Donelson v. Pfister
Filing
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ORDER & OPINION entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 10/16/2014. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 1 is DENIED. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. CASE TERMINATED. See full written Order.(JS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 16 October, 2014 09:45:07 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
CHARLES DONELSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD HARRINGTON,
Defendant.
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Case No. 13-1523
ORDER & OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Charles Donelson’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondent filed an
Answer to the Petition (Doc. 19), to which Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 23). In his
Petition, Donelson challenges the determination by an Adjustment Committee at
Pontiac Correctional Center to revoke one year of good conduct credit on the basis of
two incidents that occurred while he was incarcerated at Western Illinois
Correctional Center. He alleges that the decision violated his due process rights as
articulated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) because he did not have the
opportunity to call witnesses and because the revocation was not based on “some
evidence.” As explained below, the Petition is denied. Petitioner procedurally
defaulted his first claim by failing to comply with established procedures for calling
witnesses, and the Illinois state court did not unreasonably apply clearly
established federal law in concluding that the revocation of time credit was based
on some evidence.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is serving a fifty-year sentence for first degree murder, home
invasion, and aggravated sexual assault. He is currently incarcerated at the Pontiac
Correctional Center, where he is in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections. (Doc. 19 at 1). He filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October 21, 2013. (Doc. 1).
This Petition emerges from two disciplinary incidents that occurred while
Petitioner was incarcerated at the Western Illinois Correctional Center. The
incidents are described in two disciplinary reports, the first of which was filed on
July 12, 2011 (Doc. 119-1 at 2), and the second of which was filed on July 14, 2011
(Id. at 3).
According to the incident report and disciplinary report filed after the first
incident, Petitioner attempted to leave the “R1 B-wing” at approximately 8:20 a.m.
without being properly dressed. (Id. at 1). When Officer Jimmie Watson ordered
Petitioner to show his identification and to move away from the wing’s doorway,
Petitioner initially refused to comply. (Id. at 2). When he did comply, Petitioner told
Officer Watson, “I’ll fix you . . . I’ll have your job, bitch.” (Id. at 1). This incident was
documented by an incident report dated July 11, 2011. (Id.). Petitioner received a
disciplinary report on July 12, 2011. (Id. at 2).
According to the disciplinary report filed after the second incident,
Petitioner’s second disciplinary incident occurred approximately one hour later. (Id.
at 3). The report states that Petitioner sidestepped Officers Roberts and Pool as the
R1-B wing door was closing and ran towards Officer Watson. He “drew back his
2
right arm with a closed fist and swung his right arm around striking Watson in the
left facial area.” (Id.). Petitioner continued to strike Watson until he was restrained
by two responding officers. (Id. at 4). This assault disrupted “normal operating
procedures of the facility” and the wing “was . . . placed on a Level 1 Lockdown.”
(Id.). The incident was documented in a disciplinary report, which Petitioner
received on July 14, 2011. (Id.). There is no incident report for this incident on the
record.
Both disciplinary reports that Petitioner received included a detachable
bottom section in which Petitioner could identify witnesses that he wished the
disciplinary review board, known as the Adjustment Committee, to consider calling.
(See id. at 2-4). The report instructs the recipient to “Detach and Return [it] to the
Adjustment Committee or Program Unit Prior to the Hearing” and includes spaces
for inmates to print names of witnesses and describe the facts to which the witness
can testify. (Id.).
Petitioner completed those sections on each form, but did not detach them or
return them. (See id.). On the first, he requested the “R1-B wing camera” as a
witness, and noted it would show that “he was on the wing, control officer open
door.” He also listed “Leamon/Cox” as witnesses, and indicated that they could
testify that he “did not hold the door,” that he “was talking to C/O Roberts,” and
that he “gave C/O my ID.” He indicated they would also testify that Petitioner “did
not say a word to Watson” and testify that “Watson has been harassing” Petitioner
for two-months. (Id. at 2). On the second, he listed the “R1 B-wing camera” and
“Phone recordings” as witnesses. (Id.at 3). He indicated that the R1 B-wing camera”
3
would show that Roberts and Pool were “blocking the door,” and that “Watson was
threatening to assault me all hours.” (Id.). The phone recordings would show that
he “ran for the door for a Lieutenant since C/O Roberts would not call one. I was
assaulted.” (Id.).
