Broadstone et al v. Sherman's Place, Inc.
Filing
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ORDER denying 5 the Defendant's Motion to Sever for Misjoinder. See Written Order. Entered by Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley on 1/15/2016. (KZ, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 15 January, 2016 01:54:20 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
LAURA BROADSTONE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 1:15-cv-01453-JES-JEH
SHERMAN’S PLACE, INC.,
Defendant.
Order
Now before the Court is the Defendant Sherman’s Place, Inc.’s Motion to
Sever for Misjoinder and to Require Individual Suits (Doc. 5) and the Plaintiffs’
Response (Doc. 10) thereto.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is
DENIED.
I
On November 5, 2015, Plaintiffs Laura Broadstone, Julie Boesch, and Renee
Boesch filed their lawsuit against Defendant Sherman’s Place, Inc. (Sherman’s).
Count I of the Complaint details the events surrounding Laura Broadstone’s
employment as salesperson at the Sherman’s store in Peoria, Illinois. 1
Broadstone alleges that she complained to the store manager, Tony Hnilicka
(Hnilicka), of sex discrimination in payment of commissions, and that she
complained of sex discrimination to the assistant manager, Dan Stein.
Broadstone also alleges that she was told by Hnilicka and Renee Boesch that her
employment was terminated because she had sold a clearance mattress falsely
telling the customer it had never been used. Count 2 of the Complaint details the
There are 114 numbered paragraphs in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint which is 46 pages long. The Court has
reviewed the entirety of the Complaint, but it will not re-state here all of the detailed factual allegations
included therein.
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events surrounding Julie Boesch’s employment as salesperson at the Sherman’s
store in Peoria, Illinois. Julie Boesch alleges that she complained various times to
Jim Torok, Sales Manager and her supervisor, that male salespersons were being
treated more favorably than she as the only female salesperson. She alleges that
Paul Sherman telephoned her on February 9, 2015 and told her she was
terminated for breaking “Core Values.” Count 3 of the Complaint details the
events surrounding Renee Boesch’s employment as Human Resources Manager
at Sherman’s in Peoria, Illiniois from August 28, 2010 to January 29, 2015. She
alleges that Paul Sherman told her that he would have to demote her several
levels in the company if she were ever to date a Sherman’s employee again after
she ended her engagement to the Sherman’s Electronics Merchandiser (David
Weiss) who was also Paul Sherman’s nephew; such a policy was never applied to
males. She also alleges that because she felt unsafe at work and after the bad
evaluations by Paul Sherman, she resigned her position.
Each of the Plaintiffs bring their claims pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
2000e, et seq. for sex discrimination and retaliation for complaining of sex
discrimination. Plaintiffs Broadstone and Julie Boesch also bring claims pursuant
to the Illinois Sales Representative Act, 820 ILCS 120/3. All three of the Plaintiffs
request compensatory damages and attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs.
Plaintiffs Broadstone and Julie Boesch also request treble damages pursuant to
the Illinois Sales Representative Act.
In its Motion to Sever for Misjoinder, the Defendant argues that the
Plaintiffs’ claims do not satisfy either of the two requirements for permissive
joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) and that joinder of their
claims will not increase judicial economy or avoid prejudice. Accordingly, the
Defendant requests that the Court remedy the Plaintiffs’ misjoinder by severing
the claims of Plaintiffs Julie Boesch and Renee Boesch, assigning them new
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docket numbers, leaving the first-named Plaintiff Laura Broadstone as the only
plaintiff in this case, and requiring all of the Plaintiffs to file separate amended
complaints containing only their claims.
II
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 provides, in relevant part, that persons
may join in one action as plaintiffs if: 1) they assert any right to relief jointly,
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and 2) any
question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action. FED. R.
CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(A), (B). Misjoinder occurs when the parties seeking joinder fail to
satisfy either of the two requirements set forth in Rule 20(a)(1). Hawkins v. Groot
Industries, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 226, 229-30 (N.D. Ill. 2002). “Federal policy favors
joinder . . . .” Id. at 230.
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“In ascertaining whether a particular factual situation constitutes a single
transaction or occurrence for purposes of Rule 20, a case-by-case approach is
generally pursued because no hard and fast rules have been established.” Bailey
v. Northern Trust Co., 196 F.R.D. 513, 515 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (internal citations
omitted). Courts often consider the following factors to determine whether the
requirement of Rule 20(a)(1)(A) is met:
The time period during which the alleged acts occurred, whether the
acts of discrimination are related, whether there were differing types
of adverse employment actions, whether more than one type of
discrimination is alleged, whether the same supervisors were
involved, whether employees worked in the same department,
whether employees were at different geographical locations, and
whether a company-wide policy is alleged.
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McDowell v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 690, 694 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(internal citations omitted).
Here, the Defendant argues that the time period of each alleged occurrence
is different, that the individuals allegedly responsible for each of the adverse
actions complained of by the Plaintiffs are different, that the events underlying
each of the adverse actions complained of by the Plaintiffs are different, and that
the witnesses required to testify vary significantly for each Plaintiffs’ claims.
Thus, the Defendant argues that there is no logical connection between the
alleged events and so they do not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences. The Plaintiffs counter that the standard
for joinder of parties is a liberal one construed as broadly as possible to promote
judicial economy.
