Rangarajan v. Caterpillar, Inc.
Filing
78
ORDER entered by Judge Sara Darrow on March 28, 2017. Defendant's #47 #51 motions for summary judgment are GRANTED. The parties' #44 #62 #68 motions for leave to file under seal are GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims in this matter, and the case joined with it, 1:15-cv-01163-SLD-JEH, are all DISMISSED. No further claims remaining, the Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close the cases. (SC, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 28 March, 2017 10:27:54 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
SRI RANGARAJAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CATERPILLAR INC.,
Defendant.
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Case Nos. 1:14-cv-01156-SLD-JEH,
1:15-cv-01163-SLD-JEH
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Caterpillar, Inc.’s (“Caterpillar”) motions for summary
judgment, ECF Nos. 47, 51. Also before the Court are Caterpillar’s motion for leave to file
under seal exhibits to the first motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 44; and Rangarajan’s
motions for leave to file exhibits to his responses under seal, ECF Nos. 62, 68. For the following
reasons, the motions for summary judgment are GRANTED, and Rangarajan’s case
DISMISSED. The motions for leave to file are GRANTED.
BACKGROUND1
Rangarajan and Caterpillar
1
At summary judgment, a court “constru[es] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and avoid[s]
the temptation to decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely true.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770
(7th Cir. 2003). The facts related here are taken from the parties’ undisputed material facts, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No.
47 5–25, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 51 5–25, Resp. Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 64 12–17, Resp. Mot. Summ. J. ECF No.
71 6–11, from Rangarajan’s disputed material facts, Resp. Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 64 17–28, Resp. Mot. Summ. J.
ECF No. 71 11–22, from Rangarajan’s additional material facts, Resp. Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 64 29–39, Resp.
Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 71 23–30, and from the exhibits to the motions and responses. Where they are taken from
elsewhere, or from specific exhibits to the parties’ motions, the source is cited. Where the parties disagree about the
facts, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to Rangarajan, the non-moving party, and draws all
reasonable inferences in his favor. McCann v. Iroquois Mem’l Hosp., 622 F.3d 745, 752 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
1
Caterpillar is “an American corporation that designs, develops, engineers, manufactures,
markets and sells machinery, engines, financial products and insurance to customers via a
worldwide dealer network.” Caterpillar Inc., Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Caterpillar_Inc. (visited Mar. 19, 2017). Rangarajan was born in India, but has lived in the
United States since 1991, and is an American citizen. Caterpillar hired him in 1996, and he has
worked for Caterpillar ever since.
Caterpillar’s Product Development and Global Technology division (“PD>”)
performs engineering services for Caterpillar customers. It operates in North America, India,
and China. Caterpillar ranks positions according to salary grade (“SG”). Schlicksup v.
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 09-CV-1208, 2010 WL 2774480, at *1 (C.D. Ill. July 13, 2010). On
September 1, 2007, Rangarajan became an Engineering Manager-1, an SG 26 position, in
PD>. He held this position until he was promoted to an Engineering Manager-2, an SG 27
position, on January 1, 2016. Rangarajan’s immediate supervisor from January 1, 2013 to April
30, 2015 was Ajay Shankar, also of Indian descent. Shankar was a Director of PD>, of
whom there were four others: David Damerell, who was white; Brian Sun, Jim Blass, and Lou
Balmer. Shankar, Damerell and Sun headed up divisions of PD> aimed at the Indian, North
American, and Chinese markets respectively, although Rangarajan maintains that Shankar’s
division actually served a much larger market than the other two, and that it was composed
primarily of United States companies.
The Business Engagement Organization and the Global BE Manager
In October 2011, Rangarajan started working on a “Six Sigma”2 project sponsored by
Shankar and Damerell. The purpose of this project was to make a proposal for setting up a
2
Managerial jargon for a set of techniques and methods for groupwork in companies. See Six Sigma, Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Sigma (visited on March 21, 2017). The phrase is a Motorola trademark. Id.
2
“business engagement organization” that would offer all of the services currently offered by
PD> in individual markets to a global market. The project leader was Lavanya Ajesh. The
other members of the project team besides Rangarajan were Sandy Hoskins and Valerie Wiest,
both of whom are white. In April 2012, the project team duly recommended that Caterpillar
create the global business engagement organization, and, among other details, recommended that
the organization be run by a “Global BE Manager,” who would be an SG 27 Engineering
Manager-2. This person would be responsible for marketing to all markets the Caterpillar
engineering services that had previously been marketed by PD> to the Indian, North
American, and Chinese markets.
While working on the Six Sigma project, Rangarajan felt that Hoskins and Wiest were
hostile toward him and the employees who reported to him. This hostility was manifested at
least by Hoskins telling Rangarajan in a 2012 meeting that “none of you guys may have a job,”
and that Caterpillar would determine whether or not the creation of the global business
engagement organization made Rangarajan’s India team, and Rangarajan himself, redundant.
Rangarajan also believed that Hoskins was hostile toward him based on race because at a
meeting in 2010, Hoskins referred to the India engineering team as a “job shop.”3 He believed
that Wiest was hostile toward him because in 2011, an engineer working for Wiest had sent her a
note stating that Rangarajan made his (the engineer’s) life difficult by marketing to customers
who were also the engineer’s customers. Wiest had supported the engineer, over Rangarajan’s
objection.
3
Although Rangarajan objects that Hoskins’s behavior was part of a “larger pattern,” Resp. Mot. Summ. J. ECF No.
64 18, he does not point to any other specific events in the record that cause him to think so. See Rangarajan Dep.
87–90, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 47 Ex. 1, ECF No. 47-3. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact
cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the
record . . . .”).
3
In late 2011 or early 2012, Rangarajan ate dinner with Shankar and Ajesh. During
dinner, he told Shankar that he wanted to be considered for the Global BE Manager position that,
per the Six Sigma project team’s recommendation, was going to be created. Shankar told him he
would be “a very strong candidate for that,” and told him that “we will follow the Caterpillar
process. We will find three strong candidates, and we will go from there.” Rangarajan Dep.
101, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 47 Ex. 1, ECF No. 47-3. Then, on April 17, 2012, Rangarajan met
with Damerell to prepare for a meeting with the PD> Vice President, at which latter meeting
Rangarjan was going to present the Six Sigma project team’s recommendation for creating a new
global business engagement organization. During the first meeting, Damerell told Rangarajan
that “we are looking to elevate you to the global business engagement manager position.” Id. at
77. Rangarajan expressed his interest in the position, and said that he was well qualified, in part
because the job was similar to the one that he currently did in Shankar’s division of PD>.
