Huggins v. Astrue

Filing 11

ORDER entered by Judge Sara Darrow on August 19, 2014. Plaintiff Timothy Huggins's 6 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant Commissioner of Social Security's 9 Motion for Summary Affirmance is also GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order. (JD, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 19 August, 2014 04:35:55 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
TIMOTHY L. HUGGINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:13-cv-01046-SLD

ORDER
Plaintiff Timothy L. Huggins appeals the final decision of Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin,
Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), denying his
application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 401 et seq. This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, ECF No. 6, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Affirmance, ECF No. 10. For the
following reasons, both Motions are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
I.

Facts
Timothy Huggins has a high school education, R. 48, and has previously worked as a

factory welder, delivery sales driver, and cook, R. 155. In his most recent job, Huggins earned
about $41,000 per year as a factory welder for Caterpillar. R. 140. Around June 23, 2009,
Huggins began reporting symptoms including high blood pressure, anxiety, sleeping trouble,
dizziness, and headaches. R. 377–80. As of August 4, 2009, Huggins reported that he had
ceased working entirely due to his dizziness and other medical conditions. R. 383. Specifically,

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Huggins claims, he cannot work due to difficulties driving, unpredictable dizzy spells, and leg
swelling and pain that prevents him from standing or sitting for extended periods and requires
him to elevate his legs three to four hours each day. See R. 48, 50, 53–54.
He also claims to have breathing problems, chronic pain from a rib injury, memory and
concentration difficulties, and severe daytime fatigue due to sleeping only two to three hours per
night. R. 48–49, 55, 58. Because he sleeps so little each night, he takes a 30 to 40 minute nap
each day. R. 59. Huggins claims to experience shortness of breath and dizziness when climbing
stairs; to have difficulty walking more than a block due to windedness and cramping; and to be
unable to do more than simple exercises that do not raise his heart rate. See R. 47–49, 53–54, 60.
He has been diagnosed as obese, R. 654, and weighed 333 pounds as of July 1, 2011, R. 46.
Huggins lives with his wife, who performs most of the household chores. R. 56–57. He
does not do any activities lasting more than 15 to 20 minutes, and watches television for most of
the day. Id. He only drives a few times per week due to his dizziness, which he said has also
caused him to fall down his stairs. R. 47, 55.
II.

Procedural History
Huggins filed a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits on January 12, 2010, for a period

of disability beginning on June 23, 2009. R. 153–62. Huggins claimed that his ability to work
was limited by his reactive airway disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”),
obesity, obstructive sleep apnea, deep vein thrombosis (“DVT”), dizziness of unknown etiology,
and pain related to a left rib fracture. R. 154. His application was initially denied on April 15,
2010. R. 17. Huggins asked the Social Security Administration to reconsider his application and
was denied a second time on August 5, 2010. Id. He then requested a hearing, which was held
on July 1, 2011, with Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Robert H. Schwartz. R. 42.

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The ALJ found that Huggins had six severe impairments—reactive airway disease,
COPD, obesity, obstructive sleep apnea, DVT, and dizziness of unknown etiology—as well as
two impairments that did not qualify as “severe”: continuing pain due to a rib fracture and a
history of hypertension. R. 19–20. ALJ Schwartz also found that Huggins retained the Residual
Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to lift, carry, push, and/or pull no more than 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; to stand and/or walk at least two hours in an eight hour
workday; to occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but not ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and that
Huggins must avoid even moderate exposure to fumes, odors, dust, gases, poor ventilation, and
concentrated exposure to workplace hazards. R. 21. ALJ Schwartz found that although Huggins
is unable to perform any past relevant work, there are jobs existing in significant numbers in the
national economy that he can perform, such as eyewear assembler, circuit board screener, or
document preparer/telephone clerk. R. 27–28.
As a result of this analysis, ALJ Schwartz determined that Huggins was not disabled, as
defined in the Social Security Act, from June 23, 2009, through July 15, 2011. R. 28. On July
25, 2011, Huggins requested a review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council. R. 130.
The Appeals Council denied Huggins’s request for review on October 11, 2012, making the
ALJ’s decision final. R. 5. Huggins filed the instant action on January 31, 2013, requesting the
Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
I.

