Singleton v. East Peoria Police Department et al
Filing
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ORDER & OPINION entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 01/19/2016. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 2 and Motion to Appoint Counsel 3 are DENIED. On merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED. Plaintiff MAY file an Amended Complaint within twenty-eight (28) days. If he fails to do so, the case will be dismissed. See full written Order & Opinion.(JS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 19 January, 2016 04:05:17 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
LEON J. SINGLETON,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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EAST PEORIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, )
JEFFREY A. BIEBER, MATTHEW
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BOLTON, and PATRICK PATTERSON )
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)
Defendants.
Case No. 15-cv-1503
ORDER & OPINION
Plaintiff Leon J. Singleton has filed a Complaint against the East Peoria
Police Department and three of its officers, and alleges that Defendants violated his
civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court on
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) and Motion to
Request Counsel (Doc. 3). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motions are
both denied. Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915, as Plaintiff has failed to state any claims on which the Court can grant relief.
Plaintiff may file with the Court an amended complaint within twenty-eight (28)
days. If he does so, he may also file updated motions to proceed in forma pauperis
and for appointed counsel.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff manages the kitchen at the Sunnyland 1 Stop, a bar in East Peoria,
Illinois. (Doc. 1 at 7). He worked late on October 31, 2015, as the bar was hosting a
band. (Id.). At around 11:30 that evening, he took a smoking break, and noticed that
a police car was parked in the bar’s parking lot. (Id.). Shortly thereafter – at around
midnight on November 1, 2015 – the band stopped playing, packed up its
equipment, and left. The police car left the parking lot just before the band did. (Id.
at 7-8).
Plaintiff left work in his car shortly after that to return to his home in Peoria.
A different police officer, at the request of the original police officer, then began
following Plaintiff. That officer pulled Plaintiff over on westbound Interstate 74,
just before Plaintiff was about to exit. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff had been following all
traffic rules before he was pulled over. (Id.).
After pulling him over, the officer asked Plaintiff why he was in front of the
Sunnyland 1 Stop, and Plaintiff explained that he worked there. (Id. at 8). The
officer then processed Plaintiff’s license and registration, returned, and asked
Plaintiff to step outside of the car. (Id.). He then began assessing Plaintiff’s sobriety.
First, he gave Plaintiff a vision test. Then he administered a breathalyzer test, to
which Plaintiff consented and blew a .077. Finally, he asked Plaintiff to walk a line.
(Id.). Plaintiff declined, and told the officer that he could not because of a bad right
knee and certain medications he had taken. (Id.). The officer then arrested him for
driving under the influence, and told him it was “because [he] indicated [he] had
prescription drugs.” (Id.). The officer also told Plaintiff that he had probable cause
for the stop because Plaintiff was “all over the off ramp.” (Id.).
At the police station, the arresting officer repeatedly questioned Plaintiff
about drug activity at the bar, and asked him whether he knew certain individuals.
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(Id. at 9). In response to Plaintiff’s challenge, the officer again said that he had
probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, who “was all over the bridge.” (Id.). When
Plaintiff suggested that the officer had racially profiled him, the officer laughed and
explained that he had followed Plaintiff because his colleague – a Black officer –
had asked him to “keep an eye” on a suspicious Jaguar that was parked in the bar’s
parking lot. (Id.).
Ultimately, Plaintiff received three citations, and was released. The first
ticket was for DUI, the second was for improper lane usage, and the third was for
illegal transportation of alcohol. (Id.). Plaintiff explains that he had a cup in his car
that had a small amount of alcohol in it. (Id.).
Plaintiff formally complained of racial profiling early the next week. (Id. at
10-11). He also filed an “Appeal Form,” although it is unclear from the Complaint
what he is appealing. (Id. at 11). The criminal proceedings related to his citations
are ongoing. (Id. at 5).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), “any court of the United States may
authorize the commencement . . . of any suit, action or proceeding . . . without
prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that
includes a statement of all assets . . . .” The same section instructs that courts “shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . .
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Dismissals pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are treated in the same manner as
dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Arnett v. Webster, 658
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F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the court must take “all well-pleaded
allegations of the complaint as true and view[] them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Id.
A plaintiff’s complaint must contain sufficient detail to give notice of the
claim, and the allegations must “plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to
relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level.’” EEOC v. Concentra Health
Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The plausibility standard requires enough facts “to
present a story that holds together,” but does not require a determination of
probability. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). Though
detailed factual allegations are not needed, a “formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Pro se complaints
are to be liberally construed and “must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)(per
curiam).