Shortly after the incident, Petitioner was transferred to Pontiac Correctional
Center, where his Adjustment Committee hearing took place on July 20, 2011. (Id.
at 5). Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and the Adjustment Committee found him
guilty of “assaulting any person, insolence, unauthorized movement, and disobeying
a direct order.” (Id.). He was disciplined with a one-year demotion to C-grade status,
one-year segregation, revocation of a one-year good-conduct credit, one-year
audio/visual restriction, and six months of contact visit restriction. (Id. at 6). The
Adjustment Committee’s report states that Petitioner did not request any
witnesses. (Id.). The Committee repeated the accounts set forth in both disciplinary
reports as the basis for its decision. (Compare id. at 5 with id. at 2-4). However, it
only referenced attached “DC 434 incident reports” as part of the basis, but did not
reference the disciplinary reports. (Id. at 5).
Petitioner filed an Offender’s Grievance on August 15, 2011. In it, he argued
that the Adjustment Committee did not comply with procedural due process
safeguards because the witnesses he requested on the disciplinary reports were not
brought before the Adjustment Committee and its decision was not supported by
“some evidence.” (Id. at 7-8). In response to Petitioner’s grievance, a Grievance
Officer recommended that the grievance be denied because “no witnesses were
requested” and the findings were supported by the facts presented. (Id. at 9). The
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Chief Administrative Officer, Randy Pfister, Warden of the Pontiac Correctional
Center, approved the recommendation. (Id.). Petitioner then appealed to the
Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, S.A. Godinez, on September 20,
2011, who denied Petitioner’s appeal. (Id. at 11).
Following this denial, Petitioner filed a pro se complaint for mandamus relief,
a writ of certiorari, and a declaratory judgment against Pfister and Godinez on
February 9, 2012. The complaint alleged that that the Adjustment Committee
violated his due process rights by failing to allow his timely witness requests or
provide a reason for their exclusion and for failing to base its decision on “some
evidence.” (Id. at 12-15, 21-24).
The trial court dismissed the complaint on August 14, 2012, (Id. at 38), and
Petitioner appealed. The Illinois appellate court affirmed the trial court, concluding
that petitioner’s due process rights were not violated. (Id. at 80, 86-87). The
appellate court concluded that Petitioner’s witness claim was foreclosed because he
did not comply with the procedure for requesting witnesses when he failed to return
the witness request slips. (Id. at 86). It also concluded that the July 12 and July 14
disciplinary reports, on their own, provided “some evidence” upon which the
Committee based its decision. (Id. at 87).
The Illinois Supreme Court denied
Petitioner’s leave to appeal the appellate court’s decision on September 25, 2013.
(Id. at 103). Petitioner then filed the present Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
5
LEGAL STANDARDS
A federal district court may hear a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief by
a person in state custody only on the grounds that “he is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A
petitioner must “fairly present” each claim by including both the controlling
operative facts and legal principles at each level of the state court system.
Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 268 (7th Cir. 2014); Woods v. Schwartz, 589
F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 2009).
“When a state court resolves a federal claim by relying on a state law ground
that is both independent of the federal question and adequate to support the
judgment, federal habeas review of the claim is foreclosed.” Richardson, 745 F.3d at
268 (quoting Kaczmarek v. Rednour, 627 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2010)); Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). A state law ground is independent when the
state court “actually relied on the procedural bar as an independent basis for its
disposition of the case” and is adequate “when it is a firmly established and
regularly followed state practice.” Smith v. Mckee, 598 F.3d 374, 384 (7th Cir. 2010).
A petitioner’s claim is “procedurally defaulted” if the state court relies on procedural
state law to dismiss the claim. Kaczmarek, 627 F.3d at 591. A procedurally
defaulted constitutional claim will not be considered by a federal court unless the
petitioner “can establish cause and prejudice for the default or that the failure to
consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. A
“cause” is “an objective factor, external to the defense, that impeded the defendant’s
efforts to raise the claim in an earlier proceeding.” Smith v. Mckee, 598 F.3d 374,
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382 (7th Cir. 2010)(internal quotation omitted). “Prejudice” is “an error which so
infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Id.
Finally, a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.”
Moore v. Casperson, 345 F.3d 474, 484 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted).
For claims that are not procedurally defaulted, a federal court may not grant
relief on claims that have been adjudicated on the merits by state courts unless the
state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or rested on an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly,
a petitioner must show that the state court’s ruling on his claim “was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing
law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 131
S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011).
A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it
“applies a rule that contradicts the governing law” as stated in Supreme Court
decisions, or “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from”
those of a prior Supreme Court case and yet reaches a different result. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision is not contrary to federal
law if it identifies and affirms the principles of the relevant Supreme Court
precedent. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003).
