Jackson v. Godinez et al

Filing 171

ORDER denying 148 , Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial. See written Order. The Defendants are hereby given 14 days (by 2/28/2019) to Respond to 156 , the Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. Entered by Judge Michael M. Mihm on 2/13/2019. (RT, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 13 February, 2019 10:03:46 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
JOEL JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:14-cv-01108-MMM
v.
RICHARD BIRKEY, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
Before the Court is the Defendants’—Richard Birkey, Richard Mautino, and Curtis
Wilkey—Combined Motion Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b) and 59(a). (D. 148). 1
They also submitted a supporting memorandum thereto. (D. 149). The Plaintiff, Joel Jackson,
filed a Response in Opposition (D. 164) and the Defendants filed a Reply (D. 169). After the
Plaintiff obtained a verdict against them at trial in this Court, the Defendants now argue they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, that they are entitled to a new trial. For
the reasons set forth below, the Defendants’ Motion (D. 148) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND

The background of the Plaintiff’s underlying claims and the facts of this case are detailed
in a previous Order. (D. 89 at pp. 1-2). In summary, while incarcerated within the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) at the Illinois River Correctional Center, he was employed
as an inmate worker in the Illinois River Correctional Center Bakery. On May 17, 2011, the
Plaintiff severed four fingers on his right hand while cleaning a machine known as a bun hopper.
He claims the Defendants were deliberately indifferent, in violation of his constitutional rights

1

Citations to the Docket in this case are abbreviated as “D. __.”

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under the Eighth Amendment, because they knew there was a significant risk of danger to
inmates working on the bun hopper—a duty assigned to him—and they failed to train him
properly on it. (D. 58).
The Illinois River Correctional Center Bakery is a facility operated by Illinois
Correctional Industries, an IDOC program. During the time at issue, Birkey was the Warden of
Illinois River Correctional Center, Mautino was the Food and Beverage Manager of Illinois
Correctional Industries, and Wilkey was the Acting Superintendent of the bakery.
In October 2018, this Court presided over a jury trial in this matter. Multiple inmates
testified that they were either never trained by the staff at the bakery or were given minimal
guidance before working. The inmates consistently stated that their primary source of training
was from fellow inmates. Three inmates also testified that they suffered a serious injury while
working on the bun hopper. (D. 158 at pg. 29); (D. 159 at pp. 84-85; 94). The Defendants each
testified that they would be notified about serious injuries to inmate workers in the course of
ordinary business operations. (D. 158 at pp. 171-72; 175; 245-47; 254; 295). One of the injured
inmates testified that he spoke with Wilkey about his injury afterwards (D. 159 at pp. 84-85), and
Wilkey acknowledged his general responsibility for safety in the bakery (D. 158 at pg. 278).
An expert for the Plaintiff, William Howard, also testified at trial. The Defendants had
sought to bar his testimony entirely. (D. 112). After hearing oral arguments on the matter during
pretrial proceedings, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants’ Motion—
allowing Howard to testify but barring him from referencing Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”) standards, which the Court found had limited relevance to the case.
(See the Court’s August 24, 2018 Minute Entry); see also (D. 89 at pg. 12).

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Howard opined at trial that a bun hoper should not be operated without an upper hoper in
place to keep operators’ hands away from a dangerous part of the machine with spinning blades.
He further testified that it is an unsafe practice to clean machines such as the bun hoper without
initiating a protocol known as lockout/tagout, which is designed to ensure that machines cannot
unintentionally be turned on. Howard did not mention or discuss OSHA standards.
In discussions about jury instructions, the Plaintiff offered proposed jury instruction
number three, a modified version of the Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction No. 7.15. (D.
135-1 at pg. 10). It contained the following language: “a Defendant failed to ensure that the bun
hoper was safe” [thereby subjecting the Plaintiff to a strong likelihood of serious harm]. Id. The
Defendants objected to the quoted language. Id. at pg. 11. Ultimately, the final version of the
instruction that the Court gave the jury stated, in relevant part, “a Defendant failed to protect
Plaintiff from a known danger relating to the bun hopper, and thereby subjected Plaintiff to a
strong likelihood of serious harm.” (D. 136 at pg. 23).
At the close of the Plaintiff’s case in chief, the Defendants moved for judgment as a
matter of law, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). They argued: (1) that the
Plaintiff had failed to meet his burden and present enough evidence; (2) that the evidence
established that (a) proper training for the Plaintiff was in place, (b) there were proper safety
mechanisms in place on the bun hoper, and (c) the Plaintiff put his hand into the machine while it
was running; and (3) that none of the remaining Defendants in the case were responsible for
training the Plaintiff. (D. 159 at pp. 195-98). The latter argument specifically referenced a
former Defendant, Terry Sutter. Id. at pg. 196-98. The Court denied the Defendants’ Motion.
Id. at pp. 198.