Damerell said “that’s fine.” Id. In May or June 2012, Rangarajan spoke with Shankar on the
telephone and asked when Caterpillar would hire the new manager. Shankar said that they were
still working on it, and Rangarajan once again expressed his interest in the position. At some
point, Rangarajan also asked Sun about when the position was going to be filled, and Sun said
that Shankar and others were working on it.
PCPP Hiring at Caterpillar
Caterpillar fills some of its open management positions, including the one relevant here,
by a “Priority Candidate Placement Process” (“PCPP”). The PCPP puts priority on “current
support or management Caterpillar employees who do not have or are at risk of not having a job
due to reduction in force or position elimination . . . .” Haig Decl. 2, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 47
Ex. U, ECF No. 47-22. It also puts priority on “[f]ull time support or management employees
4
who may be in need of a position that better matches his/her skill set.” PCPP, Resp. Mot. Summ.
J. ECF No. 64 Ex. E 5, ECF No. 63. Candidates for the PCPP must have satisfactory or higher
performance ratings. Id.; Haig Decl. 2.
The PCPP works by requiring hiring managers to consider minimally qualified
candidates from the pool of PCPP candidates before they consider other candidates within
Caterpillar. Id. If a PCPP candidate meets the minimum qualifications for a position, the hiring
manager must hire the PCPP candidate for the position. Id. If no PCPP candidate meets the
minimum qualifications for the position, then, Caterpillar asserts, the position is posted internally
for other candidates within Caterpillar to apply for. Id. Rangarajan asserts, without citing to the
record beyond his own deposition testimony and affidavit, that SG 26 positions and higher were
not posted internally until February 2015, and that PD> positions were filled via another
process if they were not first filled by PCPP candidates.
The Global BE Manager is Hired
Damerell was in charge of making the ultimate decision about who should be hired for
the Global BE manager position. In 2012, Caterpillar’s human resources organization told
Damerell to consider Greg Ferkol, who is white, for the Global BE manager position. This was
because Ferkol was an international service employee (“ISE”) who was returning to the United
States after working overseas. Caterpillar claims that, pursuant to a letter of understanding
between the PD> division and ISEs within PD>, PD> must consider an ISE for any
open positions within the division when the ISE’s international assignment ends.4 Damerell
reviewed Ferkol’s personnel documents and decided to interview him, but after interviewing him
4
Rangarajan points out that Caterpillar has not produced this letter of understanding, but does not dispute its
existence. He disagrees with the way that Caterpillar applies this policy, but does not contest that it does apply the
policy in the way described here—with ISE candidates being considered for any open position when they return
from an overseas job. See Resp. Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 64 21–22.
5
in July 2012, along with Sun and Shankar, decided that he would not be a good fit for the
position and declined to hire him.
In January 2013, Damerell authorized a job requisition for the Global BE manager
position. As a result, a job description of the position was prepared. This description stated that
the Global BE manager should have at a minimum: a bachelor’s degree, ten years of experience
at Caterpillar, effective verbal and written communication skills, the ability to negotiate and
arrive at “sound enterprise decisions,” strong interpersonal skills, “being a self starter,” the
ability to work beyond organizational boundaries, the ability to grow and lead a diverse team,
and a high level of business acumen. Hoskins Decl. Ex. A, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 47 Ex. T,
ECF No. 49. Pursuant to the PCPP, Caterpillar did not at this time advertise the job internally.
Caterpillar’s human resources organization identified three PCPP candidates for the position:
James Witte, Wade Samson, Chad Heltemes, all of whom are white.
Damerell asked Hoskins to review these candidates to see if they met the minimum
requirements for the Global BE manager. Hoskins reviewed the résumés of Witte and Heltemes,
and all three of the applicants’ employee datasheets. Hoskins also spoke with Heltemes’s
supervisor, Frank McCracken, who told her that he would not be a good fit for the Global BE
manager position because he did not have strong sales and marketing skills. Hoskins also spoke
to Samson’s supervisor, Rebecca Downing, who told her that Samson did not have the requisite
skills for the position. Finally, Hoskins spoke with Witte’s supervisor, Brian Yoder, who told
her that Witte was good at working with others, and could bring disagreeing groups of
employees together. Hoskins also spoke to two of Witte’s other supervisors, who told her that
Witte had a “solid background,” was good with people and at negotiating, and would be a good
6
fit for the position. Hoskins Decl. 2. Hoskins determined that Witte was the only qualified
candidate, and relayed all of this information to Damerell.
Witte had earned a BS in Manufacturing Engineering and a MS in Manufacturing
Systems from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Caterpillar had hired him in 1988. Over
the years, he had worked for Caterpillar as a manufacturing systems engineer, facilities engineer,
field sales representative, customer account manager, project lead for a hydraulic systems
project, quality manager, and supervisor of an enterprise cost reduction team. He had been
placed in the PCPP pool because in January 2013, roughly contemporaneously with the job
requisition for Global BE manager, Caterpillar eliminated his position.
In February 2013, Wiest, Hoskins, and Randy Huber, another Caterpillar employee,
interviewed Witte for another job internal to Caterpillar for which he was eligible via PCPP, a
Virtual Manufacturing Engineering Manager. Wiest testified at her deposition that she “declined
on him as a fit for the role because he didn’t have the skill set for that particular job,” by which
she meant, “[h]e did not have the experience in engineering and in manufacturing that were
necessary for the role.” Wiest Dep. 31, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 47 Ex. Q, ECF No. 47-18.
Witte described the interview this way: the interviewers “said, You’ve done very well in the
interview. We believe we have – and you would be very well qualified for this position, but we
have another position which we think you’ll also be qualified at. That was the global business
engagement manager position.” Witte Dep. 22, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 47 Ex. R, ECF No. 4719. Two days later, Witte met with Hoskins to talk about the Global BE manager position, and
Hoskins told Witte that if he was interested, she would arrange an interview. Two days later
Witte told Hoskins that he was interested in the position, and Damerell, Shankar, and Sun
interviewed him for the position shortly thereafter. After the interview, Damerell decided to hire
7
Witte for the Global BE manager position. Shankar and Sun concurred in the decision, and
Witte filled the position on March 1, 2013.
