Orthofix, Inc. v. Gordon

Filing 102

ORDER entered by Judge Sara Darrow on March 24, 2016. Defendant's 76 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, her 77 motion for leave to file exhibits thereto under seal is GRANTED, Plaintiff's 84 motion for leave to file exhibits in r esponse under seal is GRANTED, Defendant's 86 motion for leave to exceed the type volume limitation in reply is GRANTED, her 87 motion for leave to file the exhibits thereto under seal is GRANTED, and her 94 motion for leave to supplement is DENIED. (SC, ilcd)

E-FILED

Thursday, 24 March, 2016 04:17:55 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
ORTHOFIX INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MELISSA GORDON,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:13-cv-01463-SLD-TSH

ORDER
Plaintiff Orthofix Inc. (“Orthofix”), a medical device company, is suing Defendant
Melissa Gordon, a former employee, for violating the non-solicitation, unfair competition, and
nondisclosure provisions of her employment contract; appropriating trade secrets in violation of,
the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”), 765 ILCS 1065/1–9; and tortiously interfering with its
business relations. Am. Compl., ECF No. 23. Before the Court are Gordon’s motion for
summary judgment, ECF No. 76; Gordon’s motion for leave to file under seal the exhibits to its
motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 77; Orthofix’s motion for leave to file under seal the
exhibits to its Response, ECF No. 84; Gordon’s motion for leave to exceed the type volume
limitations in her Reply and motion for leave to file attachments thereto under seal, ECF Nos. 86,
87; and Gordon’s motion for leave to supplement her motion for summary judgment, ECF No.
94. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The other
motions are GRANTED, except for the motion for leave to supplement, which is DENIED.

1

BACKGROUND1
Orthofix sells “bone growth stimulators,” which purportedly promote the healing of
broken bones. Three companies dominate this market—Orthofix, DonJoy Orthopedics (“DJO”),
and Biomet. Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter, No. 15-3216, 2015 WL 7252996, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 17,
2015). Although the devices are ultimately sold to the patients of neurosurgeons and orthopedic
spine surgeons, the companies peddle the devices directly to prescribing physicians, who
sometimes take a cut of the retail purchase price. Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1005,
1011 (N.D. Ohio 2014) reconsideration denied, No. 3:13 CV 828, 2015 WL 474319 (N.D. Ohio
Feb. 4, 2015) and rev’d and remanded, No. 15-3216, 2015 WL 7252996 (6th Cir. Nov. 17,
2015). It is unclear whether doctors typically purchase exclusively from one of the three
dominant vendors.2
Gordon worked as an Orthofix sales representative from 2007 until March 2013. When
she was hired, she signed a sales agreement (“the Agreement”)—the contract at issue in this
case—in which she promised, among other things, that after she stopped working at Orthofix she
would not do business with its customers, or compete with it, for one year, and would never
disclose any of its trade secrets or confidential information, a term which the Agreement
describes at some length, as analyzed below. The parties disagree about how fully these terms
were explained to Gordon. She was hired as an at-will employee, which she remained for the
course of her employment.
1

The facts recounted here are taken from Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed materials facts, Mot. Summ. J. 2–21;
Defendant’s response to those facts, Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 3–26, ECF No. 83; and Gordon’s reply to additional
material facts, Reply Mot. Summ. J. 2–30, ECF No. 88. Where the parties disagree about the facts, the disagreement
is noted. Citations to sources outside the parties’ statements of fact are attributed, as are direct quotations to the
parties’ facts.
2

Orthofix’s 30(b)(6) witnesses opined that once doctors have “develop[ed] a pattern [in buying or prescribing] it’s
unusual that they vary from that pattern,” Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 6. A witness who analyzed Orthofix’s sales records
determined that the average time for which a doctor remained Gordon’s customer was 3.22 years. O’Brien Dep.
115:9–10, Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. E.

2

As a sales representative, it was Gordon’s job to discover and visit doctors in central
Illinois, her “territory,” who might be interested in prescribing or buying Orthofix’s products.
Gordon would visit these doctors in an effort to “develop relationships and increase the sale of
Orthofix bone growth stimulators to these customers.” Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 15. To this end,
Gordon was expected by her superiors to keep detailed notes on the doctors she visited, including
such information as the names of the doctors’ “gatekeepers” (office personnel, apparently), their
“beliefs in the science of bone growth stimulation” (that is, whether they believed bone growth
devices work3), what they liked to eat, what their hobbies were, what days they were in the
office, their prescribing protocols, and their device-fitting and follow-up preferences. Mot.
Summ. J. 4. Gordon was also provided with some of this information when she was first hired,
in the form of a “Stim 20” report. Wood Dep. 28:1–11, Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. G.
Furthermore, there existed a “sales portal” that Gordon and other employees used, where email,
current orders, monthly sales, and sales volumes were kept track of.
Orthofix describes the information about doctors as a “playbook,” while Gordon claims
that the term was never used while she worked with Orthofix. Mot. Summ. J. 4, Resp. Mot.
Summ. J. 6. Orthofix’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness described the playbook as “basically the bible of
every sales rep,” a document he instructed sales representatives on how to put together and
maintain. Shallenberger Dep. 20:7–15, Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C. More amorphously, he also
described it as “a document or group of documents that, when combined, is what our reps use in
the field to navigate their day-to-day activities and to grow their business.” Id. 89:14–17. It
seems clear that while a category of such information existed and was circulated amongst

3

Current evidence is “inconclusive as to the benefits of [the] technology,” which is a $500 million per year business
in the United States alone. Jeffrey Wienke and Paul Dayton, Bone Stimulation for Nonunions: What The Evidence
Reveals, Podiatry Today, http://www.podiatrytoday.com/bone-stimulation-nonunions-what-evidence-reveals (last
visited March 13, 2016).

