Mays v. Godinez et al

Filing 109

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 02/09/2015. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion as it relates to the claim for retaliation are GRANTED 101 , 103 . Plaint iff's related motion 104 is DENIED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own cost s. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee. 2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Ci r. 1999)(an appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for appealing so that the district judge "can make a reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith."); Walker v OBrien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Ci r. 2000)(providing that a good faith appeal is an appeal that "a reasonableperson could supposehas some merit" from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal. See full written Opinion.(JS, ilcd)

E-FILED

Monday, 09 February, 2015 10:35:34 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
KENNETH MAYS,
Plaintiff,
v.
S.A. GODINEZ, et al.
Defendants.

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13-1114

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
Defendants Pfister, Reed, Brown, Miller, Godinez, and Lemke, and Defendants Tilden
and Mitchell filed Motions for Summary Judgment on the issue of exhaustion [d/e 53, 55]. On
February 13, 2014, the Court granted Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on the issue
of exhaustion as it related to Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
[d/e 100]. At that time, the Court granted leave for the parties to file supplemental Motions for
Summary Judgment on the issue of exhaustion related to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. The parties
have submitted supplemental motions [d/e 101, 103, 104], and the matter is before the Court on
that issue.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358
(7th Cir. 2010). The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a genuine issue
of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine”

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issue, there must be more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff filed two grievances that appear to address the issue of retaliation: one filed on
March 3, 2011 [d/e 101-2 at 3-4]1; and, one was filed on March 7, 2011 [d/e 101-2 at 5-6]. The
grievances addressed similar issues. The Grievance Officer combined the two into a single
grievance #053844, and in one fell swoop on March 26, 2011, recommended to the Chief
Administrative Officer (CAO) that the grievances be denied as moot. [d/e 101-2 at 2]. The
CAO concurred on March 31, 2011, and the Plaintiff appealed. Id. The Administrative Review
Board (ARB) denied the appeal on May 5, 2011. [d/e 101-2 at 1]. The Defendants do not argue
that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust the combined grievance prior to filing the present lawsuit
with respect to the process required by the rules. Rather, Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed
to identify, by name or inference, any of the defendants in the present lawsuit in the body of the
grievance. Therefore, Defendants argue, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
for the retaliation claim.
Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and therefore the burden of proof lies with
the defendants. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court must hold an
evidentiary hearing if a disputed issue of material fact exists, see Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739,
742 (7th Cir. 2008), but where none is present, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary and the

1

Plaintiff filed two (2) grievances on March 3, 2011. In addition to the grievance discussed above, Plaintiff filed a
grievance alleging denial of medical treatment for his wisdom tooth. [d/e 101-2 at 7]. This grievance does not
mention retaliation. See id. Accordingly, this grievance is not relevant to the issue now before the Court and will
not be discussed further.

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issue of exhaustion may be decided as a matter of law. Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F. Supp. 2d 905, 912
(S.D. Ill. 2009).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013). The purpose of this requirement is to “alert the state to the
problem and invite corrective action.” Turley, 729 F.3d at 649 (internal citations omitted). The
Seventh Circuit has adopted a strict compliance standard to exhaustion, and to exhaust remedies
“a prisoner must properly use the prison’s grievance process.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804,
809 (7th Cir. 2006). In other words, “a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place,
and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022,
1025 (7th Cir. 2002). If the prisoner fails to follow the grievance procedures, “the prison
administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner's claim can be indefinitely
unexhausted.” Id.; see Dole, 438 F.3d at 809 (quoting same). “The ‘applicable procedural rules’
that a prisoner must properly exhaust are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance
process itself.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 218 (2007)).
The Illinois Administrative Code requires that prisoners provide “factual details
regarding each aspect of the offender's complaint, including what happened, when, where, and
the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.”
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(b). If names are not known, a prisoner “must include as much
descriptive information about the individual as possible.” Id. In the combined grievance
#053844, Plaintiff alleges that he is not receiving medical care for high blood pressure and blood
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clots. [d/e 101-2 at 3-7]. Plaintiff states further that he believes that he was not receiving
medical treatment in retaliation for filing grievances. Id. Plaintiff specifically identifies “Dr.
Carter” and “Dr. Fahim” in the grievance and alleges incidents at another facility. Id.
As noted above, the Seventh Circuit requires strict compliance with the grievance
process. See Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. Illinois clearly requires that inmates identify the individuals
involved, whether by name or description. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(b). While Plaintiff
did not name any of the defendants in the combined grievances, prison officials decided the issue
on the merits without reference to the now alleged procedural defects. “Where prison officials
address an inmate’s grievance on the merits without rejecting it on procedural grounds, the
grievance has served its function of alerting the state and inviting corrective action, and the
defendants cannot rely on the failure to exhaust defense.” Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722; see also
Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A] procedural default in state proceedings
is fatal to the litigation in federal court only if the state tribunal explicitly relies on that default.”).
Read broadly, this is dispositive of the Defendants’ claim. This rule, however, cannot be
logically applied to the facts of this case.
In Maddox, the inmate did not name or attempt to describe any prison officials in his
grievance. Maddox, 655 F.3d at 714. Instead, the inmate described an announcement made via
the institution’s television channel regarding the prison’s decision to suspend religious services
for a particular faith. Id. Prison officials responded to the grievance on its merits without
reference to the inmate’s failure to adequately identify the individuals involved. Id. at 714-15.
The inmate complained about a prison administrative decision, and, as the Seventh Circuit
reasoned, “it belies reason to suggest that prison administrators…were unaware of who was
responsible for that decision.” Id. at 722. In that scenario, the court stated that the inmate’s