DISCUSSION
As it must, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint. It appears that
Plaintiff is attempting to state four claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, he
alleges that an East Peoria Police Officer (unidentified in the Complaint) stopped
him without probable cause. Second, he alleges that the same officer searched him
or his property without reasonable cause. Third, he alleges that the East Peoria
Police Department and three of its officers – Jeffrey Bieber, Patrick Patterson, and
Matthew Bolton – racially profiled him. And fourth, he alleges that the named
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Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate his civil rights. As explained below,
Plaintiff has failed to state any claim on which relief can be granted, so the Court
must dismiss his Complaint.
I.
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Claims
a. Illegal Stop
Plaintiff alleges that the unnamed officer who stopped him did so
unreasonably. “An officer’s temporary detention of an individual during a traffic
stop constitutes a seizure of a person . . . and thus must be reasonable under the
circumstances.” Huff v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 2014). If an officer has
“a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,” he “may conduct
an investigatory stop of a person.” Id. (quoting United States v. Riley, 493 F.3d 803,
808 (7th Cir. 2007)). In order to have stopped Plaintiff, the officer must have had “a
reasonable articulable suspicion that [he] had committed, [was] committing, or
[was] about to commit an offense,” including a traffic offense. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that an unnamed officer stopped him, and did so
without any basis. Plaintiff asserts that he “followed all traffic laws,” “did not
speed,” and “signaled when required.” (Doc. 1 at 8). He also denies that he was “all
over the ramp,” contrary to the arresting officer’s statements. (Id. at 9). These
allegations sufficiently state a claim that the officer unreasonably seized him by
pulling him over. See Huff, 744 F.3d at 1004.
However, Plaintiff has failed to identify the officer who stopped him.
Plaintiffs must tie specific defendants to allegations of unconstitutional conduct.
See, e.g., Abu-Shawish v. United States, 546 F. App’x 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2013). This
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is driven by the logic that defendants must be put on notice about what they have
done to violate a plaintiff’s rights. See id. at 579; Neal v. Cross, No. CIV 11-1021GPM, 2012 WL 1119767, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2012). Here, where Plaintiff has
sued three specific individual officers, but refers only to a generic officer who
stopped him, there is a genuine uncertainty as to which officer is responsible for
stopping him. See Engel v. Buchan, 710 F.3d 698, 710 (7th Cir. 2013). In light of
this, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim that he was unreasonably stopped, but
notes that Plaintiff can remedy the issue by identifying the officer who stopped him
in an amended complaint.
b. Illegal Search
Plaintiff has also indicated that the arresting officer unreasonably searched
him or his property. Yet the Complaint fails to allege that any of the officers
actually engaged in any kind of search of Plaintiff or his property. Therefore, this
claim must be dismissed as well.
c.
Abstention
For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that any
of the East Peoria police officers named as a defendant violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. It is possible, and perhaps even likely, that Plaintiff can remedy
these deficiencies in an amended complaint. Should Plaintiff choose to file an
amended complaint, however, he should be aware that the Court would abstain
from hearing his Fourth Amendment claims.
Under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), “federal courts
[must] abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that seek
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to interfere with or interrupt ongoing state proceedings.” SKS & Assocs., Inc. v.
Dart, 619 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2010). In Younger, the Supreme Court held that
federal courts must abstain “when a criminal defendant seeks a federal injunction
to block his state court prosecution on federal constitutional grounds.” Id. (citing
Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54). Subsequently, courts have extended the holding of
Younger to claims for monetary relief. See Gakuba v. O’Brien, 711 F.3d 751, 753
(7th Cir. 2013); Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 138 (7th Cir. 1995). This is because
“a federal damages suit, although not interfering with the state proceeding to the
same degree as an injunction, could beat the state action to judgment and either
undermine . . . or preclude the State’s consideration of some issues.” Majors v.
Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 1998)(citations omitted).
In situations
where plaintiffs seek damages, but the claims for damages could interfere with
ongoing state proceedings, district courts must stay the claim until the resolution of
the state proceedings. Gakuba, 711 F.3d at 753. Courts stay these claims rather
than dismiss them because they “may become time-barred by the time the state
prosecution has concluded.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff has indicated that there are ongoing state proceedings related
to the three citations he received. (Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff’s claims that he was
unreasonably stopped and searched “involve constitutional issues that may be
litigated during the course of his criminal case.” Gakuba, 711 F.3d at 753. If this
court were to decide these issues during the pendency of the state court proceeding,
it could undermine those proceedings. Id. Therefore, should Plaintiff file an
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amended complaint, the Court would stay his Fourth Amendment claims until the
conclusion of the state proceedings.
