Wallace et al v. City of Washington, An Illinois Municipal Corporation et al
Filing
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ORDER & OPINION entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 12/18/2015: As there are just reasons for delaying entry of final judgment in Granite's favor, the Court DENIES Granite's Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b).(Doc. 43 ). IT IS SO ORDERED. (SEE FULL WRITTEN ORDER & OPINION) (JRK, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 18 December, 2015 02:59:16 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
ANDREW WALLACE, JR., SHERRY
WALLACE, and ANTONIO GILES,
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)
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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CITY OF WASHINGTON, GARY M.
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MARINER, BOARD OF POLICE
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COMMISSIONERS, GRANITE
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BROADCASTING CORP., d/b/a WEEK- )
TV, DAN VOLK and JEFF STEVENSON )
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Defendants.
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Case No. 14-cv-1457
ORDER & OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Granite Broadcasting
Corporation’s (“Granite’s”) Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b). (Doc.
43). Granite asks the Court to first certify that there is no just reason for delaying
in entering a separate final judgment in its favor, and then proceed to enter the
judgment. (Id.). Granite filed this motion on November 25, 2015 and Plaintiffs’
response was due on December 14, 2015. See C.D. Ill. Loc. R. 7.1(B)(2). To date,
Plaintiffs have filed no response, so the Court presumes that they do not oppose the
motion. See id. Although the motion is unopposed, the Court will deny it.
BACKGROUND
On November 4, 2014, Plaintiffs Andrew Wallace, Jr. Sherry Wallace, and
Antonio Giles filed a two-count complaint in the Circuit Court of Tazewell County,
Illinois for false imprisonment and negligent infliction of emotional distress against
the City of Washington, its mayor Gary Mariner, the Chief of Police of the
Washington Police Department Don Volk, Washington Police Department
Commander Jeff Stevens,1 and other unknown officers of the Washington Police
Department. (Doc. 1-1). A year before that, in November of 2013, a tornado struck
Washington, Illinois and caused extensive damage. (Id. at 1). Plaintiffs alleged that
they obtained a permit to aid in the tornado cleanup effort, which allowed them to
collect recyclable items found on the public right of way in Washington. (Id. at 2).
They alleged that even though they possessed a valid permit to do so, they were
arrested by Washington police officers who found them sorting through items that
had been left along curbs. (Id.). Following the arrest, they were detained for three
days. (Id. at 3). Local media outlets published and broadcasted their pictures, and
“labeled [them] as looters who were illegally removing items from the City; even
though [] they were authorized recyclers.” (Id.).
The originally named Defendants filed a notice of removal with this Court on
December 2, 2014. (Doc. 1). On January 18, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their First
Amended Complaint. (Doc. 15). The First Amended Complaint names Granite as a
defendant, and also alleges additional claims. A claim for defamation of character,
which was among the new ones Plaintiffs included in the First Amended Complaint,
is the only one brought against Granite. (Id. at 11-12)
Although Plaintiffs refer to a Defendant Stevens in their initial Complaint, they
refer to him as Jeff Stevenson in their Amended Complaint. (Compare Doc. 1-1 with
Doc. 15). In Defendant City of Washington, Gary M. Manier, Don Volk, and Jeff
Stevens’ Answer to the First Amended Complaint, they note that Jeff Stevens was
“improperly named Jeff Stevenson” in the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 18 at 1).
Throughout the Answer, these Defendants refer to Stevenson as Stevens. For
consistency, the Court will refer to him as Defendant Stevens.
1
2
After filing an Answer to the First Amended Complaint, Granite filed a
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in which it argued that Plaintiff’s claim for
defamation of character against it was barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc.
39). The Court granted Granite’s motion on August 31, 2015. (Doc. 40). A number of
Plaintiffs’ claims against four defendants remain pending before the Court. This
includes Plaintiffs’ claim for defamation of character against the remaining
Defendants.2
DISCUSSION
Granite asks the Court to enter a separate final judgment in its favor, as the
Court recently resolved Plaintiffs’ only claim against it. “When an action presents
more than one claim for relief . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or
parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
As made clear by the text of the rule, a court should only enter partial
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) when two circumstances are present. Hampton v.
Beltz, No. 1:09-CV-361-WTL-JMS, 2009 WL 1971400, at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 6, 2009).
First, the judgment must either resolve all disputes with a particular party or
resolve a separate claim that is distinct from those that remain pending. See Lottie
v. W. AM. Ins. Co., 408 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2005). Second, the court must
determine that there is no just reason for delay. Hampton, 2009 WL 1971400, at *1.
These Defendants filed an Answer to the First Amended Complaint, which
included an answer to Plaintiffs’ claim for defamation of character. (Doc. 18 at 1518). They have not sought judgment on that claim.
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3
There is just reason for delay when an adjudicated claim is factually or legally
similar to a pending claim, as early certification could unnecessarily expend judicial
resources by producing a duplicative appellate effort. See Schieffelin & Co. v. Valley
Liquors, Inc., 823 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir. 1987); Hampton, 2009 WL 1971400, at
*1.
Here, the first prerequisite is satisfied, as the Court has adjudicated all of
Plaintiffs’ claims against Granite. See Lottie, 408 F.3d at 938. However, Plaintiffs’
still-pending defamation of character claim against the remaining Defendants is
factually and legally similar to the one adjudicated in Granite’s favor. (See Doc. 15
at 11-12). For this reason, the Court concludes that Rule 54(b) certification is not
appropriate. See Shieffelin, 823 F.2d at 1065; Hampton, 2009 WL 1971400, at *1.
CONCLUSION
As there are just reasons for delaying entry of final judgment in Granite’s
favor, the Court DENIES Granite’s Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b).
(Doc. 43). IT IS SO ORDERED.
Entered this 18th day of December, 2015.
s/Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge
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