Linton v. Randall et al

Filing 84

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 1/3/14. IT IS ORDERED: Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 56 79 . The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defe ndants and against Plaintiff. This case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. The Defendants' motion to stay is denied as moot. 83 All deadlines and settings on the Court's calendar are vacated including the January 9, 2014 pretrial and the February 18, 2014 jury trial date. 2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appe al in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues Plaintiff will present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal. SEE FULL ORDER. (FDT, ilcd)

E-FILED

Friday, 03 January, 2014 01:11:25 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TITUS V. LINTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

10-1208

MICHAEL RANDALL, et al.,
Defendant.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
This cause is before the court for consideration of the Defendants’ supplemental motion
for summary judgment. [79]
I. BACKGROUND
The pro se Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has one surviving claim alleging Defendants Illinois
Department of Corrections Director Michael Randle, former Director Roger Walker, Pontiac
Correctional Center Warden Guy Pierce, former Warden Eddie Jones and former Stateville
Correctional Center Warden Terry McCann violated his due process rights based on his
approximately three years in administrative detention without meaningful reviews. See
September 27, 2013 Summary Judgment Order. The court noted in its September 27, 2013
Summary Judgment Order that the parties had not clearly addressed the length of time the
Plaintiff spent in administrative detention or segregation, nor specific information concerning the
conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement or the reviews of that confinement. Therefore, before the
case could proceed to trial, the court ordered the Defendants to file an additional motion for
summary judgment clarifying the record. See September 27, 2013 Summary Judgment Order.
The Defendants have now complied and the Plaintiff has filed a response.
II. FACTS
The following facts are taken from the previous motion for summary judgment, the
supplemental motion for summary judgment and the record before the court.
Defendant Guy Pierce is the Assistant Warden of Operations at Pontiac Correctional
Center. (Def. Mot. [80], Pierce Aff., p. 1). From June 2006 to August 2009, Pierce served as the
Deputy Director for District One of the Illinois Department of Corrections.
Defendant Pierce states that Administrative Detention is a nondisciplinary confinement
status which removes an inmate from general population. (Def. Mot. [80], Pierce Aff., p. 1; see
also 20 Il.Admin.Code 504.660). The process of placing an inmate in Administrative Detention
begins at the individual facility. A warden can place an inmate in Administrative Detention after
consideration of various issues such as the seriousness of any alleged offense, the safety and
security of the facility or any person, the offender’s behavior and disciplinary history, reports and
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recommendations concerning the offender, an interview and any submissions of relevant
information, institutional order and other legitimate penological interests. (Def. Mot. [80], Pierce
Aff., p. 1; see also Il.Admin.Code 504.660(a)(b) ). The Deputy Director then must review the
placement and can approve or deny the warden’s recommendation.
Defendant Pierce states that “[f]ollowing the initial placement of (the Plaintiff) into
Administrative Detention, I was not involved in reviewing his continued placement until August
14, 2009.” (Def. Mot. [80], Pierce Aff., p. 1). Pierce states when he was the Warden at Pontiac
from August 14, 2009 to May 10, 2011, the facility review committee was responsible for
reviewing the Plaintiff’s placement in Administrative Detention every 90 days and would then
forward the recommendation to Warden Pierce for final approval. (Def. Mot. [80], Pierce Aff., p.
1-2). The Plaintiff claims the review committee was not established until 2012, but has provided
no evidence in support of his claim. The Illinois Administrative Code requires the periodic
reviews “to determine whether continued placement is appropriate,” but “the offender need not
be interviewed during these reviews.” 20 Il.Admin.Code 504.660(c)(1).
The Chief of Operations for the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) states the
Plaintiff did receive reviews of his placement on Administrative Detention at Pontiac
Correctional Center. (Def. Mot.[63], Mont. Aff., p. 2). Jesse Montgomery states the Plaintiff’s
status was reviewed every 90 days as required and the first review occurred 90 days after he
entered Pontiac Correctional Center on November 8, 2008. (Def. Mot.[63], Mont.Aff., p. 2).
Montgomery has provided copies of the Plaintiff’s Administrative Detention sheet noting
reviews by the Chief Administrative Officer every 90 days until November 10, 2011. (Def. Mot,
[63], Ex. B). The document reflects a review was conducted, signed by the Warden and dated.
The basis of the continued confinement is not included. However, the documents do include the
stated basis for the Plaintiffs initial placement in Administrative Detention: “(The Plaintiff) has
a history of Black P. Stone STG (security threat group) dating to 2004. (The Plaintiff) fell out of
favor with the Black P. Stone and was placed in Administrative Detention for his safety.” (Def.
Mot, Ex. D).
Defendant Pierce states offenders in Administrative Detention as well as offenders in the
General Population receive: 1) a bed; 2) clean bedding including a mattress, sheets, blanket,
pillow and pillow case; 3) a wash basin with running water; 4) a flushable toilet; 5) adequate
lighting for reading; 6) a nutritional diet at regularly scheduled hours; 7) seasonal appropriate
clothing; 8) a shower and shave at least once a week; 9) hygiene items including toilet paper,
soap, a towel, toothbrush and toothpaste if the offender has insufficient commissary funds; and,
10) laundry services or a weekly exchange of clothing. (Def. Mot. [80], Pierce Aff., p. 2-3) In
addition, Pierce says inmates in Administrative Detention are allowed visitors, although the
Plaintiff states they are non-contact visits. Medical staff also visits the unit daily and the
Chaplain may visit offenders in the unit. The Plaintiff participated in the Ramadan Feast in 2010
and 2011. (Def. Mot. [80], Pierce Aff., p. 4). A correctional counselor visits with the offender at
least once every 30 days. Further, the inmate can continue his involvement in various programs
after submitting a written request to the warden for approval. (Def. Mot. [80], Pierce Aff., p. 3).
The Plaintiff claims he was unable to participate in programs, but has not stated whether he
submitted a such a request.