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The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and against each of the Defendants.
(D. 137). They awarded the Plaintiff $350,000 in compensatory damages and a total of $100,000
in punitive damages. Id. Shortly thereafter, the Defendants filed the instant Renewed Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law and included a Request for a New Trial. (D. 148).
The Defendants first argue, pursuant to Rule 50, that: (1) they were wrongly held liable
for Sutter’s failure to train the Plaintiff (D. 149 at pp. 5-9); (2) Birkey and Mautino were
unaware of the risks associated with cleaning the bun hopper because they had no actual
knowledge of the three prior inmate injuries (Id. at pp. 9-12); (3) even assuming that Birkey and
Mautino did know about the prior inmate injuries, their failure to take affirmative steps to
prevent future injuries would not equate to cruel and unusual punishment (Id. at pp. 12-14); and
(4) no reasonable jury could find that the Defendants’ conduct was malicious and reckless,
entitling the Plaintiff to an award of punitive damages (Id. at pp. 14-15).

Pursuant to Rule 59,

the Defendants further claim: (1) allowing the Plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction number three
was reversible error (D. 149 at pp. 15-17); (2) expert Howard’s testimony was improper (Id. at
pp. 17-20); and (3) awarding punitive damages to the Plaintiff was against the manifest weight of
the evidence (Id. at pg. 21). See also (D. 148 at pg. 2). Lastly, the Defendants make a general
claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity (D. 149 at pg. 21).
LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 50(b) motion “is only a renewal of the preverdict [50(a)] motion, [and] it can be
granted only on grounds advanced in the preverdict motion.” Passanti v. Cook County, 689 F.
3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), comm. Note (2006 amend.)) (additional
citations omitted). Parties forfeit claims they did not argue both preverdict and postverdict.
Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 404-05 (2006).

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When reviewing Rule 50 motions, the Court “views the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed under the verdict.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). In making a Rule 50(b)
determination, the Court is not at liberty to weigh the parties’ evidence, judge the credibility of
witnesses, or substitute its judgment of the facts for that of the jury’s. McNabola v. Chicago
Transit Authority, 10 F. 3d 501, 515 (7th Cir. 1993). Judgment as a matter of law may only be
granted where “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [a]
party on [an] issue.” FED. R. CIV. P. 50. Simply put, “[a] trial court should overturn a verdict
only where the evidence supports but one conclusion—the conclusion not drawn by the jury.”
Ryl-Kuchar v. Care Centers, Inc., 565 F. 3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Pierce v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 F. 3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Similarly, when reviewing motions for a new trial brought pursuant to Rule 59(a), the
Court must “construe[] the evidence strictly in favor of the party who prevailed before the jury
and examine[] the evidence only to determine whether the jury’s verdict could [have] reasonably
be[en] based on that evidence.” Passanti v. Cook County, 689 F. 3d at 659 (citing Tart v. Illinois
Power Co., 366 F. 3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 2004)). Rule 59 motions will only be granted if “the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence … the damages are excessive, or … for other
reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.” Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F. 3d 525, 530
(7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The decision to grant a new trial “is confided almost entirely
to the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court.” Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon,
Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980).

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ANALYSIS
I.
First, the Defendants forfeited the following Rule 50(b) arguments: (1) that Birkey and
Mautino were unaware of the risks associated with cleaning the bun hopper because they had no
actual knowledge of the three prior inmate injuries; (2) even assuming Birkey and Mautino did
know about the three prior inmate injuries, their failure to take affirmative steps to prevent future
injuries would not equate to cruel and unusual punishment; and; (3) that no reasonable jury could
find that the Defendants’ conduct was malicious and reckless, entitling the Plaintiff to an award
of punitive damages. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants forfeited these Rule 50(b) claims
by failing to make them in their Rule 50(a) arguments at trial. (D. 164 at pg. 9) (citing Wallace
v. McGlothan, 606 F. 3d 410, 418-19 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Under the most liberal construction of the Defendants’ arguments noted above, they have
no reasonable foundation in their original 50(a) Motion. As discussed previously, the Court need
not address Rule 50(b) arguments now asserted by the Defendants which were not argued in their
Rule 50(a) Motion because they were forfeited. Passanti, 689 F. 3d at 660 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
50(b), comm. Note (2006 amend.)); Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 404-05. Therefore, the Defendants’
Rule 50(b) arguments identified above are DENIED. 2
The Defendants’ only remaining Rule 50(b) claim is that they were wrongly held liable
for Sutter’s failure to train the Plaintiff. (D. 149 at pp. 5-9). They claim Sutter, who is no longer
a defendant in this matter, was responsible for training the Plaintiff on the bun hopper and, at

2

The Court notes that the Defendants first assert their qualified immunity argument under Rule 50(b) in their
Motion. (D. 148 at pg. 2). To the extent that the Defendants make this argument pursuant to Rule 50(b), it is also
forfeited for failing to raise it in their Rule 50(a) Motion. In their supporting memorandum, the Defendants neglect
to assert their claim pursuant to Rule 50(b). Instead, they assert it generally, without citation to authority, further
forfeiting their claim. (D. 149 at pg. 21); Judge v. Quinn, 612 F. 3d 537, 557 (7th Cir. 2010) (“perfunctory and
undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived”).

