Broadstone et al v. Sherman's Place, Inc.
ORDER AND OPINION entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 11/30/2017. For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion 30 for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Julie Boesch is GRANTED. SEE FULL WRITTEN ORDER AND OPINION. (JS, ilcd)
Thursday, 30 November, 2017 04:17:00 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LAURA BROADSTONE, JULIE
BOESCH, and RENEE BOESCH,
SHERMAN’S PLACE, INC.,
Case No. 15-1453
ORDER AND OPINION
Now before the Court is Defendant’s Motion  for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff
Julie Boesch. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion  is GRANTED.
Defendant, Sherman’s Place, Inc. (“Sherman’s”), is a corporation in the business of
selling appliances, electronics, furniture, and mattresses. Sherman’s has stores in Peoria, Normal,
and Peru, Illinois. Plaintiff Julie Boesch 2, the twin sister of co-Plaintiff Renee Boesch, began
working for Sherman’s on March 21, 2014 as a commission-based sales professional. Boesch
excelled at her job; she was one of four salespeople to ever exceed $200,000 in monthly sales,
and she consistently ranked in the top five salespeople each month. Her success led to her
inclusion on Sherman’s lifestyle team—a select group of salespeople authorized and trained to
sell high-end appliances that generated greater commissions—in September 2014, after working
for Sherman’s for about six months. In fact, Boesch was placed on the lifestyle team faster than
any other salesperson at Sherman’s. Boesch was also top-ranked in Sherman’s Satmetrix system,
The following facts have been distilled from Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts (“SOF”).
For the remainder of this Opinion, “Boesch” will refer to Plaintiff Julie Boesch.
which was an online survey system that allowed customers to rate Sherman’s salespeople. SOF
Boesch’s relationship with other Sherman’s employees was more complicated. In
November 2014, fellow salesperson Kevin Gualandi told Boesch to “shut the fuck up” after they
had a disagreement about another coworker. She reported the incident to one of her supervisors,
Jim Torok, immediately, and the incident was resolved after Gualandi apologized. Boesch also
felt she lost a sale when salespersons Joe Moon and Tim Kipfer made an insensitive comment to
one of Boesch’s customers. Paul Sherman told Moon and Kipfer not to do it again, but Boesch
felt that they should have been disciplined. On January 1, 2015, Boesch had a dispute with
salesperson Dustin Leon about two large sales. According to Boesch, Leon had a reputation for
stealing sales, and five other (male) salespeople had also complained about Leon’s habits. The
following business day, Boesch and Leon sat down with supervisors Tony Hnilicka and Jim
Torok to discuss the situation, which was resolved when Leon apologized and the commission
was split between the two. SOF ¶¶ 17–25.
Toward the end of 2014, salesperson Justin Garza accused Boesch of stealing his
Tempurpedic sale, which was one of the highest commission items of all Sherman’s products.
Boesch reported the situation to Torok immediately and Torok spoke to Garza about it. Torok did
not require Boesch to split the commission, and she and Garza remained friends afterwards. Also
in 2014, Boesch spoke to others at Sherman’s about what she perceived to be unfair treatment of
Sherman’s salespeople generally, including 100% commission-based wages, not being paid for
training, deductions from their commissions, and not getting consistent lunch breaks. SOF ¶¶
Renee Boesch’s employment with Sherman’s, her relationship with David Weiss, and her
resignation are recounted in a separate opinion and will only be discussed here as necessary. Julie
Boesch testified that she had no issues with other salespeople until approximately two to three
months before her termination, when “[t]hings started to speed up for [her]” and became
uncomfortable after Renee and Weiss ended their relationship. Immediately after Renee’s
resignation as the Human Resources Manager on January 29, 2015, Boesch missed multiple days
of work because of a back injury. 3 Shortly after she returned to work, she became upset about an
interaction with a customer, turned red, and went into Sherman’s kitchen exclaiming that she
“just want[s] to go the fuck home right now.” SOF ¶¶ 28–36.
On February 9, 2015, Paul Sherman and Tasha Scott (Sherman’s furniture buyer) met
with Boesch, expressed concern over her attendance and outburst, and explained their
expectations going forward as documented in an employee transaction form. 4 Boesch felt that the
meeting deviated from protocol because her actual managers were not involved and because Paul
Sherman did not usually insert himself in sales matters. Rather, Boesch believed that she
received the employee transaction form because of what happened between Renee and Weiss. 5
SOF ¶¶ 37–39.
