Woods v. Schmeltz et al

Filing 26

ORDER & OPINION entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 7/14/2014: IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 21 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant Bennett is DISMISSE D from this case. A telephone status conference is SET for July 16, 2014, at 10:30 A.M. and a Pavey hearing is SET for August 6, 2014, at 3:00 P.M. The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue a writ for Plaintiff's participation in the telephone status conference on July 16, 2014, at 10:30 A.M. (SEE FULL WRITTEN ORDER & OPINION)(JRK, ilcd)

E-FILED

Monday, 14 July, 2014 12:31:21 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
MAURICE ANTONIO WOODS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER
SCHMELTZ, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 13-cv-1477

ORDER & OPINION
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies filed by Defendants Joseph Bennett,
James Berry, Adam Deal, Glendal French, Jacob Liles, Randy Lovrant, Brian
Maier, Kent Robinson, and Brian Schmeltz. (Doc. 21). Defendants argue that
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. (Doc. 21).
Defendants filed a Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. 22) and Plaintiff filed a
Response (Doc. 24). For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion is granted in
part and denied in part.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted where “the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. SMS Demag Aktiengesellschaft v. Material Scis. Corp., 565 F.3d 365,
1

368 (7th Cir. 2009). All inferences drawn from the facts must be construed in favor
of the non-movant. Moore v. Vital Prods., Inc., 641 F.3d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 2011). If
the evidence on record could not lead a reasonable factfinder to find for the nonmovant, then no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. McClendon v. Ind. Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 796 (7th
Cir. 1997).
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff is currently a prisoner at Pontiac Correctional Center in Pontiac,
Illinois. (Doc. 22 at 2). Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on March 12, 2014,
alleging that the Defendants violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by
placing him, on two separate occasions, in segregation cells, the walls of which were
contaminated with fecal matter. (Doc. 13 at 5). Plaintiff alleges that fecal matter
remained on the walls of his first cell from August 22, 2013, until August 26, 2013,
despite his requests to Defendants French, Deal, Schmeltz, and Robinson to have it
removed. (Doc. 13 at 5). Plaintiff alleges that fecal matter remained in his second
cell from September 5, 2013, until October 7, 2013, despite his requests to an
unknown correctional officer and Defendants Schmeltz, Berry, Liles, Maier,
Lovrant, and Bennett to have it corrected. (Doc. 13 at 5).
Plaintiff states that he filed a grievance on September 6, 2013, in regards to
the cell conditions that began on August 22, 2013. (Doc. 24 at 1-2). Plaintiff further
states that he has received no response to the grievance whatsoever, (Doc. 24 at 1Unless otherwise noted, these facts reflect the Court’s determination of the
undisputed facts. All inferences are drawn in Plaintiff’s favor.
2
1

3), and Defendants deny that the grievance was ever filed, (Doc. 22 at 7). In support
of his argument, Plaintiff has sworn an affidavit stating that he did file the
grievance, but that he received no response to it. (Doc. 24 at 3). Plaintiff also
provided an Inmate Transaction Statement indicating that he sent a document to
the prison library to be copied on September 5, 2013. (Doc. 24 at 4). Plaintiff states
that the document was the grievance form pertaining to his cell conditions from
August 22, 2013, to August 26, 2013. (Doc. 24 at 2). However, Plaintiff states his
copy of this grievance has been misplaced, so he could not present it to the Court.
(Doc. 24 at 1).
In regards to the conditions of the second cell, which began on September 5,
2013, it is undisputed that Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance on September 8,
2013. (Doc. 22-3 at 7). The grievance states that Plaintiff complained about the cell
conditions to Defendants Berry, Liles, Lovrant, Maier, and Schmeltz, as well as
other prison officials not named in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (Doc. 22-3 at 78). Although Plaintiff alleges that he complained to Defendant Bennett as well and
names him as a Defendant on this basis, (Doc. 13 at 5), Defendant Bennett is not
named in the grievance filed on September 8, 2013. (Doc. 22-3 at 7-8). After an
Illinois Department of Corrections employee determined the emergency was not
substantiated, the grievance was passed along to a counselor, who responded that
inmates are given cleaning supplies weekly and cells are cleaned prior to occupancy.
(Doc. 22-3 at 7). The grievance officer that subsequently received and reviewed the
grievance returned the grievance to Plaintiff on November 19, 2013, because
Plaintiff had since been moved to a new cell, thus mooting the issue. (Doc. 22-3 at
3

