Malone v. City of Peoria et al
Filing
24
ORDER & OPINION entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 3/19/2014: IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Timothy Moore's Motion to Dismiss 19 is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint 13 is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff MAY file an amended complaint within twenty-one days of the date of this Order if he has grounds for equitable tolling. If he fails to do so, the case will be terminated. SEE FULL WRITTEN ORDER & OPINION. (JRK, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 19 March, 2014 02:57:18 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
WILLIAM A. MALONE,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF PEORIA, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 12-cv-1257
ORDER & OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Timothy Moore’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 19). Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition (Doc. 23). For the reasons
stated below, this Motion is granted.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on July 30, 2012, bringing multiple claims
against numerous Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging these
Defendants violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). Upon screening this
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court determined that Plaintiff was
improperly attempting to bring unrelated claims against multiple Defendants, and
gave Plaintiff one opportunity to amend his complaint to correct this problem. (Doc.
8). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 13), but it again sought to bring
unrelated claims against multiple Defendants; accordingly, the Court began its
merit review analysis with the first presented claim, and dismissed all unrelated
claims and Defendants. (Doc. 12 at 1-2). Ultimately, the Court concluded the only
claim that properly remained after this analysis was Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
excessive force claim against Defendant Timothy Moore, based specifically on
conduct during Plaintiff’s arrest. (Doc. 12 at 2, 3). All other Defendants were
dismissed.
Defendant Timothy Moore filed the present Motion to Dismiss on October 17,
2013. He argues Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations,
and seeks dismissal of the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 19 at 1).
LEGAL STANDARD
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), “the court must treat all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” In re marchFIRST Inc., 589 F.3d 901,
904 (7th Cir. 2009). The complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint must contain sufficient detail to
give notice of the claim, and the allegations must “plausibly suggest that the
plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level.’”
EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, although the statute
of limitations is typically an affirmative defense, if the allegations “show that relief
is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); see
also Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A., 610 F.3d 382, 383 (7th Cir.
2010). However, the defense must be “airtight,” and such issues are generally more
2
appropriate for a motion under Rule 12(c), rather than Rule 12(b)(6). Richards v.
Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012).
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Defendant Timothy Moore is a detective for the Peoria Police Department. On
the morning of June 20, 2009, Defendant made a traffic stop of Plaintiff’s vehicle in
downtown Peoria, Illinois. Plaintiff was in the bed of his truck, and Defendant
demanded that he get out. When Plaintiff said he could not, Defendant pulled him
over the side of the truck, handcuffed him, elbowed him, and dragged him to his
squad car. Plaintiff was taken to the police station, where Defendant and another
detective, not named in the pleadings, “grabbed, pushed, knocked to the floor, yelled
at, and intimidated” Plaintiff for several hours. After this, Plaintiff was brought to
the Peoria County Jail. There are no other allegations relating to Defendant
Timothy Moore or the excessive force claim against him in the Amended Complaint.
DISCUSSION
The statute of limitations applicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
brought in federal court in Illinois is two years. Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506
F.3d 622, 623 (7th Cir. 2007). This limitations period is borrowed from the state
statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Id. The state’s tolling provisions
also apply when determining the timeliness of a § 1983 claim. See Johnson v.
Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 2001).
The Court draws the facts in this section from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
(Doc. 13), treating his allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
his favor, in accordance with the motion to dismiss standard described above.
1
3
As a preliminary matter, in the interest of efficiency and judicial economy,
because the legal standards for a motion under Rule 12(c) is the same as one under
12(b)(6), see United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1581 (7th Cir. 1991), the Court
treats the Motion to Dismiss as though it were a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on
the pleadings, rather than require Defendant to file an answer and a subsequent
Rule 12(c) motion that would contain identical arguments.
The conduct that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s only remaining claim occurred
on July 20, 2009, when Plaintiff alleges Defendant Moore stopped his vehicle,
forcefully dragged him out of his truck and into the police car, and took him to the
police station. The claim is limited to the alleged Fourth Amendment violation
during Plaintiff’s arrest on that day. There are no other allegations related to this
claim after July 20, 2009. Plaintiff’s initial Complaint was filed on July 30, 2012,
more than three years after the conduct took place. This is clearly beyond the twoyear limitations period.
In Plaintiff’s Response, he raises no issues of tolling. However, in the
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he filed numerous grievances, and that
he still has not received responses. The time during which a prisoner completes an
administrative grievance process ordinarily tolls the statute of limitations period
under Illinois law, because the PLRA prohibition of prison condition suits prior to
exhaustion operates as a statutory prohibition under the applicable tolling statute,
735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-216. Johnson, 272 F.3d at 521-22. However, even taking
Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds this general rule does not apply to
Plaintiff’s grievances about a Fourth Amendment violation during his arrest. The
4
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires only that prisoners exhaust
administrative remedies available before bringing § 1983 claims “with respect to
prison conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Plaintiff’s claim does not come within this
category, as it is based on conduct during his arrest, before he was incarcerated, and
is not about prison conditions. Cf. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 529, 532 (2002)
(holding “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about
prison life” and finding it plausible that “Congress inserted ‘prison conditions’ into
the exhaustion provision simply to make it clear that preincarceration claims fall
outside § 1997e(a), for example, . . . a § 1983 claim against [an inmate’s] arresting
officer.”). Because exhaustion was not required, there is no basis for tolling the
limitations period while he pursued alternative administrative procedures to obtain
a remedy. See Taylor v. Chi. Police Dep’t, No. 07-CV-5097, 2008 WL 2477694, at *3
(N.D. Ill. June 18, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Taylor v. City of Chi., 334 F. App'x 760 (7th
Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the only plausible basis for tolling the statute of limitations
alleged in the Amended Complaint does not apply, and Plaintiff has not raised any
other basis for equitable tolling in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss.
The only argument Plaintiff raised in his Response against the statute of
limitations defense is plainly without merit. Plaintiff argues that because there are
exceptions to the two-year limitations period in Illinois for claims of damages that
result from certain felonies if the perpetrator was convicted, and because Plaintiff
was convicted of felonies in those classes, he had a longer period to file his claim.
(Doc. 23 at 1-2). Even if this exception for felonious conduct applied to § 1983
actions, which is not clear given that the general personal injury limitations period
5
for a state applies rather than any more specific limitations period, see Owens v.
Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989), Plaintiff misunderstands the statute. The
alleged perpetrator, Defendant Moore, would have to be the person convicted of a
felony for the conduct; Plaintiff’s felony convictions are irrelevant.
Thus, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is clear from the pleadings that
Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred and must be dismissed. This dismissal is without
prejudice, as Plaintiff may plead allegations that would allow a finding of equitable
tolling or equitable estoppel. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Cook Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., 993
F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ill. 1998). If Plaintiff feels he has a basis for equitable
tolling of the time to file his Complaint, he must file an amended complaint within
twenty-one days of the date of this Order including such allegations. Otherwise, this
case will be terminated.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Timothy Moore’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 19) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff MAY file an amended complaint
within twenty-one days of the date of this Order if he has grounds for equitable
tolling. If he fails to do so, the case will be terminated.
Entered this 19th day of March, 2014.
s/ Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?