3

Orthofix employees, frequently in the form of electronic communications, database entries, etc.,
there was no single document to which the term “playbook” refers, or which Gordon or another
employee could be identified as having possessed, transferred, etc. Certainly, no party has
submitted any such document for the Court’s perusal. The term, despite its apparently concrete
referent is categorical, rather than concretely denotative—“playbook information,” but no
playbook, except in the most loosely synoptic sense of the metaphor.4
Gordon appears to have done well in her position, growing Orthofix’s business in central
Illinois. She received positive reviews from her supervisors and was “very good at what she
did.” Shallenberger Dep. 69:13–14. In 2010, Orthofix expanded her territory from central
Illinois to include parts of Chicago. However, in 2012, Orthofix took this region away from
Gordon and gave it to a company called Innotek, an independent distributor of medical devices.
The parties agree that Gordon began at some point to have disagreements with her manager,
regional sales director Chris Summers. Orthofix claims that Gordon was disrespectful to
Summers, and insisted that she be permitted to work for a different independent distributor of
medical devices, that is, not for Orthofix, so as not to have to work with him.
Then, in March 2013, Orthofix also took the central Illinois territory from Gordon and
gave it to Innotek. Orthofix expected and wanted Gordon to go work for Innotek, which would
have obvious practical advantages, since she would be working in the same territory and with the
same doctors as before. Gordon claims that the only choices Orthofix gave her were to go work
for Innotek or be terminated from employment with Orthofix. Orthofix counters that Gordon
was offered sales positions in New York and Austin, Texas (although the New York position was
offered to Gordon much earlier, in 2012, and the deposition Orthofix cites does not support its
4

Orthofix itself refers to the playbook at times, tellingly, as “the plethora of playbook information [sic],” Resp. Mot.
Summ. J. 8, and states that the playbook “as a whole” is its proprietary possession, while its distributed “individual
components” may not be, id.

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assertion with respect to the Austin job, Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 19). Following the decision to
transfer her territory to Innotek, Gordon claims she was told in so many words that she was
terminated; Orthofix claims that she called its human resources manager on March 8, 2013, and
“demanded to be terminated.” Mot. Summ. J. 9, Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 19–20.
She then went to work for Orthofix’s competitor, DonJoy Orthopedics (“DJO”), where
she worked in the same geographic region, but for the first year sold products that (she asserts)
were non-competitive with Orthofix’s, like “back bracing and pain cream.” Mot. Summ. J. 11.
While employed with DJO, Gordon recruited Kelly Bizosky to work there as well.
Gordon, who was friends with Bizosky, had initially recruited Bizosky to work at Orthofix as a
“fitter” when Gordon was working for Orthofix. (Fitters help fit patients with bone growth
stimulators.) When she was recruited to work for DJO, Bizosky worked as a salesperson of bone
growth stimulators in Gordon’s old territory. After Gordon’s year-long promise not to compete
with Orthofix expired, she took over Bizosky’s job and resumed selling DJO’s bone growth
stimulators to her former customers in central Illinois. Orthofix contends that Gordon was using
Bizosky as a cat’s paw to allow DJO access to some of the doctors Gordon used to sell to during
the period that Gordon was contractually barred from doing so. As evidence of this, Orthofix
points to the fact that Gordon resumed a direct sales role after her year was up, and admitted to
having accompanied Bizosky to meet with doctors—her former clients— on at least two
occasions. Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 21.
DISCUSSION
I.

Legal Standard on a Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is the “put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must

show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.”

5

Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A court should grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a).
At the summary judgment stage the court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial—that
is, whether there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a
verdict in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Patel v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1997). The court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
McCann v. Iroquois Mem’l Hosp., 622 F.3d 745, 752 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 255).
II.