Sometime after 5:00 p.m. on February 9, 2015, Boesch entered the Human Resources loft
and took a blue folder from the Human Resources desk. 6 When John Willis learned that Boesch
had taken a folder, he made her give it back. 7 Willis brought Paul Sherman the folder and
Plaintiff lists Defendant’s 35th statement of fact as both undisputed and disputed.
Plaintiff lists Defendant’s 37th statement of fact as disputed, but simply repeats the asserted fact and offers
Plaintiff lists Defendant’s 39th statement of fact as disputed, but simply repeats the asserted fact and offers
Plaintiff lists Defendant’s 40th statement of fact as disputed, but simply repeats the asserted fact and offers
Plaintiff neither admits nor denies Defendant’s 41st statement of fact.
notified him that Boesch stole personnel records from the Human Resources office immediately
after Willis left work for the evening. 8 The folder contained personnel records for Bob
Fitzgeralds, a former salesperson. 9 Paul Sherman sent Boesch home and told her he would call
her the next day after he thought the matter over. 10 Paul Sherman called Boesch on February 10,
2015, and terminated her employment because of her theft of confidential personnel records.
SOF ¶¶ 40–46.
Plaintiff’s Response contains 105 purported additional material facts. Doc. 40, at 10–31;
AMF ¶¶ 1–105. Of the 105 purported additional material facts, paragraphs 1 through 77 are
wholly unrelated to Julie Boesch. Paragraphs 78 through 96 merely repeat the factual allegations
in Defendant’s Statement of Facts. The remaining paragraphs contain a medley of immaterial
facts, facts repeated from Defendant’s statement of facts, and inadmissible hearsay. Counsel’s
willful failure to comply with the Local Rules regarding summary judgment is discussed in more
Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows, through “materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations … admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” that “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In resolving a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he court has one task
and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material
d Plaintiff lists Defendant’s 42nd statement of fact as disputed, but simply repeats the asserted fact and offers
Plaintiff lists Defendant’s 43rd statement of fact as disputed, but simply repeats the asserted fact and offers
Plaintiff lists Defendant’s 44th statement of fact as disputed, but simply repeats the asserted fact and offers
dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.
In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must “set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986). When presented with a motion for summary judgment, the court must
construe the record “in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and avoid the temptation to
decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely true.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770
(7th Cir. 2003). If the evidence, however, is “merely colorable, or is not significantly probative
or merely raises ‘some metaphysical doubt as the material facts,’ summary judgment may be
granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249–50. Thus, in order to overcome the undisputed facts set
forth in a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot rest on the allegations in
his complaint but must point to affidavits, depositions or other evidence of an admissible sort
that a genuine dispute of material fact exists between the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2);
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996).
(1) Plaintiff’s Counsel Failed to Comply with Local Rule 7.1(D)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the Central District of
Illinois both prescribe “rules.” A rule is “a principle of guidance that has a close relation to
individual conduct and method, or a desire for order and discipline within a group. Typically it
implies restriction for the sake of achieving an articulable end, such as conformity to a standard
or uniformity of procedure.” Rule, Bryan A. Garner, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE.
The committees responsible for promulgating these directives could have instead implemented
the “Federal Suggestions for Civil Procedure” or the “Local Recommendations for the Central
District of Illinois,” but they chose the term “rule” instead. These rules are thus mandatory; they
are meant to be followed.
Plaintiff’s counsel has failed to follow these rules. For example, Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b)
requires that the response to the opposing party’s statement of undisputed material facts contain
separate subsections indicating undisputed material facts, disputed material facts, disputed
immaterial facts, undisputed immaterial facts, and additional material facts. Plaintiff’s Response,
on the other hand, does not identify which facts are immaterial. Plaintiff counsel’s failure to
comply with the Local Rules was also willful: counsel has been admonished by this Court
multiple times for violating the same rule, yet knowingly chose to violate the rule again. See,
e.g., McMahon v. Dunlap Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 323, No. 15-1269, 2017 WL 1319812, at *3
(C.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2017); Troeger v. Minnesota Life Ins. Co., 200 F. Supp. 3d 745, 748 (C.D. Ill.
2016); Frakes v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, No. 12-1329, 2015 WL 5050256, at *1 (C.D. Ill.
Aug. 26, 2015), aff'd, 872 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2017).
