Coleman v. City of Peoria et al
Filing
83
OPINION entered by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins. Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Defendants' Subpoena to IDOC and for a Protective Order 66 and Third Party Dana Holland's Motion to Quash Defendants' Subpoena to the Ill inois Department of Corrections for Audio Recordings of Dana Holland's Telephone Calls 70 are ALLOWED IN PART. The requests to quash the subpoenas are denied; however, the material produced pursuant to the subpoenas shall be Confidential Information subject to the terms of the Confidential Matter Protective Order entered August 17, 2015 30 . See written Opinion. (LB, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 22 July, 2016 02:48:40 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER COLEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF PEORIA, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 15-cv-1100
OPINION
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash
Defendants’ Subpoena to IDOC and for a Protective Order (d/e 66) (Motion
66), and Third Party Dana Holland’s Motion to Quash Defendants’
Subpoena to the Illinois Department of Corrections for Audio Recordings of
Dana Holland’s Telephone Calls (d/e 70) (Motion 70) (collectively Motions).
For the reasons set forth below, the Motions are ALLOWED IN PART. The
requests to quash the subpoenas are denied; however, the material
produced pursuant to the subpoenas shall be Confidential Information
subject to the terms of the Confidential Matter Protective Order entered
August 17, 2015 (d/e 30) (Protective Order).
Page 1 of 14
BACKGROUND
In 1995, Plaintiff Christopher Coleman was convicted of home
invasion and sexual assault that occurred in 1994 in Peoria, Illinois
(“1994 Home Invasion” or “Crime”). A group of men committed the 1994
Home Invasion. James Coats and Robert Nixon were arrested at the
scene and were convicted for their participation in the Crime. Coleman
was arrested and tried. Two of the victims identified Coleman as one of the
perpetrators. A thirteen year old boy, Anthony Brooks, testified that he
participated in the Crime as a look out. One of the victims testified that a
boy acted as look out. Brooks testified on direct examination that Coleman
participated in the Crime, but testified on cross examination that Coleman
was not involved. Brooks testified on cross examination that City of Peoria
(Peoria) Police Detective Patrick Rabe (Detective Rabe) threatened Brooks
that he would not see his family again unless he identified Coleman as one
of the perpetrators. Detective Rabe testified that he did not threaten
Brooks, and that Brooks identified Coleman as a perpetrator. People v.
Coleman, 2013 IL 113307 ¶¶ 4-34, 996 N.E.2d 617, 620-26 (Ill. 2013).
Nixon testified at trial that he, James Coats, Robert McKay, Lamont
Lee, and a man named Drey committed the 1994 Home Invasion. Nixon
testified that Coleman was not involved in the Crime. James Coats did not
Page 2 of 14
testify. Coleman presented alibi witnesses, and he testified that he did not
participate in the Crime. The jury found Coleman guilty of home invasion,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, armed robbery, and residential
burglary. Id., at 620-27, ¶¶ 35-43.
At a hearing on Coleman’s post-trial motions, James Coats testified
that he, Nixon, Robert McKay, Lamont Lee and a man named Drey
committed the 1994 Home Invasion. Coats testified that Coleman was not
involved. The trial court credited the trial testimony rather than the
testimony of Nixon and James Coats. The trial court denied the post-trial
motions and sentenced Coleman to 30 years. Id., at 628, ¶¶ 44-46.
At the 2010 post-conviction hearing, James Coats, Lamont Lee,
Robert McKay, and Coats’s brother, Robert Coats, testified that they
participated in the 1994 Home Invasion and Coleman was not involved.