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To be an “unreasonable application” of federal law, the state court
determination must be more than simply incorrect, it must be unreasonable as that
term is widely understood in the law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11. A state
court’s application of federal law is reasonable if it is “at least minimally consistent
with the facts and circumstances of the case.” Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335
(7th Cir. 1997). Further, “it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been
squarely established” by the Supreme Court. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,
122 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
In his § 2254 Petition, Petitioner raises two grounds for relief. The first
ground is that that the Adjustment Committee violated his due process rights when
it improperly denied his request for witnesses. The second ground is that the
Adjustment Committee violated his due process rights when it found that he had
assaulted a staff member without the required “some evidence.”
Respondent concedes that Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies.
(Doc. 19 at 6-7). Respondent argues that Petitioner procedurally defaulted his first
ground for relief by failing to request witnesses in the manner established by
regulation. Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his second
ground because the state court adjudicated it on the merits and the decision was not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.
8
I. Denial of Witnesses
Petitioner’s first ground for relief is that the Adjustment Committee
improperly denied his request to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing. Federal
habeas review of this claim is procedurally barred. Petitioner failed to comply with
procedural requirements for calling witnesses at the Adjustment Committee
hearing, and the Illinois appellate court relied upon this adequate and independent
state law ground when it denied Petitioner’s mandamus petition on this ground.
A. Inmates’ Due Process Rights to Call Witnesses in Adjustment Proceedings
Under established Supreme Court precedent, inmates have a liberty interest
in time credits earned for good conduct. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557
(1974). They therefore enjoy certain procedural due process rights in disciplinary
proceedings that may deprive them of such time credits, such as the right to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence. Id. at 566.
However, the right is not absolute. “[P]rison officials are granted a great deal
of leeway in addressing inmates’ request for witnesses.” Whitlock v. Johnson, 153
F.3d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1998). This is because “[t]he operation of a correctional
institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at
566. Therefore, prison officials may deny inmates the right to call witnesses “[s]o
long as the reasons are logically related to preventing undue hazards to
institutional safety or correctional goals.” Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497 (1985).
The Seventh Circuit has indicated that prisons should generally make
individualized determinations when deciding to deny inmates’ requests to call
witnesses, Whitlock, 153 F.3d at 386, but allows prisons to exclude classes or
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categories of witnesses when “the prison officials demonstrate that the reasons for
excluding the class apply with equal force to all potential witnesses falling within
that category.” Id. at 387.
Illinois has established through regulation adjustment committee hearing
procedures that comport with Wolff. See 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.80. Pursuant to the
regulations, inmates may request witnesses at disciplinary hearings by complying
with the procedure for submitting witness request slips in each living unit. See id.
at 504.80(h)(3). If the witness requests are not received prior to the hearing, the
Committee may disapprove them. Id. If the Committee receives a timely request for
a witness and denies it, the regulations require that it provide a written reason. Id.
at 504.80(h)(4). In this way, the Committee is given the necessary discretion to
allow inmates to call witnesses or deny requests for witnesses.
B. Petitioner’s Procedural Default
Petitioner claims that the Adjustment Committee denied him the right to call
witnesses, but Petitioner did not follow the procedure that the Committee provided
to call witnesses. Each disciplinary report that Petitioner received included a
section that allows inmates to list witnesses who they would like to appear at the
hearing before the Adjustment Committee and explain the witness’s testimony.
(Doc. 19-1 at 2). The text of the disciplinary report directs inmates to detach and
return the paper to the Adjustment Committee prior to the hearing. (Id.). Although
Petitioner completed both forms, he failed to detach and return witness requests for
each of his disciplinary reports. (Id. at 85-86).
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When a state court fails to reach the merits of a federal claim because of past
procedural error, those claims are said to be procedurally defaulted. Kaczmarke, 627
F.3d at 591. Procedural default ordinarily forecloses federal habeas review because
it provides a ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to
support the judgment. See Richardson, 745 F.3d at 268.
Ordinarily, procedural default occurs in federal court or state court, at trial or
on appeal. Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.2d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 1986). However, the
Seventh Circuit has concluded that Petitioners can procedurally default claims at
“the forum initially available” to them. Id. In the case of state inmates, the forum
that is initially available is the Adjustment Committee proceeding established by
regulations. See id. Therefore, just as a criminal defendant can procedurally default
certain claims by failing to raise them in appropriate ways at trial, a state inmate
can procedurally default other claims by failing to raise them in appropriate ways in
a disciplinary hearing. See id. When Petitioner failed to detach and return his
witness requests, he failed to follow procedural requirements established by
regulation. See 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.80(h)(3).
