Dallefeld v. The Clubs At River City, Inc.

Filing 67

ORDER Entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 10/16/17. The Court is granting in part and denying in part 56 Motion for Back Pay. The Plaintiff is entitled to $12,846.84 in back pay and benefits and $1,430.62 in prejudgment interest o n that amount. The Court denies the Plaintiff's Motion in so far as it seeks liquidated damages and front pay. The Court is denying 59 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and denying 62 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. As for the Plaintiff's request for attorney fees and costs, the Court hereby orders any Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, with supporting affidavit(s) to the Court within 14 days of entry of this Order. Motion due by 10/30/2017. Response to said Motion is due within 7 days.(DK, ilcd)

E-FILED

Monday, 16 October, 2017 01:57:56 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
JASON DALLEFELD,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:15-cv-01244-JES-JEH
v.
THE CLUBS AT RIVER CITY, INC.,
Defendant.

ORDER AND OPINION
Now before the Court is the Plaintiff, Jason Dallefeld’s, Motion for Back Pay,
Employment Benefits, Interest, Liquidated Damages, and Front Pay (“Motion for Back Pay”).
(D. 56). 1 The Defendant, The Clubs at River City, Inc. (“The Clubs”), filed a Response (D. 58),
as well as a Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. (D. 59). The Plaintiff has filed a
Reply to the Defendant’s Response (D. 64) and a Response to the Defendant’s Renewed Motion
for Judgment as a Matter of Law. (D. 66). In turn, the Plaintiff filed a Renewed Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law (D. 62) and the Defendant filed a Response (D. 65). For the
reasons set forth below, the parties’ Renewed Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law are
DENIED and the Plaintiff’s Motion for Back Pay is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
BACKGROUND
The Court and the parties have briefed the background in this case extensively. What
follows, are portions of the relevant facts pertinent to the motions presently before the Court.

1

Citations to the Docket in this case are abbreviated as “D. __.”

1

The Plaintiff filed the instant suit in June 2015. (D. 1). He alleged violations of the
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq.; Title I of the Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1211 et. seq.; and retaliatory discharge
under Illinois common law. (D. 1 at pg. 1). The Plaintiff’s FMLA claim alleged two violations:
interference with his rights under FMLA and retaliation for exercising those rights.
The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as its Director of Membership Sales. His annual
salary was $46,800. He aggravated a preexisting injury to his right knee while at work. The
Plaintiff’s medical treatment provider, Blair Rhode, declared the Plaintiff incapable of working
for the Defendant on March 26, 2014 due to his injury. The Plaintiff did not explicitly request
FMLA leave and the Defendant did not offer it to him at that time. Testimony later confirmed
that a Defendant employee was trained in FMLA employee rights, all employees were informed
of their FMLA rights at the time they were hired, and an FMLA summary was posted at the
Defendant premises. The Defendant did give the Plaintiff time off of work and paid him as if he
was working until April 13, 2014. During this time, the Plaintiff went to Florida and some of the
Defendant’s employees noticed pictures of him on the beach that were posted on Facebook.
On May 21, 2014, Rhode issued a note stating that the Plaintiff could return to work for
the Defendant on a modified light duty basis. The Plaintiff claims he immediately provided this
note to the Defendant. The Defendant denies ever receiving it. The parties met on June 2, 2014
and The Clubs owner told the Plaintiff to get his knee surgery done. There was no mention of
the Plaintiff being terminated.
Rhode later issued another note stating that the Plaintiff could no longer work for the
Defendant on June 4, 2014. On June 13, 2014, the Defendant mailed the Plaintiff a letter
terminating his employment. The letter was dated June 1, 2014. Rhode successfully performed

