Lucien Scott McArthur vs. Andrew Tilden et al

Filing 61

ORDER & OPINION entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 6/10/15. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED 44 46 . The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plai ntiff. All pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee. 2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in determining whether the a ppeal is taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164 F.3d 396,398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given an opportunity to submit astatement of his grounds for appealing so that the district judge can ma ke areasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.); Walker v OBrien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that a good faith appeal is an appeal that "a reasonable person could supposehas some merit" from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal. (See Full Written Order).(VP, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 10 June, 2015 09:14:07 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
LUCIEN SCOTT MCARTHUR,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW TILDEN, et al.
Defendants.

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13-1248

ORDER & OPINION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center,
brings the present lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an Eighth Amendment Claim
for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, and a conspiracy claim. The matter comes
before this Court for ruling on motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants Tilden and
Wexford (Doc. 44) and Defendants Bruner, Melvin, Pfister, and Reed (Doc. 46). For the reasons
discussed below, the motions are granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358
(7th Cir. 2010). The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a genuine issue
of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine”
issue, there must be more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that

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might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff is a prisoner incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”). In May
2003, Plaintiff suffered a fracture to his left heel that required surgery. Shortly thereafter, and as
part of Plaintiff’s aftercare for the surgery, a podiatrist recommended Plaintiff wear a specific
type of shoes, though some dispute exists over whether these shoes were “orthopedic.”
Nonetheless, Plaintiff was issued a new pair of the special shoes every two years until August
2012. Plaintiff requested a new pair of shoes at that time stating that his current pair had worn
down and did not provide support. Defendant Tilden, the medical director at Pontiac, reviewed
Plaintiff’s medical records and opined that Plaintiff did not need the specially ordered shoes
Plaintiff had previously been issued as the “state-issued” shoes available at Pontiac could
adequately meet Plaintiff’s needs. Defendant Tilden based this opinion on his observations that
Plaintiff had a strong gait and a good range of motion in his hips, could walk with minimal
discomfort, and several x-rays taken periodically since Plaintiff’s surgery showed no bony
abnormalities in Plaintiff’s foot, and did not indicate that Plaintiff’s foot condition was
worsening. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not complain about foot pain. Instead, Plaintiff’s
complaints of pain focused on his hips. With regards to his hip pain, Defendant Tilden
concluded that Plaintiff most likely suffered from degenerative joint disease and osteoarthritis in
his hips. To treat those conditions, Plaintiff was consistently prescribed pain medication and
issued low bunk permits. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tilden’s denial of the shoes amounts to
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

1

Unless otherwise noted, these facts are undisputed.

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After Defendant Tilden’s decision to not renew the order for Plaintiff’s special shoes,
Plaintiff made several requests to obtain copies of his medical records. Plaintiff was eventually
provided copies of the requested records, though with some delay with respect to a portion of the
records as Pontiac officials had difficulty locating them. As a result of Plaintiff’s alleged
difficultly obtaining his medical records, combined with Defendant Tilden’s decision to not
renew his shoes, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Pfister, Reed, Melvin, Bruner, and Tilden
conspired to deprive Plaintiff of adequate medical care, specifically related to Plaintiff’s shoes.
ANALYSIS
Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need
To implicate a violation of the Eighth Amendment for inadequate medical care, the
Plaintiff must show that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Deliberate indifference is more than
negligence, but does not require the plaintiff to show that the defendants intended to cause harm.
Mayoral v. Sheehan, 245 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001). Liability attaches under the Eighth
Amendment when “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Defendants Tilden and Wexford
Defendants Tilden and Wexford argue that Plaintiff did not suffer from a serious medical
need because Plaintiff did not actually need orthopedic shoes. “An objectively serious medical
need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”