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failure to identify the individuals involved “was a mere technical defect that had no effect on the
process and didn’t limit the usefulness of the exhaustion requirement.” Id.
The facts of this case are distinguishable. Plaintiff specifically identified “Dr. Carter”
and “Dr. Fahim” in the body of the grievances and describes events that happened at a prison
facility other than Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac C.C.”), where the grievance was filed.
Plaintiff was not complaining about a prison policy, but about specific acts committed by
specific individuals at a different facility. As this Court has previously stated, “[i]t is logical to
require a prison to enforce a procedural defect such as a missed deadline or improper method of
filing in order to later rely upon it for a failure to exhaust defense.” Woods v. Schmeltz, No. 13CV-1477, 2014 WL 3490569, at *4 (C.D. Ill. July 14, 2014). In this case, however, Plaintiff
named individuals other than the defendants in this case. There was no inference that individuals
at Pontiac C.C. were responsible for the actions alleged. Therefore, unlike the prison officials in
Maddox, it would have been impossible for prison officials at Pontiac C.C. to identify
individuals within their facility responsible for the conduct that Plaintiff alleged, much less
determine that a procedural defect upon which to reject Plaintiff’s grievance existed. Plaintiff
cannot now sue individuals at Pontiac C.C. merely because he filed the grievance at that facility.
To argue otherwise would ignore the stated purpose of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement: to
“alert the state to the problem and invite corrective action.” Turley, 729 F.3d at 649.
Furthermore, as the Defendants point out, Plaintiff has pending litigation in the Northern
District of Illinois for claims similar to this case that names “Dr. Carter” as a defendant. See
Mays v. Carter et al., No. 12-CV-7065 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept. 27, 2012). Presumably, Plaintiff is
pursuing the claims alleged in his grievance in that case as Plaintiff has not pointed to any
specific facts to suggest otherwise. In fact, Plaintiff has not offered any specific evidence

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showing that the grievances he filed involved any of the defendants here as it relates to
retaliation. Therefore, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has properly exhausted the combined
grievance #053844. See Waldridge v. Amer. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[I]f
the non-movant [in a summary judgment proceeding] does not come forward with evidence that
would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in her favor on a material question, then the
court must enter summary judgment against her.” (citations omitted)).
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment as to the
Issue of Exhaustion concerning the retaliation claim are GRANTED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion as it
relates to the claim for retaliation are GRANTED [d/e 101, 103]. Plaintiff’s related
motion [104] is DENIED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in
favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions are denied as moot,
and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. Plaintiff
remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this
Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion
for leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues the Plaintiff will
present on appeal to assist the court in determining whether the appeal is taken in
good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164 F.3d 396,
398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a
statement of his grounds for appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker v O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626,

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632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable
person could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff does
choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of
the outcome of the appeal.

Entered this 9th day of February, 2015.

_______________s/ Joe B. McDade________________
JOE BILLY MCDADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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