UA Plumbers & Steamfitters 353 Joint Pension Trust Fund et al v. Wiegand Plumbing, Inc.
Filing
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ORDER entered by Judge Sara Darrow on November 15, 2016. The parties' 13 Amended Joint Motion for Entry of a Consent Decree is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' 1 Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. (RS1, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 15 November, 2016 02:11:27 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
. UA PLUMBERS 63 & STEAMFITTERS
353 JOINT PENSION TRUST FUND,
EAST CENTRAL ILLINOIS PIPE
TRADES HEALTH & WELFARE
FUND, PLUMBERS 63
EDUCATIONALTRUST FUND,
PLUMBERS LOCAL 63 ANNUITY
BENEFIT PLAN, MID-ILLINI
MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION INDUSTRY FUND,
WEST CENTRAL BUILDING TRADES
Case No. 1:15-cv-01150-SLD-JEH
COUNCIL CHECK OFF, POLITICAL
EDUCATION COMMITTEE FUND,
TRI-COUNTY CONSTRUCTION
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COUNCIL,
PIPE TRADES DISTRICT COUNCIL
#34, AND UNITED ASSOCIATION OF
JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES
OF THE PLUMBING INDUSTRY OF
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
LOCAL #63
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 1:15-cv-01150-SLD-JEH
WIEGAND PLUMBING, INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court is the parties’ Amended Joint Motion for Entry of a Consent Decree,
ECF No. 13. The parties have stipulated to dismissal of their case pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), and request that the Court retain jurisdiction over this matter for
the purpose of enforcing a consent decree containing the terms of their settlement. For the
reasons below, the motion for entry of the consent decree is GRANTED, and the case is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court has adopted the parties’ proposed consent
decree below.
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs UA Plumbers 63 & Steamfitters 353 Joint Pension Trust Fund, et al. (“UA
Plumbers”) filed suit against Defendant Wiegand Plumbing (“Wiegand”) for delinquent
contributions to employee benefit funds and other monies owed pursuant to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq. (“ERISA”) and the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §141 et seq. (“LMRA”). See Complaint 7, ECF
No. 1. Shortly after filing the complaint, the parties reported that they were working toward
resolution of the claim, pending calculation of the amounts owed by Wiegand, and that Wiegand
had begun to make payments. Status Report, June 24, 2015, ECF No. 4. The parties submitted a
proposed consent decree, Joint Mot. Entry Consent Decree, Dec. 15. 2015, ECF No. 11, but the
Court took issue with certain provisions of that initial proposal for the reasons described in its
September 20, 2016 Order, ECF No. 12. The Court requested, and the parties provided, an
amended proposed consent decree, ECF No. 13-1, which the Court considers below.
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Standard for Entry of Consent Decree and Retention of Jurisdiction
A consent decree is “a court order that embodies the terms agreed upon by the parties as a
compromise to litigation.” U.S. v. Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing U.S. v.
Witco Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (D. Del. 1999)). Parties who enter into a settlement
agreement may request that the court enter a consent decree—binding the parties pursuant to the
requirements enunciated by Rule 65(d)—and dismiss the case without prejudice pursuant to Rule
41(a). See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377–82 (1994); Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n v. Am. Express Co., 467 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2006). This
procedure is necessary because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and cannot
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simply “retain jurisdiction” by a mere statement that they intend to enforce a settlement
agreement. See Blue Cross, 467 F.3d at 636 (holding that district court’s order that it “retained
jurisdiction” to enforce settlement agreement was ineffectual after a dismissal of the underlying
claim because the order intended to bind the parties and thus was an injunction, but did not
comply with Rule 65(d), “compliance with which would have made the continuance of federal
jurisdiction clear[.]”). It is clear in the Seventh Circuit that one reliable source of a district
court’s power to retain jurisdiction over a case after the original case or controversy has been
resolved in a dismissal or judgment is compliance with rule 65(d); doing so permits the Court to
act to enforce the settlement pursuant to its original source of jurisdiction. See id. at
638(“Indeed, if the settlement had been entered as a consent decree, as it should have been, the
original federal-question jurisdiction would have sufficed.”); Kokonnen, 467 F.3d . at 377
(“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute . . . which is not to be expanded by judicial decree[.] (citations omitted)).
When utilizing this option, the parties’ proposed consent decree must comply with the
requirements for an injunction laid out in the Federal Rules. That is, the proposed order must:
“(a) state the reasons why it [should be] issued; (b) state its terms specifically; and (c) describe in
reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts
restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). Once the decree is entered, the case may be
dismissed by the parties pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1). See Kokonnen, 511 U.S. at 381–82. Because
the terms of the settlement have been drafted into a court order, the court may then enforce the
settlement by way of contempt proceedings (or whatever else the decree authorizes the court to
do in light of a breach).
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II.