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King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). In evaluating
the seriousness of a medical condition, the court evaluates several factors: (1) whether failure to
treat the condition would result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain; (2) whether a reasonable doctor or patient would find the alleged injury worthy
of comment or treatment; (3) the existence of a medical condition that significantly affects daily
activities; and, (4) the existence of any chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111
F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997).
The parties agree that Plaintiff suffered a heel injury in May 2003 that required surgery
and resulted in the placement of several screws in Plaintiff’s heel. According to Plaintiff,
doctors told him that he would always experience some degree of pain with likely development
of arthritis in the hips, ankles, and knees. Pl. Dep. 32:9-17. The medical records show that
Plaintiff was consistently prescribed pain medication that alleviated, or reduced, at least some of
the resulting and ongoing pain. These facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, show that Plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical need for purposes of
the Eighth Amendment.
As part of the basis for denying Plaintiff’s requests for new footwear, Defendant Tilden,
the medical director at Pontiac, asserts that orthopedic shoes were not ordered as part of the
podiatrist’s initial recommendation, and that Plaintiff was subsequently given a pair of “stateissued” leather shoes. Plaintiff counters by stating that “state-issued” leather shoes do not exist
and, therefore, his shoes must have been orthopedic. A review of the podiatrist’s initial
recommendation shows that Plaintiff was given a recommendation for “special shoes other than
state-issued shoes.” (Doc. 44-23). From this, the Court must assume for purposes of this ruling
that the shoes Plaintiff received were not of the type issued or readily available to inmates

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without a doctor’s order. Whether the shoes were truly “orthopedic” remains up for debate, but
nonetheless, the recommendation for special shoes was made as part of an overall treatment plan
designed towards the end of alleviating the pain associated with, and assisting in the healing of,
Plaintiff’s original injury. When viewed in this light, Defendant Tilden’s decision to discontinue
the recommendation for special shoes is a matter of professional discretion with which the courts
will not interfere unless the evidence suggests that “‘no minimally competent professional would
have so responded under those circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894-95 (7th Cir.
2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir. 1998)). In other
words, a medical professional is deliberately indifferent only if “the decision by the professional
is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”
Id. (quoting same). Within these bounds, a prison medical professional “is free to make his own,
independent medical determination as to the necessity of certain treatments or medications,” and
deference to a prior doctor’s diagnosis is not required to satisfy the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment. Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff states in his response to the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment that his
difficulty walking is a result of severe foot pain. The medical records, however, show that
Plaintiff’s complaints of foot pain since 2009 have been few and far between. The medical
records indicate that Plaintiff’s complaints of pain related primarily to the diagnosed
osteoarthritis in Plaintiff’s hips. To what extent Plaintiff’s special shoes played a role in
aggravating or reducing the amount of pain Plaintiff experienced is difficult to ascertain as
Plaintiff experienced hip and foot pain even with the special shoes and, according to Plaintiff,
lifelong pain was expected by the very nature of his original injury. According to the medical

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records, Plaintiff responded favorably to the pain medication he was administered and there is no
dispute that Plaintiff received this medication on a regular basis. Plaintiff does not allege that his
requests for medical treatment were categorically denied, only that he was not provided with the
specific treatment he desired. In this scenario, the law is clear: a mere disagreement with the
course of medical treatment, without more, is not sufficient to attach constitutional liability.
Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996). The parties do not dispute that Defendant
Tilden made his treatment decision after a review of Plaintiff’s medical records. Given that the
original recommendation was made almost a decade prior to Defendant Tilden’s review,
Plaintiff’s relative lack of complaints of foot pain, medical evidence that Plaintiff’s condition
was not getting worse, and Plaintiff’s favorable response to the pain medication administered,
the Court cannot say that Defendant Tilden’s determination fell outside the bounds of acceptable
professional judgment. See Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2006) (prison
doctor’s determination that inmate did not need soft-soled shoes made after review of inmate’s
medical records was not deliberate indifference); Askew v. Davis, No. 14-2980, 2015 WL
3477797, at *2-3 (7th Cir. June 2, 2015) (determination that soft-soled shoes were not medically
necessary was not deliberate indifference). Therefore, the Court finds that no reasonable juror
could conclude that Defendant Tilden was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs.
Next, Defendant Wexford, as a private corporation, may be held liable under § 1983 if
“the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the
corporation itself,” but may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior. E.g. Shields
v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Iskander v. Village of Forest Park,
690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982)). There is no evidence in the record to show that Plaintiff

