Presley et al v. Board of School Directors of Rankin School District No. 98, an Illinois Local Governmental Entity et al
Filing
8
OPINION by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins: Defendants' Motion for More Definite Statement and Brief in Support 5 is DENIED. Defendants are directed to respond to the Complaint by May 9, 2014. See written order entered by Judge Schanzle-Haskins on 4/15/2014. (LB, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 15 April, 2014 03:55:21 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
JAY PRESLEY and TAMMY
PRESLEY, Husband and Wife,
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
BOARD OF SCHOOL
)
DIRECTORS OF RANKIN
)
SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 98, an )
Illinois Local Governmental
)
Entity; STEVEN K. JOHNSON,
)
Superintendent of Rankin
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Elementary School District
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No. 98, in his Individual
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Capacity; DEBBIE LOWMAN,
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President of the Board, in her
)
Individual Capacity; JULIA
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NELMS; Secretary of the Board, )
in her Individual Capacity;
)
TIMOTHY GAY, Board Member, )
in his Individual Capacity; and
)
LYLE SECREST, Board Member, )
in his Individual Capacity;
)
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Defendants,
)
No. 14-cv-1055
OPINION
THOMAS P. SCHANZLE-HASKINS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for More
Definite Statement and Brief in Support (d/e 5) (Motion). For the reasons
set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.
Page 1 of 9
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff Jay Presley was a duly elected and
appointed member of the Board of School Directors (Board) of Defendant
Rankin School District No. 98 (“District”), and his wife, Plaintiff Tammy
Presley, was a secretary to the Administration of the District, a junior high
school principal, and Defendant Steven K. Johnson. Johnson was
Superintendent of the District. The other individual Defendants, Debbie
Lowman, Julia Nelms, Timothy Gay, and Lyle Secrest were all members of
the Board; Lowman was also President of the Board, and Nelms was also
Secretary of the Board. Each individual Defendant is sued in his or her
individual capacity. Complaint (d/e 1), ¶¶ 4-10.
The Plaintiffs sue the District for the following:
Defendant, Rankin School District No. 98, is an Illinois Local
Governmental Entity organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Illinois acting under color of state law. Rankin is
sued for the following:
a. Under Section 1983, for the conduct of its policy making agents,
the defendant School Board Members.
b. Under Section 9-102 of the Illinois Local Governmental Tort
Immunity Act for the compensatory damages awarded against its
Superintendent and Directors.
Complaint, ¶ 5.
Page 2 of 9
The Plaintiffs allege that on September 16, 2013, Jay Presley sent an
email to Lowman about “several matters involving the administration of the
School.” Complaint, ¶ 13. Jay Presley had spoken to Lowman about these
matters before sending the email. The Plaintiffs allege,
The email included a list of matters from parents, teachers,
staff, other board members, and other Superintendents that Jay
had kept which had not been answered. Jay stated his
intention was to determine whether policies were being
implemented as to how district monies were spent, and, if not,
to establish accountability for the failures.
Id. The Plaintiffs allege that Jay Presley’s email was sent in his capacity as
a member of the Board and was concerning matters of public concern.
Complaint, ¶ 28.
On November 25, 2013, the Board suspended Tammy Presley, and
on December 2, 2013, the Board fired Tammy Presley. Defendant
Superintendent Johnson raised the matter before the Board that led to the
suspension, and recommended the firing. The other individual Defendants
all voted in favor of the firing. Complaint, ¶¶ 22-24. The Plaintiffs allege
that the Defendants suspended and fired Tammy Presley in retaliation for
Jay Presley speaking out about matters of public concern in the September
16, 2013, email and in his conversations with Lowman about the same.
Complaint, ¶¶ 29-31. The Plaintiffs further allege that the Individual
Defendants “impermissibly infringed upon Jay and Tammy Presley’s liberty
Page 3 of 9
interest of intimate association in violation of both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.” Complaint, ¶ 32.
Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs bring claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and § 9-102 of the Illinois Local Government
Tort Immunity Act 745 ILCS 10/9-102 (Tort Immunity Act). The Defendants
pray for damages and attorney fees against all Defendants, and for an
injunction against the District to reinstate Tammy Presley to her position as
secretary. Complaint, at 11-12, Prayer for Relief.
ANALYSIS
The Defendants move for a more definite statement. The Defendants
argue that the Complaint contains no factual allegations against the District
and no allegations of any violation of the Tort Immunity Act. The
Defendants also argue that the Complaint contains no factual allegations of
any violation of the civil rights of either Plaintiff. The Defendants complain
that the allegations are too vague to allow a response. They move to
require the Plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement or to replead the
Complaint.
Motions for more definite statement are disfavored. Such motions
are granted only when the complaint is so vague that a party cannot
respond to it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e); Harper v. City of Murphysboro, Ill.,
Page 4 of 9
2008 WL 2782837, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 15, 2008); Moore v. Fidelity Financial
Services, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 557, 559-60 (N.D. Ill. 1994). After careful
review of the Complaint, the Court finds that the Complaint is not
sufficiently vague to require a more definite statement. The Defendants
can respond with either a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or an
answer.