5). On appeal before the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”), Plaintiff’s grievance
was denied because “the claim cannot be substantiated.” (Doc. 22-3 at 1).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that his right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution was violated by Defendants. (Doc. 13). Plaintiff’s action arises under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured.” In litigation brought by prisoners challenging prison conditions, 42
U.S.C. § 1997e prohibits any action brought under § 1983 “until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” Thus, “[t]here is no question that
exhaustion is mandatory under [§ 1997e] and that unexhausted claims cannot be
brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (citing Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002)). “Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an
affirmative defense, defendants have the burden of pleading and proving the
defense.” Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1999).
Defendants make two arguments on summary judgment pertaining to
Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. First, Defendants
argue that Plaintiff never filed a grievance in regards to his cell conditions that
started on August 22. (Doc. 22 at 8). Thus, without properly filing a grievance and
pursuing it through the prison appeal process, they argue that Plaintiff failed to
4

exhaust his administrative remedies in regards to that incident. Second,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to name Defendants Bennett, Deal, French,
and Robinson in any grievance pertaining to his alleged unsanitary conditions.
(Doc. 22 at 8). Defendants argue that these four Defendants should thus be
dismissed from the case because Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his
administrative remedies against them. (Doc. 22 at 8).
I.

The Missing Grievance
The first issue is whether Plaintiff filed any grievance complaining of his cell

conditions from August 22 to August 26, 2013. The Seventh Circuit requires strict
compliance with procedures for prison administrative remedies. Dole v. Chandler,
438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). If the prisoner fails to follow the grievance
procedures, “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and
the prisoner's claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Id. (citing Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). However, further administrative
remedies become unavailable when prison officials fail to respond to a properly filed
grievance and § 1997e is thus satisfied due to the exhaustion of available remedies.
Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002).
In Dole, the plaintiff properly followed all grievance procedures, but his
grievance went missing after he gave it to a guard to be mailed. Dole, 438 F.3d at
807-08. The Seventh Circuit held that Dole had exhausted his remedies “[b]ecause
[he] took all steps necessary to exhaust one line of administrative review, and did
not receive instructions on how to proceed once his attempts at review were foiled.”
Id. at 813. Dole could not maintain control of his grievance after submitting it
5

according to prison procedures, he had no choice in the method of submission, and
he had no way to know that the ARB did not receive it. Id. at 810. Thus, Dole had
exhausted his available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Id. at 813.
In the present case, the disputed question of whether Plaintiff actually filed a
grievance on the conditions of his first cell would be conclusive on the issue of
exhaustion of that claim. Plaintiff presents evidence indicating he filed a grievance
regarding his August cell conditions on September 6, 2013, after sending it to the
library to be copied, and that he never received any response. (Doc. 24 at 3-4).
Further, he claims he followed up by asking the Chief Administrative Officer
(“CAO”) about the grievance, who stated he had not received the grievance, and
filing a separate grievance to complain of a lack of response to his prior grievances.
(Doc. 24 at 3; Doc. 13 at 11-12). Defendants deny that Plaintiff filed any grievance
about the August conditions, and submit evidence showing no record of having
received it. Thus, there is a material dispute of fact that precludes summary
judgment. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a factfinder
could conclude that the grievance was filed in accordance with prison procedures,
though subsequently lost, and that Plaintiff’s attempts to follow up did not result in
instructions on how to proceed, rendering administrative remedies unavailable for
Plaintiff to exhaust. While the Court must still determine as a factual matter
whether this is true, it is clear that Defendants have failed to prove that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.

6

II.

Failure to Name Defendants in a Grievance
The second issue is whether Plaintiff is required to name all Defendants in a

grievance pertaining to the incidents in his Complaint in order to properly exhaust
his administrative remedies against those Defendants before filing suit. Plaintiff
named Defendant Bennett in his Amended Complaint in regards to the cell
conditions that started on September 5, 2013, and named Defendants Deal, French,
and Robinson in regards to the cell conditions that started on August 22, 2013. (Doc.
13 at 5). However, none of these Defendants were named in the only grievance
Defendants admit was filed, which pertains to the September cell conditions.
“[N]othing in [42 U.S.C. § 1997e] imposes a ‘name all defendants’
requirement.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 217. Rather, each state specifies what must be
included in a grievance and “it is the prison’s requirements, and not [§ 1997e], that
define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. Illinois has
established a system outlining the level of detail required in prison grievances. The
regulations governing grievances require a prisoner to include the details of “what
happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is
otherwise involved in the complaint.” Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504.810(b)
(emphasis added).
A.

