Evans v. Hillgendorf et al

Filing 32

Opinion entered by Judge Sara Darrow on 12/5/2016. See written order. By 1/3/2017, Plaintiff may file a supplemental response to the summary judgment motion regarding his claims against Defendants Spencer, Smith, and Lee.The clerk is directed to keep Defendants motion for summary judgment pending (24). (ED, ilcd)

E-FILED

Monday, 05 December, 2016 10:22:09 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHARLES EVANS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
LYNN HILLGENDORF,
BARBARAA KING, STEPHEN
DAMEWOOD, CLIFFORD
SANGSTER, KYLE SPENCER,
OFFICER SMITH, and
PATRICK LEE,
Defendants.

15 -CV-1043

OPINION
SARA DARROW, U.S. District Judge.
Plaintiff proceeds on constitutional claims of excessive force,
failure to intervene, and procedural due process violations arising
from incidents which occurred in the Hill Correctional Center in
March 2014. 1 Before the Court is the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
A rational juror could find for Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim against Defendant Sangster and on Plaintiff’s procedural

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Plaintiff filed this case while in prison but has since been released.

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due process claims against Defendants Hillgendorf, King, and
Damewood. Summary judgment will be denied on those claims.
Remaining are Plaintiff’s excessive force and failure to intervene
claims against Defendants Spencer, Smith, and Lee. The current
record warrants summary judgment to these Defendants, but,
because Defendants relied on facts not proposed in their undisputed
fact section, Plaintiff will be given an additional opportunity to
respond before a final determination is made.
Facts
For summary judgment purposes, the facts are as follows.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)(evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, with material factual disputes resolved in the
nonmovant's favor).
On March 20, 2014, Plaintiff got into a fight with another
inmate, inmate Barksdale, in the Hill Correctional Center on the R3A wing. Officer Sephus broke up the fight and directed Plaintiff to go
wait in the foyer. Plaintiff went to the foyer and sat down to wait.
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Sangster, a correctional officer,
entered the foyer and began yelling, “I am fucking tired of your shit
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Evans. It’s too early in the fucking morning for your shit.” (Compl.
p. 8.) Sangster and Plaintiff had some history—They disliked each
other from a prior incident when, according to Plaintiff, Sangster
had made a homosexual comment to Plaintiff which led to an
argument between Plaintiff and Sangster. (Pl.’s Dep. p. 54.)
According to Plaintiff, after Officer Sangster yelled at Plaintiff,
Sangster grabbed Plaintiff by Plaintiff’s arm and tried to push
Plaintiff up against the window glass, but the chair got in the way.
Plaintiff gripped the chair, whereupon other officers—Defendants
Smith, Spencer, and Lee took Plaintiff to the ground by tripping him,
causing Plaintiff’s face to hit the ground first. Plaintiff received a
minor cut above his eyebrow and felt dizzy but was otherwise fine.
(Pl.’s Dep. p. 29-30).
Plaintiff received two disciplinary reports arising from this
incident. The first report was for fighting, to which Plaintiff pled
guilty. The second disciplinary report was written by Defendant
Lynn Hillgendorf, then a sergeant. Hillgendorf accused Plaintiff of
assault. According to Hillgendorf, she was escorting inmate Barkley
(who was handcuffed behind his back) through the foyer when
Plaintiff broke free from Defendant Sangster and charged at inmate
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Barkley, trying to swing and hit inmate Barksdale. Hillgendorf
maintained that Plaintiff slammed Defendant Hillgendorf and Inmate
Barksdale into the glass window, causing Hillgendorf lower back
pain. Hillgendorf claimed in her disciplinary report that she
reported to the health care unit with lower back pain, but in her
interrogatory answer she denied going to the health care unit. (d/e
28-1, pp. 8-9.) Defendants Sangster and Lee more or less confirm
Defendant’s Hillgendorf’s version, while Defendant Spencer cannot
recall. There is no affidavit from Defendant Officer Smith.
Plaintiff categorically denies Hillgendorf’s version. He denies
any contact whatsoever with Defendant Hillgendorf or resisting any
of the other officers in any way. Since this is summary judgment,
Plaintiff’s version governs. Stokes v. Board of Educ. of the City of
Chicago, 599 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2010)("In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, neither the district court nor this court may
assess the credibility of witnesses, choose between competing
reasonable inferences, or balance the relative weight of conflicting
evidence.")
At his disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty of assault
by Defendants Damewood and King, the committee members. Three
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of the witnesses that Plaintiff had requested were unable to give
eyewitness testimony because they had not personally seen what
transpired. Plaintiff also wanted to call inmate Barksdale as a
witness, who would have personally witnessed the alleged assault.
However, Plaintiff’s request was denied, and, according to Plaintiff,
Defendant Damewood told Plaintiff something to the effect that
Damewood would not believe anything Plaintiff or inmate Barksdale
said anyway. (Pl.’s Dep. p. 37.)
Plaintiff was punished with six months of segregation, a
disciplinary transfer, contact visit restrictions for six months, and
the loss of one month’s good time. However, Plaintiff’s good time
was ultimately not revoked.
Analysis
Defendants’ argument in their summary judgment
memorandum introduces proposed facts that are not listed in the
proposed fact section. CDIL-LR 7.1(D)(1)(b). The motion could be
denied on that grounds, but doing so is unnecessary because
Plaintiff has responded to all the proposed facts in Defendants’
arguments, and the claims in this case are simple.