The Illinois appellate court resolved Petitioner’s action for mandamus on this
ground. It held that because Petitioner failed to follow the Department’s rules for
requesting witnesses, he was not entitled to mandamus relief. (Doc 19-1 at 86). The
appellate court, therefore, relied upon a procedural bar as an independent basis for
its dismissal of Petitioner’s claim. See Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 384 (7th Cir.
2010).
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This independent procedural ground for dismissing Petitioner’s claim was
also adequate. A state law ground is adequate “when it is a firmly established and
regularly followed state practice.” Id. The regulations governing Adjustment
Hearings have been in place since 2003. See 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.80. Petitioner
also received notice of the procedural requirements each time he was subjected to
disciplinary proceedings as an inmate. See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423
(holding that a petitioner’s failure to comply with a procedural requirement can
thwart review when the petitioner was appraised of the requirement and the
requirement has existed for some time).
Petitioner argues that his past experience proves that the Adjustment
Committee does not regularly follow this practice, nor is it firmly established. He
points to past occasions in which he was able to call witnesses at Adjustment
Committee hearings even though he failed to comply with the required procedures
and instead followed the procedures he followed in this case. (Doc. 23 at 6 (arguing
that in the past, “Petitioner submitted his witness request the same way on the
form and it was accepted. Respondent knows this.”)).
If the regulations posed
mandatory consequences for a failure to comply with procedures and Adjustment
Committees regularly failed to impose them, perhaps Petitioner would have a point.
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 297 (1964) (refusing to
apply procedural bar when state court had never previously applied it with the
“pointless severity” shown in the case). However, the regulations at issue provide a
great deal of discretion to the Adjustment Committee. See 20 Ill. Adm. Code
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504.80(h)(3)(“The Committee may disapprove witness requests that are not received
prior to the hearing.”).
The Supreme Court has held that state law grounds are not inadequate when
they are discretionary. See Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60 (2009). It reasoned that
holding otherwise “would pose an unnecessary dilemma for the States” because it
would force them to choose between finality and flexibility. See id. The same
reasoning that Beard applied to state court proceedings applies here to Adjustment
Committee hearings. As the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit have held, prison
staff must be able to exercise discretion when handling requests for witnesses. See,
e.g., Whitlock, 153 F.3d at 386. If the Court held that the state’s past discretionary
decision to allow Petitioner to call witnesses in spite of his failure to comply with
administrative procedures was an inadequate procedural bar, it would undermine
this necessary discretion and replace it with stringent rules that are more likely to
be unfavorable to inmates than the current rule. See Beard, 558 U.S. at 60.
Finally, Petitioner has not excused his failure to comply with the required
procedures. Petitioners may excuse procedural default when they show “cause for
and prejudice from” the default. Brooks v. Walls, 279 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 2002).
Petitioner has not provided any reasons that he failed to detach and submit his
witness request form as required other than an argument that he was not required
to submit proposed witnesses in such a way in the past. This is not a valid cause for
procedural default, as it simply provides an excuse for not following the rule.
Because Petitioner failed to request witnesses in compliance with the
Adjustment Committee’s established procedures, and because the last state court to
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articulate a reason for dismissing the case did so by relying upon this failure,
Petitioner procedurally defaulted his first claim and his petition was not properly
filed. See Brooks, 279 F.3d at 522.
II. Some Evidence
Petitioner’s second ground for habeas relief is that the Adjustment
Committee’s revocation of his good time credit was not supported by “some
evidence.” (Doc. 1 at 6). The Due Process Clause requires that prison disciplinary
board findings be supported by “some evidence.” Superintendent, Mass. Correctional
Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 56367). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that
could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455-56.
Petitioner claims that there is no evidence that he assaulted any staff in the
incident report filed by Officer Watson. (See Doc. 19-1 at 1-2). Based on language in
its final summary report, he also argues that the Adjustment Committee only relied
upon Officer Watson’s reports in deciding to revoke one year of good time credit.
(See Id. at 5 (“Based on the observation of the reporting employee Watson.”)). He
therefore asserts that the Adjustment Committee did not rely upon any evidence in
finding that he assaulted a staff member.