Deondre Coleman, a/k/a Drey testified that he went with the group to the
house where the Crime was committed, but stayed outside and did not
participate in the Crime. Deondre Coleman testified that Coleman was not
involved. Brooks testified in 2010 that he did not participate in the 1994
Home Invasion. Brooks testified that Detective Rabe threatened him and
forced him to testify that he participated in the Crime and that Coleman also
was a perpetrator. Another suspect, Robert Nickerson, was arrested for
Page 3 of 14
the Crime, but the charges were dropped. Nickerson testified that while in
custody in 1994, Coats told him that Coleman was not involved in the
Crime. Another suspect named Mark Roberson testified that he was
arrested and released when he had an alibi. Detective Rabe testified that
he did not threaten Brooks. Detective Rabe testified that Brooks stated that
Coleman was a perpetrator in the Crime. Detective Rabe testified that
Coats and Nixon denied any involvement in the Crime when they were
interviewed during the investigation. The trial court denied post-conviction
relief, and the Appellate Court affirmed. Id., at 628-33, ¶¶ 47-78.
On March 13, 2014, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed Coleman’s
conviction and granted Coleman a new trial based on Illinois law. The
Court found that under Illinois law a new trial was required because the
2010 post-conviction testimony of James Coats, Robert McKay, Lamont
Lee, Robert Coats, and Deondre Coleman constituted new evidence and
were “conclusive enough that another trier of fact would probably reach a
different conclusion.” People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶¶ 102, 113-16,
996 N.E.2d 617, 639, 641-42 (Ill. 2013). Coleman was released from
prison.
On March 13, 2014, the Peoria County State’s Attorney dropped the
charges against Coleman. On March 5, 2015, the Peoria County, Illinois,
Page 4 of 14
Circuit Court issued Coleman a certificate of innocence. Amended
Complaint (d/e 51), ¶¶ 48-52.
On March 11, 2015, Coleman brought this action against Peoria;
Detective Rabe; and Peoria Police Officers Terry Pratt, Timothy Anderson,
and Michael Ford for violation of his constitutional rights during the
investigation and prosecution of the 1994 home invasion (1994
Investigation). Coleman also brought claims against Peoria for violation of
his constitutional rights under the principles set forth in Monell v.
Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95
(1978) (Monell Claims). Amended Complaint, Counts I-IV. Coleman also
alleged supplemental state law claims based on the investigation and
prosecution. Amended Complaint, Counts V-X. Detective Rabe died
during the pendency of this case. Michael Rabe, as executor of Detective
Rabe’s estate, has been substituted in as a defendant. Text Order entered
February 29, 2016.
Coleman disclosed Nixon, James Coats, Roberson, McKay, Brooks,
Robert Coats, and Deondre Coleman as possible witnesses in this case.
Deposition testimony taken during discovery indicates that Coleman had
telephone conversations with Nixon, James Coats, Roberson, McKay,
Brooks, Robert Coats, and Deondre Coleman while Coleman was in the
Page 5 of 14
custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). Coleman made
some of these calls through his sister, Kim Coleman, and others. Coleman
called his sister or others, and they would set up a three-way call with
Coleman, who was in custody, and one of the witnesses listed above.
Other times, Coleman made the call to Kim Coleman while one of these
disclosed witnesses was with Kim Coleman, and the witness spoke to
Coleman. See Defendants’ Response to Motions to Quash Defendants’
Subpoenas to IDOC and Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order (d/e 74)
(Response), at 4-5, Exhibits D-H, Discovery Deposition Excerpts; Exhibit I,
Center for Wrongful Conviction Memorandum dated March 4, 2014; Exhibit
J, Excerpt of Testimony at Certificate of Innocence Hearing on September
19, 2014.
On May 25, 2016, Defendants issued subpoenas to correctional
facilities operated by the IDOC to produce recordings of telephone calls
relating to Coleman, McKay, Nixon, Brooks, Roberson, Robert Coats, and
James Coats while they were incarcerated in those facilities from 1994 to
the present; and telephone calls relating to Dana Holland while he was
incarcerated from January 1, 2002, through June 3, 2003. Motion 66,
Exhibit A, Subpoenas. Holland was Coleman’s cell mate from January 1,
2002, to June 3, 2003. Holland allowed Coleman to make calls under his
Page 6 of 14
phone account during this time period. See Response, at 15. The IDOC
recorded all telephone calls made by inmates. Coleman does not dispute
that he and other inmates knew that their telephone calls were recorded.