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Defendant Pierce further states Administrative Detention inmates can exercise outside
their cells consistent with the cell house schedule. They are further permitted to make collect
phone calls if they are not on c-grade status. Administrative Detention is provided the same
mail service as general population inmates. Reading materials are permitted and the inmates
have access to materials from the law library when a staff member makes rounds to accept
requests and deliver materials. Additionally, a satellite law library is maintained in the unit for
the inmate’s use.
Major Patrick Hobart states he works at Pontiac Correctional Center and supervised
Administrative Detention inmates from 2008 to 2011. Hobart says the Plaintiff received a yard
restriction from August 2011 to September 9, 2011. However, at all other times he was provided
five hours of yard time per week. (Def. Mot. [80], Hobart Aff., p. 1). Hobart also confirms the
other items which were provided to inmates from bedding and hygiene items to medical care and
phone services. (Def. Mot. [80], Hobart Aff., p. 2). The cell house inventory from July 22, 2009
demonstrates the Plaintiff had his television, ear plugs, religious items, notepads and other books
in his cell. (Def. Mot. [80], Hobart Aff., p. 2; Ex. B-1)
The Plaintiff received a disciplinary ticket at Pontiac Correctional Center on July 22,
2009 accusing him of Intimidation or Threats and Disobeying a Direct Order. The Adjustment
Committee considered the evidence on July 29, 2009. The Plaintiff attended the meeting and
admitted to one of the charges. The committee found him guilty of both charges after
considering Plaintiff’s statement as well as other evidence. The Adjustment Committee
recommended three months in segregation. (Def. Mot. [80], Pierce Aff., p. 2, Ex. A-1).
The Plaintiff received a second disciplinary ticket on July 22, 2009 for Damage of
Property, Theft and Unauthorized property. The Adjustment Committee also considered this
ticket on July 29, 2009, and the Plaintiff admitted the offenses. The Adjustment Committee
found the Plaintiff guilty after considering the Plaintiff’s statement and the other evidence
provided. The Plaintiff received six months in segregation as well as a three month revocation
of good time credits. (Def. Mot. [80], Pierce Aff., p. 2; Ex. A-2).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A movant may demonstrate the absence of a material dispute through specific
cites to admissible evidence, or by showing that the nonmovant “cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the [material] fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(B). If the movant clears this
hurdle, the nonmovant may not simply rest on his or her allegations in the complaint, but instead
must point to admissible evidence in the record to show that a genuine dispute exists. Id.;
Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 649 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2011). “In a § 1983 case, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof on the constitutional deprivation that underlies the claim, and thus must
come forward with sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact to avoid summary
judgment.” McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010).