Rangarajan Complains and Caterpillar Investigates
Around January 13, 2013, Kamakshy Velayudhan, a Human Resources Manager, had
told Rangarajan that “boss . . . [had] decided that this [Global BE manager] position must be
filled by a local U.S. native.” Rangarajan Dep. 128. Shankar, who was Velayudhan’s superior,
testified that he did not remember making such a statement, but that had he said it, he would
have meant that the position should be filled by someone based in the United States, because
most of Caterpillar’s customer base is there. Shankar Dep. 49–50, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 47
Ex. M, ECF No. 47-14.
Around April 17, 2013, Rangarajan met with Shankar at Shankar’s office in Chennai,
India. Rangarajan asked Shankar why Rangarajan had not been given the opportunity to
interview for the Global BE manager position. Shankar told Rangarajan “you need cream with
your coffee,” and to “just keep doing your job.” Rangarajan Dep. 155–56. On April 22, 2013,
Rangarajan sent an email to Shankar stating that Damerell had abused his position in PD> to
deny Rangarajan advancement opportunities, and threatening litigation. Rangarjan Dep. 195–96.
On July 18, 2013, Rangarajan sent another email to Shankar, complaining of more or less the
same thing, and adding that Damerell and a few managers of his had also blocked Rangarjan’s
efforts to get other jobs within Caterpillar. Rangarajan Dep. 206–07. He also alleged that
Damerell’s organization did not reflect the diversity of inclusion that would be expected of a
company such as PD>. Id. at 212. He also complained that two other employees who did
work similar to him had SG 27 positions, while he still had an SG 26 position. Id. at 217.
8
On July 19, 2013, Rangarajan sent an email to PD> Vice President Gwenne Henricks
complaining about minority staffing issues at PD>. The email alleged that minorities who
conformed to managers’ views of how things should work had advancement opportunities, while
those who did not conform, like Rangarajan, did not; that the leadership was not diverse, that
Hoskins had made the “job shop” comment, and that Rangarajan had not been promoted to the
Global BE manager position because of his nonconforming views. Henricks forwarded this
email to Human Resources Manager Suzanne Kisby, who investigated the complaints. As part
of her investigation, Kisby interviewed Damerell, Shankar, and Hoskins. Damerell told Kisby
that he had hired Witte because he was a PCPP candidate who met the minimum qualifications.
Kisby met with Rangarajan on January 22, 2014, and told him that she had determined that Witte
was properly promoted to the Global BE manager position.
Reorganization and Rangarajan’s First Lawsuit
On August 9, 2013, Damerell told Witte that Witte was not meeting expectations, and
that Damerell thought the poor performance was the results of a skills mismatch with the
position, which Caterpillar had now decided to eliminate. Witte was placed back in the PCPP
pool, and ultimately, on October 30, 2013, hired back within Caterpillar at an SG 24 position.5
Witte Dep. 45–46.
On November 13, 2013, Rangarjan filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission (“EEOC”), alleging race and national origin
discrimination by Caterpillar for not promoting him to the Global BE manager position. He also
alleged that Caterpillar had retaliated against him for complaining by removing him from an
5
Rangarjan claims that Witte remained in the Global BE manager position until October 30, 2014. Resp. Mot.
Summ. J. ECF No. 71 24. But this contradicts Witte’s testimony, and Rangarajan’s only support for the assertion is
citation to Caterpillar’s statement of undisputed material facts in their second motion for summary judgment, which
do not support Rangarajan’s different view.
9
organization chart and harassing him. On February 24, 2014, the EEOC declined to investigate
further and issued a right to sue letter. Compl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 1-2. Rangarajan filed the instant
lawsuit on April 24, 2014, alleging discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e–17 (“Title VII”), Counts I–II, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
Count III, specifically for Caterpillar’s failure to promote him to the Global BE manager position
on account of his race (Asian) and national origin (Indian).
Caterpillar Reviews Salaries
This was not the end of it, however. When Caterpillar reorganized PD> in January
2014, all of the teams that had reported to Damerell and some of the teams that had reported to
Sun began reporting to Shankar. Since Rangarajan worked for Shankar, this meant that
Rangarjan was now responsible for engineering services performed in India, the United States,
and China.
In the first quarter of 2014, Henricks asked the human resources organization to do “a
thorough review” of the employees who reported to a PD> director.6 The review was
undertaken because the employment structure in PD> had recently changed, as described
above. Cignetti Dep. 32, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 51 Ex. S, ECF No. 51-20. It was specifically
a review of salary grades. Cignetti Decl. 1, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 51 Ex. BB, ECF No. 51-29.
Human Resources Manager Stacey Cignetti, who is white, was the coordinator for this project.
She asked each employee whose salary was being reviewed to submit a description of his or her
job duties. She sent out job description templates that included each employee’s current job
description, and the job descriptions for one salary grade above and below for purposes of
6
Rangarajan lists many objections to Caterpillar’s assertion to this effect, but does not appear to dispute that it is
directly supported by deposition testimony, or offer any competent evidence to suggest that it is materially disputed.
See Crain Dep. 5, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 51 Ex. V, ECF No. 51-23; Cignetti Dep. 5,11, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No.
51 Ex. S, ECF No. 51-20.
10
comparison. Cignetti Decl. 2. The template contained a space for the employee to describe his
or her actual job responsibilities. Cignetti asked all the employees not to modify the template
and to fill out only the space provided on the template. Cignetti Dep. 15.
Rangarajan filled out and sent back his template. He also sent a separate email to
Cignetti claiming that three other employees who had had jobs similar to his in the past had held
SG 27 positions. Cignetti reviewed Rangarajan’s template, Cignetti Dep. 12, by comparing
Rangarajan’s description of his job duties to the duties of SG 25, 26, and 27 engineering manager
positions, in order to determine if his then-SG 26 Engineering Manager-1 position was consistent
with his actual job duties. Based on her review, Cignetti determined that Rangarajan’s job
responsibilities appropriately matched the SG 26 Engineering Manager-1 position that he held.
Cignetti subsequently met with other job evaluators and with Shankar to review her findings.
Shankar asked that they be send to Mary Crain, a Senior Corporate Job Evaluator, for final
review. Crain concurred with Cignetti in her evaluation of Rangarajan’s job responsibilities.
Cignetti then gave her recommendations to Henricks and each Director, including Shankar.
Henricks and Shankar approved Cignetti’s recommendation to keep Ragnarajan at an SG 26.