Coleman and Holland have moved to quash the subpoenas. The
IDOC has not filed a motion to quash, and none of the other individuals
named in the subpoenas have filed motions to quash. Coleman and
Holland move to quash the subpoenas on the grounds that the subpoenas
are overly broad and interfere with their rights to privacy. The Defendants
respond that Coleman and Holland have no standing because the
subpoenas are directed at the IDOC, not them, and they had no
expectation of privacy in the content of calls that they knew were being
recorded by the IDOC.
The Defendants argue that they are entitled to discover the
substance of Coleman’s conversations with these potential witnesses
during his incarceration. The Defendants state further that they have no
way to narrow the subpoenas to calls made to specific recipients because
Coleman made some of these calls through third parties, such as his sister
Kim Coleman. Response, at 12.
Page 7 of 14
ANALYSIS
The Defendants challenge Coleman and Holland’s standing to move
to quash a subpoena directed to a third party. Generally, a party lacks
standing to move to quash a subpoena directed at a third party unless the
party has a claim of privilege attached to the information sought or unless
the production of the information sought implicates a party’s privacy
interests. See Jump v. Montgomery County, Illinois, 2015 WL 6558851, at
*1 (C.D. Ill. October 29, 2015); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-14, 287
F.R.D. 513, 516 (N.D. Ind. 2012). A person needs only a minimal privacy
interest to establish standing to move to quash a subpoena. Malibu Media,
287 F.R.D. at 516. The Court finds that Coleman and Holland would have
reasonably expected prison and other public officials would have access to
recordings of their phone calls, but would not have expected that other
parties would have access such as parties in a civil proceeding. The Court
finds that they have standing to move to quash the subpoena for the calls
that they made.
The Defendants argue that Coleman and Holland have no standing
because, as prisoners, they had no expectation of privacy in those calls for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment does not
apply to determining standing to challenge a subpoena in a civil
Page 8 of 14
proceeding. See Syposs v. United States, 181 F.R.D. 224, 227 (W.D. N.Y.
1998). Coleman and Holland must only show enough of a privacy interest
to invoke the Court’s discretionary authority to control discovery in a civil
case. Prisoners would reasonably expect the access to recordings of their
telephone calls to be limited to prison officials, law enforcement officials,
and other public officers with a bona fide need for such access. Prisoners
would reasonably expect that their conversations would not be handed over
to civil litigants. Coleman and Holland have demonstrated the minimal
interest necessary to establish standing to challenge the subpoenas for
recordings of calls that they made. See Malibu Media, 287 F.R.D. at 517.
Coleman and Holland move to quash the subpoenas because they
are overly broad and impose an undue burden. The scope of material that
may be secured by Subpoena is as broad as that permitted under the
discovery rules. See Graham v. Casey’s General Stores, 206 F.R.D. 251,
253-54 (S.D. Ind. 2002). Relevant information under the discovery rules
consists of admissible evidence or information that is reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Coleman and Holland have the burden of proof on this Motion. See Malibu
Media, LLC, 287 F.R.D. at 516.
Page 9 of 14
Coleman and Holland argue that the production of all of their calls
interferes with their rights to privacy because many of the calls produced
have no relationship to this case. A production of all of their calls,
therefore, will result in the disclosure of irrelevant personal information.1
The Defendants counter that they have no way to identify the relevant and
irrelevant calls without listening to each recording.
The Court, in its discretion, determines that Coleman and Holland
have failed to demonstrate that the burden on them from the disclosure of
personal, otherwise private information is sufficient to warrant quashing the
subpoenas for the calls that they made. The discovery shows that
Coleman called his possible witnesses while he was in prison. Coleman
made the calls directly and indirectly through third parties. The Defendants
are entitled to discover the content of those calls.