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best, the evidence at trial established that Mautino and Wilkey were Sutter’s supervisors. Id. at
pg. 5. In their view, nothing at trial established that Mautino and Wilkey were ever aware that
Sutter failed to train the Plaintiff, and there was no proof of their personal involvement in the
conduct at issue, which is required for them to be held liable for a subordinate’s actions. Id. at
pp. 5-6.
To prove his Eighth Amendment claim, the Plaintiff needed to demonstrate that the
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “Because inmates have been deprived of the ordinary
means of protecting themselves, liability in deliberate-indifference cases can be found when
prison staff fail to protect a prisoner from a known danger.” Bratchett v. Braxton Environmental
Services Corp., et al., 564 Fed Appx. 229, 233 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “[A] prison
official may be found liable only if he ‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the inmate
health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’”
Boyce v. Moore, 314 F. 3d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837) (additional
citations omitted).
Here, the Defendants emphasize that there was no evidence presented at trial that they
knew Sutter failed to train the Plaintiff on the bun hopper before he was assigned to work on it.
(D. 149 at pp. 5-8). They also, appropriately, highlight that it would be insufficient for the
Plaintiff to merely prove that they could or should have known about prior accidents on the
machine. Id. at pp. 9-12. The Defendants concede that Wilkey knew about one of the prior
injuries but argue there was no way the Defendants could have known about the other accidents,

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or that Birkey and Mautino knew about any of them, because the inmates themselves never
personally informed the Defendants about the accidents. Id. at pg. 9.
At trial, however, three inmates testified that they suffered a serious injury as a direct
result of working on the bun hopper before the Plaintiff’s incident. (D. 158 at pg. 29); (D. 159 at
pp. 84-85; 94). While the Defendants denied knowing about these incidents or remembering
them specifically, they each testified that they would be notified of all serious injuries to inmate
workers at the bakery in the course of day to day operations. (D. 158 at pp. 171-72; 175; 245-47;
254; 295). One of the injured inmates specifically testified that he spoke with Wilkey about his
injury afterwards. (D. 159 at pp. 84-85).
Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the Plaintiff met
his burden and proved his Eighth Amendment claim. The jury heard testimony that three other
inmates were injured on the same machine before the Plaintiff suffered a similar injury. Coupled
with the Defendants’ testimony that they each were, generally, informed of all serious injuries at
the bakery, there was a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that the Defendants knew of an
excessive risk to the Plaintiff’s safety and ignored it. It was also reasonable for the jury to
further find that the Defendants were aware of these facts, from which they could reasonably
infer that the Plaintiff was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the Defendants
actually drew that inference. The Defendants’ claims that they were unaware of the risks
associated with allowing prisoners to operate the bun hopper and that the injured inmates never
personally told them about their injuries does not make the jury’s finding unreasonable. Based
on the record before the Court, the jury’s verdict was, in fact, reasonable and rationally linked to
evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, the Defendants’ remaining Rule 50(b) argument is
DENIED.

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II.
Next, the Defendants argue they are entitled to a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59, on
multiple grounds. (D. 149 at pp. 15-21). As a reminder, when reviewing Rule 59 motions, the
Court must “construe[] the evidence strictly in favor of the party who prevailed before the jury
and examine[] the evidence only to determine whether the jury’s verdict could [have] reasonably
be[en] based on that evidence.” Passanti, 689 F. 3d at 659. Such motions will only be granted if
“the verdict is against the weight of the evidence … the damages are excessive, or … for other
reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.” Kapelanski, 390 F. 3d at 530.
First, the Defendants claim that allowing the Plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction number
three (D. 135-1 at pg. 10) was reversible error. (D. 149 at pp. 15-17). Specifically, they state:
“[b]y allowing the jury to determine that ‘a Defendant failed to ensure that the bun hoper was
safe’ subjecting Plaintiff to a strong likelihood of serious harm, the judge allowed a misleading
jury instruction.” Id. at pp. 16-17 (erroneously quoting a proposed instruction but citing to the
actual instruction given, (D. 136 at pg. 23)). The Defendants’ claim is inaccurate.
As the Plaintiff points out, the proposed instruction was never given to the jury with the
specific language the Defendants cite and object to. (D. 164 at pp. 17-18). Rather, the language
quoted by the Defendants above and in their Motion is from a proposed jury instruction. (D.
135-1 at pg. 10). In reality, the relevant portion of the instruction they cite states “a Defendant
failed to protect Plaintiff from a known danger relating to the bun hopper, and thereby subjected
Plaintiff to a strong likelihood of serious harm.” (D. 136 at pg. 23). Given that the Plaintiff’s
argument is based on a false premise, it fails. The Defendants’ Rule 59 claim for relief based on
the Court’s alleged allowance of the Plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction number three is
DENIED.