As a part of the salary review, six other employees who worked for Shankar were
reviewed: Hoskins, an SG 28, and white; Wiest, an SG 28, and white; Nilesh Shah, an SG 24
and Asian; John Norlin, an SG 26 and white; Asokan Manivelu, an SG 26 and Asian;
Ramalingham Venkatesan, an SG 26 and Asian. Shah, Norlin, and Manivelu were promoted to
higher salary grades: Shah to an SG 26, Norlin to an SG 27, and Manivelu to an SG 27.
Hoskins Misbehaves
On March 27, 2015, Hoskins approached Rangarajan in Peoria outside a conference room
and asked him about reserving a conference room for an upcoming meeting. Rangarajan replied
11
that it was not his meeting, and was being handled by another Caterpillar employee. Hoskins
grabbed Rangarajan by the lapels, shook him, and told Rangarajan that he did not care about his
boss. Rangarajan testified that Hoskins “kind of got pretty upset,” Rangarajan Dep. II, Mot.
Summ. J. ECF No. 51 Ex. E, ECF No. 51-6, while Hoskins testified that she was “trying to tease
him a little bit.” Hoskins Dep. 31, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 51 Ex. R, ECF No. 51-19.
Rangarajan stated that another employee was handling the meeting, and after saying that she was
surprised, Hoskins walked away. Later that day, Rangarajan reported the incident to Bansidhar
Phanasalkar, a superior. Phanasalkar had no reaction.
On March 31, 2015, Rangarajan visited Caterpillar’s Aurora, Illinois facility with his
team members, who included Phanasalkar and Hoskins. During the visit, Rangarajan went to
check his email at a visitor terminal. As he did so, Hoskins approached him, visibly upset, and
said “I want to slap you and Nilesh.” Rangarajan Dep. II 119. (Nilesh was another Caterpillar
employee.) Rangarajan rolled his chair away from Hoskins, and she told him to “stop sending all
these e-mails.” Id. at 120. The two then discussed an email exchange from earlier in the day
relating to an engineering team at another Caterpillar facility. Hoskins left. That day,
Rangarajan reported to Phanasalkar that Hoskins had threatened him. Phanasalkar told
Rangarajan that he and Hoskins needed to work this out between themselves. The same day,
Rangarajan also reported Hoskins’s slap comment to his supervisor, Shankar, and a human
resources manager, but heard back from none of them.
On April 1, 2015, Rangarajan interviewed a candidate for a position in his office.
Another Caterpillar manager was there, and Rangarajan had invited Hoskins, but she had not
showed up. During the interview, however, she came into Rangarajan’s office and suggested
that they move to her office. Ranagarajan instead offered Hoskins a chair in his office, and
12
proceeded to ask the candidate about being able to work with others. Hoskins broke in and said
“Sri has no accountability, and Sri has no responsibility.” Rangarajan Dep. II 124. Rangarajan
ignored the comment, but later reported her conduct to Henricks in an email, and added that he
was concerned for his safety. Henricks responded the same day, saying that she had informed
the proper people about Rangarajan’s concerns. She also told him to ensure that someone else
was present if he met with Hoskins for any reason.
Corporate Human Resources Manager Victoria Barron investigated Rangarajan’s
complaint. Based on her investigation, she recommended to her supervisor that Hoskins be
suspended for two weeks, demoted, and removed from Rangarajan’s work group. On June 1,
2015, Caterpillar demoted Hoskins from an SG 28 Engineering Manager-3 position to an SG 26
Engineering Tech Team Lead position because she had violated “Caterpillar’s Values in Action.”
Rangarajan also asked that his office be moved so that he sat farther away from Hoskins. The
request was granted. Hoskins has since retired.
Rangarajan’s Second Lawsuit
On March 11, 2015, Rangarajan filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC against
Caterpillar, alleging that Caterpillar had discriminated against him on the basis of race and
national origin by failing to promote him in May 2014. On March 26, 2015, the EEOC declined
to investigate further and issued a right to sue letter. See Compl. Ex. 2, Rangarajan v.
Caterpillar Inc., 1:15-cv-01163 (C.D. Ill. 2015), ECF No. 1. On April 21, 2015, Rangarajan
again sued Caterpillar, again alleging failure to promote under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
Counts I–II, V, Compl. 7–9, 11–13, Rangarajan v. Caterpillar Inc., 1:15-cv-01163 (C.D. Ill.
2015), ECF No. 1, and adding a retaliation claim, Count III, id. at 9–10, on the basis of his race
(Asian) and national origin (Indian). He also alleged “Coercion, Intimidation, Threats, or
13
Interference,” without identifying a particular statutory violation, as a result of Hoskins’s
behavior toward him. Id. at 11.
Discovery proceeded in both cases, and on July 24, 2015, the Court consolidated them.
ECF No. 35. Caterpillar moved for summary judgment on all claims in both cases, and the
motions are fully briefed and ripe for ruling.
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Standard on a Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). At the summary judgment stage the court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial—that
is, whether there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a
verdict in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Patel v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1997). The court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
McCann v. Iroquois Mem’l Hosp., 622 F.3d 745, 752 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 255). “However, neither ‘the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties,’ nor the existence of ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ is sufficient to
defeat a [properly supported] motion for summary judgment.” Hoffman v. MCA, Inc., 144 F.3d
1117, 1121 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (citations omitted). “A genuine issue for trial
exists only when a reasonable jury could find for the party opposing the motion based on the
14
record as a whole.” Pipitone v. United States, 180 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Roger
v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 21 F.3d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1994)).
II.
Analysis
Rangarajan’s claims are (a) that Caterpillar failed to promote him to the Global BE
manager position in March 2013, in violation of Title VII and section 1981, as alleged in his first
complaint; (b) that Caterpillar failed to promote him to an SG 27 position in May 2014, in
violation of Title VII and section 1981, as alleged in the second complaint; (c) that Caterpillar
retaliated against him by failing to promote him in the latter instance in violation of Title VII and
section 1981, and (d) that Hoskins’s behavior toward him amounted to discriminatory
harassment by Caterpillar under Title VII and/or section 1981. The Court discusses Caterpillar’s
challenge to each claim below.
a. Failure to Promote – Global BE Manager
Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). A failure
to promote claim under Title VII requires a plaintiff to show that “the basis for . . . [an adverse
employment action] was the impermissible consideration of race, i.e. that a person of another
race would not also have been [adversely affected] under similar circumstances.” Rush v.