The Defendant is not incorrect that there are some differences between
each of the Plaintiff’s claims. However, the differences are not so distinct or
significant to preclude a finding that the Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. A span of little
more than twelve months is involved, and the underlying events of two of the
Plaintiffs’ claims happened within less than a month of each other. While two of
the Plaintiffs allege that they were terminated by the Defendant and one alleges
she resigned from her position, they all allege sex discrimination and retaliation
for complaining of sex discrimination based upon events that occurred within
twelve of each other.
Moreover, there is overlap between the individuals
involved in the events leading up to Broadstone’s and Julie Boesch’s
terminations and Renee Boesch’s resignation.
For instance, Assistant Sales
Manager Jim Torok is identified as playing a role in the underlying events
pertaining to Plaintiffs Broadstone and Julie Boesch, and President Paul Sherman
is identified as playing a role in the underlying events pertaining to Plaintiffs
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Julie Boesch and Renee Boesch. Though the supervisors that were involved in
each instance were not exactly the same, the same individuals are identified in
more than one of the Plaintiffs’ claims. 2
An inescapable fact in this case is that the Plaintiffs allege incidents that
occurred at just one location – the Sherman’s store in Peoria, Illinois, and there is
currently nothing in the record to suggest that the store was so large, or had such
different departments of workers and supervisors as to render each Plaintiff’s
claim a separate transaction or occurrence. To the contrary, as the Court has
already discussed, the same individuals reappear in different counts of the
Complaint, two of the Plaintiffs held the position of salesperson, and all of the
Plaintiffs worked at the same geographical location. For these reasons, it is not
fatal to the Plaintiffs’ joinder that there are different alleged particular events that
led to two of the Plaintiffs’ terminations and the other Plaintiff’s resignation. The
Court therefore finds that at this stage of the case, each of the Plaintiff’s claims
arises out of “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A).
2
As for the second requirement of Rule 20, that there exist any question of
law or fact common to all plaintiffs that will arise in the action, the Defendant
again argues that the Plaintiffs’ claims involve alleged discrete acts by
Sherman’s, undertaken by different individuals during different time periods
and the only similarity the Plaintiffs’ claims share is that they all allege unlawful
gender discrimination and retaliation. The Defendant further argues that the
Complaint alleges violations of the Illinois Sales Representative Act for only two
of the three Plaintiffs, thereby also precluding a finding of a common question of
2
Assistant Manager Dan Stein is identified in both Broadstone’s Count 1 and Julie Boesch’s Count 2.
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law or fact as to all the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs argue, as they do in regard to the
first requirement of Rule 20, for the liberal application of Rule 20 and that the
second requirement is satisfied where they allege Sherman’s discriminated
against them in the workplace and terminated their employment when they
complained.
The Court finds that the second requirement of Rule 20 is satisfied given
that all three of the Plaintiffs allege sex discrimination and retaliation against the
same Defendant based upon alleged underlying events which involved common
individuals in the same geographical location during the same general time
period. The Defendant’s additional argument that the inclusion of claims for
violations of the Illinois Sales Representatives Act by only two of the three
Plaintiffs precludes a commonality finding as to all the Plaintiffs goes nowhere;
Rule 20(a)(1)(B) only requires that there be any question of law or fact common to
all plaintiffs that will arise in the action.
III
Finally, the Defendant argues that the Court may consider, in addition to
the two requirements of Rule 20(a), whether joinder would prejudice any party
or result in needless delay. In Chavez v. Illinois State Police, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals explained that the discretion allowed a trial court concerning
the joinder of parties under Rule 20 also includes “other relevant factors in a case
in order to determine whether the permissive joinder of a party will comport
with the principles of fundamental fairness.” 251 F.3d 612, 632 (7th Cir. 2001)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, if joinder will create
prejudice, expense, or delay a court may deny the motion.
Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
Here, the Court finds that at this stage of the litigation, severance of the
individual Plaintiffs’ claims into three separate lawsuits would lead to judicial
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inefficiency and potentially cause additional expense to the parties. There is
sufficient overlap between the alleged underlying events that there will almost
certainly be overlap in the discovery that is conducted, particularly in regard to
the witnesses to be deposed and the information to be gathered regarding
employment at Sherman’s.
The Court notes that the Defendant’s Motion to Sever for Misjoinder
presents a close question, but in ruling as it does, the Court is guided by the
notion that the tests of Rule 20(a) are “to be read as broadly as possible whenever
doing so is likely to promote judicial economy.” 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, RICHARD L. MARCUS & ADAM N. STEINMAN,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1653 (3d ed. 2015); see also United Mine Workers
of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (“Under the Rules, the impulse is
toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness
to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged”);
Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The purpose of Rule
20(a) in permitting joinder in a single suit of persons who have separate claims,
albeit growing out of a single incident, transaction, or series of events, is to
enable economies in litigation . . . .”).
Insofar as the Defendant’s expressed
concerns over the judicial inefficiency of three mini-trials within one action and
the risk of confusion and prejudice towards Sherman’s should this case proceed
to a single trial involving all three of the Plaintiffs’ claims, there are safeguards
available to the Court and the parties to mitigate any unfairness to the parties
that may result from the denial of the Defendant’s Motion to Sever for
Misjoinder. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20(b) (“The court may issue orders--including
an order for separate trials--to protect a party against embarrassment, delay,
expense, or other prejudice that arises from including a person against whom the
party asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against the party”). Lastly, the
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parties are given leave to file a properly supported motion for separate trials
pursuant to whichever applicable, suitable authority the parties so choose at the
appropriate time.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s Motion to Sever for Misjoinder
and to Require Individual Suits (Doc. 5) is DENIED.
It is so ordered.
Entered on January 15, 2016.
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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