Counsel’s failure to follow the Local Rules extends beyond Rule 7.1(D)’s labeling
requirements. For example, Defendant’s 35th statement of fact provides, “[i]mmediately
following her sister’s resignation as the Human Resources Manager on January 29, 2015, Boesch
missed multiple days of work.” Doc. 30, at 7. Plaintiff lists this as both undisputed and disputed,
and states, “Plaintiff denies. She missed work after her sister resigned because she threw her
back out, contacted her managers as required by Shermans policy, and took time off work. She
tried to go back to work too soon, threw it out again, and had to take more days off.” Doc. 40, at
6. What, then, does Plaintiff deny? Nonsensical responses such as these are not “even remotely
helpful to resolving the issues succinctly framed by Rule 56.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp.,
24 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1994). Nor is counsel’s response to statement 35 an aberration; the
responses to statements 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, and 44 also list facts as disputed immediately before
repeating the statement, often nearly verbatim, along with multiple paragraphs of supplemental
The section of Plaintiff’s Response containing 105 purported additional material facts
also deserves discussion. See Doc. 40, at 10–31; AMF ¶¶ 1–105. As previously stated, the 105
purported additional material facts, paragraphs 1 through 77 are wholly unrelated to Julie
Boesch, and paragraphs 78 through 96 largely repeat the factual allegations in Defendant’s
Statement of Facts. Plaintiff’s counsel prefaces this section of the Response with an
“Introductory Note” explaining that the additional material facts are the same as those contained
in Plaintiff Broadstone’s Response (Doc. 37), because “Julie Boesch is relying upon the same
evidence of top female salespersons, Laura Broadstone, Julie Boesch, and Gina Giarrante, being
terminated for pretextual reasons and being treated differently than men to avoid any contention
of waiver.” Doc. 40, at 10. “Whether evidence of the treatment of other employees is “relevant
depends on a variety of factors, including ‘how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff's
circumstances and theory of the case.’ ” Graham v. Town of Normal, No. 07-CV-1284, 2010 WL
582608, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2010) (quoting Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520,
529 (7th Cir. 2008)). While the Court does not fault counsel for trying to preserve an argument,
wholesale copying and pasting of 105 purported additional material facts from one response to
the next is not the proper way of doing so, especially when the circumstances and actors
involved in Plaintiff Broadstone and Boesch’s termination were different.
Finally, the argument section of Plaintiff’s Response fails to comply with the Local Rules
because it “begin[s] with pretext.” Doc. 40, at 32. Under Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(c), nonmovants
must, “[w]ith or without additional citations to authorities, respond directly to the argument in
the motion for summary judgment, for example, by explaining any disagreement with the
movant’s explanation for each point of law, why a point of law does not apply to the undisputed
material facts, why its application does not entitle movant to relief or why, for other reasons,
summary judgment should not be granted.” By beginning with pretext, counsel failed to address
Defendant’s arguments regarding a prima facie case, which Plaintiff has the burden of
establishing before pretext is even examined. See David v. Bd. of Trustees of Cmty. Coll. Dist.
No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 225 (7th Cir. 2017).
This Court has previously remarked on counsel’s shortcomings with respect to summary
judgment responses in Frakes.
This failure to follow the Local Rules requires the Court to do an extensive
scouring of the record to determine if these are actual disputed facts or simply
undisputed facts with a supplemental explanation from Plaintiff’s counsel, which
would be more appropriately laid out in Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional
Material Facts. While there may be some legitimate rationale to Plaintiff’s
counsel’s actions, using this method as an attempt to survive summary judgment
is not appropriate. When Plaintiff unnecessarily lists facts that are undisputed as
disputed or states that a fact is “admitted, but its not” it makes it difficult for the
Court to identify which facts are actually in dispute. Accordingly, the Court will
not consider Plaintiff’s supplementary explanation to any admitted fact. In
addition, the Court will deem admitted any facts Plaintiff stated are “admitted, but
Frakes v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, No. 12-1329, 2015 WL 5050256, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 26,
2015), aff'd, 872 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2017). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit made the following
Even if Local Rule 7.1(D) was merely a “requirement of form” Frakes would
have no recourse. A “local rule imposing a requirement of form must not be
enforced in a way that causes a party to lose any right because of a nonwillful
failure to comply.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(2). Here, Frakes's attorney's failure to
comply was willful, and the district court's enforcement of its local rules did not
cause Frakes to lose any rights. The district court noted that Frakes's counsel was
admonished by the court for violating the same local rule in earlier summary
judgment briefings, yet counsel knowingly chose to violate the rule again.
Further, Frakes was given a fair opportunity to oppose summary judgment. Any
failure to properly support her argument with evidence was her own doing.