The Complaint alleges interference with the Plaintiffs’ intimate
association with each other as husband and wife. The right to intimate
association is analyzed as a liberty interest under the due process clause.
Christensen v. County of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2007); Null v.
Gardner, 2009 WL 2928144 (C.D. Ill. September 9, 2009).1 The right to
due process is violated when a state actor abuses his office to directly and
substantially interfere with a liberty interest, and the nature of the
interference “shocks the conscience.” Christensen, 483 F.3d at 464; see
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774 (2003); County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 834 (1998); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 209
1
Plaintiffs cite persuasive authority from other Circuits that analyze the issue under the First Amendment
right of freedom of association. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion for More Definite Statement
(d/e 7) (Response), at 3 (citing Adkins v. Board of Educ. of Magoffin County, Ky., 982 F.2d 952, 955-56
(6th Cir. 1993)). This Court must follow the controlling authority of the Seventh Circuit set forth in
Christensen, and so, declines to follow such persuasive authority. The Court also notes that the Eleventh
Circuit has held in a different context that a plaintiff must show a direct and substantial interference with
the liberty interest under either a First Amendment or Due Process analysis. See Parks v. City of Warner
Robins, Ga., 43 F.3d 609, 615 (11th Cir. 1995) (case involved a challenge to an official written policy
rather than a claim of abuse of office).
Page 5 of 9
(1952). In this case, the Defendants can evaluate the allegations in the
Complaint in light of the applicable law and respond with either a motion to
dismiss or an answer.
The Plaintiffs also allege that the Individual Defendants suspended
and fired Tammy Presley to retaliate against Jay Presley for exercising his
First Amendments Rights to speak on a matter of public concern. The First
Amendment protects a public employee from unjustified disparate
treatment for speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern. E.g.,
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417-20 (2006); see Chrzanowski v.
Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 2013). The Defendants can, again,
evaluate the allegations in the Complaint in light of the applicable law and
respond with either a motion to dismiss or an answer.
The allegations against the District are less clear than those against
the individual Defendants. The Plaintiffs allege that the District is liable for
the acts of its “policy making agents.” Complaint, ¶ 5(a). A municipality is
not liable under § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v.
Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978). A municipality, however, may be directly liable in certain limited
situations in which the wrongful conduct can be attributed to an official
municipal policy or custom. Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464,
Page 6 of 9
467 (7th Cir. 2010). Such direct liability under § 1983 may arise when the
person with final policymaking authority caused the wrongful conduct. See
e.g., Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 434 (7th Cir. 2011). The
reference to “policy making agents” in paragraph 5(a) of the Complaint
appears to be a reference to this theory. The Defendants are correct,
though, that the Complaint contains no factual allegations regarding this
theory of liability. The Defendants have enough information, however, to
respond with either a motion to dismiss or an answer.
The Plaintiffs also allege that the District is liable under § 9-102 of the
Tort Immunity Act. Complaint, ¶ 5(b). Section 9-102 provides, in part, “A
local public entity is empowered and directed to pay any tort judgment . . .
for compensatory damages . . . for which it or an employee which acting
within the scope of his employment is liable . . . .” The Plaintiffs state that
the District is named for the purpose of indemnity under § 9-102.
Response, at 3.
A municipality in Illinois is sometimes a necessary party for indemnity.
A county in Illinois must be named as a necessary party in an action
against an independently elected county officer who is being sued in his
official capacity. Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, Ill., 324 F.3d 947, 948
(7th Cir. 2003). On the other hand, a county was not a necessary party for
Page 7 of 9
indemnity in an action brought against a deputy sheriff in his individual
capacity. Askew v. Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, 568 F.3d 632, 637-37
(7th Cir. 2009); see also Stone v. Pepmeyer, 2011 WL 1627076, at *2-*3
(C.D. Ill. April 28, 2011). In this case, the Defendant Board members are
elected officials, but the Plaintiffs are suing them in their individual
capacities. Defendant Johnson is appointed as Superintendent and is
being sued in his individual capacity. The Complaint provides enough
information to allow the Defendants to analyze the legal issues involved
and respond to this aspect of the Complaint with either a motion to dismiss
or an answer.
The Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief against the District in the form
of reinstatement of Tammy Presley to her position. The Court agrees with
the Defendants that the factual basis for a claim against the District for
injunctive relief is less than clear. Even so, the Defendants can still
respond even to this portion of the prayer for relief with a motion to dismiss
or an answer.
The Court determines that this case will proceed more expeditiously if
the Defendants respond to the Complaint with either a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim or an answer. Directing the Plaintiffs to replead or
file a more definite statement will only delay matters.
Page 8 of 9
THEREFORE, Defendants’ Motion for More Definite Statement and
Brief in Support (d/e 5) is DENIED. Defendants are directed to respond to
the Complaint by May 9, 2014.
ENTER: April 15, 2014
s/ Tom Schanzle-Haskins
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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