Analysis
In its previous order, the Court noted problems with the proposed decree that resulted in
non-compliance with Rule 65(d). Order 4–5, September 20, 2016. These problems have been
addressed in the amended proposal. A “sufficiently precise and self-contained” injunction will
comply with Rule 65(d). Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 602 F.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing
PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that 65(d)
compliance requires of an injunction that “a person subject to it who reads it and nothing else has
a sufficiently clear and exact knowledge of the duties it imposes on him that if he violates it he
can be adjudged guilty of criminal contempt.”)). The injunction at issue in this case requires a
set number of twenty-four discrete payments, made monthly and totaling $72,000; the parties
have spelled out the manner in which payments are to be made, and have specified that “fail[ure]
to make any payment” constitutes a breach of the agreement which may result in contempt
proceedings or entry of judgment for the then-remaining amount owed. Am. Proposed Consent
Decree 2–3, ECF No. 13-1. Additionally, the parties have stricken the language the Court
identified in its previous order as overly broad. See Joint Mot. Entry Consent Decree 2,
December 15, 2015 (asking the Court, in the parties’ initial proposed consent decree, to retain
jurisdiction “for all other purposes related to this matter.”) The proposed order now provides
only that the Court will retain jurisdiction “for the purpose of implementing and enforcing the
terms and conditions of this Consent Decree.” Am. Proposed Consent Decree 2.
The parties deem this arrangement sufficient to settle their dispute over Wiegand
Plumbing’s alleged failure to pay required contributions to employee funds, and the Court
accepts and adopts this reason for entry of the injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(A). Based
on the above-mentioned terms of the amended proposed consent decree, the Court finds that the
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parties have stated the terms of payment with specificity, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(B). The
Court also finds that the proposed decree describes in “reasonable detail” the acts required of the
parties, in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(C), such that the parties can easily determine
when a breach has occurred and the consequences of that breach. See PMC, Inc., 151 F.3d at
619. See also H-D Michigan, LLC v. Hellenic Duty Free Shops S.A., 694 F.3d 827,843 (7th Cir.
2012) (providing district courts with broad discretion to determine the scope of an injunction
under Rule 65(d)(1)(C)).
In view of these modifications, the Court finds that the Seventh Circuit’s requirements for
a district court to adopt a consent decree by way of compliance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(d) have been satisfied. The Court enters and adopts the decree, and incorporates
the parties’ proposed text, verbatim, below.
III.
The Amended Proposed Consent Decree
THIS MATTER, coming on to be heard by agreement of the Parties, and the Parties
having reached a compromise, and the Parties having stipulated and agreed to the entry of this
Consent Decree, and the Parties having requested that the court retain jurisdiction to enforce the
terms of their agreement under the authority of Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company
of America, 511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994), and the Court being fully advised in the premises
HEREBY MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS:
1.
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, as amended from time to time and codified at 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq.
("ERISA") and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended from time to time and
codified at 29 U.S.C. §141 et seq. ("LMRA").
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2.
The Parties have reached an agreement that resolves the matters at issue in this case,
without the need for trial or adjudication of any issue of law or fact.
3.
The Parties have moved the Court to enter a Consent Decree to further ensure compliance
with the settlement.
4.
The Parties agree that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this action and jurisdiction
over the Parties for the purpose of implementing and enforcing the terms and conditions of this
Consent Decree.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
A.
The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this action and over the Parties for the purposes of
enforcing the terms of this Consent Decree.
B.
Defendant shall pay the Plaintiffs the sum of $72,000.00 for fringe benefit contributions,
interest, liquidated damages, and a portion of attorney's fees and costs arising out of collection
efforts.
C.
Specifically, Defendant shall pay the Plaintiffs the sum of $72,000.00 over a twenty-four
(24) month period by making twenty-four (24) monthly payments to the Plaintiffs, with the first
of these twenty-four monthly payments under this Consent Decree due to Plaintiffs on or before
November 30, 2016,1 and each subsequent payment due on or before the 30th day of each month
thereafter until the sum of $72,000.00 is paid in full.
D.
The above-referenced payments shall be made payable to the "Plumbers #63 and
Steamfitters #353 Trust Funds" and mailed to the law offices of Cavanagh & O'Hara LLP at
2319 West Jefferson Street, Springfield, Illinois 62702.
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The parties’ Amended Proposed Consent Decree included an initial payment date of October 30, 2016.
However, since the Court’s order did not issue until after that date, the Court, sua sponte, amended that
date to November 30, 2016. If the parties object to the Court’s amendment of the date, they may move
for relief as necessary.
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E.
The Defendant shall be in breach of this Consent Decree if Defendant fails to make any
payment under this Consent Decree in the amount required and when due, or fails to fulfill
and/or comply with any other term, provision or obligation of this Consent Decree. Upon any
breach by Defendant, the Plaintiffs shall have the right to institute the usual and customary
proceedings available under applicable law against the Defendant for violation of a consent
decree. In addition to those rights, Plaintiffs shall be immediately entitled to petition the Court to
reopen this case and enter a judgment against Defendant and in favor of the Plaintiffs for all
sums then owed to the Plaintiffs under the terms and provisions of this Consent Decree, which
sums Defendant stipulates to in the event of a default.
F.
Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed to limit or bar Plaintiffs from pursuing
claims for delinquent contributions, interest, liquidated damages, or any other additional sums to
which the Plaintiffs may be entitled to from the Defendant.
G.
The terms and provisions of this Consent Decree shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit of the Parties' successors and assigns.
CONCLUSION
The parties’ Amended Joint Motion for Entry of a Consent Decree, ECF No. 13, is
GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ complaint, ECF No. 1, is dismissed without prejudice.
Entered November 15, 2016
s/ Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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