II.
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff has alleged that East Peoria police racially profiled him by stopping
him, and in their subsequent treatment of him. Specifically, he alleges that Officer
Bolton (a supervisor with the East Peoria Police Department) permitted East Peoria
police officers to continue interrogating him about his involvement in the drug trade
at the police station even after “all leads came back (returned) as clear.” (Doc. 1 at
3). And he alleges that Officer Patterson racially profiled him later, when he refused
to release to Plaintiff certain police surveillance tapes from the evening of his
arrest.
“Racial profiling, or selective enforcement of the law, is a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.” Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.
2011). See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). As the Supreme
Court explained, “an allegation that speeding tickets are given out on the basis of
race or sex would state an equal protection claim, because such discriminatory
classifications implicate basic equal protection concerns.” Enquist v. Oregon Dep’t of
Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 604 (2008). “To state a prima facie equal protection claim, a
plaintiff must allege that (1) [h]e is a member of a protected class, (2) [h]e is
otherwise similarly situated to members of the unprotected class, and (3) [h]e was
treated differently from members of the protected class.” Britt v. Anderson, 21 F.
Supp. 3d 966, 973 (N.D. Ill. 2014)(citing Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 916 (7th Cir.
2005)).
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Plaintiff has pleaded that he is Black, so he has properly alleged that he is a
member of a protected class. However, he has failed to plead any facts from which
an inference can be drawn that he is similarly situated to drivers of other races and
that those drivers were treated differently from him. Absent such allegations,
Plaintiff’s equal protection claim must be dismissed. See Britt, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 973
(dismissing equal protection claim where female detainee alleged that a police
officer improperly searched and seized her cell phone photographs because she was
a woman but failed to allege facts that any similarly situated men were treated
differently); Chriswell v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, No. 11 C 00547, 2013 WL 5903417, at
*11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2013) aff’d sub. nom. Chriswell v. O’Brien, 570 F. App’x 617
(7th Cir. 2014)(dismissing racial profiling equal protection claim based upon a
traffic stop where the plaintiff failed to “name similarly situated individuals of other
races who were not stopped by [the] police under similar conditions or offer any
statistical evidence that would permit a plausible inference of discriminatory
effect.”); Britt v. Peoria County, No. 11-1034, 2011 WL 1979859, at *2 (C.D. Ill. May
20, 2011)(same); Battle v. Alderden, No. 14 C 1785, 2015 WL 1522943, at *4-5 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 30, 2015)(dismissing racial profiling equal protection claim where Black
plaintiff pleaded that law enforcement officers targeted him for “discrimination,
opprobrium and mistreatment” but failed to “identify any non-African-American
person who was treated differently” or offer other facts that “would allow a
plausible inference of discriminatory effect.”).
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Should Plaintiff include a racial profiling claim in an amended complaint, it
may be necessary for the Court to stay that claim for the same reasons that it would
stay the Fourth Amendment claims. See supra at 6-7.
III.
Plaintiff’s Conspiracy Claim
Finally, Plaintiff has suggested that the named Defendants conspired to
violate his civil rights. (Doc. 1 at 5). “[A] bare allegation of conspiracy [is] not
enough to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Conney v.
Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2009). “To state a claim for § 1983 conspiracy, a
plaintiff must allege: ‘(1) an express or implied agreement among defendants to
deprive plaintiff of his or [his] constitutional rights and (2) actual deprivation of
those rights in the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement.’” Harshaw v.
Sarabia, No. 09 CV 6723, 2011 WL 196832, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2011) (quoting
Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiffs must also plead
“the parties, general purpose, and approximate date” of the conspiracy. See Cooney
v. Casady, 652 F. Supp. 2d 948, 957 (N.D. Ill. 2009)(quoting Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320
F3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2003)). Here, Plaintiff has not pleaded that there was any
express or implied agreement to deny him of his constitutional rights, nor has he
identified the parties of any such agreement or its approximate date. Therefore, his
conspiracy claim must be dismissed.
IV.
East Peoria Police Department
If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he may not bring any
claims against Defendant East Peoria Police Department, as it is an improper
party. In Illinois, police departments do not have a legal existence separate from
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their municipalities, and so cannot be sued under § 1983. Chan v. City of Chicago,
777 F. Supp. 1437, 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1991); see also 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-1-1.
Because a police department is part of the municipality, any claims stated against
the East Peoria Police Department are more properly stated against the City of
East Peoria.