2

knee surgery on the Plaintiff on June 17, 2014. Rhode issued another modified light duty note
for the Plaintiff on August 13, 2014.
In August 2017, the Court presided over the jury trial. The parties stipulated that if the
Plaintiff prevailed, the Court would determine his entitlement to “lost compensation, the amount
of interest, whether liquidated damages should be reduced, front pay, and reasonable attorney
fees and costs of litigation.” (D. 45 at pg. 8). At trial, the Plaintiff testified that he could not
give tours of the Defendant’s facility upon his release to light duty. While giving tours was not
listed in his written job description, the Plaintiff stated that it was part of what made him good at
his job, selling membership to prospective clients. After the Plaintiff rested, the Defendant
orally moved for a directed verdict as a matter of law on all of the Plaintiff’s counts. The Court
dismissed the Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim but otherwise denied the Defendant’s motion.
Once the remaining evidence was presented, the Plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter
of law on all remaining counts. The Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion. Ultimately, the jury
found for the Plaintiff on his FMLA interference claim, and for the Defendant on the rest of the
counts. (D. 53).
The Plaintiff filed his Motion for Back Pay shortly after the trial concluded. (D. 56). He
asserts that he is entitled to a host of damages, in excess of $417,000. (D. 57 at pg. 19). The
Defendant responds that the Plaintiff cannot prevail on his FMLA claim as a matter of law, and
is therefore entitled to no damages. (D. 58 at pg. 2). Alternatively, the Defendant argues the
damages should be limited to the 10 days in which he was authorized to work light duty while
still employed by the Defendant. Id. at pg. 4. Both parties further assert that they are entitled to
a grant of their Renewed Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law. (D. 59; 62).

3

As an initial matter, the Court addresses the parties’ Renewed Motions for Judgment as a
Matter of Law. District courts may enter judgment against a party who has been fully heard on
an issue during a jury trial when “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (motion for judgment
as a matter of law), (b) (renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law). In deciding a Rule 50
motion, the Court construes the evidence strictly in favor of the party who prevailed before the
jury and examines the evidence only to determine whether the jury’s verdict could have
reasonably been based on that evidence. Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir.
2012). The Court is obliged to leave such judgments undisturbed unless the moving party can
show that no rational jury could have brought in a verdict against it. Hossack v. Floor Covering
Associates of Joliet, Inc., 492 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2007).
Neither of the parties in this case have convinced the Court that the jury’s verdicts were
irrational. As such, both parties’ Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law
(D. 59; D. 62) are DENIED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The FMLA entitles an employee to take up to twelve weeks of leave during a twelvemonth period for various reasons, including a serious health condition which makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of their job. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Once the
employee returns from qualified FMLA leave, the employer must reinstate the employee to their
same position, or an equivalent, without loss of seniority. 29 U.S.C. 2614. Section 2615(a)(1)
makes it unlawful for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the
attempt to exercise, any right provided under” the Act. A violation of an employee’s FMLA
rights entitles the employee to damages. 29 U.S.C. § 2617.

4

If an employee is either unwilling or unable to return to work at the expiration of their
FLMA leave, however, an employer can lawfully terminate their employment and the employee
is not entitled to damages. Franzen v. Ellis Corp., 543 F.3d 420, 426 (7th Cir. 2008). As the
court explained in Franzen:
An employee may be entitled to both back pay and front pay as a remedy for losses
flowing from an employer’s interference with his substantive rights under the
FMLA; however, section 2617 provides no relief unless the plaintiff can prove that
he was prejudiced by the violation. We have held that a plaintiff may not collect
damages for periods of time in which he otherwise would have been unable to work
for the company. An employee also has no right to reinstatement—and, therefore,
damages—if, at the end of his twelve-week period of leave, he is either unable or
unwilling to perform the essential functions of his job.
Id. (citations omitted).
In his Motion for Back Pay, the Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to damages under the
FMLA. (D. 57 at pp. 2-3). Specifically, he argues that he is entitled to $147,414.46 in back
pay/lost wages and employment benefits (Id. at pp. 3-7), $17,589.63 in prejudgment interest (Id.
at pp. 7-9), $165,004.08 in liquidated damages (Id. at pp. 9-16), and $87,371.76 in front pay (Id.
at pp. 16-18). The Plaintiff makes his backward-looking calculations based on the assumption
that he is entitled to income from May 21, 2014—the day he alleges he presented the Defendant
with a light duty return to work slip—until August 17, 2017—the day the jury rendered a verdict
in his favor on the FMLA interference count. Id. at 5. The Defendant argues, in relevant part,
that “if the jury concluded that the Clubs interfered with Dallefeld’s rights under the FMLA by
refusing to reinstate him on light duty, its verdict cannot be upheld, as a matter of law.” (D. 58 at
pg. 2).
ANALYSIS
The extent of the Plaintiff’s damages in this case is a complicated equation that is highly
speculative. The Defendant failed to bring up FMLA leave at a few pivotal times. As a result,
5