McDonald’s Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1112 (7th Cir. 1992). “To proceed to trial on a failure to
promote claim [at summary judgment], a plaintiff either must produce ‘sufficient direct or
circumstantial evidence that [the employer’s] promotion decisions were intentionally
discriminatory or make an indirect case of discrimination’ under the burden-shifting method of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).” Riley v. Elkhart Cmty. Sch.,
15
829 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied (quoting Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d
720, 735 (7th Cir. 2014)).
The Seventh Circuit has recently made clear that a “direct” case of intentional
discrimination at summary judgment simply means a showing that, considered as a whole, “the
evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex,
religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.”7
Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). A failure to promote claim
under the indirect method of McDonnell Douglas requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie
showing that “1) he belongs to a protected class, 2) he applied for and was qualified for the
position sought, 3) he was rejected for that position[,] and 4) the employer granted the promotion
to someone outside of the protected group who was not better qualified than the plaintiff.”
Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2003). Once a plaintiff has made this
showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment action. Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 519 F.3d 393, 402 (7th Cir. 2008). If he does so,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the offered explanation is pretextual. Id.
Section 1981, a reconstruction-era civil rights law, protects the rights of “[a]ll persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(a). It permits both discrimination and retaliation actions. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries,
553 U.S. 442, 454–55 (2008). “Although section 1981 and Title VII differ in the types of
discrimination they proscribe, the methods of proof and elements of the case are essentially
identical.” Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 940 (7th Cir. 1996). While section
1981 claims do not lie when discrimination is alleged to be on the basis of national origin, they
7
The point is that there is no difference in applicable legal standard between a court’s consideration of direct and
circumstantial evidence. Ortiz leaves in place burden-shifting frameworks like McDonnell Douglas. Ortiz, 834
F.3d at 766.
16
do when it is alleged to have been racially motivated. Anooya v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 733 F.2d
48, 50 (7th Cir. 1984). Since in every instance, Rangarajan’s claim appears to be that he was
discriminated against on the basis of both race and national origin, the Court will analyze his
discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and section 1981 at the same time.
Caterpillar argues that Rangarajan’s claim fails under both direct and burden-shifting
methods of proof because he never applied for the Global BE manager position, Mot. Summ. J.
ECF No. 47 27–29; that Rangarajan cannot show sufficient evidence under the direct method
from which a jury could infer an impermissible racial motive behind Caterpillar’s actions, id. at
29–31; that under the burden-shifting method, he cannot show that a less qualified employee got
the position, id. at 31–33; and that he cannot show that Caterpillar’s offered reason for picking
Witte and not picking him is pretextual, id. at 33–36. Rangarajan responds that while he was not
able to apply for the position, he expressed his interest in it, Resp. Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 64
40–41; that his offered evidence of discriminatory motives at Caterpillar could convince a jury to
find discrimination had occurred, id. at 42–49; and that Ferkol and Witte were less qualified than
he was, id. at 50–61. Rangarajan asserts that his claim should survive summary judgment under
both direct and burden-shifting methods of proof.
i.
Burden-Shifting Method
Turning first to the burden-shifting method, and Rangarajan’s prima facie case, he is
correct that it is not always necessary to have applied for a promotion that one alleges was
awarded on a discriminatory basis. For instance, when an employer “does not solicit and await
applications but hands out promotions on its own initiative in a nonselective, serial fashion,”
Loyd v. Phillips Bros., 25 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 1994), all a plaintiff need do is “[allege] that
the employer’s decision not to approach people of her status was itself illegitimately motivated
17
and [show] that but for such a practice she likely would have been approached,” and that she
would have taken the job if offered it, id. This is because the prima facie phase of a McDonnell
Douglas analysis is not intended to be applied mechanistically, but, rather, reflects “standing-like
concerns” intended to ensure that the plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination are even possible.
Id.
More particularly, [the prima facie case requirement] closes the causal gap
between the employer’s decisionmaking process and the complained-of condition
of the employee, thus allowing a tentative inference of bad motive on the
employer’s part. That is, only if the plaintiff would realistically have been in the
running for the job absent the alleged discrimination will the tentative assumption
that her current plight was caused by illegal discrimination be justifiable.
Id. The facts show that Rangarajan eagerly and frequently communicated his interest in the
manager position—to Shankar in late 2011 or early 2012, to Damerell on April 17, 2012, to
Shankar in May or June 2012, and at some point to Sun. Even without a formal application
process in place, Rangarajan made it clear to those responsible for filling the position that he was
interested. It is clear that if he had been offered the opportunity to apply, he would have done so.
The question, as to whether Rangarajan has made out the second requirement of his prima facie
case, must therefore be whether Rangarajan has adequately shown that he would have been in the
running for this position, but for some discriminatory hiring decision that caused the job to be
offered to someone else. Loyd, 25 F.3d at 523.
However, Rangarajan he has not shown that Caterpillar’s hiring process, qualified by the
PCPP, could have resulted in his being offered the job, absent the racism that he alleges. In
Loyd’s terms, he has not closed the causal gap between Caterpillar’s decisionmaking process and
his not getting hired by showing that, had the process been managed in a non-racist way, he
would have had the opportunity to apply for the position.
18
Caterpillar describes the PCPP as a program designed to help employees who have lost
their job or are in danger of losing it find another job at Caterpillar. Rangarajan complains that
he was not considered officially for the position, and points our repeatedly that, in his view, he
was more qualified for the Global BE manager position than were either Ferkol and Witte; and
he complains bitterly that it is an unfair and unwise policy. Resp. Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 64
47–48. But he does not contend that the PCPP is itself an illegitimately, i.e. racially motived
policy. See Loyd, 25 F.3d at 523. Nor does he contest that the PCPP is consistently applied in
other cases, that it was applied in this case, or that its rules, as applied to the filling of the Global
BE manager position, mandated that Witte get the job. Witte was a member of the PCPP pool
because he had just lost his job at Caterpillar; he met the minimum qualifications of the Global
BE manager position; he was awarded the job. Rangarajan could not have applied for the
position, and so need not show that he did apply to make out the second part of a prima facie
case. But he has not alleged that the PCPP program itself was illegitimately motivated, and
cannot show, as he must, that his inability to apply for the job was the result any practice on
Caterpillar’s part of not approaching people “like himself.” Loyd, 25 F.3d at 523. Cf. Simple v.
Walgreen Co., 511 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding prima facie case of discrimination was
made where defendant drugstore knew of plaintiff’s interest in a position but hired a white
woman for it instead without notifying him). This is insufficient to show that Rangarajan would
“realistically have been in the running for the job absent the alleged discrimination,” Loyd, 25
F.3d at 523, and so, insufficient to make out a prima facie case.
