Banco Panamericano, Inc. v. City of Peoria, Illinois et al

Filing 9

ORDER Entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 10/29/13. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 6 is DENIED. Defendants shall answer the Complaint within 21 days from the date of this Order. This matter is again referred to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings. (SW, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 29 October, 2013 04:11:04 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
BANCO PANAMERICANO, INC., a
South Dakota Corporation,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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CITY OF PEORIA, ILLINOIS, an Illinois
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Municipal Corporation, and COUNTY OF
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PEORIA, ILLINOIS, a unit of local government )
in the State of Illinois,
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Defendants.
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Case No. 13-1064

ORDER
This matter is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. For the
reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss [6] is DENIED.
B ACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants City of Peoria (the “City”) and Peoria County
(the “County”) alleging that they have been unjustly enriched by refusing to compensate Plaintiff for
the use of landfill gas to energy conversion equipment located at a landfill owned by the City and
County. Plaintiff provided post-bankruptcy financing to the contractor that owned and installed the
equipment, receiving a security interest in the assets in return. The contractor subsequently defaulted
on the arrangement, and Plaintiff seeks to enforce its security interest against the City and County.
Defendants have moved to dismiss. Plaintiff has responded, and this Order follows.
D ISCUSSION

Courts have traditionally held that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears from
the pleadings that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle
her to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Gould v. Artisoft, Inc., 1 F.3d 544, 548 (7th
Cir. 1993). Rather, a complaint should be construed broadly and liberally in conformity with the

mandate in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(f). More recently, the Supreme Court has phrased this
standard as requiring a showing sufficient “to raise a right to relief beyond a speculative level.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). Furthermore, the claim for relief must be
“plausible on its face.” Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff; its well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true, and all reasonably-drawn
inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994);
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d
467 (7th Cir. 1997); M.C.M. Partners, Inc. V. Andrews-Bartlett & Assoc., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 969 (7th
Cir. 1995); Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1992).
Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to state a claim for unjust enrichment, as it fails to
state sufficient facts demonstrating that they were unjustly enriched, any impoverishment on the part
of Plaintiff, or any relationship between the alleged enrichment and impoverishment. Rule 8(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s
jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction, and the
claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader
seeks.
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants have received a benefit by retaining the gas to
energy conversion equipment without paying rent on it. Plaintiff further alleges that it holds a
security interest in the equipment as a result of providing post-bankruptcy financing to the
contractor and that it is attempting to enforce its security interest in the wake of a default on the

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financing agreement by the contractor. The alleged retention and use of the equipment without
providing rental payments sufficiently alleges a detriment to Plaintiff. The allegation that Plaintiff
has a security interest in the equipment also promotes the reasonable inference that it has a claim to
the equipment or revenue therefrom that is superior to Defendants status as renters, suggesting a
benefit being retained by Defendants. This sufficiently outlines a recognizable legal claim and
promotes the reasonable inference that Defendants have been unjustly enriched as required to
survive a motion to dismiss.
C ONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [6] is DENIED. Defendants
shall answer the Complaint within 21 days from the date of this Order. This matter is again referred
to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.
ENTERED this 29 th day of October, 2013.

s/ James E. Shadid
James E. Shadid
Chief United States District Judge

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