the Court is faced with the nearly impossible task of deciding, in hindsight, what would have
happened if the Defendant had offered the Plaintiff FMLA leave and what the Plaintiff’s
response would have been.
The jury in this case found that the Defendant interfered with the Plaintiff’s rights under
the FMLA. This establishes that he was prejudiced in some way by an FMLA violation.
Therefore, the benefit of the doubt on that front goes to the Plaintiff. Conversely, the jury found
against the Plaintiff on all of the other counts. To maintain an FMLA interference cause of
action, a plaintiff must show: (1) he was eligible for protection under the FMLA; (2) he was
covered by the FMLA; (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) he provided sufficient
notice of his intent to take leave; and (5) the employer denied him leave to which he was entitled.
Ridings v. Riverside Medical Center, 537 F.3d 755, 761 (7th Cir. 2008); see also (D. 50 at pg.
26). The jury in this case found that the Plaintiff successfully demonstrated all five of these
elements. (D. 53).
Determining the twelve weeks is more problematic. The record is clear that the Plaintiff
was off work from March 26, 2014 to May 21, 2014 when he attempted to return to work on
modified or light duty. He would have left work again on June 4, 2014. During this time period,
there were a couple of times the Defendant could have offered the Plaintiff the opportunity to
take FMLA leave for as long as 12 weeks. The first time was on March 26, 2014, when the
Plaintiff first stopped working. To the Defendant’s credit, they paid the Plaintiff until April 13,
2014, even though they did not have to and would not have been required to do so under the
FMLA. On April 13, 2014, when the Defendant chose to stop paying the Plaintiff, they also
could have offered him FMLA leave. Finally, on June 2, 2014, when the Defendant met with the
Plaintiff and told him to have his surgery, they could have explained his rights under the FMLA.

6

In hindsight, if the Defendant had seized upon any of these opportunities, it would have been a
more cost effective means of doing business.
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff is entitled to no damages because he could not
perform the essential functions of his job within 12 weeks of taking time off of work, the time he
was entitled to take under the FMLA. (D. 58 at pg. 2). The Plaintiff returned to work with some
restrictions. In fact, there is no such thing as light duty under the FMLA and an employer can
lawfully terminate someone that is unable to perform their duties at the end of their FMLA leave.
James v. Hyatt Regency Chicago, 707 F.3d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 2013). The evidence supports
some of the Defendant’s argument, but the Defendant speculates on the start date of the
Plaintiff’s leave time. This is an unknown entity due to the Defendant’s error
The undisputed facts demonstrate that by June 4, 2014 at the latest, when Rhode issued a
second off-duty notice for him, the Defendant should have expressly offered the Plaintiff a
chance to utilize FMLA leave, in compliance with the statute. See Burnett v. LFW, Inc., 472
F.3d 471, 480 (7th Cir. 2006). The Defendant did not. In light of this, the Court finds June 4,
2014 the start date of the FMLA leave and finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to 12 weeks of back
pay and benefits. Accordingly, the Plaintiff would have been entitled to be off of work until
approximately September 4, 2014. The record establishes that Rhode issued another light duty
slip for the Plaintiff to return to work with restrictions on August 13, 2014. There is nothing in
the record, however, indicating whether or not the Plaintiff would have been able to fully
perform his duties by September 4.
There are a couple of complications during this time period. The Plaintiff filed for, and
started collecting, unemployment in late May 2014 and the Defendant terminated the Plaintiff
after telling him to have the surgery. As if these events never occurred, Rhode released the