If Plaintiff had named the City of East Peoria as a Defendant instead of the
East Peoria Police Department, the present allegations would still be lacking. A
municipality may not be held vicariously liable for the failings of its employees
under § 1983. Rather, a municipality is only liable under § 1983 when “execution of
a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Municipal policies take
three possible forms: “(1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation
when enforced; (2) a widespread practice, that, although unauthorized, is so
permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of
law; or (3) an allegation that a person with final policymaking authority caused the
injury.” Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 2004).
It appears that Plaintiff believes the East Peoria Police Department has a
widespread unofficial practice of racially profiling people. “There is no clear
consensus as to how frequently [certain conduct] must occur to impose Monell
liability, except that it must be more than one instance, or even three.” Thomas v.
Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted)(citations omitted). To properly allege a widespread practice, a
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plaintiff must plead facts that show either the application of a particular policy to
many individuals or show many actions directed at a single individual. Hare v.
Cnty. of Kane, No. 14 C 1851, 2014 WL 7213198, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2015).
The majority of Plaintiff’s allegations deal solely with events leading up to,
during, and subsequent to his arrest. He has not alleged facts that plausibly suggest
that East Peoria police officers have racially profiled any other individuals, or
illegally stopped and searched individuals. Rather, all he has alleged is that East
Peoria has stopped and arrested 450 Black men in the last year when only 4.7% of
East Peorians are African-American. (Doc. 1 at 2). Standing alone – and without
allegations that place the arrests in the context of similarly situated people of other
races – this allegation cannot plausibly suggest a widespread practice of racial
profiling. See supra at 8-9.
V.
Other matters
As all of Plaintiff’s claims are deficient, the Complaint must be dismissed.
However, before dismissing the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), courts
must give litigants the opportunity to amend. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
722 F.3d 1014, 1022-25 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court has endeavored to identify the
deficiencies in Plaintiff’s claims and explain what Plaintiff must do in order to
properly allege each of his claims in an amended complaint. See Tate v. SCR Med.
Transp., No. 15-1447, 2015 WL 9463188, at *2 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2015). In light of
this, the Court will also address Plaintiff’s two pending motions.
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A. Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides that a civil proceeding may proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee. “The privilege to proceed without [paying] costs and
fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who, within a district
court’s discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not
afforded to them.” Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th
Cir. 1972).
At this point, it is unclear to the Court whether Plaintiff should be able to
proceed in forma pauperis. The Court can’t help but note the incongruity between
Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) and Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis.
(Doc. 2). Plaintiff has alleged that he works as a “cook-partner” at the Sunnyland 1
Stop in East Peoria, and receives his pay based on the profitability of the bar’s food
business. (Doc. 1 at 7). Yet, in his Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis,
Plaintiff states that he does not have any gross pay or wages and that his only
source of income is $753.00 per month in social security benefits. (Id. at 1, 2).
Based upon this incongruity, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
Proceed in forma pauperis. This denial is without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a
second Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. If the Court is mistaken, and
Plaintiff in fact receives no wages or income through his employment with
Sunnyland 1 Stop, Plaintiff should say so. However, if Plaintiff does receive wages
or income through his employment with Sunnyland 1 Stop, Plaintiff should report it
so the Court is able to fully assess his ability to pay the filing fee.
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B. Motion to Request Counsel
Plaintiff has also requested that the Court recruit counsel for him. A civil
litigant is not entitled to a court-appointed attorney. Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d
1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2006). However, the Court may request an attorney to
represent an indigent litigant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The decision of whether to
recruit counsel is generally left to the discretion of the Court. Wilson v. Duckworth,
716 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 1983). The litigant must first show that he made a
reasonable attempt to acquire counsel without Court intervention. Pruitt v. Mote,
503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). If the litigant has made the proper attempt, the
Court considers whether, “given the difficulty of the case,” he appears able to
litigate it himself, and, if not, whether appointed counsel would be “reasonably
likely to alter the outcome.” Id. at 655-56, 660.
Here, Plaintiff has not shown that he made a reasonable attempt to acquire
counsel without the Court’s intervention. See id. at 654. For that reason his Motion
to Request Counsel (Doc. 3) is denied.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed
in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) and Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 3) are DENIED.
On merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), Plaintiff’s complaint is
DISMISSED. Plaintiff MAY file an Amended Complaint within twenty-eight (28)
days. If he fails to do so, the case will be dismissed.
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Entered this 19th day of January, 2016.
s/Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge
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