Defendant Bennett

Plaintiff states in his Amended Complaint that he complained to Defendant
Bennett regarding the September cell conditions sometime between September 5
and September 8. (Doc. 13 at 5). However, despite naming in the corresponding
grievance multiple other Defendants and some correctional officers not named as
7

defendants, Plaintiff fails to mention Defendant Bennett. (Doc. 22-3 at 7-8).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff thus has not exhausted his claim against Defendant
Bennett because the failure to name all involved individuals violates the grievance
procedure. (Doc. 22 at 8). Plaintiff makes no argument in his Response as to why he
failed to name Defendant Bennett in the grievance or why Defendant Bennett
should remain in this case. (Doc. 24). The issue is thus whether failing to name one
Defendant in the grievance when multiple others are named constitutes a failure to
exhaust against that Defendant.
As noted above, the Seventh Circuit requires strict compliance with
procedures for prison administrative remedies. Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. Illinois clearly
requires the name of each individual involved, or a description of any unknown
individuals, to be listed in the grievance. Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504.810(b).
However, the Seventh Circuit has stated that “[w]here prison officials address an
inmate’s grievance on the merits without rejecting it on procedural grounds, the
grievance has served its function of alerting the state and inviting corrective action,
and defendants cannot rely on the failure to exhaust defense.” Maddox v. Love, 655
F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011). In another case, the court similarly stated “a
procedural default in state proceedings is fatal to the litigation in federal court only
if the state tribunal explicitly relies on that default.” Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395,
397 (7th Cir. 2004). Read broadly, these cases could be dispositive of the issue in the
present case and require denial of summary judgment for Defendant Bennett,
because the prison system did not reject Plaintiff’s grievance, which omitted

8

Defendant Bennett’s name, on that procedural basis. However, the rule does not
hold up logically when applied to the facts of this case.
The Maddox case, explicating the rule that a claimed procedural violation
must have been used to reject the grievance, is factually distinguishable from the
present case. In Maddox, the plaintiff filed a grievance asserting a denial of his
religious fellowship, but did not name a single defendant in the grievance. 655 F.3d
at 712. However, the prison never informed the plaintiff that the grievance was
procedurally deficient and instead addressed his complaint on the merits at every
stage. Id. at 721-22. Because the grievance complained about an issue of prison
policy, the court reasoned it was impossible for the prison not to know who made
the decision. Id. at 722. Additionally, the grievance form used by the prison did not
specifically request the names of each party involved. Id. at 714. For all these
reasons, the failure to name the defendants in the grievance was a “mere technical
defect that had no effect on the [grievance] process and didn’t limit the usefulness of
the exhaustion requirement.” Id. at 722. Thus, because the prison had addressed
the grievance on the merits without regard to this technical defect, it could not later
cite this same defect to support a failure to exhaust defense. Id.
These facts that supported the conclusion in Maddox are not present in this
case. First, Plaintiff’s grievance form specifically required “the name or identifying
information for each person involved.” (Doc. 22-3 at 7). This requirement is
consistent with Illinois’s grievance regulations requiring “the name of each person
who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.” Ill. Admin.
Code tit. 20, § 504.810(b). Second, Plaintiff is not complaining about prison policy,
9

but about specific incidents and the deliberate indifference of specific officers. In
Maddox, the prison was easily able to determine who made the policy decision about
which Maddox complained. In the present case, it would have been impossible for
the prison to determine which of its employees were involved in the incidents unless
Plaintiff named them in the grievance. Accordingly, the omission of Defendant
Bennett from the grievance effectively prevented the prison from fully investigating
the incidents. Finally, because several prison officials were named in Plaintiff’s
grievance, either by name or by job description, (Doc. 22-3 at 7-8), it would have
been impossible for the prison to determine that a procedural defect had occurred
due to the omission of Defendant Bennett until the suit was filed.
In addition to these factual distinctions between Maddox and the present
case, the rule does not logically apply in cases such as this involving numerous
defendants, only some of which were named in a grievance. It is logical to require a
prison to enforce a procedural defect such as a missed deadline or improper method
of filing in order to later rely upon it for a failure to exhaust defense. However, in
order for the prison to rely on a procedural defect, it must first be able to detect that
defect. A defect such as failing to name one of several involved officers is not
detectable through the grievance process, but it is no less a procedural defect under
Illinois regulations, and fails to satisfy the strict compliance rule in this Circuit.
Here, there is no conceivable way the prison could have rejected Plaintiff’s
grievance for the procedural defect of failing to name Defendant Bennett. The
prison could only know who was involved if Plaintiff named them in the grievance.
The grievance Plaintiff filed did not serve the purpose of alerting the prison to the
10