Even if Rangarajan had made out a prima facie case, he has not offered evidence that
Caterpillar’s offered nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring him—that the company was
following the PCPP rules—is pretextual. “Simply put, pretext is a lie—‘a phony reason for some
19
action.’” Riley, 829 F.3d at 894 (quoting Smith v. Chi. Transit Auth., 806 F.3d 900, 905 (7th Cir.
2015)). Here, where the offered reason for Caterpillar’s action is that the action was mandated
by policy that the company did in fact employ, Rangarajan’s offered evidence would have to be
something showing that the policy had itself been employed for scurrilous reasons, as a cover-up
for actual, impermissibly racist motivations. But he shows only evidence that, even construed in
the light most favorable to him, would not be sufficient for a jury to find that the PCPP had been
employed as a pretext.
As evidence of pretext, Rangarajan points to the gap of time between Ferkol’s
consideration and rejection for the position; the fact that Witte was told that he would be “very
well qualified” for the Virtual Manufacturing Engineering Manager job, but was invited to
interview for the Global BE manager position instead; his more general notion that the PCPP is a
senseless policy and without legitimate business purpose; and his theory that when Ferkol was
considered for the job, Caterpillar did or should have also run its PCPP hiring process, rendering
its actual use of the process a second and pretextual effort. All of these are supposed to show,
presumably, that Caterpillar was casting about for ways to hire someone other than himself, by
delaying and employing alternative methods to look for someone else in the meantime.
First, the evidence shows that Ferkol was referred to Damerell and his team by human
resources well before Damerell et al began searching for candidates for the position. This is
consistent with Caterpillar’s description of the way that ISE candidates are treated, and not with
a scenario in which, as Rangarajan implies, Caterpillar was working actively to find white or
non-Indian candidates instead of allowing him to apply or offering him the job.
Second, Witte’s testimony that he was told he would be “very well qualified” for the
Virtual Manufacturing Engineering Manager job must be viewed in its context. Witte had just
20
been interviewed by a panel of three managers—Wiest, Hoskins, and Huber—who were filling
that position, and declined to fill it with Witte, despite what they said to him. Wiest later stated
that, in fact, Witte was not a good fit for the job. They did refer him, however, to the other PCPP
job then available, the Global BE manager position, where he was determined by a different
interview panel—Damerell, Shankar, and Sun—to be minimally qualified for the position. This
sequence of events is consistent with Witte’s being minimally qualified for the BE Manager
position and not for the Virtual Manufacturing Engineering Manager position, and is not
consistent with a sinister plan on the part of Caterpillar managers to shunt Witte, white, into a
position that might otherwise be filled by Rangarajan, Asian.8 Furthermore, internal emails
between Hoskins and Shankar, Sun, and Demerell show nothing other than a hiring process
consistent with the PCPP. See Jan. 25, 2013 Email, Hoskins Decl. Ex. H, ECF No. 58.
Third, while Rangarajan may think the PCPP ill-advised—“analogous to the unfortunate
shortage of lifeboats on the Titanic,” Resp. Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 64 47—criticism of its
consequences as a policy does nothing to suggest that it is used for cover when Caterpillar
secretly wishes to fill a position with an unqualified white candidate, or was so used on this
occasion.
Fourth, Rangarajan offers nothing other than his suspicions to support the claim that
Caterpillar was under some obligation to find members for its PCPP pool at the time when
human resources asked Damerell to interview Ferkol.
A jury could not infer that Caterpillar’s offered reason, the PCPP, was pretextual.
Rangarajan’s case fails under the burden shifting method for this reason as well.
8
This sequence of events would only be consistent with Rangarajan’s theory if the hiring team for the Virtual
Manufacturing Engineering Manager job had colluded in secret with the hiring team for the Global BE manager
position. Aside from the fact that Rangarajan offers no evidence to support this theory, it is further belied by the fact
that Shankar stated in his deposition, when asked about the Virtual Manufacturing Engineering Manager job:
“Virtual manufacturing manager position. I don’t even know what that is.” Shankar Dep. 48.
21
ii.
Direct Method
No reasonable jury could infer, on the basis of all the admissible evidence in the record,
that the Global BE manager job was offered to Witte instead of Rangarajan for an impermissible
motive. As explained above, there is insufficient basis for a jury to infer that Rangarajan was
deprived of the opportunity to apply for the job by a racist policy, or to infer that Caterpillar’s
stated reason for offering the job to Witte was pretextual. None of the rest of the evidence
suggests that race or national origin played an impermissible role in Rangarajan’s not receiving
the job.9
Velayudhan’s statement, as reported by Rangarajan, that “boss” had decided the Global
BE manager must be filled by a “local U.S. native” would not be admissible. See
Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A party may not rely upon
inadmissible hearsay to oppose a motion for summary judgment.”); Fed. R. Evidence
801(c) (hearsay is an out of court statement offered for its truth); id. 801(d)(2) (opposing
party statement not hearsay); id. 805 (hearsay within hearsay only permissible if each
statement conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule).
Shankar’s statements, in response to Rangarajan’s question about not being hired, that
“you need cream with your coffee” and to “just keep doing your job” are elliptical at
best, without more. Rangarajan wants the phrase to be a metaphor about race, and not
only that, but a statement describing Caterpillar’s impermissibly racist motives, as
9
Given the Court’s analysis above, if race had nevertheless played a role in Caterpillar’s decision, this would be a
“mixed-motive” case, in which both permissible and impermissible motives played a role in the defendant’s
behavior. Liability can still accrue in such circumstances. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258
(1989). Logically, however, a plaintiff’s argument that an impermissible motive coexisted with a permissible one
would have to be shown directly, rather than via a burden-shifting approach, since a legitimate non-pretextual reason
could, by hypothesis, be offered. Grigsby v. LaHood, 628 F.3d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 2010).
22
understood by Shankar and intentionally conveyed to Rangarajan.10 Presumably the
implication is that a white employee was needed in an otherwise largely Indian
workforce. But Rangarajan supplies no context to think that this reading would be
accurate, instead arguing that Caterpillar’s management positions, at least, are
predominantly filled by whites.11 Even accepting this racialized reading, it is far from
clear whether the statement was offered to describe the hiring process that Caterpillar
actually engaged in, or rather, as Rangarajan himself suggested, that Shankar was “just
encouraging [him] not to dwell on what had happened.” Rangarajan Dep. 158.