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I. Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force survives summary
judgment against Defendant Sangster. As to Defendants
Spencer, Smith, and Lee, Plaintiff does not appear to have a
viable excessive force or failure to intervene claim, but Plaintiff
will be given an opportunity to supplement his response.
Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force fall under the Eighth
Amendment, which is a high standard of proof. Plaintiff’s evidence
must allow a jury to find that Defendants used force for the very
purpose of harming Plaintiff. “‘[T]he question whether the measure
taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering
ultimately turns on “whether force was applied in a good faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm.”’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1 (1992)(quoted cites omitted). That the force may have been
unnecessary or unreasonable is not enough under the Eighth
Amendment.
The Court cannot rule out an Eighth Amendment excessive
force claim against Defendant Sangster. According to Plaintiff,
Plaintiff was merely waiting in the foyer as directed and not resisting
in any way when Sangster set in motion a chain of events which
landed Plaintiff on the floor face first. The history between Sangster
and Plaintiff, along with Sangster’s purported angry statements
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before Sangster tried to push Plaintiff against the window, allow an
inference that Sangster may have had ill motives, and, at this stage,
the Court must accept Plaintiff’s testimony that he was not resisting
Sangster in any way. Plaintiff’s physical injury was minor, but that
would not necessarily preclude a verdict in his favor, though any
award of damages would likely be small. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9
(“When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to
cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated.
. . This is true whether or not significant injury is evident. ”)
However, Plaintiff does not appear to have enough evidence
against the other officers—Spencer, Smith, or Lee—to support an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against them. Plaintiff
stated in his deposition that he believed these officers “assumed I
was being aggressive and that’s when all the officers took me down.”
(Pl.’s Dep. 23.) Plaintiff also stated that, “when he [Sangster] said
what he said, stop resisting, I guess this what [sic] triggered the rest
of the officers to take me down, and they all basically took me down
and slammed me to the ground.” (Pl.’s Dep. 27). Plaintiff also
stated, “Officer Sangster initiated it. They had no other choice to, I
feel, to participate in what Sangster was doing. They couldn’t just
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stand there and watch. That’s what I’m going to take from it.” (Pl.’s
Dep. p. 55.)
Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Officers Spencer,
Smith, or Lee were maliciously trying to harm Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s
own deposition testimony indicates that even Plaintiff believes that
these officers were acting in good faith, which would preclude an
excessive force and failure to intervene claim against them. 2
However, in light of Defendants’ reliance on facts not listed in their
undisputed fact section, the Court will give Plaintiff an opportunity
to file a supplemental response.
II. Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim survives against
Defendants Hillgendorf, Damewood, and King.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s punishment for assault was
not significant enough to trigger procedural due process protections,
but the factual record is not developed on that score. Six months of
segregation may or may not trigger procedural due process
protections depending on the conditions endured, such as access to
the yard, showers, and opportunities for human interaction. See,
e.g., Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2015)(segregation

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Whether Plaintiff intends to pursue a failure to intervene claim is not clear.

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shorter than six months could be actionable depending on totality of
punishment and conditions of confinement); Hardaway v. Meyerhoff,
734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013)(six months and one day
segregation not significant deprivation where inmate received shower
and yard once a week); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th
Cir. 1995)(six months of segregation not an “extreme term,” but
remanding for factual development on restrictions in segregation).
Defendants, therefore, have not shown that Plaintiff was not
entitled to procedural due process. Procedural due process rights in
prison disciplinary proceedings include the right to call witnesses
with relevant testimony, subject to the prison’s legitimate
penological concerns. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566
(1974)(“inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to
call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense
when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to
institutional safety or correctional goals.”) Defendants do not
explain why Plaintiff was not allowed to call his main witness,
inmate Barksdale. According to Plaintiff, Barksdale would have
confirmed that Plaintiff had not charged at Barksdale or made any

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contact with Defendant Hillgendorf. If true, that would be relevant
and potentially exonerating testimony.
Further, procedural due process entitled Plaintiff to a neutral
decisionmaker. Id. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Damewood
essentially stated that he would never believe anything Plaintiff or
inmate Barksdale said, which implies that Damewood was biased.
Summary judgment must therefore be denied on the procedural due
process claim.
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied as to

the excessive force claim against Defendant Sangster and the
procedural due process claim against Defendants Hillgendorf,
Damewood, and King.
2.

The Court reserves ruling on Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment regarding the excessive force and failure to
intervene claims against Defendants Spencer, Smith, and Lee.
3.

By January 3, 2017, Plaintiff may file a supplemental

response to the summary judgment motion regarding his claims
against Defendants Spencer, Smith, and Lee.

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4.

The clerk is directed to keep Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment pending (24).
ENTER: 12/5/2016
FOR THE COURT: United States District Court for the Central
District of Illinois.

s/Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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