Moore v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Filing
49
ORDER granting 40 Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties are directed to confer regarding the discovery, if any, which still needs to be conducted on the claims remaining in this case and submit a supplemental discovery plan to the Court for consideration on or before January 13, 2017. Entered by Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley on 12/22/16. (WG, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 22 December, 2016 04:22:03 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
KEIRAND R. MOORE,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:15-CV-01058-JEH
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
Order
Now before the Court is the Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”), motion for summary judgment (D. 40) and the
pro se Plaintiff, Keirand Moore’s, response thereto (D. 48). For the reasons stated, infra,
State Farm’s motion is granted. 1
I
A
As alleged in the Complaint, Moore worked at State Farm until he was fired in
April 2014. He claims he was denied an opportunity for a promotion to a “Service
Level Liaison” position because he is black and also due to State Farm’s retaliation
against him for filing internal complaints regarding State Farm’s racism as well as
administrative charges of racial discrimination and retaliation with the Illinois
Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”).
The Complaint also alleges that State Farm failed to reasonably accommodate
Moore’s illness, namely his Crohn’s disease. In particular, State Farm allegedly did
not “adjust [Moore’s] workload even though [State Farm] knew that [he] was
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The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (D. 38-39).
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seriously ill and out on sick leave frequently.” Further, State Farm allegedly assigned
him new tasks even though Moore was working from home; that new assignment
caused him stress that exacerbated his illness. Additionally, Moore claims State Farm
“constantly harassed [Moore] about productivity even though [his] symptoms were
such that [he] could not produce the same amount of work as [his] healthier
counterparts.” Finally, Moore claims that one of his co-workers assaulted and
battered him following a meeting, and former co-workers defamed him during the
IDHR’s investigation of his case.
State Farm previously moved to dismiss the portion of Moore’s Complaint
alleging disability discrimination, arguing that Moore failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies by failing to raise this claim with the IDHR or the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Judge Sara L. Darrow denied that
motion, finding that the issue was better suited for consideration on a motion for
summary judgment in which State Farm could “provide greater background
regarding whether Moore has filed any other IDHR or EEOC charges during the
relevant time period.” (D. 27 at p. 8).
State Farm has now filed such a motion, arguing that it is entitled to summary
judgment on Moore’s American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim because of his
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Additionally, State Farm argues that it is
entitled to summary judgment on Moore’s Illinois defamation claim because the
alleged statements forming the basis of that claim are privileged. (D. 40 at p. 1). Moore
responds to the exhaustion argument by challenging the fairness of the IDHR
investigation. (D. 48 at pp. 8-9). Moore responds to State Farm’s argument concerning
the defamation claim by challenging the characterization of those making the alleged
statements as “co-workers,” although he also acknowledges that the individuals in
fact work for State Farm. (D. 48 at pp. 5-7). He also discusses at length the nature of
the alleged statements and the harm they allegedly caused him. Id.
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B
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Moore filed five charges of
discrimination with the IDHR and EEOC. A review of all these documents clearly
demonstrates that in none of them did Moore ever make a claim related to a disability
or disability discrimination; all of his claims were based on race discrimination or
retaliation related thereto. (D. 40-1). Additionally, Moore in his response nowhere
asserts that he raised a claim of disability discrimination before the IDHR or EEOC.
(D. 48 at pp. 1-4).
Regarding the defamation claim, the Complaint alleges that State Farm
employees Omar West and Jenna Hillesheim defamed Moore by testifying falsely in
the IDHR proceedings that Moore had a poor performance history. (D. 1 at p. 4). It is
undisputed that both West and Hillesheim are State Farm employees and whatever
statements they may have made at issue in this case were made during the course of
the administrative proceedings. (D. 48 at pp. 4-8).
II
A
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 7477 U.S. 317, 32223 (1986). The moving party has the burden of providing proper documentary
evidence to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323- 24 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the
opposing party must come forward with specific evidence, not mere allegations or
denials of the pleadings, which demonstrates that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V., 112 F.3d 291, 294 (7th Cir. 1997). “[A] party moving
for summary judgment can prevail just by showing that the other party has no
evidence on an issue on which that party has the burden of proof.” Brazinski v. Amoco
Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1183(7th Cir. 1993).
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Accordingly, the non-movant cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must
designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or
admissions that establish that there is a genuine triable issue; he “‘must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact.’” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986)(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d
813, 818 (7th Cir. 1999). Finally, a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant’s
position is not sufficient to oppose successfully a summary judgment motion; “there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].”