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The Defendants also allege that allowing Howard’s testimony was improper. (D. 149 at
pp. 17-20). Without citing to the record, they state that Howard “offered opinions [at trial] based
on ‘bakery industry standard’ including opinions regarding lockout/tagout procedure training at
the Illinois River Correctional Center bakery and the safety of the bun hoper machine.” Id. at pp.
17-18. More specifically, the Defendants assert that: (1) his general testimony about bakery
industry standards prejudiced them, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, and also
confused and misled the jury (Id. at pp. 18-19); (2) his opinion that the bun hoper did not meet
industry standards and was unsafe because it lacked an upper hoper was irrelevant and
prejudicial, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 (Id. at pg. 19); and (3) his general
testimony about vague, bakery industry standards violated the Court’s bar against OSHA
references, which are inapplicable to the bakery, and unfairly misled the jury (Id. at pp. 19-20).
The Plaintiff argues in response that the Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Howard to
testify. (D. 164 at pp. 20-22). He further asserts that even if the Court did abuse its discretion in
allowing the testimony, the Defendants have failed to establish that the alleged error infected the
proceedings to the extent that a new trial is necessary.
Construing the evidence strictly in favor of the Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, the Court
concludes that the evidence noted by the Defendants in their Motion does not entitle them to a
new trial. As noted above, the jury’s verdict was reasonably based on the evidence.
Additionally, as the Plaintiff highlights, industry standards—including OSHA’s—can be relevant
in constitutional cases. (D. 164 at pp. 20-21) (citing Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 732 F.3d 710,
721-22 (7th Cir. 2013), Sanders v. City of Chicago Heights, 2016 WL 1730608, *9, and French
v. Owens, 777 F. 2d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1986)). Here, the Court cannot say the trial was unfair

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to the Defendants. As such, the Defendants’ Rule 59 claim for relief based on the Court’s
allowance of Howard’s testimony is DENIED.
The Defendants remaining assertion is that the jury’s award of punitive damages was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. (D. 149 at pg. 21). They rely exclusively on their
Rule 50(b) argument regarding punitive damages, claiming that no reasonable jury could have
found that the Defendants’ conduct was malicious and reckless. Id. at pp. 14-15; 21. The
Defendants emphasize the evidence presented at trial, which supported their contention that
safety procedures and protocols were in place at the bakery. Id. at pp. 14-15. The evidence they
highlight, however, does not negate the jury’s award of punitive damages.
Much like its finding that the Plaintiff met his burden and proved his Eighth Amendment
claim, it was also reasonable for the jury to conclude that the Plaintiff was entitled to punitive
damages. Again, three inmates testified that they were injured while working on the bun hopper
before the Plaintiff’s incident. (D. 158 at pg. 29); (D. 159 at pp. 84-85; 94). Although the
Defendants denied any knowledge or memory of these events, they acknowledged they were
notified of all serious injuries to inmate workers during the course of normal business. (D. 158
at pp. 171-72; 175; 245-47; 254; 295). Given this record, it was reasonable for the jury to
conclude that the Plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages. The jury’s conclusion that the
Defendants acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
rights is, per se, a sufficient basis to sustain an award of punitive damages for deliberate
indifference. Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F. 2d 789, 801-02 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Woodward v.
Correctional Medical Services of Ill., Inc., 368 F. 3d 917, 930 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
standard is the same for both claims). Therefore, the Defendants’ Rule 59 claim for relief based
on the jury’s award of punitive damages is DENIED.

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As a result of the foregoing analysis, the Defendants’ Combined Motion Under Rules
50(b) and 59(a) (D. 148) is DENIED.
The Court notes that the Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (D.
156) was stayed pending the Court’s resolution of this Motion. (See the Court’s November 30,
2018 Text Order). The Defendants hereby have 14 days, by February 28, 2019, to file their
Response to the Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ Combined Motion Under Rules 50(b) and
59(a)—(D. 148)—is DENIED. The Defendants have until February 28, 2019, to file their
Response to the Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (D. 156).
It is so ordered.
Entered on February 13, 2019

s/ Michael M. Mihm
Michael M. Mihm
Senior United States District Judge

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