District Court Review of the ALJ Decision
The Court’s function on review is not to try the case de novo or to supplant the ALJ’s

findings with the Court’s own assessment of the evidence. See Schmidt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970,
972 (7th Cir. 2000); Pugh v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1989). Instead, the Court’s

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role is to determine whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and
whether the proper legal standards were applied. See Cannon v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 970, 975 (7th
Cir. 2000). To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the Court reviews the record as a
whole but does not reconsider facts, reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide
questions of credibility. See id. (citing Williams v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1066, 1072 (7th Cir. 1999)).
Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.

See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);

Henderson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 1999). Even if reasonable minds could differ
concerning a disability determination, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if it is adequately
supported. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). Indeed, “[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2000).
Although great deference is afforded to the determination made by the ALJ, the Court
does not merely rubber stamp the ALJ’s decision. Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir.
2002) (citations omitted).

Rather, the ALJ’s decision must “sufficiently articulate their

assessment of the evidence to assure us that they considered the important evidence and to
enable us to trace the path of their reasoning.” Id. at 595 (quoting Hickman v. Apfel, 187 F.3d
683, 689 (7th Cir. 1999)). The ALJ has a duty to “minimally articulate his or her justification for
rejecting or accepting specific evidence of disability.” Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 700
(7th Cir. 2004) (citing Steward v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1988)). Further, the
ALJ’s decision must build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the ultimate
conclusions. Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010); Scott, 297 F.3d at 595.
Though the ALJ “need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record, he must confront the

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evidence that does not support his conclusion and explain why it was rejected.” Indoranto v.
Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Kararsky v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 539, 543
(7th Cir. 2002)). If there is an error of law, reversal is warranted “irrespective of the volume of
evidence supporting the factual findings.” Schmoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir.
1980).
II.

Entitlement to Benefits
In order to be entitled to DIB, a claimant must show that his inability to work is medical

in nature and that he is totally disabled.

Economic conditions, personal factors, financial

considerations, and attitudes of employers are irrelevant in determining whether a claimant is
eligible for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566, 416.966. The establishment of
disability under the Social Security Act is a two-step process.
First, the claimant must be suffering from a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment, or combination of impairments, which can be expected to result in death, or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
Second, there must be a factual determination that the impairment renders the claimant
unable to engage in any substantial gainful employment. See McNeil v. Califano, 614 F.2d 142,
143 (7th Cir. 1980). This factual determination is made by using a five-step test. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The five-step test requires the ALJ to evaluate whether the claimant:
1) Has not, during the relevant time period, performed any substantial gainful
activity;
2) Suffers from an impairment that is severe or whether a combination of his
impairments is severe;

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3) Suffers from an impairment which matches or is substantially equivalent to an
impairment in the Listing of Impairments (20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1);
4) Is unable to perform his former occupation; and
5) Is unable to perform any other work within the national economy.
An affirmative answer at steps 1, 2, or 4 leads to the next step of the test. An affirmative
answer at steps 3 or 5 leads to a finding that the claimant is disabled. Conversely, a negative
answer at any point, other than at step 3, stops the inquiry and leads to a determination that the
claimant is not disabled. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). A negative
answer at step 3 requires the ALJ to proceed to step 4, where the ALJ will make a finding about
the claimant’s RFC based on all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
The RFC “measures the claimant’s capacity to engage in basic work activities. If the claimant’s
RFC permits him to perform his prior work, benefits are denied.” Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S.
467, 471 (1986) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e)).

If, on the other hand, the

claimant cannot perform his past relevant work, then the RFC is used in step 5 to determine
whether the plaintiff can adjust to other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
The claimant has the burden of production and persuasion at steps 1 through 4. But once
the claimant shows an inability to perform past work (step 4), the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to show that the claimant is able to engage in some other type of substantial
gainful employment (step 5). Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1252–53 (7th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
In determining that there were still some jobs Huggins could perform, the ALJ found
that Huggins’s conditions were not as debilitating as both he and his treating physicians
claimed. Huggins argues that the ALJ’s determination should be reversed because he (1)

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improperly rejected Huggins’s treating physicians’ opinions, and (2) erroneously rejected
Huggins’s testimony regarding the extent of the limitations imposed by his impairments. Pl.’s
Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 10–17, ECF No. 7.
I.