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At the summary judgment stage, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, with material factual disputes resolved in the nonmovant's favor. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when a
reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant. Id.
IV. ANAYLSIS
“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations
of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish
that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkerson v Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Therefore,
the court must first determine whether the Plaintiff has a liberty interest. If the Plaintiff passes
this hurdle, then the court must determine what process is due to protect that interest.
The Supreme Court has “held that the Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty
interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.” Id. citing Meachum v
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) citing Sandin v Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In fact, the
Seventh Circuit has found liberty interests in avoiding segregation or administrative detention are
very limited or even nonexistent in relatively short periods of six months or less. See Lekas v
Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 2005)(90 days in disciplinary segregation did not violate due
process); Hoskins v Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 374-75 (7th Cir. 2005)(60 days in disciplinary
segregation did not violate due process); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 760-62 (7th Cir.
1997)(70 days in disciplinary segregation does not violate due process); Crowder v. True, 74
F.3d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 1996)(90 days in non-disciplinary segregation does not violate due
process).
However, the Seventh Circuit has held due process protections can be triggered not only
by the conditions of confinement, but also by the amount of time spent in segregated
confinement. Marion v Columbia Correctional Institution, 559 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009)(240
day stay in segregation demands scrutiny of conditions of confinement); Earl v Racine County
Jail, 718 F.3d 689, 691 (7th 2013)(liberty is impacted in administrative segregation if the
conditions are particularly harsh compared to ordinary prison life “or if he remains subject to
those conditions for a significantly long time.”) Therefore, “a prison inmate may establish the
requisite liberty interest if the length of the administrative segregation term is sufficiently long
and the conditions sufficiently harsh.” Nolan v Thomas, 2011 WL 4962866 at 5 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
19, 2011) citing Marion, 559 F.3d at 697-98; Williams v Norris, 177 Fed. Appx 647 (8th Cir.
2008) (almost nine years in segregation constitutes atypical and significant hardship, considering
restrictions.); Pressley v Blaine, 352 Fed. Appx 701 at 4(3rd Cir. 2009)(district court “was
required to examine the duration of disciplinary confinement, and the actual conditions of that
confinement in relation to the hardships endured by other prisoners.”).
The court first notes there is disagreement concerning the length of time the Plaintiff
spent in Administrative Detention. The Plaintiff still maintains, as he did in his amended
complaint, he was in Administrative Detention for four years and eight months. The Defendants
state the Plaintiff’s housing classifications were as follows:

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1) June 9, 2008 to August 18, 2008(two months): Administrative Detention at Stateville
Correctional Center.
2) August 18, 2008 to July 21, 2009 (eleven months): Administrative Detention at
Pontiac Correctional Center.
3) July 21, 2009 to May 5, 2010 (nine months): Disciplinary Segregation at Pontiac
Correctional Center.
4) May 5, 2010 to December 1, 2011(seven months): Administrative Detention at Pontiac
Correctional Center. See also September 27, 2013 Summary Judgment Order, p. 2.
The Plaintiff first argues the dates he was on Administrative Detention at Stateville
Correctional Center are incorrect. The Plaintiff claims he began this housing on April 23, 2007,
after was accused of fighting with another inmate. He was found not guilty of the disciplinary
charge on April 30, 2007. (Amd. Comp., p. 7) However, the Plaintiff says he remained on
Administrative Detention based on the belief that he was the highest ranking member of a gang,
had a violent history, and there was fear if he returned to the general population, he would
retaliate and “cause a possible gang war.” (Amd. Comp, p. 5).
The Plaintiff admits he was not housed in segregation or the administrative detention
cells during this time. Instead, he remained in the infirmary from April 30, 2007 until he was
transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center one year and four months later. The Plaintiff also
admits he suffered from various health problems including Crohn’s disease and was taken to
outside medical providers at the University of Illinois at Chicago Medical Center.(Def. Mot.
[63]; Plaint. Depo., p. 72).
The Defendants maintain the Plaintiff was still classified as a member of the general
population until June 8, 2009 when he was placed on administrative detention. However, the
Defendants admit the Plaintiff remained in the infirmary in part for his own protection.
Defendant Guy Pierce says the Plaintiff cooperated with an investigation into a staff member at
Menard Correctional Center. (Pierce Aff., [72], p.1-2). There was concern that inmates in the
general population might suspect the Plaintiff’s involvement, and therefore he was allowed to
stay in the Heath Care Unit. The Plaintiff remained in the Health Care Unit until he was
approved for Administrative Detention on June 8, 2009.
The Plaintiff claims none of this is true. The Plaintiff states there was an incident at
another correctional center, but it had nothing to do with his placement in the infirmary or on
Administrative Detention. The Plaintiff has pointed to some inconsistencies in the record
regarding his placement from April 23, 2007 to June 9, 2008, but he admits when he filed a
grievance concerning his placement during this time, he was told he was not on Administrative
Detention. (Amend. Comp., p. 6). Further confusing the record is the Plaintiff’s own claim in
this grievance that he was “currently on medical hold!” (Amd. Comp, Dec. 29, 2009 Grievance,
p. 7-1, 6). In addition, the Plaintiff has previously argued he was on an indefinite term of
involuntary protective custody during this same time period, but the documentation he presented
clearly contradicted this claim. September 27, 2013 Summary Judgment Order, p. 4, FN 1.
The disputed facts concerning the Plaintiff’s specific classification or whether he spent
two months or more than a year on Administrative Detention are not material facts in this
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particular instance. The Plaintiff’s admitted living conditions during this time were not the type
of segregated confinement associated with typical Administrative Detention status. In his
grievance filed on December 29, 2007 concerning his housing at Stateville Correctional Center,
the Plaintiff states:
the reasons for me being placed on administrative detention, whatever they
all may be now, are totally defeated by everything I have written. I not
only have communication with the population, but physical contact with
population also outside of H.C.U. (Health Care Unit). (Amd. Comp,
Dec. 29, 2009 Grievance, p. 7-1, 1).
The Plaintiff also stated in his deposition he was allowed to go to commissary, had all of
his property and was allowed hospital yard time. (Def. Mot, Plain. Depo., p. 47, 63-64). The
Plaintiff’s complaints in his grievance include his inability to visit the law library; no
participation in school and other unspecified programs; and a lack of cable outlets which limited
his television viewing. (Amd. Comp,Dec. 29, 2009 Grievance, p. 7-1, 4). The Plaintiff may have
been somewhat segregated from the general population, but he certainly has not demonstrated his
confinement at Stateville Correctional Center involved “sufficiently harsh” conditions to
establish a liberty interest. Nolan, 2011 WL 4962866 at 5.
Plaintiff’s confinement at Stateville Correctional Center was also distinct from his
housing at Pontiac Correctional Center. When he was transferred to Pontiac in August of 2008,
the Plaintiff was housed in the “Administrative Detention Re-Entry Management Program Unit”
designed for “inmates who are attempting to re-enter a general population environment…”
