Kayer v. Morgan et al
Filing
8
MERIT REVIEW ORDER & OPINION entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 11/24/2014: IT IS ORDERED: 1) Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for the reasons stated in the full written opinion, and this case is closed. All pending motions are denied a s moot 2 3 . 2) The clerk is directed to enter a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. 3) The clerk is directed to obtain Plaintiff's trust fund ledgers and to assess the statutorily required fees. 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(b)(1) requires Pla intiff to pay the filing fee in installments even though his case is being dismissed. 4) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A mo tion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. (SEE FULL WRITTEN ORDER AND OPINION)(JRK, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 24 November, 2014 11:27:24 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
BRIAN MARK KAYER,
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Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. MORGAN, and
JOHN OR JANE DOE,
Defendants.
14-CV-1447
MERIT REVIEW OPINION
JAMES E. SHADID, U.S. District Judge.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se from his incarceration in the
Lincoln Correctional Center, pursues claims arising from his
wrongful conviction and incarceration in 2011.
The case is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the
factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff's
favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).
However, even under a liberal construction, Plaintiff states no
federal claims that can proceed.
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ALLEGATIONS
On July 6, 2011, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with a
violation of 730 ILCS 150/6—failure of a registered sex offender to
register a change of employment. Plaintiff had lost his job and had
not found another. Plaintiff alleges that he was pressured to plead
guilty and was serving his sentence when, on or around May of
2013, the Illinois Appellate Court vacated Plaintiff’s conviction. The
Appellate Court held that 730 ILCS 150/6 did not apply to Plaintiff.
The Appellate Court reasoned that the plain meaning of “change in
place of employment” meant leaving one place of employment for
another, not becoming unemployed. People v. Kayer, 988 N.E.2d
1097, 1100-1101 (7th Cir. 2013). Judge Steigmann dissented from
the majority opinion on the grounds that a “change” in employment
necessarily included losing employment, whether or not new
employment was found.
Plaintiff seems to be alleging that it should have been obvious
to all involved in his arrest and prosecution that he had not violated
the plain language of 730 ILCS 150/6. He seeks compensation for
the time he spent wrongfully incarcerated, which he says was 20
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months. According to the IDOC website, Plaintiff is currently
incarcerated in the IDOC on different charges of failure to register.
ANALYSIS
The only possible federal claim that Plaintiff might be able to
pursue is a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim against the
arresting officer. However, a false arrest claim would be barred by
the two-year statute of limitations, since Plaintiff was arrested in
July of 2011 and did not file this case until more than three years
later. A false arrest claim accrues at the time of the arrest, not
when a conviction is vacated. Bryant v. City of Chicago, 746 F.3d
239, 241 (7th Cir. 2014)(In Illinois, 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions are
subject to the two-year statute of limitations in 735 ILCS 5/13202); Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2013)(quoting
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007)(Statute of limitations
starts to run on Fourth Amendment false arrest claim when
“‘claimant becomes detained pursuant to the legal process.’”).1
Plaintiff cannot pursue a federal claim arising from his
prosecution and incarceration. The prosecuting attorney is
The arresting officer would likely be entitled to qualified immunity on a false
arrest claim, given that even the Appellate Court Judges did not agree on how
the statute should be interpreted, but that issue is not before the Court.
1
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absolutely immune from a suit for damages for bringing and
pursuing criminal charges, and the sentencing Judge is immune
from suit for his rulings. Lewis v. Mills, 677 F.3d 324 (7th Cir.
2012)(A prosecutor is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit for
choosing to initiate or pursue criminal charges); Polzin v. Gage, 636
F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2011)( “A judge has absolute immunity for
any judicial actions . . . .”)
If Plaintiff believes that his counsel failed to adequately
represent him in the criminal proceedings, that is a state law
malpractice action: Public defenders and private attorneys are not
state actors under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312 (1981). Lastly, even putting aside immunity hurdles,
Plaintiff cannot pursue a federal malicious prosecution action
because an action for malicious prosecution is available under state
law. Llovet v. City of Chicago, 761 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2014)(“federal
suit for malicious prosecution by state officers is permissible only if
the state in which the plaintiff had been prosecuted does not
provide an adequate remedy”).2
The Court does not decide here whether Plaintiff has a viable state law claim
for malicious prosecution. However, the Court does note that pleading malice
might be difficult because the only question in Plaintiff’s criminal case
2
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Plaintiff may be able to petition the state court for a certificate
of innocence pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-702, which might then
enable him to seek damages in the Illinois Court of Claims. See
People v. Dumas, 988 N.E.1d 713 (2d Dist. 2013)(innocence finding
allows a defendant to seek relief in the Court of Claims for wrongful
incarceration). However, that remedy must be pursued in state
court, not federal court.
IT IS ORDERED:
1)
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for the reasons stated
above, and this case is closed. All pending motions are denied as
moot (2, 3).
2) The clerk is directed to enter a judgment pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.
3)
The clerk is directed to obtain Plaintiff’s trust fund
ledgers and to assess the statutorily required fees. 28 U.S.C.
Section 1915(b)(1) requires Plaintiff to pay the filing fee in
installments even though his case is being dismissed.
appeared to be a statutory interpretation question. See Swick v. Liautaud, 169
Ill.2d 504, 512 (1996)(elements of state malicious prosecution claim are: 1)
pursuit of criminal proceedings against the plaintiff without probable cause; 2)
termination of those proceedings in the plaintiff's favor; 3) malice by the
defendants; and, 4) damages suffered by the plaintiff).
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4)
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of
judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present
on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose
to appeal, he will be liable for the $505 appellate filing fee
irrespective of the outcome of the appeal.
ENTERED: 11/24/2014
FOR THE COURT:
s/ James E. Shadid
JAMES E. SHADID
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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