Analysis
Orthofix’s amended complaint alleges that Gordon: (I) breached the non-solicitation

portion of the Agreement by taking a role at DJO within the first year after she left Orthofix and
indirectly selling bone growth products through Bizosky, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57–66; (II) breached
the unfair competition portion of the Agreement by the same activities and by using Orthofix’s
confidential information and trade secrets to do it, id. ¶¶ 67–76; (III) violated her promise in the
Agreement not to disclose Orthofix’s confidential information and trade secrets by sharing and
using customer lists, pricing information, customer needs and preferences and other information
at DJO, id. ¶¶ 77–86; (IV) misappropriated trade secrets in violation of ITSA by the same
actions, id. ¶¶ 87–96; and (V) tortiously interfered with Orthofix’s business relations to the
extent that her alleged misuse of confidential information is not pre-empted by ITSA, id. ¶¶ 97–

6

103. Gordon now moves for summary judgment as to Counts I–III on the ground that the
Agreement’s restrictive covenants are unenforceable, Mot. Summ. J. 22–27; as to Count IV on
the ground that none of the playbook information Gordon is alleged to have used is a trade secret
within the meaning of ITSA; id. at 27–35; and as to Count V on the ground that the tortious
interference claim is wholly preempted by ITSA, and alternatively pleading tortious interference
is disfavored, id. at 35–36. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.
a. Breach of Contract Claims, Counts I–III
Gordon argues that she was terminated without cause, and thus all the restrictive
covenants contained in the Agreement are unenforceable, Mot. Summ. J. 22–24, and that the
provisions are also unenforceable because they are not limited in scope or protective of
legitimate business interests, id. at 24–27.
The parties provided in the Agreement that its interpretation would be governed by the
laws of the state in which Gordon resided at the time of the termination of her employment.
Agreement 6, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 5. Both parties agree that Gordon and Orthofix entered into the
Agreement freely, and that Gordon resided in Illinois when her employment ended. Thus, this
Court will apply Illinois law in interpreting the contract and determining its applicability. See
Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 243 n.8 (1981) (stating that “a [federal] court ordinarily
must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits” (citing Klaxon v. Stentor Electric
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)); In re Marriage of Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1990)
(recognizing the applicability of choice of law clauses in contracts) (citing Reighley v. Cont’l Ill.
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 61 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill. 1945)). Federal courts’ “role in interpreting a
question of state law is to predict how the highest court of the state would answer the question.”
Cannon v. Burge, 752 F.3d 1079, 1091 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

7

1. Termination With or Without Cause
Gordon argues that she was terminated without cause, and that under Illinois law such
terminations render unenforceable any restrictive covenants to which a party to a contract is
subjected, Mot. Summ. J. 22–24. Orthofix responds that only bad-faith breaches of employment
contracts by an employer render such provisions unenforceable, and Gordon was an at-will
employee. Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 27–31. Moreover, Orthofix argues, it did not fire Gordon, who
instead herself requested to be terminated, id.
Parties to a contract in Illinois promise to act in good faith. Osten v. Shah, 433 N.E.2d
294, 296 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). Interpreting Illinois law, the Seventh Circuit has construed the
requirement of good-faith dealing to mean that “a restrictive covenant that can become effective
when an employee is terminated without good cause is not reasonably necessary to protect an
employer’s good will,” and thus, not enforceable. Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 224 (7th Cir. 1983).
In other words, the Seventh Circuit seemed to say that a dismissal of an at-will employee without
any reason (“without good cause”) but without any impermissible intent or bad faith—as an atwill employee may be terminated—precludes an employer from enforcing restrictive covenants
in that employee’s contract.5 The justification for the view is that restrictive covenants are
disfavored as being restraints on trade, and the best means to prevent an employee whom one has
no good reason to fire from competing with one is not to fire her. Id. This is the interpretation
Gordon urges. Mot. Summ. J. 23.
The extent to which Illinois courts have agreed with this interpretation of Illinois law is
unclear. In Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hospital., P.C., 644 N.E.2d 33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), the
5

It is difficult to tell whether the Seventh Circuit intended this reasoning to apply to cases where an employee is
terminated without good cause, but for no particular bad reason, because Rao involved a dismissal of an employee to
prevent the employee from obtaining a contractually-stipulated benefit, plainly in bad faith. The Rao court at one
point explicitly described its holding as being that “a restrictive covenant is unenforceable when an employee is
terminated in bad faith and without good cause.” Rao, 718 F.2d at 224. As explained below, Illinois courts have
taken different lessons from Rao.

8

Appellate Court of Illinois “agree[d] with the seventh circuit’s [sic] reasoning [in Rao] and
[found] that the implied promise of good faith inherent in every contract precludes the
enforcement of a noncompetition clause when the employee is dismissed without cause,” 644
N.E.2d at 36. But the Appellate Court later construed Rao and Bishop narrowly, explaining
(despite the broad language in the passage quoted above) that the Bishop holding was limited to
cases where a restrictive covenant was triggered upon an employee’s termination “for any
cause,” rather than “for any cause whatsoever.” Am. Pest Control, Inc. v. Rakers, 2012 WL
7050434 ¶ 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). Thus, the Rakers court determined that parties could contract
so that an at-will employee could be terminated without cause and yet be subject to restrictive
covenants, whereas, pace the Appellate Court’s reading of Bishop and Rao, the earlier decisions
appear plainly to state that all dismissals without cause foreclose an employer from seeking to
enforce restrictive covenants. See Rao, 718 F.2d at 224 (explaining that such enforcement
“serves only the purpose of preventing competition—an insufficient justification for
enforceability”). The Illinois Supreme Court has not clarified the issue.
However, this Court need not at this juncture try to determine how the Illinois Supreme
Court would rule, because, on the materials submitted with the parties’ motions, there is a
genuine dispute of material fact about whether or not Gordon was terminated or, instead, chose
to leave of her own accord; and, if she was terminated, whether or not she was terminated for
cause; and yet again, if she was terminated without cause, whether that termination could be said
in any more substantive sense to have been in bad faith.
In Illinois, termination occurs when an employer’s decision to fire an employee is
unequivocally communicated to the employee, regardless of the exact words used. See Hinthorn
v. Roland’s of Bloomington, Inc. 519 N.E.2d 909, 912 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (“There are no magic

