacy of the
response to Request no. 5.
Gao complains that other tenants complained and Snyder has
documents that contain the requested identifying information. Gao claims
that the information is on the leases used by Snyder. Snyder responds that
its answer is responsive. The parties apparently disagree on whether any
other tenant complained about second hand smoke. Gao states that other
tenants complained, but has not produced any proof of these complaints.
Without some evidence to prove that Snyder’s answer is evasive, the Court
is not in a position to fashion an order to compel production. The Motion to
compel is denied with respect to this request.
Page 12 of 14
III.
Motion 46
Gao asks to renew his motion to compel Snyder to produce
documents that show that Teal and Kennedy were barred from the
clubhouse and office of the apartment complex. Gao again relies on the
quoted statements by Thacker that she had documents to show that these
two individuals were so barred. Snyder stated that it produced all of the
documents in its possession regarding these two individuals. Gao argues
that Snyder must have some other documents because the ones produced
do not show that Teal and Kennedy were barred.
As explained above, Thacker’s testimony regarding documents is
unclear. Regardless, she does not identify the documents. The Court,
thus, cannot identify the documents or determine whether those documents
have been produced. Without more specificity, the Court is not in a
position to order Snyder to produce additional documents. Motion 46 is
denied.
IV.
Motion 47
Gao asks for an extension of time to complete discovery because he
has requests outstanding to which Snyder has not yet responded. Snyder
objects to any extension. The Court will extend the time to conduct fact
discovery to October 15, 2011, for the limited purposes of completing
responses to any outstanding discovery requests. The time for filing
Page 13 of 14
dispositive motions is extended to October 31, 2011. The Scheduling
Order (d/e 27) otherwise remains unchanged.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jinrun Gao’s Motion to Compel Answers to
Interrogatories (d/e 43) and his Motion for Extension of Time (d/e 47) are
ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part; his Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (d/e 44) and his Motion to Renew Portion of Motion to Compel
Production of Documents (d/e 46) are DENIED. The Defendants are
directed to provide the additional response as directed in this Opinion by
September 30, 2011.
ENTER:
September 20, 2011
s/ Byron G. Cudmore
BYRON G. CUDMORE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Page 14 of 14
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