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suffered a constitutional deprivation as a result of an unconstitutional Wexford policy. Thus,
Defendant Wexford is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Defendants Pfister, Reed, Melvin & Bruner
Defendants Pfister, Reed, Melvin and Bruner are non-medical prison administrators at
Pontiac, serving at the time in the capacities of Acting Warden, Assistant Warden of Programs,
Health Information and Site Privacy Officer, and Correctional Counselor, respectively. These
defendants are not trained medical professionals and they are not responsible for administering
medical care to inmates at the facility.
Courts in this Circuit have been reluctant to impose constitutional liability upon
nonmedical prison officials in cases where the official deferred to the judgment of the medical
staff. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (nonmedical prison officials “are
entitled to defer to the judgment of jail health professionals” so long as the inmate’s complaints
are not ignored (citations omitted)); Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008) (no
deliberate indifference where nonmedical prison official investigated inmate’s complaints and
referred then to medical providers who could be expected to address the concerns); Greeno v.
Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (no deliberate indifference where nonmedical prison
official referred inmate complaints to medical providers). As the court in Greeno explained:
If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts ... a non-medical prison official
will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands. This
follows naturally from the division of labor within a prison. Inmate health and
safety is promoted by dividing responsibility for various aspects of inmate life
among guards, administrators, physicians, and so on. Holding a non-medical
prison official liable in a case where a prisoner was under a physician's care
would strain this division of labor.
Greeno, 414 F.3d at 656 (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). In other
words, “the law encourages non-medical security and administrative personnel at jails and

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prisons to defer to the professional medical judgments of the physicians and nurses treating the
prisoners in their care without fear of liability for doing so.” Berry, 604 F.3d at 440.
With respect to Plaintiff’s claim regarding inadequate medical care, Defendants Pfister,
Reed, Melvin, and Bruner were entitled to rely upon the medical opinions of Defendant Tilden.
As discussed above, there are no allegations that Plaintiff’s requests for medical care were being
ignored, and given this fact, these defendants were entitled to defer to opinions of Pontiac’s
medical staff with regards to Plaintiff’s medical treatment. Therefore, no reasonable juror could
conclude that Defendants Pfister, Reed, Melvin, and Bruner were deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s serious medical need.
Conspiracy
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Pfister, Reed, Melvin, Bruner, and Tilden conspired to
deprive him of adequate medical care, specifically the special shoes. After Defendant Tilden’s
decision to not renew Plaintiff’s special shoes, Plaintiff alleges that prison officials continually
stonewalled his efforts to obtain his medical records. Plaintiff asserts he filed several grievances
and wrote several letters to no avail, often waiting several months for a response. The
combination of Defendant Tilden’s decision and the other defendants’ efforts to deny Plaintiff
copies of his medical records is, Plaintiff alleges, evidence of a conspiracy to deny Plaintiff his
right to orthopedic shoes. A bare allegation of conspiracy is not enough to state a plausible
conspiracy claim: there must be sufficient allegations of fact showing or giving rise to a plausible
suggestion of an agreement or conspiracy between the various defendants. See Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2009); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009);
Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970-71 (7th Cir. 2009).

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To establish § 1983 liability through a conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that “state official[s] . . . reached an understanding [among themselves] to deprive the plaintiff of
his constitutional rights.” Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citations
omitted). Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that the defendants reached an understanding
to deprive him of any constitutional rights. Plaintiff, instead, alleges that the defendants must
have conspired given that five defendants were involved in some capacity with Plaintiff’s
requests for special shoes and medical records. Pl. Dep. 55:7-18. Absent any evidence of an
agreement or understanding between these defendants, a reasonable juror could not find in
Plaintiff’s favor on the issue of conspiracy. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to judgment as
a matter of law on the conspiracy allegations.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could find in
Plaintiff’s favor on the alleged constitutional violations. Therefore, the Defendants’ Motions for
Summary Judgment [44][46] are granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED [44][46]. The clerk of
the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff.
All pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties
to bear their own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this
Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion
for leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues the Plaintiff will
present on appeal to assist the court in determining whether the appeal is taken in
good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164 F.3d 396,
398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a
statement of his grounds for appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker v O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626,
632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable
person could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff does

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choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of
the outcome of the appeal.
Entered this 10th day of June, 2015.

s/Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY MCDADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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