Because the Illinois appellate court addressed the merits of this claim, the
Court reviews its decision to see if it is contrary to or involves an unreasonable
application of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
In this case, the Illinois
appellate court’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application
of prevailing federal law. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
14
The Illinois appellate court’s decision was not contrary to controlling federal
law. In this case, the Illinois appellate court cited to state regulations rather than
Supreme Court precedent, but the result was the same because the regulations are
consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedent. Under controlling Supreme Court
precedent, there is “some evidence” if “there is any evidence in the record that could
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.
In Illinois, the “some evidence” standard is codified. Regulations require that the
Adjustment Committee “be reasonably satisfied there is some evidence that the
offender committed the offense for the individual to be found guilty.” 20 Ill. Adm.
Code 504.80(j)(1). The Illinois appellate court relied upon this articulation of the
some evidence standard, and then applied a Seventh Circuit case applying Hill. (See
Doc. 19-1 at 88, citing McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999)).
Because the rule that the Illinois court applied did not contradict governing law as
stated in Supreme Court decisions, it is not contrary to controlling federal law. See
Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
The Illinois Court’s decision was also not an unreasonable application of
federal law, as it is “consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.” See
Hennon, 109 F.3d at 335. In determining whether a state court unreasonably
misapplied controlling precedent, a habeas court must “determine what arguments
or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision;
and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that
those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of
this Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
15
The Illinois court’s decision is hardly an unreasonable application of federal
law. Under Hill, “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the
record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” 472
U.S at 455-56. The court noted that the Adjustment Committee “indicated it read
the reports and then provided the bases for its decision in finding plaintiff guilty of
the alleged offenses.” (Doc. 19-1 at 87). The Illinois state court concluded that a
“disciplinary report alone provides ‘some evidence’ for the disciplinary decision
where the report describes the incident in sufficient detail.” (Id., citing McPherson
v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999)).
This analysis is consistent with the record in front of this Court. In his
disciplinary report, Officer Lindsey wrote:
On the above date and approximate time C/O ROBERTS, and C/O
POOL walked onto R1 B wing to lock the wing up for 9:30 AM lock up
time. C/O WATSON was sitting at the foyer office desk, as WATSON
was assigned to R1 Foyer. As the wing door was closing, I/M
DONELSON R02278 quickly sidestepped around C/O’s ROBERTS and
POOL and ran off of B wing and into the foyer. Once into the foyer,
DONELSON ran directly towards C/O WATSON drew back his right
arm with a closed fist and swung his right arm around striking
WATSON in the left facial area, before WATSON could get out of the
chair and onto his feet. DONELSON continued to swing closed fist
punches striking C/O WATSON several times in the facial area,
causing C/O WATSON and I/M DONELSON to both fall to the floor,
where DONELSON continued his assault on C/O WATSON.
(Doc. 19-1 at 3)
Officer Lindsey’s report is cited in the Adjustment Committee’s report (See id. at 5
(listing Incident Officer as “Lindsey, Matthew W” and Location as “WIL-R1 House
Foyer Area”), and the entire second paragraph of the Adjustment Committee’s Final
16
Summary Report quotes heavily from Officer Lindsey’s report. (Compare id. with id.
at 3).
Therefore, the Court concludes that the Illinois state court did not
unreasonably apply federal law. Some evidence only requires “a modicum of
evidence,” and only requires that disciplinary boards rely on a record that “is not so
devoid of evidence that [its findings are] without support or otherwise arbitrary.”
See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. The Illinois court did not act unreasonably (in fact, it
acted quite reasonably) in concluding that the record from Petitioner’s Adjustment
Committee hearing contained some evidence that he committed an assault, and that
the Committee relied upon that evidence. Therefore, Petitioner’s petition is denied
with respect to the second ground for relief.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court
“must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order
adverse to the applicant.” Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), a petitioner may only
appeal from the court’s judgment in his habeas case if he obtains a certificate of
appealability. A certificate of appealability may only be issued where the petitioner
“has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). This requirement has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean
that an applicant must show that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000). A petitioner need not show that the appeal will succeed, but he
must show “‘something more than the absence of frivolity’ or the existence of mere
17
‘good faith’” on his part. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337-38 (2003) (quoting
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)). If the district court denies the request,
a petitioner may request that a circuit judge issue the certificate. Fed. R. App. P.
22(b)(1).
Based on the record before it, the Court cannot find that reasonable jurists
would debate that Petitioner’s claims are meritless. Accordingly, a certificate of
appealability is denied.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is DENIED. The Court DECLINES to issue
a certificate of appealability.
CASE TERMINATED.
Entered this 16th day of October, 2014.
s/Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge
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