entirety of Plaintiff’s claim and did not allow the prison to fully investigate or take
corrective action as to the allegations against Defendant Bennett. Plaintiff cannot
now sue prison officials unnamed in his grievance without facing a failure to
exhaust defense simply because the prison did not previously reject his grievance on
the basis of this undiscoverable procedural defect. To argue otherwise is mere
sophistry.
This conclusion is not novel. See, e.g., Ambrose v. Godinez, 510 F. App’x 470,
472 (7th Cir. 2013) (upholding a district court’s dismissal of two defendants who
were not named in any of the prisoner’s grievances by name or inference);
Flemming v. Shah, No. 12-761-GPM, 2013 WL 3033102, at *2-3 (S.D. Ill. June 17,
2013) (distinguishing Maddox and dismissing a defendant who was not named in
the prisoner’s grievance because the incident in the grievance was not “the type of
decision . . . where the prison would know that [the defendant] was involved just by
the nature of [the] [p]laintiff’s grievance”). Thus, the Maddox rule is not controlling
in this case. Plaintiff failed to name Defendant Bennett in his grievance, and thus
did not comply with the requirements of the grievance process. Accordingly,
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies for his claim
against Defendant Bennett. Therefore, Defendant Bennett is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on this basis, and must be dismissed from the case.
B.

Defendants Deal, French, and Robinson

Defendants Deal, French, and Robinson were named in the Amended
Complaint regarding the August cell conditions, but not in the submitted grievance
regarding the September cell conditions. However, as noted above, Plaintiff has
11

offered evidence showing that he filed a grievance regarding the August cell
conditions, but that his copy has been misplaced. At this stage, it is a reasonable
inference from Plaintiff’s submitted facts that this grievance, if it was filed, named
Defendants

Deal, French, and/or Robinson. Thus, summary judgment is

inappropriate as to these Defendants because the material fact of whether Plaintiff
actually filed the missing grievance is still in dispute. If Plaintiff did file the
grievance and did name Defendants Deal, French, and Robinson in it, then he
properly exhausted his administrative remedies for that claim. However, if Plaintiff
did not file the grievance or filed it without naming these Defendants, then he failed
to properly exhaust administrative remedies and summary judgment would be
appropriate. The issue of the missing grievance will be resolved at the Pavey
hearing and thus summary judgment as to Defendants Deal, French, and Robinson
must be denied.
III.

Pavey Hearing
Summary judgment must be denied as to the issues pertaining to the August

cell conditions because there is a material dispute of fact as to whether Plaintiff
properly filed a grievance about these cell conditions. Before this case can proceed
on the merits, however, this Court must decide the exhaustion issue. Pavey v.
Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008). To do so, this Court must hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Plaintiff did, in fact, properly exhaust the
administrative remedies available to him regarding his claim of unsanitary prison
conditions in August 2013. Id. Accordingly, a Pavey hearing is tentatively set for
August 6, 2014, at 3:00 P.M. A telephone status conference will be held on July 16,
12

2014, at 10:30 A.M. to determine any discovery needs of the parties and to identify
any potential witnesses for the Pavey hearing. The Clerk is to issue a writ for the
Plaintiff's participation in the telephone status conference.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Doc. 21) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant Bennett is DISMISSED
from this case. A telephone status conference is SET for July 16, 2014, at 10:30 A.M.
and a Pavey hearing is SET for August 6, 2014, at 3:00

P.M.

The Clerk is

DIRECTED to issue a writ for Plaintiff’s participation in the telephone status
conference on July 16, 2014, at 10:30 A.M.

Entered this 14th day of July, 2014.

s/ Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge

13