Weighing Medical Opinions
In finding that Huggins was not totally incapable of work, the ALJ rejected (1) Dr. Athir

Hajjar’s opinion that Huggins required two to three unscheduled breaks throughout the day and
would have to miss work more than three times per month, and (2) Dr. James Morse’s opinion
that Huggins was limited in arm and hand use, could not carry any weight, and required extra
breaks one to two times per hour. R. 26, 898–912. Huggins argues that the ALJ refused to give
these opinions controlling weight without sufficient basis, and even if not entitled to controlling
weight, the ALJ failed explain why he did not grant them any measure of deference. Pl.’s Mem.
in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 10–12.
A. Standards for Evaluating Medical Opinions
In order to determine a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must determine what weight to give the
opinions of his treating physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. The general rule is that a treating
physician’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is supported by medical evidence and is
not inconsistent with other evidence in the record. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2); Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345
F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003). A treating physician’s opinion, however, “is not the final word on
the claimant’s disability,” as her opinion may lack objectivity due to her desire to help her
patient. See Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ may therefore
discount that physician’s opinion if it “is inconsistent with the opinion of a consulting physician
or when the treating physician’s opinion is internally inconsistent,” provided that the ALJ

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“minimally articulates his reasons for crediting or rejecting evidence of disability.” Id. (quoting
Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 2004)).
Even if an ALJ determines that a treating physician’s opinion does not deserve
controlling weight, the ALJ must still determine whether the opinion is entitled to consideration
under a lesser measure of deference. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d
556, 561 (7th Cir. 2009). In making this determination, an ALJ is to examine the following
factors: (1) the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; (2) the frequency of
examination; (3) the supportability of the opinion; (4) the consistency of the opinion with the
record; (5) the specialization of the treating source; and (6) other factors that tend to support or
contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6). An ALJ may not reject the physician’s
opinion on the basis of conjecture or speculation. Moss, 555 F.3d at 561.
B. Analysis
ALJ Schwartz rejected certain opinions by Drs. Hajjar and Morse in the Multiple
Impairment Questionnaires they submitted on Huggins’s behalf because they were inconsistent
with evidence in the record, and instead based his determination on “objective medical findings
and reasonable limitations deduced therefrom.” R. 26. Specifically, the ALJ rejected Dr.
Hajjar’s opinion that Huggins would need two to three unscheduled breaks and would miss more
than three days of work per month, explaining that Dr. Hajjar had relied heavily on Huggins’s
report of his symptoms and limitations. R. 27. That Dr. Hajjar’s opinion corresponds with
Huggins’s subjective complaints does not necessarily mean, however, that it lacks objective
scientific support. Indeed, Dr. Hajjar noted “positive clinical findings” of shortness of breath,
chest tightness, wheezing, edema, episodic acute asthma, fatigue, and coughing, R. 907, and
indicated that echocardiogram results supported his diagnosis, R. 908. By contrast, the ALJ

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never identifies which particular “objective medical findings” undermine Dr. Hajjar’s
conclusion, nor how they do so.
Similarly, the ALJ rejected Dr. Morse’s opinion that Huggins would miss several days of
work and would need extra breaks, because Dr. Morse did not specifically explain how these
limitations arose from the medical tests and studies Huggins underwent. R. 27. The ALJ also
rejected Dr. Morse’s opinion that Huggins suffered from limitations in the claimant’s ability to
grasp items and use his arms because the record did not indicate that Dr. Morse had treated
Huggins for any impairment of his hands or arms, or that Huggins complained of limitations or
pain in those areas. R. 26. According to the ALJ, the limitations endorsed by Dr. Morse
appeared to be based on Huggins’s opinion of his abilities rather than medical findings. R. 27.
Like Dr. Hajjar, however, Dr. Morse based his Questionnaire opinions on “positive clinical
findings” of shortness of breath under any degree of exertion, R. 856, as well as the results of
pulmonary function testing, a CT scan of Huggins’s chest, and an echocardiogram, among other
tests. R. 857. The ALJ does not explain how such clinical findings and test results fail to
support Dr. Morse’s conclusions—even if they also account for Huggins’s subjective reports—
nor what “objective medical evidence” elsewhere in the record contradicts Dr. Morse’s opinion.
See Gudgel, 345 F.3d at 470.
The ALJ therefore fails to adequately explain the inconsistencies between both
physicians’ Questionnaire opinions and the record that justify rejecting those opinions. See
Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870. Moreover, the ALJ articulated no basis for finding that the physicians’
opinions reflected only Huggins’s subjective biases, and not the cited medical evidence. See
Moss, 555 F.3d at 560–61. Finally, assuming arguendo that the doctors’ opinions were not
entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ failed to explain why some lesser deference was not

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accorded them under the multi-factor analysis required by Social Security regulation. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6); Moss, 555 F.3d at 561. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the
ALJ to explain how he weighs the opinions of Huggins’s treating physicians.
II.