Rangarajan’s assertions to the effect that Caterpillar’s management underrepresents
minorities are wholly unsupported by record evidence.
Rangarajan states that Damerell is biased against Asian employees because in 2007,
Damerell told Rangarajan to move out of his cubicle, and believes that Damerell told him
to do this because Rangarajan was “the only colored guy in the whole cube.” Rangarajan
Dep. 175–76. When Rangarajan returned to the space several months later, Damerell had
a closed-door office and a white employee was sitting where Rangarjan had formerly
been placed. Id.
Rangarajan’s evidence for racial or national origin bias in Caterpillar’s hiring process, in other
words, comes down to Shankar’s obliquity, and an incident where Damerell asked him to move
his desk five years before the events in question. Taken as a whole, this is insufficient evidence
to support a jury’s finding of liability under Title VII or section 1981 for Caterpillar’s decision to
hire Witte for the Global BE manager position rather than Rangarajan.
10
Rangarajan stated in his deposition that he took the statement to mean that “[y]ou need Caucasian people with
colored people for doing this kind of job.” Rangarajan Dep. 158.
11
When asked about this at his deposition, Shankar said he did not remember saying this, but allowed that “[i]t
could mean white person versus nonwhite.” Shankar Dep. 46.
23
Since Rangarajan cannot succeed via direct evidence or the burden-shifting approach, his
failure to promote claims arising from the Global GE manager position must be dismissed.
b. Failure to Promote – SG 27 Position
Caterpillar argues that Rangarajan did not suffer a materially adverse employment action
in not being promoted to an SG 27 position in May 2014, Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 51 27–28; that
there is insufficient evidence to infer directly that Caterpillar failed to promote him on this
occasion for impermissible reasons, id. at 28–29; that he cannot establish a prima facie case
under the indirect method, id. at 29–32; and that he cannot establish pretext, id. at 32–34.
Rangarajan responds that the failure to promote him was an adverse employment action, Resp.
Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 71 31–32; points to the evidence of discrimination upon which he rested
his previous failure to promote claim to show direct evidence of discrimination here, id. at 32–
34; and claims he has made out a prima facie case, id. at 34–41.
i.
Burden-Shifting Method
First, it is important to be clear about what kind of claim Rangarajan makes about the
failure to advance him to an SG 27 position. Rangarajan’s claim is not that he was not offered a
job position or promotion, but that his pay was not raised to the SG 27 level when Caterpillar
reviewed salaries of managerial staff. Changes in job responsibilities, insofar as they had
occurred, had already happened by the time Caterpillar undertook its review; Rangarajan’s
argument is that he ought to have been bumped up on the pay scale because his job
responsibilities merited more pay after the restructuring, and Caterpillar ought to have
recognized this.
Viewed in this light, Caterpillar’s argument that its refusal to raise his pay was not an
adverse employment action fails. An adverse employment action is “a significant change in
24
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington
Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Although denial of a raise is not, considered
directly, a “significant change” in employment status, courts have consistently held that failure to
give a raise can constitute an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Whigum v. Keller Crescent
Co., 260 F. App’x 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The receipt of an inadequate pay raise can, though,
amount to an adverse employment action[.]”); Griffin v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824, 830 (7th Cir.
2004) (“[T]he denial of a raise can constitute a materially adverse employment action if a raise
would have been an expected element of the employee’s salary and its denial cuts the salary in
real terms.”). Here, Rangarajan’s not being classified as an SG 27 cost him a five percent raise,
along with various losses of fringe benefits like stock options, retirement benefits, and insurance.
Resp. Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 71 32. This is sufficiently materially adverse to make out a prima
facie case.
However, Rangarajan still fails to make out a prima facie case because he cannot show
that similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class were treated more favorably. “In
the usual case a plaintiff must at least know that the comparators (1) dealt with the same
supervisor, (2) were subject to the same standards, and (3) engaged in similar conduct without
such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the
employer’s treatment of them.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012). It
must be remembered that, since what is at issue is Caterpillar’s willingness or unwillingness to
pay employees more after evaluating whether their actual job responsibilities merit the pay
bump, a “similarly situated” employee to Rangarajan would be not just an employee who was an
SG 26 and was promoted to an SG 27, but who performed substantially the same job
25
responsibilities as Rangarajan did, but was rewarded with a pay raise where Rangarajan was not,
or who, after review, kept at an SG 27 position he or she had previously occupied.
As comparators, Rangarajan points to Witte, Brian Jensen, and Stacy Smith. See 1:15cv-01163 Compl. 7–8. But Witte did not have the same supervisor as Rangarajan, and moreover,
at the time had already been placed in an SG 24 position. Brian Jensen was an SG 27 employee,
and remained so for the PD> pay raise of 2014, but he reported to Damerell. Cignetti Decl.
4. He was responsible for governance of all of PD>’s services, rather than only Shankar’s
group. Rangarajan Dep. II 84–85. And Smith, who was an SG 26, reported to Craig Brabec, and
did not receive a salary upgrade as part of the 2014 PD> salary review. Witte was two salary
grades below Rangarajan, and so is not a suitable comparator. Jensen was an SG 27, and
determined during the 2014 review to be at the appropriate pay scale, but his job was materially
different from Rangarajan’s. He had a different supervisor, performed business engagement
work with all of PD>’s clients, rather than just those served by Shankar’s group, and he
reported to and interacted with different levels of Caterpillar personnel than did Rangarajan.
Rangarajan Dep. II 84–85. And Smith, who reported to a different supervisor, like Rangarajan
did not receive a pay upgrade from SG 26 to SG 27 during the 2014 salary review. The similarly
situated analysis is designed to “eliminate other possible explanatory variables, ‘such as differing
roles, performance histories, or decision-making personnel . . . .’” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846
(quoting Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007)). Here, the analysis
shows that these other employees had differing roles, or indeed, did not receive better treatment
than Rangarajan. His prima facie case fails.
ii.