9

words required to discharge an employee: an employer cannot escape responsibility for an
improper discharge simply because he never uttered the words ‘you’re fired.’”). Gordon admits
that she was offered at least one other employment position within Orthofix before March 2013,
but had turned it down. And she admits that she was given the “opportunity to continue
servicing [her] territory as an employee of Innotek,” Gordon Dep. 157:4–7, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 4.
She also admits that she submitted her resignation on March 8, 2013. But she claims that she
was given no other option but to quit, given the relative undesirability of the position at Innotek,
id. at 164:7–12, and given her mistrust of Orthofix based on “several instances,” id., in which
Orthofix had materially misrepresented their intentions with respect to her employment. Both
parties agree that Gordon was told about the decision to give her territory to Innotek, and the fate
of her continued employment decided, at a meeting with Mark Faucett, Orthofix’s Vice President
of Sale, in Chicago in March 2013. But Gordon claims that at this meeting, she was told that she
had been terminated and that he only option was to work at Innotek, which she declined—
effectively, that she had been fired. Gordon Dep. 37:4–11, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 4. And Jason
Shallenberger, Orthofix’ Rule 30(b)(6) representative, states that he was not aware of any
ultimatum given to Gordon, and that she resigned rather than being terminated. Shallenberger
Dep. 77:5–6, Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C.
On the basis of the record before the Court, the Court cannot determine whether it was
“clearly and unequivocally communicated,” Hinthorn, 519 N.E.2d at 912, to Gordon that her
employment was terminated, let alone what Orthofix’s exact motivations were if Gordon was
indeed fired. Thus, the Court cannot determine whether the restrictive covenants upon which
Orthofix sues in Counts I-III are unenforceable because of the way in which Gordon left her job,
and summary judgment on the Counts for this reason is inappropriate.

10

2. Validity of the Restrictive Covenants
Gordon next argues that because restrictive covenants can only protect legitimate
business interests, and under Illinois law, Orthofix does not have a legitimate business interest in
its relationship with its doctor-customers. Mot. Summ. J. 24–27. She further contends that her
confidentiality agreement was not reasonably limited in scope, id. at 24, and that “playbook”
information is not the sort of thing that a confidentiality agreement can protect, id. at 26–27.
Orthofix counters that because it had near-permanent relationships with its customers, it did have
a legitimate and protectable business interest. Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 31–33, and that the
confidentiality agreement was both appropriately limited in scope and that the “playbook”
information was a proper topic for its protection, id. at 34–37.
Because restrictive covenants are restraints on trade, Illinois courts will not enforce them
unless their terms are reasonable and necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate business
interests. Hanchett Paper Co. v. Melchiorre, 792 N.E.2d 395, 400 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
Legitimate business interests exist where (1) because of the nature of the business, customer
relationships with the employer are near permanent and the employee would not have had
contact with the customers but for her employment relationship, and (2) the employee gained
confidential information through the employment that she attempted to use for her own benefit.
Office Mates 5, N. Shore, Inc. v. Hazen, 599 N.E.2d 1072, 1080 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). To
determine whether customer relationships with an employer are near-permanent, Illinois courts
use a 7-factor test, considering:
(1) the length of time required to develop the clientele; (2) the amount of money
invested to acquire clients; (3) the degree of difficulty in acquiring clients; (4) the
extent of personal customer contact by the employee; (5) the extent of the
employer’s knowledge of its clients; (6) the duration of the customer’s association
with the employer; and (7) the continuity of the employer-customer relationships.

11

Audio Properties, Inc. v. Kovach, 655 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
A. Near-Permanent Relationships
The facts before the Court are sufficient to, at the least, create a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Orthofix’s relationships with its clients were near-permanent and protectable,
rendering summary judgment inappropriate.
The first factor is in Orthofix’s favor. The record shows that the process of cultivating
relationships with surgeons is long and complicated and generally involves multiple visits to a
surgeon’s office over a period of months or years before a salesperson is even granted an
audience with a surgeon. And it takes time to gather the bits and pieces of information about a
surgeon’s personal life and preferences, and the personal lives and preferences even of her staff,
that medical device companies apparently regard as useful for persuading doctors to prescribe
their products.
The second factor is also in Orthofix’s favor. Orthofix asserts that its primary investment
in developing clients is made in the form of salaries to its salespeople. Although the parties are
not forthcoming in their filings before this Court, litigation of similar spats between Orthofix and
DJO suggests that, with commissions included, salespeople are compensated in the multiple
hundreds of thousands of dollars per year. Hunter, 55 F. Supp.3d at 1009 (stating that salesman
poached by DJO in 2012 offered “at least $230,000 in salary and commissions for his first
year”).
The third factor, like the first two, cuts in Orthofix’s favor. Persistence and multiple
visits are necessary to get doctors to prescribe products, a practice Orthofix describes as a
“diverse and prolonged history with the account.” Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 8. A salesperson, in
order to sell, must become familiar with a doctor’s fitting preferences, follow-up preferences,