Credibility Determinations
The ALJ found that Huggins statements as to the debilitating effects of his symptoms

“are not credible to the extent that they are inconsistent with” his RFC. R. 22. In addition to the
ALJ’s use of this discouraged “boilerplate language,” see, e.g., Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351,
367–68 (7th Cir. 2013), Huggins argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting Huggins’s testimony
about limitations imposed by his symptoms, particularly his (1) sleep apnea and episodes of
dizziness, (2) respiratory ailments, and (3) DVT. Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 14–15.
A. Legal Standard
A claimant can establish the severity of his symptoms on the basis of his own testimony.
Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2007). If a claimant’s testimony regarding his
symptoms is not “substantiated by objective medical evidence,” the ALJ must determine the
credibility of these statements in light of the entire record. See SSR 96-7p. The “entire record”
includes “the objective medical evidence, the individual’s own statements about symptoms,
statements and other information provided by treating or examining physicians . . . about the
symptoms and how they affect the individual, and other relevant evidence in the case record.”
Arnold, 473 F.3d at 823 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An ALJ may not
discredit testimony regarding the severity of symptoms on the sole basis of lack of objective
medical evidence. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2014).
The ALJ must state enough of the rationale underlying his credibility determination so
the claimant and reviewing bodies understand why the credibility determination was reached.

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See Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333–34 (7th Cir. 1994).

The ALJ’s credibility

determination is entitled to deference if it is supported by “substantial and convincing evidence.”
Arnold, 473 F.3d at 823. An ALJ’s determination is subject to reversal only if it is “patently
wrong.” Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). This Court’s review is confined
to the rationales offered by the ALJ. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93–95 (1943).
B. Analysis
Formulaically stating the inconsistency between claimed symptoms and the ALJ’s RFC
finding is on its own insufficient to support a credibility determination. Richison v. Astrue, 462
F. App’x 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2012). However, use of such “boilerplate” language does not
automatically invalidate the ALJ’s conclusion “if he otherwise points to information that justifies
his credibility determination.” Pepper, 712 F.3d at 367–68. Here, the ALJ explained his
credibility determinations on the basis of specific evidence in the record that contradicted
Huggins’s assertions, as explained below, and therefore the ALJ’s use of the “boilerplate”
phrasing, while regrettable, is not reversible error.
1. Sleep Apnea and Dizziness
The ALJ discredited Huggins’s claims as to the limitations imposed by Huggins’s sleep
apnea on the basis of objective medical evidence and Huggins’s own reports of improvement.
See Arnold, 473 F.3d at 823. The ALJ found that Huggins’s sleep apnea “responded well to the
CPAP machine” and that his sleep apnea “is well controlled and does not preclude all work
activity.” The ALJ cited reports from Huggins, echoed by his doctor, that the CPAP therapy
helped mitigate his sleep apnea, including reducing daytime sleepiness and nonrestorative sleep.
R. 24. The ALJ also looked to the results of the August 27, 2009 Illinois Lung Institute sleep
study Huggins underwent, which demonstrated that CPAP use increased Huggins’s sleep

