USA

Filing 10

ORDER entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 8/20/13. the Trust's Motion to Dismiss 3 is GRANTED and the Motion to Dismiss by Ms. Urbanowski 6 is MOOT, as is the Motion to Strike 8 the Motion to Dismiss. While the Seventh Circuit has no t addressed this specific circumstance directly, holdings in analogous cases suggest that the Court of Appeals would find against applying the void ab initio exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to vest this Court with jurisdiction to grant the r elie frequested in this matter. The Court finds that is lacks jurisdiction to proceed in this case and remands the matter to the Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Bureau County, Illinois. SEE FULL ORDER. cc: Conventional filers by Clerk. (FDT, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 20 August, 2013 03:51:43 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

IN RE: APPLICATION OF NINA
URBANOWSKI, COUNTY TREASURER
AND EX OFICIO COUNTY COLLECTOR
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUREAU
FOR JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF SALE
ON DELINQUENT PROPERTIES FOR THE
YEAR 2008, AND ANY AND ALL PRIOR
YEARS,

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Case No. 13-1268

ORDER
This matter is now before the Court on Motions to Dismiss by the S.Sodeman Living Trust
(the “Trust”) and Nina Urbanowski, as well as a Motion to Strike by the Postal Service. For the
reasons set forth below, the Trust’s Motion to Dismiss [3] is GRANTED. Ms. Urbanowski’s Motion
to Dismiss [6] and the Motion to Strike [8] the Motion to Dismiss are MOOT.
BACKGROUND
The United States Postal Service (“USPS”) was the owner of a parcel of land located at 315
S. Pleasant Street, Princeton, Illinois. Bureau County levied taxes against the property, and after the
USPS did not pay the taxes, Ms. Urbanowski, acting in her capacity as the Bureau County Treasurer
and Collector, sold the property at an annual tax sale to the Trust on October 26, 2009. On
November 13, 2012, the Circuit Court issued a tax deed to the Trust, which was recorded on April
3, 2013.
On April 15, 2013, Ms. Urbanowski filed a motion pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 and 35
ILCS 200/22-45 seeking relief from the final order issuing the tax deed. The USPS removed the case
to this Court on June 14, 2013. Ms. Urbanowski and the Trust have now moved to dismiss the
Complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction. The matter is fully briefed, and this Order follows.

Legal Standard
Courts have traditionally held that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears from
the pleadings that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Gould v. Artisoft, Inc., 1 F.3d 544, 548 (7th
Cir. 1993). Rather, a complaint should be construed broadly and liberally in conformity with the
mandate in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f). More recently, the Supreme Court has phrased this
standard as requiring a showing sufficient “to raise a right to relief beyond a speculative level.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). Furthermore, the claim for relief must be
“plausible on its face.” Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff; its well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true, and all reasonably-drawn
inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994);
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d
467 (7th Cir. 1997); M.C.M. Partners, Inc. V. Andrews-Bartlett & Assoc., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 969 (7th
Cir. 1995); Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1992).
Analysis
The Trust argues that the USPS’s attempt to attack the state court judgment would be barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack
jurisdiction to review determinations of state court judgments or claims that are “inextricably
intertwined” with state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923);
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Long v. Shorebank
Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). The effect of this doctrine is to make it clear that “no
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matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, the Supreme Court of the
United States is the only federal court that could have jurisdiction to review a state court judgment.”
Remer v. Burlington Area School District, 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000).
The USPS responds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar federal district court
review where the state court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment in the first place. Specifically,
the USPS relies on a line from Rooker itself, noting that the state court “had jurisdiction of both the
subject-matter and the parties,” before going on to argue that an order vacating a state court order
made without subject-matter jurisdiction does not involve a review of the merits. This appears to
be referred to in caselaw as the rarely-invoked “void ab initio” exception to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See Schmitt v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 2003). While some circuits have
applied this exception to open the doors to federal district court, the Seventh Circuit does not appear
to be among them. In Schmitt, much like the argument advanced by the USPS here, the movant
argued that faulty service of process had deprived the state courts of jurisdiction over him, resulting
in a void judgment. Id. The Court of Appeals noted that it acknowledged the exception but had not
endorsed it before concluding that “[w]hile a void ab initio Rooker-Feldman exception might be
appropriate in some bankruptcy cases (apparently the only situation in which it has been applied) in
order to protect the dominant federal role in that specialized area of the law, it has no place here.
As we have said, the Illinois state courts were competent to determine their own jurisdictional
boundaries, so there is no need for the federal court to intervene.” Id. This is consistent with the
Seventh Circuit’s earlier pronouncement on the issue, where the court stated, “Put another way, if
the injury which the federal plaintiff alleges resulted from the state court judgment itself, then
Rooker-Feldman controls, and the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction over the claim. It does not
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matter that the state court judgment might be erroneous or even unconstitutional.” Kamilewicz v.
Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1996).
While the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and principles of sovereign
immunity certainly call into question the process resulting in Bureau Country’s sale of a United
States Post Office property, this Court must reluctantly conclude that it lacks jurisdiction to grant
the relief requested in this removal action, as the relief sought is not available in this forum.
Assuming that the state court does not act promptly to remedy the situation, as it has been requested
to do by Ms. Urbanowski, the appropriate place to seek a reversal of the state court judgment is the
United States Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Trust’s Motion to Dismiss [3] is GRANTED and the
Motion to Dismiss by Ms. Urbanowski [6] is MOOT, as is the Motion to Strike [8] the Motion to
Dismiss. While the Seventh Circuit has not addressed this specific circumstance directly, holdings
in analogous cases suggest that the Court of Appeals would find against applying the void ab initio
exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to vest this Court with jurisdiction to grant the relief
requested in this matter. The Court finds that is lacks jurisdiction to proceed in this case and
remands the matter to the Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Bureau County, Illinois.
ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2013.
s/ James E. Shadid
James E. Shadid
Chief United States District Judge

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