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purchasing patterns, etc. The office staff themselves must be assaulted with diligence and
persistence; Shallenberger asserts that “[i]t could take years to even get past the front desk
person to get to the back of the office to conduct that lunch.” Id. The process of selling a bone
growth stimulator is protracted.
The fourth factor, Illinois law suggests, cuts neither way. Where an employee has close
personal contact with customers, as Gordon surely did with the doctors, but the employee was
just a salesperson for a product offered exclusively by the employer, the fourth factor “favors
neither plaintiff nor defendant.” Melchiorre, 792 N.E.2d at 401.
The fifth factor, as suggested by the basis of this lawsuit in the large universe of customer
information Orthofix maintained, cuts in its favor. Orthofix recorded doctors’ names, addresses,
credentials, surgery days, names of office staff, beliefs in the efficacy of bone growth
stimulators, and appears to have tracked whether its representatives had sent them thank-you
notes, discussed various bone growth technologies, or shared certain scientific literature with
them, and to have developed and maintained “plans of action” with different doctors. Gordon’s
spreadsheet notes contain reminders like “STOP IN ONCE A WEEK” and “continue to
strengthen relationship with [office assistant].” Mot. Summ. J. Ex. J. Orthofix knew a lot about
these surgeons.
The sixth and seventh factors also cut in Orthofix’s favor. Orthofix’s witnesses suggest
that doctors tend not to vary from their loyalty to one bone growth stimulator company or
another, and Gordon’s notes, which identify doctors’ brand loyalties (“USING
COMPETITION”), suggest the same. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. J. The evidence suggests that doctors
continued to prescribe Gordon’s products, on average, for a period of years at a time.

13

Illinois courts have found near-permanent relations exists between employers and
customers in the sale of lawn care products, Tyler Enterprises of Elwood, Inc. v. Shafer, 573
N.E.2d 863, 865 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), animal feed products, Agrimerica, Inc. v. Mathes, 557
N.E.2d 357, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), and business awards programs, McRand, Inc. v. van
Beelen, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985), all of which involved a similar level of
involvement and solicitousness on the part of the salesperson in cultivating a lasting relationship
with clientele. Gordon does not show that there is no question of material fact as to whether
Orthofix had sufficiently near-permanent relationships with the orthopedic surgeons in central
Illinois to protect that interest with restrictive covenants.
B. Protectability of Confidential Information and Scope of Protection
As an initial matter, Gordon’s argument that the non-disclosure clause of the Agreement
is overbroad is a non-starter under unambiguous decisional law. Gordon claims that the
Agreement’s provision that she not disclose trade secrets or confidential information “at any
time” after her employment with Orthofix, Agreement 3, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 5, is not
enforceable because it is not limited in time or geographical scope. But “a confidentiality
agreement will not be deemed unenforceable for lack of durational or geographic limitations
where trade secrets and confidential information are involved.” Coady v. Harpo, Inc., 719
N.E.2d 244, 250 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); see 765 ILCS 1065/8(b)(1) (“[A] contractual or other duty
to maintain secrecy or limit use of a trade secret shall not be deemed to be void or unenforceable
solely for lack of durational or geographical limitation on the duty[.]”).
Gordon also argues that none of the “playbook” information she is alleged to have
misappropriated in working for DJO is confidential information within the meaning of the
Agreement. Mot. Summ. J. 26. The Agreement defines “confidential information” as

14

“information acquired by the Employee in the course and scope of his activities for Orthofix that
is not generally known or disseminated outside the Company . . . or that Orthofix indicates
through its policies, procedures, or other instructions should not be disclosed to anyone outside
Orthofix.” Agreement 3. The Agreement then includes a non-exhaustive list of materials (which
are also assertedly trade secrets), which contains such items as “customer lists, customer needs
and preferences, customer purchasing histories internal financial data, research and development
regarding existing and prospective customers,” and like information. Id. The Agreement
specifically mentions “reports [which] will outline which physicians and other customers in
Employee’s territory use which particular type of products, [and] the volume and purchasing
history of physicians and other customers with respect to specific products.” Id.
There is no doubt that Gordon’s detailed spreadsheet notes on the doctors she sold to,
Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. J., and the “Stim 20 reports,” Wood Dep. 28:1–11, Resp. Mot. Summ.
J. Ex. G, are such information, so the only question is whether the Agreement could permissibly
make them subject to confidentiality. Gordon’s argument is mostly reserved for the assertion
that the customer information she gathered and used while at Orthofix cannot qualify as a trade
secret under ITSA, and so the Court similarly reserves most of its discussion of these materials
for the motion for summary judgment on Count IV, below. However, the Court finds instructive
the distinction drawn by the Sixth Circuit in another case involving a former Orthofix sales
representative poached by DJO. There, the Court noted, citing the Third Restatement of Unfair
Competition, that there are three basic kinds of information relevant to non-disclosure
agreements, two of which are permissibly protectable by an employer. Hunter, 2015 WL
7252996, at *1. The first is trade secrets, properly understood, which are protected categorically
by the laws of the jurisdiction. Id. The second is other confidential information, which, while