7

Plaintiff back to work on August 13, 2014 with restrictions. Although the Plaintiff argues these
restrictions would not have kept him from performing his prior duties, his testimony suggests
otherwise. While he was hired for sales, he would at times also work as the manager on duty.
This involved giving tours of The Clubs, which the Plaintiff could not do while on light duty.
While the FMLA itself does not entitle employees to pay, the Defendant’s violation, in
light of the jury verdict, does entitle the Plaintiff to damages. 29 U.S.C. § 2617. The Plaintiff’s
request for $147,414.46 is excessive and does not account for the totality of the circumstances.
Using the Plaintiff’s front pay and benefits calculations, but limiting him to 12 weeks of pay, the
Plaintiff is entitled to $12,846.84. This figure was reached by utilizing the Plaintiff’s figures of
$128.22 per day in back pay (multiplied by12 weeks, $128.22 x 84 = $10,770.48) and $692.12 in
health insurance benefits paid by the Defendant (multiplied by three months, $692.12 x 3 =
$2,076.36). (D. 57 at pp. 5-6). 2
The Plaintiff is also entitled to prejudgment interest on that amount. This totals
$1,430.62. Again, the Court reaches this figure by utilizing the Plaintiff’s provided calculations:
the average prime rate (3.48%) over a period of approximately three years—3.2 (June 4, 2014 to
August 17, 2017). Id. at 8. The full equation is $12,846.84 multiplied by 3.48% ($447.07),
which is then multiplied by 3.2 years, for a total of $1,430.62.
The Court further finds that the Plaintiff is not entitled to liquidated damages. This
would require a finding that the Defendant acted unreasonably and in bad faith. Holder v.
Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 751 F.3d 486, 498 (7th Cir. 2014). While the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the Plaintiff on his FMLA interference claim, there was no evidence presented at trial
suggesting that the Defendant acted unreasonably or in bad faith. Rather, both parties

2

The Court does not find that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the benefits of cell phone costs, vacation pay, gym
membership, or optional dental insurance.

8

acknowledge that upon hiring, the Plaintiff was made aware of his FMLA rights. He also
testified that his supervisor encouraged him to get the surgery and that she was a decent person.
According to the Plaintiff, they had a good working relationship and he did not believe she
would do anything to intentionally harm him. The Defendant paid the Plaintiff for a period,
March 26, 2014 to April 16, 2014, while he was off work. This was done even after learning that
he went on vacation in Florida during that timeframe.
The jury found there was no retaliation due to his firing. The Plaintiff testified that he
thought the confusion between the parties might have been due to the lack of communication
between them at the time. Although the Plaintiff provided the Defendant with sufficient notice,
the failure of the Defendant to sit down with him and explain the FMLA, under the
circumstances, does not rise to the level of bad faith.
As stated above, the parties’ arguments on damages are speculative. This includes the
Plaintiff’s remaining request for front pay. There is no guarantee that he would have been rehired after he returned from 12 weeks of FMLA leave, whenever it would have started. Nothing
in the record indicates he could return to his previous position. As such, it is far too speculative
to assert that the Plaintiff would have maintained his employment with the Defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Back Pay (D. 56) is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. The Plaintiff is entitled to $12,846.84 in back pay and benefits and
$1,430.62 in prejudgment interest on that amount. This fully satisfies the Plaintiff’s claim for
damages. The Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s Motion in so far as it seeks liquidated damages and
front pay. Additionally, both parties’ Renewed Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law (D. 59;
D. 62) are also DENIED.

9

As for the Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees and costs, the Court hereby orders any
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, with supporting affidavit(s), to the Court within 14 days of
entry of this order. Response to said Motion is due within 7 days.
It is so ordered.
Entered on October 16, 2017

_s/James E. Shadid_________
James E. Shadid
Chief United States District Judge

10