Frakes v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 872 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2017). Although counsel’s
failure to follow the Local Rules extends well beyond the summary judgment response in
Frakes, the Court recognizes that the Seventh Circuit’s decision was issued after the responses in
the instant case were filed. For that reason, the Court will attempt to look past the deficiencies in
the Response and analyze whether a genuine dispute of fact exists requiring a trial. Future
responses that fail to comply with the Local Rules will not receive the same benefit. 11
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with
respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII covers “two types forms of employment
discrimination: so-called discrete acts of discrimination, such as termination, failure to promote,
denial of transfer, or refusal to hire, … and acts that create a hostile workplace, which are
different in kind from discrete acts, and do not require tangible adverse employment actions.”
Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
Discrimination claims based on discrete acts are often analyzed under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting approach, though the legal standard is “simply whether the evidence
would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion,
or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Ortiz v.
Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). Under the McDonnell Douglas
approach, “the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing that (1) she is a member of a
protected class, (2) she performed reasonably on the job in accord with her employer[’s]
Counsel knows better—he is an experienced litigator who has practiced for over 30 years in federal courts. The
Court has time and time-again granted him some leeway. Counsel is admonished to perform to his capabilities.
legitimate expectations, (3) despite her reasonable performance, she was subjected to an adverse
employment action, and (4) similarly situated employees outside of her protected class were
treated more favorably by the employer.” David v. Bd. of Trustees of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508,
846 F.3d 216, 225 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). “If the plaintiff satisfies that
burden, then the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action, at which point the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to submit evidence that
the employer's explanation is pretextual.” Id.
Here, it is undisputed that Julie Boesch was a member of a protected class (female).
However, Defendant argues that Boesch cannot establish that she was meeting her employer’s
legitimate expectations because she was terminated for taking documents from the human
resources area, which was contrary to Sherman’s core values. Doc 30, at 11. Plaintiff’s Response
recites the McDonnell Douglas framework to establish a prima facie case, but her argument
“begin[s] with pretext” rather than addressing Defendant’s argument directly. Doc. 40, at 31–32.
Nonetheless, the gist of Plaintiff’s argument is that “[s]he was fired for retrieving a folder—
which if confidential would have been in a file cabinet—that contained information on the
departure from employment of an employee which was not confidential.” Id. at 32. Plaintiff does
not attempt to define the term “confidential,” but she does cite to Paul Sherman’s deposition
testimony to support her argument. Paul Sherman testified, in relevant part, as follows:
Q. Okay. How did Julie Boesch’s employment come to your attention on her last
A. I was notified that she had stolen personnel records.
Q. Who told you that?
A. John Willis.
Q. Did he bring to you the records that were—he believed to be stolen?
Q. Was it in a file folder?
Q. And was it one page if you recall?
A. It was very few pages. It could have been a single page. It could have been
only a few.
Q. Do you remember the contents of what was in there?
A. It was regarding a former employee, some paperwork relating to a man named
Bob Fitzjerrells [sic] who was also a salesperson.
Q. Had he transferred or left employment?
A. Both actually. He had transferred from one store to another and resigned.
Q. Was there anything confidential about the fact that the employee had left
employment and been transferred?
A. Are you asking if it was common knowledge that he had left the company?
A. It was not confidential.
Q. And you looked at the—at some point, you looked at the file; and did you
make a decision on Julie Boesch’s employment then, or did you wait until you
talked to her?
A. I did not make a decision on her employment until after I had asked her to go
home that day.
Q. After you talked with John Willis, did you and John Willis have a conversation
with Julie Boesch?
Q. And the subject of the conversation was this file folder?
Q. And do you recall what you said to her and what she said to you?
A. She said that she did not know what was in it and thought it was Renee’s
Q. And what did you say?
A. That that is not credible and that she would have gone into personnel record
files to obtain that.
Q. Did she have a response?
A. Nothing that I recall.
Q. Did she ever tell you that Renee had told her she had printed out some hard
copies of her resume and asked her to get them?
A. I don’t recall the specifics beyond her mentioning that, “I went to get her
Q. Would there have been anything inappropriate if there had been hard copies of
Renee’s resume, a group of them, for Julie to pick them up for her?
A. Yes. For an employee to go into the HR office and take out files without
requesting permission is unacceptable.
Doc. 30-2, at 11–12 (Sherman Dep. at 12–19).
Plaintiff cannot establish that she was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations for
two reasons. First, Plaintiff’s argument that the information in the folder was not confidential
misstates Sherman’s testimony. Sherman testified that the fact that a former employee was no
longer with the company was not confidential; he did not state that Sherman’s personnel records
were not confidential. Second, whether or not personnel records were confidential is immaterial.