(Amd. Comp., p. 8). The Plaintiff admits these inmates “are afforded rights similar to those of
general population with some limitations, but not those of disciplinary segregation.” (Amd.
Comp, p. 9). In his deposition, the Plaintiff also stated: “[w]hen I was in administrative
detention they allowed us to have more stuff and more freedom” than when he was in
segregation. (Def. Mot., [63], p. 39). The Plaintiff does not provide specific information about
each of his housing classifications since he has combined them all into one period of
administrative detention. However, the Plaintiff was not on administrative detention throughout
his stay at Pontiac.
The Plaintiff was placed in segregation from July 21, 2009 to May 5, 2010 after he was
found guilty of two different disciplinary tickets. Throughout his amended complaint and his
extensive briefing in this case, the Plaintiff has referred to his four year and eight month
confinement as Administrative Detention or Administrative Detention/Segregation. In response,
to the summary judgment motion, the Plaintiff states “[a]lthough I was serving a segregation
term, my administrative detention still continued.” (Plain. Resp., Plain Aff.,p. 2). The Plaintiff
has provided no evidence to support this claim and instead, he has provided evidence that
housing in Administrative Detention involves different privileges and freedoms than housing in
segregation. Furthermore, the due process protections allotted to prisoners in Administrative
Detention are different than the protections provided to disciplinary segregation inmates. See
Harris v Caruso,465 Fed.Appx. 481,484 (6th Cir.2012)( administrative segregation requires
“some sort of periodic review of the confinement.”); see also Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969
F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir.1992)(due process in prison disciplinary proceeding requires: “(1)
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advance (at least 24 hours before hearing) written notice of the claimed violation; (2) the
opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker; (3) the opportunity to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence (when consistent with institutional safety); and (4) a written
statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary
action.”)
The Plaintiff did not clarify in his amended complaint that he served nine months in
disciplinary segregation, nor did he articulate a specific due process violation in the disciplinary
proceedings. Based on his allegations, the court clearly stated in its merit review order the
Plaintiff’s surviving claim alleged his due process rights were violated “based on his continued
placement in administrative detention.” (October 19, 2010 Merit Review Order, p. 2). While
the Plaintiff has filed extensive briefs in this case and has asked to amend his complaint, he has
never asked to add a due process claim based on the disciplinary tickets1. See (Amd. Comp.[7]
(79 pages with exhibits); Mot. Reconsider Merit Review [21](15 pages); Plain. S.J. Resp.
[51](100 pages with exhibits); Plain.S.J. Resp. [64, 65](200 pages with exhibits)). Therefore,
this claim is not currently before the court and the court will not consider the Plaintiff’s time in
segregation. Shanhan v City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1996)(a party “may not
amend his complaint through arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment.”)
The Plaintiff’s final stay on Administrative Detention was seven months from May 5,
2010 to December 1, 2011. Although the Plaintiff has presented little specific evidence
concerning the differences in his housing, it appears this term of Administrative Detention was
more restrictive than his previous confinements. The Plaintiff states there are different levels of
Administrative Detention and apparently he was placed on a different level after his disciplinary
infractions. See (Plain. Resp., Offender Orientation Manual, p 5). For instance, the Plaintiff
maintains he was isolated from other inmates during this time. However, he was allowed
showers once a week, five hours of yard time a week, phone calls, non-contact visits, a
television, access to legal materials and the opportunity to participate in some religious
observances. The Plaintiff says he was not allowed to participate in congressional services or
have a job. He states he was not able to participate in programs which were offered, but does not
state whether he made the appropriate written request for participation. The Plaintiff also claims
he was given a smaller property box and provided unsuitable shaving cream once a week.
The court notes the Plaintiff has included many arguments in his response which are not
relevant to his surviving claim. For instance, he alleges he was denied his “special medical diet”
at Pontiac because he was told the facility did not provide that diet. (Plain. Resp., Plain. Aff, p.
2). He also alleges he did not receive medical care if he did not submit a money voucher. The
Plaintiff does not claim his housing in Administrative Detention had any bearing on his medical
1