15

not protected by trade secrets laws, a contract may permissibly cover. Id. (“[A] nondisclosure
agreement prohibiting the use or disclosure of particular information can clarify and extend the
scope of an employer’s rights beyond the protection afforded by trade secret statutes.”). Finally,
there is general skill, knowledge, or training—matter not protectable by a contract. Id.
The divisions amongst these kinds of information are created by state law. Illinois
distinguishes between information that may be made confidential and general skills in this way:
[W]hile an employee, at the termination of his employment, can take with him
general skills and knowledge acquired during the course of his employment, he
may not take confidential particularized information disclosed to him during the
time the employer-employee relationship existed which are unknown to others in
the industry and which give the employer advantage over his competitors.
Burt Dickens & Co. v. Bodi, 494 N.E.2d 817, 819 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
While some of the more general information Gordon is alleged to have taken with her
may be so broad as to fall under general skills and knowledge, such information as a doctor’s
prescribing history, his or her belief in the science of bone growth stimulation, and the various
collected minutiae of details about Orthofix’s ongoing relationship with the doctors surely does
qualify as “particularized information.” Illinois law is replete with instances where the sort of
information the Agreement protects was afforded confidential information status. See, e.g., The
Agency, Inc. v. Grove, 839 N.E.2d 606, 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding client profiles
confidential where profiles contained identities, client business cycles, expiration dates, and
personnel preferences); Tower Oil & Technology Co. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981) (holding confidential information acquired in meetings where salesmen
exchanged ideas concerning servicing customers and discussed new products and the proper
application thereof); Lyle R. Jager Agency, Inc. v. Steward, 625 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (holding that worksheets used to determine insurance premiums for customers were

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confidential). Furthermore, “the compilation, generation, and use of information and the
circumstances under which the information was maintained are also important in determining
confidentiality,” Lifetec, Inc. v. Edwards, 880 N.E.2d 188, 197 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), so that
compilations of publicly-available information, if they took time and effort to create, may be
protected by confidentiality agreements.
The information covered by Gordon’s confidentiality clause in the Agreement is plainly
of this kind. Under Illinois case law, The Agreement is neither overbroad in its temporal scope,
nor does it purport to restrain the use of information that may not properly be named
confidential. Gordon’s motion for summary judgment fails as to Count III.
b. Illinois Trade Secrets Act, Count IV
Gordon argues that her alleged use of the “playbook” information cannot be a violation of
ITSA because Orthofix did not take adequate steps to keep the information confidential, and
because the information is readily ascertainable. Mot. Summ. J. 27. Orthofix responds that the
“playbook” information was valuable and difficult to acquire, and is hence protectable under
ITSA, and that it took reasonable measures to keep the information secret.
ITSA protects against the misappropriation of “trade secrets,” which it defines this way:
(d) “Trade secret” means information, including but not limited to, technical or
non-technical data, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, drawing, process, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers
or suppliers, that:
(1) is sufficiently secret to derive economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and
(2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy or confidentiality.

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765 ILCS 1065/2. While a mere list of customers, where that information is easy to acquire or
well-known within a particular industry, is usually not sufficiently secret to warrant trade secret
protection, pricing formulas and the business history and data used to generate them generally
are. See Fleetwood Packaging v. Hein, No. 14 C 9670, 2014 WL 7146439, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
15, 2014) (holding that customer lists in the packing materials industry were trade secrets, but
“product matrices,” containing information about vendors, vendor names, product costs, and
delivery information were). To determine whether information about customers is “generally
known” or, on the other hand, sufficiently recondite to qualify for protection, courts look to the
amount of effort it takes to acquire and compile the information. See Delta Med. Sys. v. Mid-Am.
Med. Sys., Inc., 772 N.E.2d 768, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that trial court abused its
discretion in finding a customer list a trade secret where the list could be duplicated merely by
looking in the yellow pages or a FOIA request); Hamer Holding Group, Inc. v. Elmore, 560
N.E.2d 907, 912 (holding customer list not a trade secret where it could be easily duplicated by
reviewing lists from Secretary of State's office, distilling them by geographic region, and
updating contacts and telephone numbers).
Here, not only did some of the lists that Orthofix calls “playbook” information clearly
take a great deal of time and effort to compile, they contained information that only Orthofix
salespeople had, because it was in fact a record of the salespeople’s individual and perhaps
unique efforts. See Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. J. The lists also appear to contain records of
products Orthofix sold to doctors over the years. Of the handful of heterogeneous documents
Orthofix supplied with its motion, it appears that in addition to the names of doctors, their staff,
what kind of doctors they were, and whether they were DO’s or MD’s, Orthofix’s salespeople
used charts to track the number of lumbar and cervical devices sold, whether a given doctor was