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efficiency and allowed for a “fair amount” of REM sleep. Id. Additionally, the ALJ noted,
Huggins drove a few times a week, a risk he would not likely take if his daytime sleepiness was
debilitating. R. 24. Huggins argues that this evidence does not contradict his claims that he
sleeps only two to three hours per night, which on its own results in fatigue limiting his ability to
work a full-time job. Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 15 (citing R. 58). However, in light of
the substantial record evidence that treatment had improved Huggins’s sleep apnea and led to
better quality sleep, the ALJ’s rejection on this basis of Huggins’s testimony regarding his
sleep—to the extent it indicates he is incapable of performing even the limited work provided for
in his RFC—is not patently wrong. See Jones, 623 F.3d at 1160.
In addition to fatigue from lack of sleep, Huggins claims his dizziness precludes his
ability to work. Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 15. Here too, the ALJ explained his
rejection of Huggins’s testimony on the basis of medical evidence and Huggins’s statements to
his doctors. The ALJ noted: a head CT scan revealed no abnormalities; after receiving treatment
for his other impairments, Huggins reported improvement with his dizziness, which he said was
reduced to three to four occurrences per week; and Huggins’s physician had only advised
Huggins against climbing ladders or working at a height, which implied that nonelevated work
was possible. R. 25. Therefore, the ALJ did not obviously err in discounting Huggins’s
testimony regarding the limitations imposed by his dizziness.
2. Respiratory Symptoms and Cigarette Smoking
The Seventh Circuit discourages discrediting claimants on the basis of their failure to quit
smoking. See Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Rousey v. Heckler,
771 F.2d 1065, 1069 (7th Cir. 1985)). There must at least be medical evidence directly linking
the smoking to the claimant’s symptoms. See id. Even with such evidence, given nicotine’s

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addictive nature, “it is extremely tenuous to infer from the failure to give up smoking that the
claimant is incredible” when he testifies to the severity of a symptom. Id.
In finding that Huggins’s restrictive airway disease and COPD were not totally disabling,
the ALJ noted that Huggins “continues to smoke a pack of cigarettes per day, as he has done for
several years, despite being informed that this was a large contributor to his symptoms.” R. 24.
At least one of his physicians, Dr. Penelope Eubank, who Huggins consulted regarding his
asthma, determined that smoking was a large contributor to Mr. Huggins’s respiratory symptoms
and “strongly encouraged” him to quit. R. 653–54. The ALJ was therefore justified in taking
Huggins’s smoking into consideration because medical evidence established the requisite link
between cigarette use and Huggins’s symptoms. See Shramek, 226 F.3d at 813.
On its own, Huggins’s continued smoking would be “an unreliable basis on which to rest
a credibility determination.” See id. However, the ALJ’s credibility determination regarding
Huggins’s respiratory conditions did not turn on smoking, but rested on the weight of the record
evidence as a whole, including medical findings and Huggins’s reports to his doctors. See SSR
96-7p; Arnold, 473 F.3d at 823. The ALJ cited: physician findings that Huggins’s lungs were
clear, and that he lacked substantial rales, rhonchi or wheezing; pulmonary function testing
establishing that Huggins suffered only “moderate restriction”; Huggins’s lack of daytime
oxygen supplementation, or clubbing or cyanosis of his extremities; the absence of frequent
emergency room or hospital visits based on his respiratory symptoms, with Huggins suffering
“only mild wheezes” and “no acute distress” in the only such visit of note; and Huggins’s reports
to his doctors that treatment and/or time away from welding had helped reduce the severity of his
symptoms.

R. 24. Therefore, even if the Court ignores the link the ALJ found between

Huggins’s smoking and his symptoms, the ALJ supported his credibility determination with

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substantial and convincing other record evidence such that the Court cannot say his finding was
patently wrong. See Jones, 623 F.3d at 1160; Arnold, 473 F.3d at 823.
3. Deep Vein Thrombosis
Huggins disputes the ALJ’s alleged finding of “no evidence of complications” from
Huggins’s DVT.

Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 15.

However, the ALJ’s actual

determination was narrower: the record did not support a claim that the DVT precluded all work
activity.

R. 25.

In discrediting Huggins’s testimony to the contrary, the ALJ examined:

evidence that even though the DVT began during Huggins’s childhood, it did not prevent
Huggins from welding for Caterpillar from 2002 to 2009, a job with a medium exertion level;
Huggins’s statement in 2009 that his last DVT occurred three years prior, and that he lacked any
history of pulmonary emboli; a 2010 chest CT scan that similarly indicated no acute emboli; and
Huggins’s decision against a right-heart catheterization given its risks and the stability of his
symptoms. R. 25. Given this marshaling of substantial record evidence, the Court has no basis
for finding that, in discrediting Huggins’s claimed total inability to work due to his DVT, the
ALJ was patently wrong. See Jones, 623 F.3d at 1160; Arnold, 473 F.3d at 823.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 6, is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Affirmance, ECF No. 9, is also
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. This case is remanded to the ALJ for further
proceedings consistent with this order.
Entered this 19th day of August, 2014.
s/ Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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