The Defendants have also provided copies of the disciplinary proceedings showing the Plaintiff

was given notice of the disciplinary ticket, was able to attend the hearing and was provided the
basis for the Adjustment Committee’s decision. (Def. Mot. [80],Ex. A-1, Ex. A-2). The report
indicates the Plaintiff admitted all or part of each of the disciplinary infractions. He received
three months segregation for the first ticket and six months segregation in addition to a loss of
three months of good time credits for the second ticket. (Def. Mot. [80],Ex. A-1, Ex. A-2). The
Plaintiff has never indicated either ticket was expunged
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diet or money vouchers, nor has he previously established an Eighth Amendment claim on either
issue.
Based on the record before the court, neither of the Plaintiff’s two separate terms in
Administrative Detention at Pontiac (August 18, 2008 to July 21, 2009 or May 5, 2010 to
December 1, 2011) where sufficiently harsh to establish a liberty interest. Furthermore, each of
the Plaintiff’s placements was different and distinct in nature. The Plaintiff has ignored those
distinctions and never clearly alleged any due process claim based on his time in segregation
versus administrative detention.
The court acknowledges that some circuit courts have held that periods of confinement
that approach or exceed one year may trigger a liberty interest without any reference to the
inmate’s living conditions. See Marion, 559 F.3d at 698 FN 3 (7th Cir. 2009)(collecting cases).
However, the Seventh Circuit in considering a case involving 240 days in disciplinary
segregation stated that “a liberty interest may arise if the length of segregated confinement is
substantial and the record reveals the conditions of confinement are unusually harsh.” Id at 69798.
[B]oth the duration and the conditions of segregation must be considered
in the due process analysis; if the conditions of segregation were significantly
harsher than those in the normal prison environment, ‘then a year of [segregation]
might count as a deprivation of liberty where a few days or even weeks might not.’
Marion, 559 F.3d at 698 quoting Bryan v Duckworth, 88 F.3d 431, 433 (7th Cir. 1996)
Neither the Plaintiff’s eleven month stay in the Administrative Detention Re-Entry Program Unit
(August 18, 2008 to July 21, 2009) or his seven month stay in Administrative Detention (May 5,
2010 to December 1, 2011) tip the balance in favor of establishing a liberty interest.
Furthermore, if the Plaintiff was able to combine these distinct and different housing
assignments, the Plaintiff has still not demonstrated his living conditions were particularly harsh
compared to ordinary prison life. See Morefield v Smith, 2010 WL 5018221 (11th Cir. Dec, 9,
2010)(although four year confinement in administrative segregation was lengthy, plaintiff did not
establish liberty interest based on living conditions).
In addition, although the Plaintiff insists that all of his different confinement periods
should be combined for consideration into one four year and eight month period of segregated
confinement, he has presented no case law to support this contention and therefore the
Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity
insulates government actors from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
been aware. Siliven v Ind.Dept. of Child Servs., 635 F.3d 921, 925-26 (7th Cir. 2011). “In other
words, the doctrine protects public officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be
lawful, and thus leaves ample room for mistaken judgments.” Id.(citations omitted). The
Defendants in this case worked at different correctional centers and had no reason to believe the
different housing classifications, including time spent in the infirmary, time in administrative
detention and time in disciplinary segregation, would all be considered one term of segregated

8 

confinement which rose to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest entitled to the
same due process protections.
Finally, to the extent the Plaintiff could demonstrate that any of his periods of
confinement in Administrative Detention at Pontiac Correctional Center establish the requisite
liberty interest, there is evidence the Plaintiff received the process he was due. There are no
rigid rules for the court to consider. Wilkinson v Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005).
“Administrative segregation, however, may not be used as a ‘pretext of indefinite confinement of
an inmate.” Alston v DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 1994). “The Supreme Court has
indicated that ‘[p]rison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement
of such inmates [in administrative segregation].’” See Harris v Caruso,465 Fed.Appx. 481,484
(6th Cir.2012) quoting Hewitt v Helms 459 U.S. 460, 477 n. 9 (1983) abrogated on other grounds
by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. “This review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit
the submission of any additional evidence or statements.” Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477, n. 9.
“However, the decision to continue confinement must be supported by some evidence. This
requirement balances the procedural rights of prisoner against the need of prison officials to have
freedom to operate their facilities on a day-to-day basis.” Harris , 465 Fed.Appx at 484(internal
citations omitted) (plaintiff received meaningful, periodic reviews of placement in administrative
segregation); Morefield,404 Fed. Appx at 446 (Plaintiff “received all the process he was due....an
opportunity for rebuttal at his initial hearing, and periodic reviews of his status every 30
days.”);Williams v Hobbs, 662 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2012) (Defendants violate due process based on
14 year stay in administrative segregation without meaningful reviews).
The Plaintiff’s confinement was reviewed every 90 days by a facility review committee.
While the Plaintiff states he did not know the reasons for his initial placement, he has repeated
listed the reasons in his briefing to this court and states he was able to discuss his classification
with various administrators. (Def. Mot, [63], Plain. Depo., p. 7). The Defendants motion for
summary judgment is granted. [79]
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 56
[79]. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and
against Plaintiff. This case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. The
Defendants’ motion to stay is denied as moot. [83] All deadlines and settings on the
Court’s calendar are vacated including the January 9, 2014 pretrial and the February 18,
2014 jury trial date.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this
Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues Plaintiff will present on
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be
liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

Entered this 3rd day of January, 2014.
9 

s/James E. Shadid
_________________________________________
JAMES E. SHADID
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10