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a “non believer” or “using competition,” the doctor’s surgery and clinic days, and what kind of
materials the salesperson had showed to a doctor. Each doctor also had a “notes” field
associated with them, where things like the salesperson’s intention to discuss with a doctor “why
he’s no longer using our product” were memorialized. Although Orthofix did not supply many
of these documents with its response to Gordon’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the number of
doctors contained on the list it did supply, coupled with the testimony of Orthofix’s 30(b)(6)
witness about the importance of compiling this information to salespeople’s practice, is sufficient
at summary judgment to show that Orthofix’s “playbook” information took a great deal of time
and effort to acquire, and was of great value to it as a corporation. Without this information—
details about its client base and the state of its relationship with each doctor—it would be
impossible for Orthofix to strategize about how to continue selling products to given doctors, or
train new salespeople. Indeed, Trent Wood, a regional sales director at Orthofix, identified the
“Stim 20” as a document that would have been given to Gordon to bring her up to speed on the
doctors in her territory, when she replaced her predecessor. Wood Dep. 27:24–2817, Ex. G.
It is perhaps true, as Gordon argues, that all of this information is publicly available in the
sense that getting it is “a matter of asking questions.” Mot. Summ. J. 33. But those questions
had to be asked over a long period of time, over the course of many visits, and integrated into a
corporate strategy, then memorialized in a document on a regular basis that superiors and
salespeople apparently used to go about the business of selling bone growth stimulators. The
information is of sufficient economic value to warrant trade secrecy protection under 765 ILCS
1065/2. Accord Hunter, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1012–13 (“Hunter makes much of the fact that the
information contained in the playbook . . . can be discovered by a scan through the local phone

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book or a Google search. However, that items may be individually available through public
resources is not dispositive.”).
Orthofix has also provided enough information about the efforts it took to keep this
information secret to create a genuine issue of material fact. 765 ILCS 1065/2(d)(2). “Whether
the measures taken by a trade secret owner are sufficient to satisfy the Act’s reasonableness
standard ordinarily is a question of fact for the jury.” Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood
Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 725 (7th Cir. 2003). “[O]nly in an extreme case can what is a
‘reasonable’ precaution be determined [as a matter of law], because the answer depends on a
balancing of costs and benefits that will vary from case to case.” Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v.
DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir.1991). At this phase, it is sufficient to observe that
a jury could determine that Orthofix made reasonable efforts to keep the “playbook” information
secret by requiring all employees who used it to sign nondisclosure agreements (and suing those
who it perceived to have violated them). See Playwood, 342 F.3d at 725–26 (“[I]t is well
established that the formation of a confidential relationship imposes upon the disclosee the duty
to maintain the information received in the utmost secrecy . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
Gordon has not shown, as she must to prevail at summary judgment, that there is no
dispute of material fact as to Orthofix’s ITSA claim and that she is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Her motions fails as to Count IV.
c. Collateral Estoppel
Gordon argues that issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, requires summary judgment in
her favor, pointing to two district court cases, one from the Eastern District of Michigan,
Orthofix Inc. v. Lemanski, No. 13-11421, 2015 WL 1488267 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015), and
one from the Northern District of Ohio, Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1007

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(N.D. Ohio 2014). In the latter, factually analogous to the instant case in a number of respects,
the district court after a bench trial found that Orthofix had not taken sufficient steps to keep the
“playbook” information secret, thus failing to qualify for protection under the Ohio analogue to
ITSA, see R.C. § 1333.61(D). 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1014. The Hunter court further found that the
confidentiality agreement covered no more ground than the Ohio trade secrets statute. Id. at
1014–15.
The Lemanski of the first-named case was Hunter’s business partner; both left Orthofix
to work for DJO and were contemporaneously sued by their former employer. After the Hunter
court’s judgment, the Lemanski court granted partial summary judgment for Lemanski on the
basis of issue preclusion. Lemanski, 2015 WL 1488267, at *3. The doctrine dictates that when
four conditions are met, a party is estopped from asserting a claim or defense that has already
been adjudicated. Those conditions are:
(1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior
litigation, (2) the issue must have been actually litigated, (3) the determination of
the issue must have been essential to the final judgment, and (4) the party against
whom estoppel is invoked must be fully represented in the prior action.
H-D Michigan, Inc. v. Top Quality Serv., Inc., 496 F.3d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 2007). Several facts
counsel against application of collateral estoppel in the instant case. First, Hunter was reversed
and remanded for further proceedings by the Sixth Circuit late in 2015. See Orthofix, Inc. v.
Hunter, No. 15-3216, 2015 WL 7252996, at *7 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2015). A Rule 60(b) motion
remains pending before that court. ECF No. 133. Second, the issue before this Court is not the
same as the issue before either the Hunter or Lemanski courts. Those cases were factually
intertwined; the defendants were collaborators. While Orthofix made similar arguments about
“playbook” information in those two cases, the factual scenarios were somewhat different.
Third, the law applied by the district court and then the court of appeal was different from what
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this Court must apply, since Ohio statutes and precedent are not the same as Illinois law and
precedent, despite the similarities (say) in the trade secret statutes.
In any case, even if collateral estoppel were to apply, given the Sixth Circuit’s reversal of
the Hunter court, the doctrine would not now counsel granting Gordon’s motion for summary
judgment.
d. Preclusion of Tort Law Claims, Count V
Finally, Gordon argues that Orthofix’s claims of tortious interference must be dismissed
because they are pre-empted by ITSA. Mot. Summ. J. 35–36. Orthofix responds that its tortious
interference claims are based not on behavior violative of trade secret law, but upon only
misappropriation of confidential information in violation of the Agreement, and additionally
include Gordon’s recruitment of Bizosky to act as a proxy for selling bone growth products to
Gordon’s clients during the year when she regarded herself as unable to sell them on her own.
Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 42–43.6
ITSA is the sole remedy for tort claims arising from the misappropriation of a trade
secret. 765 ILCS 1065/8(a). ITSA “abolishes claims other than those based on contract arising
from misappropriated trade secrets, replacing them with claims under the Act itself.” Hecny
Transp., Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir.2005) (emphasis added). This means that the
common law of Illinois cannot be used to bring a tort claim for the misappropriation of trade
secrets, and cannot be pleaded as an alternative theory to an ITSA claim. See Spitz v. Proven