The recorded calls contain the most accurate information available
about the content of those calls. The relevant calls cannot be identified
without listening to the recordings. The impact on their privacy interests is
less than a private citizen making phone calls at home because Coleman
and Holland knew that the calls were recorded and could be heard by some
other individuals. In light of the relevance of the calls sought by the
1
Coleman and Holland present no evidence that the production of the calls presents a significant burden
on IDOC. The IDOC has not challenged the subpoenas.
Page 10 of 14
Defendants, and the difficulty in identifying the relevant calls, Coleman and
Holland’s lessened privacy interests is insufficient to quash the subpoenas.
Coleman and Holland’s privacy interests can be protected by making the
recordings Confidential Information subject to the terms of the Protective
Order. The Protective Order prohibits disclosure of the content of the calls,
except to the limited extent that disclosure of relevant calls will be
necessary to litigate this case.
Coleman relies on the opinion in Jump to argue that the production
would be unduly burdensome. The Jump opinion does not apply to this
circumstance. The subpoena in Jump sought the home phone records of
the Jump plaintiff’s mother from her phone company to discover whether a
specific phone call between plaintiff and daughter occurred. The mother
testified about the call in her deposition. The defendants did not know the
date of the call, and so, the records were not likely to prove or disprove
whether the call occurred. Jump, 2015 WL 655881, at *2-3. Further, the
phone records sought in Jump did not contain information on the content of
a call. The recordings here contain the actual content of the calls. The
recordings are far more likely to lead to discoverable evidence than the call
records in Jump.
Page 11 of 14
Coleman also relies on the opinion in Special Markets Ins.
Consultants, Inc. v. Lynch, 2012 WL 156538 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2012). The
Special Markets case also does not apply to this circumstance. The
plaintiff in Special Markets subpoenaed all of the defendants’ emails from
their email service providers Yahoo and Verizon to discover a limited
number of relevant emails. The Special Markets court quashed the
subpoenas because the plaintiff could secure the emails directly from the
defendants. In this case, the Defendants cannot secure the relevant
recorded conversations from Coleman because he has no recordings. The
Defendants can only get the recordings from the IDOC. The Defendants
could not narrow the subpoena by limiting the calls to certain call recipients
because Coleman made calls through third parties using three-way calling.
The relevant recordings cannot be identified without listening to them. The
Special Markets opinion does not apply.
Coleman and Holland suggest that Coleman’s counsel should listen
to the calls, make a log of all calls, and identify the relevant calls that would
be produced to the Defendants. Coleman’s proposal will only result in
additional discovery litigation and delay. The review by Coleman’s counsel
will take time. The Defendants will invariably dispute whether additional
Page 12 of 14
calls should be produced. The protective order will protect Coleman and
Holland’s privacy interests and speed the resolution of this matter.
Coleman lacks standing to challenge the subpoenas directed at the
calls made by McKay, Coats, Nixon, Brooks, Roberson, and Robert Coats.
Coleman and Holland have no privacy interests in those telephone calls.
The Court, however, will make those calls subject to the Protective Order in
order to avoid improper disclosure of personal information. The documents
produced shall be considered Confidential Information as designated in
paragraph two of the Protective Order, even if the documents are not so
designated by the producing party. Any copies of the documents produced
shall be designated as Confidential Information pursuant to paragraph
three of the Protective Order.
THEREFORE, Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Defendants’ Subpoena to
IDOC and for a Protective Order (d/e 66), and Third Party Dana Holland’s
Motion to Quash Defendants’ Subpoena to the Illinois Department of
Corrections for Audio Recordings of Dana Holland’s Telephone Calls
(d/e 70) are ALLOWED IN PART. The requests to quash the subpoenas
are denied; however, the material produced pursuant to the subpoenas
Page 13 of 14
shall be Confidential Information subject to the terms of the Confidential
Matter Protective Order entered August 17, 2015 (d/e 30).
ENTER: July 22, 2016
s/ Tom Schanzle-Haskins
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Page 14 of 14
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