Anderson at 250.
B
Judge Darrow, in her Order on State Farm’s Motion to Dismiss, set forth the
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement for ADA claims, and this Court
repeats it verbatim here. Specifically:
Certain kinds of employment discrimination claims, including
those arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§
12111–12117, require exhaustion of administrative remedies as a
precondition to filing a federal lawsuit. See id. § 12117(b); Green v. Nat’l
Steel Corp., Midwest Div., 197 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] plaintiff
is barred from raising a[n ADA] claim in the district court that had not
been raised in his or her EEOC charge . . . .”). The Seventh Circuit
characterizes an employment discrimination plaintiff’s failure to
exhaust as an affirmative defense. Mosely v. Bd. of Ed. of City of Chi., 434
F.3d 532– 33 (7th Cir. 2006) (ADEA case); Bibbs v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty.,
No. 13-3355, 618 F. App’x 847, 849 (7th Cir. July 2, 2015) (writing in a
Title VII case: “failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an
affirmative defense . . .”).
The ADA’s exhaustion requirement “serves the dual purpose of
affording the EEOC and the employer an opportunity to settle the
dispute through conference, conciliation, and persuasion . . . and of
giving the employe[r] some warning of the conduct about which the
employee is aggrieved.” Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500
(7th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted). A plaintiff may therefore only
sue over an employer’s conduct “if there is a reasonable relationship
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between the allegations in the [administrative] charge and the claims in
the complaint, and the complaint can reasonably be expected to grow
out of an EEOC investigation of the allegations in the charge.” Id.; see
also Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he
scope of the subsequent judicial proceedings is limited by the nature of
the charges filed with the EEOC. An aggrieved employee may not
complain to the EEOC of only certain instances of discrimination, and
then seek judicial relief for different instances of discrimination.”).
Charges of discrimination are reasonably related if “there is a factual
relationship between them,” which means, “at a minimum . . . that the
EEOC charge and the complaint . . . describe the same conduct and
implicate the same individuals.” Ezell v. Potter, 400 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th
Cir. 2005).
Administrative charges of discrimination, whether filed with a
state or federal agency, are to be construed liberally by federal courts to
accommodate pro se filers and to further the remedial purposes of antidiscrimination statutes. Ezell, 400 F.3d at 1047.
(D. 27 at pp. 4-5).
The undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates that at no time did Moore
raise in the administrative proceedings below anything related to his disability
discrimination claims. All of his claims before the IDHR and EEOC related only to
race discrimination and retaliation related thereto. Accordingly, the disability
discrimination claims Moore makes in his Complaint are not “reasonably related” to
his charges in the administrative proceedings, for the charges there did not “describe
the same conduct.” Ezell, 400 F. 3d at 1046. Thus, the administrative agencies and
State Farm “did not have opportunity to settle the dispute through conference,
conciliation, and persuasion, “and State Farm was not given “some warning of the
conduct about which the employee is aggrieved.” Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500.
In light of Moore’s failure to raise his ADA claims before the IDHR and EEOC,
he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on these claims and cannot, therefore,
bring those claims for the first time in this Court. State Farm is entitled to summary
judgment on Moore’s ADA claims.
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C
State Farm is also entitled to summary judgment of Moore’s defamation claim.
It is well established in Illinois that “statements made during quasi-judicial
proceedings, such as an IDHR investigation, are privileged and cannot be the basis
for a private cause of action.” Zhan v. County of Cook, 2004 WL 2966953, *4 (N.D. Ill),
citing Thomas v. Petrulis, 465 N.E.2d 1059 (1984). Even assuming West and Hillesheim
made that statements as alleged by Moore in the Complaint, the undisputed facts
demonstrate that the statements were made by them during the IDHR investigation,
a quasi-judicial proceeding. Accordingly, those statements cannot form the basis of a
defamation claim under Illinois law, and State Farm is entitled to summary judgment
on Moore’s Defamation claim.
III
For the reasons stated, supra, State Farm’s motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED. (D. 40). The parties are directed to confer regarding the discovery, if any,
which still needs to be conducted on the claims remaining in this case and submit a
supplemental discovery plan to the Court for consideration on or before January 13,
2017.
It is so ordered.
Entered on December 22, 2016
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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