6

To state a claim for tortious interference with business relations, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) a reasonable expectation of entering into a valid business relationship, (2) the defendant’s
knowledge of the expectation, (3) a purposeful interference by the defendant that prevents
plaintiff’s legitimate expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship, and (4) damage
to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s interference.

Atanus v. American Airlines, Inc., 932 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); see also Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz,
801 F.2d 520, 546 (7th Cir. 1986).

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Winners N. Am., LLC, 759 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Illinois courts have read the
preemptive language in the ITSA to cover claims that are essentially claims of trade secret
misappropriation, even when the alleged ‘trade secret’ does not fall within the Act's definition.”);
Playwood, 1999 WL 529572 at *3 (“The ITSA did not establish a parallel statutory regime to
complement the common law; rather, it abolished common law theories of misuse of such
[secret] information.... Unless defendants misappropriate[ ] a statutory trade secret, they d[o] no
legal wrong.”).
The question, then, is whether Orthofix’s claims for tortious interference grounded in the
misappropriation of confidential information, as opposed to trade secrets, in violation of the
Agreement, are pre-empted by ITSA. Orthofix does itself no favors in arguing that every
conceivable piece of “playbook” information is a trade secret just as surely as it is confidential; If
that reasoning is accepted, every piece of misappropriated information on which the tortious
interference claim is based must logically be, by Orthofix’s lights, trade secret information, or
“essentially” so, Proven Winners, 759 F.3d at 733, and thus pre-empted by ITSA. But Orthofix
also argues, and this Court agrees, as explained above, that the confidential information protected
by a contract is necessarily a broader category than trade secret information protected by ITSA.
Hunter, 2015 WL 7252996, at *1. To prevail at summary judgment, Gordon must show that
there is no dispute of material fact attending on the tortious interference claim, and she is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But if there are concededly some facts
that may not be “essentially” trade secrets, but rather only confidential information, and their use
may have constituted tortious interference under Illinois common law, then Gordon cannot do so.
See Universal Imagine Print Grp., LLC v. Mullen, No. 07 C 6720, 2008 WL 62205, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 4, 2008) (“Several of the categories of information classified as Confidential

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Information, such as personnel information or other information not available to the public, may
prove to be outside the scope of a trade secret because its continued secrecy does not provide
economic value to [Plaintiff].”). In part because the exact scope, and success or failure, or
Orthofix’s trade secret and breach of contract claims has not yet been determined, Gordon cannot
show that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Furthermore, Orthofix has clearly alleged, as the Court suggested it do in the Court’s
January 13, 2014 Order, ECF No. 18, that Gordon solicited Bizosky to sell bone growth
stimulators to her former clients, and has supported that allegation adequately with evidence to
survive summary judgment. See Bizosky Dep. 29:1–32:20. Bizosky was hired for just one year
to serve Gordon’s former clients in central Illinois, despite her lack of sales experience, then
replaced by Gordon when the year was up; Gordon accompanied Bizosky on some of the visits
to her biggest former clients. Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 21. A reasonable jury could conclude that
this constituted “purposeful interference” with Orthofix’s business expectancies. Atanus v.
American Airlines, Inc., 932 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
e. Remaining Motions
Both the parties moved, ECF Nos. 77, 84, for leave to file the exhibits to their motions
under seal. These motions are granted, and the parties are directed to file their exhibits under
seal forthwith. Gordon’s motion to exceed the type volume limitation is granted. Because the
case material Gordon supplied in her motion to supplement the record, ECF No. 94, was
irrelevant to the present matter and the Court did not rely on it, it is denied.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 76 is DENIED; her
motion for leave to file exhibits thereto under seal, ECF No. 77, is GRANTED; Plaintiff’s

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motion for leave to file exhibits in response under seal, ECF No. 84, is GRANTED; Defendant’s
motion for leave to exceed the type volume limitation in reply, ECF No. 86, is GRANTED; her
motion for leave to file the exhibits thereto under seal, ECF No. 87, is GRANTED; and her
motion for leave to supplement, ECF No. 94, is DENIED.

Entered this 24th day of March, 2016.
s/ Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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