Direct Method
26
For similar reasons, Rangarajan’s offered evidence is insufficient for a jury to conclude
that he was not upgraded to an SG 27 position because of prohibited animus. The evidence of
animus that Rangarajan offers is the same as the evidence that he offered to support his first
failure to promote claim, which, as the Court has already explained, is insufficient. Indeed, the
record shows that of the other six employees working under Shankar whose salaries were
reviewed in 2014, three were given a raise, and two were Asian; one of them was upgraded from
an SG 26 to an SG 27 position.12 There is no other evidence in the record that the salary grade
review was conducted in a discriminatory manner, or that its results demonstrated a racially
disparate effect. Rangarajan complains that Cignetti, in conducting the review for the human
resources organization, did not make a sufficient effort to understand how valuable his job duties
were. Resp. Mot. Summ. J. ECF No. 71 25. But simply because the human resources
organization disagreed with Rangarajan’s obvious desire for a raise does not mean that it had a
nefarious motive for doing so. In addition, Rangarajan eventually received his long-sought raise
to an SG 27 position, making his claim that Caterpillar refused to give him one on the basis of
race or national original all the less plausible. Rangarajan’s claim for failure to promote on the
basis of the 2014 salary grade review fails.
c. Retaliation – SG 27 Position
Rangarajan alleges that the failure to promote him to an SG 27 position was also an act of
retaliation for his EEOC complaint and subsequent lawsuit. Under Title VII, employers are
prohibited from discriminating “against any . . . employee . . . because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). A
plaintiff may, as with a discrimination action, proceed by the direct or burden-shifting method.
12
If Norlin, who was white and was upgraded from an SG 26 to an SG 27 position, was shown to have sufficiently
similar job responsibilities to Rangarajan, then he might have been an appropriate comparator. But the record
contains no information about how Norlin’s job responsibilities compared to Rangarajan’s.
27
See Fyfe v. City of Fort Wayne, 241 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir.2001). If proceeding under the direct
method, a plaintiff must show that he “(1) [he] engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) [he]
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the two.” Majors v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 537 (7th Cir. 2013). The indirect method requires proof that “(1)
the employee engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she was meeting her employer’s
legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated
less favorably than similarly situated employees who did not engage in statutorily protected
activity.” Id. After this showing comes the familiar shifting of the burden to explain to the
defendant employer, and the shifting back to the plaintiff to show that the offered explanation is
pretextual. Rangarajan is unspecific about which method he seeks to proceed under, so the Court
analyzes both.
i.
Burden-Shifting Method
Leaving aside the elements of the prima facie case under the burden-shifting method,
Rangarajan cannot show that Caterpillar’s offered reason is pretextual. Caterpillar states that it
did not promote Rangarajan to an SG 27 because the human resource department’s review of his
job responsibilities found that his current level, SG 26, was appropriate to those responsibilities.
Cignetti Decl. 3, Cignetti Dep. 16–17. Rangarajan’s only evidence in support of his argument
that the SG 26 determination was made retributively is that he had filed a complaint with
Henricks and had complained to Shankar. (While he also claims that Henricks must have known
about his EEOC claim and his subsequent lawsuit, and that Shankar must have known about
them too, he offers no evidence to support the claim.) But Rangarajan does not contest
Cignetti’s testimony or declaration that she determined appropriate salary scales solely by
comparing the roles and responsibilities of each salary grade with the job descriptions employees
28
provided. Cignetti Dep. 16–17. Nor does he contest that these recommendations were then
reviewed with other human resources employees, given to Shankar, reviewed by a Senior Job
Evaluator in the human resources department, and then approved by Shankar and Henricks
before being finalized. This thorough process of review by multiple people in multiple parts of
the Caterpillar organization, all of whom concurred in the salary recommendations, along with
lack of evidence of pretext, makes Caterpillar’s offered reason wholly believable. Rangarajan
cannot succeed via the burden-shifting method.
ii.
Direct Method
Under the direct method, the showing of a causal link must be a showing of but-for
causation. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). But-for
causation may be shown by things like timing, ambiguous statements of animus, evidence that
other employees were treated differently, or evidence that an employer’s proffered reason was
pretexutal. Greengrass v. Int’l Monetary Sys. Ltd., 776 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 2015). As
explained above, Rangarajan cannot show pretext. As to timing, it is not clear exactly when the
human resources organization conducted its first quarter review of salaries, but it may well have
been prior to the filing of Rangarajan’s lawsuit; in any event, it is clear that the process of salary
review was set in motion many months before the lawsuit was filed, and that it encompassed all
of the managerial employees in PD>, and so was not likely to have been in and of itself
retaliatory. No complained-of action followed close on the heels of any of Rangarajan’s
protected activities. As explained in the comparator discussion above, no employees can be
shown to have been treated differently. And Rangarajan has offered no statements suggesting
animus against him on the part of those who made the decision, at any level. His claim of
retaliation fails under the direct method.
29
d. Harassment Claim – Hoskins
Rangarajan claims that Caterpillar discriminated against him through Hoskins’s behavior,
including threatening his safety, saying that the India engineering team was a “job shop,” playing
a role in hiring Witte, grabbing his lapels, and threatening to slap him. Resp. Mot. Summ. J.
ECF No. 71 43. But, as Caterpillar observes, Mot. Summ. J. ECF no. 51 38–40, no evidence has
been produced showing that Hoffman’s lapel-grabbing or slap threat were motivated by
Rangarajan’s race or national origin. Cf. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S.
75, 80 (1998) (“Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it
is directed only at ‘discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.’”). Tellingly, the only link
Rangarajan has between the slap-threatening and grabbing behavior and prohibited animus are
one remark from years before, and her involvement in a hiring that, as the Court has already
explained, has not been shown to be discriminatory. Furthermore, all the evidence shows that
when Hoskins’s actions became inappropriate, Caterpillar took swift action to discipline her and
protect Rangarajan. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Once
aware of workplace harassment, [an] employer can avoid liability for its employees’ harassment
if it takes prompt and appropriate corrective action reasonably likely to prevent the harassment
from recurring.” (quotations omitted)). No jury could find for Rangarajan on his harassment
claim against Caterpillar for Hoskins’s behavior.
e. Motions to Seal
The parties each filed motions to seal contemporaneous with their motions for summary
judgment. The parties had previously entered into an agreed confidentiality order, ECF No. 16,
including employment personnel or employment records of non-parties. The few exhibits to the
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motions for summary judgment sought to be sealed all fell within the ambit of the agreed
protective order. The motions to seal these exhibits are granted.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant’s motions for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 47, 51, are
GRANTED. The parties’ motions for leave to file under seal, ECF Nos. 44, 62, and 68 are
GRANTED. Rangarajan’s claims in this matter, and the case joined with it, 1:15-cv-01163SLD-JEH, are all DISMISSED. No further claims remaining, the Clerk is directed to enter
judgment and close the cases.
Entered this 28th day of March, 2017.
s/ Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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