Sherman testified that it was unacceptable “for an employee to go into the HR office and take out
files without requesting permission.” Sherman Dep. at 19. Plaintiff has failed to rebut this point
entirely. Because no dispute exists that Plaintiff took personnel files from the HR office without
permission, or that such action violated Defendant’s legitimate expactions, she has failed to
establish the second element of a prima facie case of discrimination.
For the sake of completeness, the above reasoning also precludes Plaintiff from
establishing or rebutting the remaining elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Again,
Plaintiff cannot establish the third element because she did not meet her employer’s legitimate
expectations. Nor can she establish that similarly situated employees outside of her protected
class were treated more favorably; Boesch has not identified a single comparator who stole or
took files from the HR office without authorization. Similarly, Defendant’s stated reason for
terminating Boesch—taking the personnel file without permission—is a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for her termination and is entirely consistent with Paul Sherman’s
testimony. “The focus of a pretext inquiry is whether the employer's stated reason was honest,
not whether it was accurate, wise, or well-considered.” Bates v. City of Chicago, 726 F.3d 951,
956 (7th Cir. 2013). Having disposed of Plaintiff’s “confidential” argument, there is nothing in
the record to suggest that Paul Sherman’s sated reason was dishonest. Accordingly, Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on Julie Boesch’s discrimination claim.
Defendant also moves for summary judgment on Boesch’s retaliation claim. Title VII
“prohibits discriminating against an employee ‘because [she] has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.’ ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). Courts in this Circuit have recognized two methods of
proof for retaliation claims. In order to succeed under the direct method on her Title VII
retaliation claim, Plaintiff must “present evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a
materially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two.”
Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 382–83 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Turner v.
The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010)). Under the indirect method, a plaintiff must
prove that she “(1) engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) met h[er] employer’s legitimate
expectations; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was treated less favorably than
similarly situated employees who did not engage in statutorily protected activity.” Turner, 595
F.3d at 688 (internal citations omitted). Because Plaintiff and Defendant have framed their
arguments under the direct method, the Court will begin by analyzing whether Plaintiff has
established a prima facie case of discrimination under that approach.
Here, the Parties disagree as to whether Boesch engaged in a statutorily protected
activity. Defendant maintains that Boesch never complained about discrimination, and cites
portions of Boesch’s deposition testimony where she claims that the dissolution of her sister’s
relationship with Weiss was the reason why she received a written warning for an outburst in the
breakroom and missing work. Doc. 30-1, at 48 (J. Boesch Dep. at 186–87). However, Boesch
also testified that “I told Sherman that I felt like I was being retaliated against and that it was not
fair because men had other standards if they missed a lot of days. I mean, and to my knowledge,
I didn’t miss a lot of days. But if they missed consecutive days, nobody had ever been written
up.” Id. at 184. Plaintiff has thus made a sufficient showing to establish the first element of her
retaliation claim. The second element is also met—it is undisputed that Boesch suffered an
adverse employment action when Sherman’s terminated her employment.
The remaining hurdle Plaintiff must overcome requires her to show a causal connection
between her statutorily protected activity and her termination. Volling, 840 F.3d at 382–83. To
clear this hurdle, Plaintiff argues that (1) she complained of discrimination when she received a
written warning for missing work when other employees who were male were not given
warnings; (2) the complaint was protected activity; and (3) within 24 hours of making her
complaint, “Boesch was fired for taking a folder from her sister’s desk after she had departed
employment that contained an employee resignation letter which Paul Sherman testified was not
confidential.” Doc. 40, at 34–35. The problem with Plaintiff’s argument is that the only
connection between her complaint and her termination is temporal, and “suspicious timing alone
is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact to support a retaliation claim.” Turner,
595 F.3d at 687 (internal citations omitted). Notably, Plaintiff is not arguing that Sherman’s
decision to terminate her for taking personnel files without permission was a disproportionate
response, or that a dispute exists as to whether she actually took the file or whether she had
permission. Rather, Plaintiff’s argument hinges on a purported inconsistency as to whether the
files were “confidential.” That argument, however, has already been addressed and rejected in
the Court’s analysis of her discrimination claim, supra.
(4) Illinois Sales Representative Act
Plaintiff does not respond to the arguments in Defendant’s Motion regarding her Illinois
Sales Representative Act commission claim. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D)(2), her failure to
respond is deemed an admission. Summary judgment is therefore granted in favor of Defendant
on Plaintiff’s commission claim.
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion  for Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff Julie Boesch is GRANTED.
Signed on this 30th day of November, 2017.
s/ James E. Shadid
James E. Shadid
Chief United States District Judge
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