Youngman v. Chief Judge Michael E. Brandt et al
Filing
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ORDER & OPINION denying 5 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 7/19/2016. (RK, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 19 July, 2016 11:23:06 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
EDWARD L. YOUNGMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHIEF JUDGE STEPHEN A. KOURI
and PEORIA COUNTY,
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Case No. 16-cv-1005
Defendants.
ORDER & OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Peoria County’s motion to
dismiss. (Doc. 5). In it, Peoria County argues that Plaintiff Edward Youngman has
failed to state a claim against it upon which relief may be granted. Peoria County’s
motion must be denied, as it is a necessary party to this lawsuit under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 19(a).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 1, 2016, Plaintiff Edward Youngman filed a complaint against
Chief Judge Michael E. Brandt and Peoria County, Illinois. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges
that he is disabled, as he suffers from hypothyroidism and also has a hormonal
disorder caused by a tumor in his pituitary gland. (Id. at 2-3). He was employed by
the Chief Judge as a Youth Counselor in the Peoria County Juvenile Detention
Center beginning in October 1998, and was terminated on August 12, 2012 after the
Chief Judge failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. (Id. at 2-3). He alleges
that Peoria County is a potential indemnifier of the Chief Judge. (Id. at 2).
On March 24, 2016, Peoria County moved to dismiss the complaint against it.
(Doc. 5). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 12). In
the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff substituted Judge Stephen A. Kouri for Judge
Michael E. Brandt, as Judge Brant has retired and Judge Kouri had assumed the role
of Chief Judge in Peoria County. (Id. at 2). The Amended Complaint is identical in all
other ways to the original Complaint, so it did not moot Defendant Peoria County’s
pending motion to dismiss. (Compare Doc. 1 with Doc. 12).
LEGAL STANDARDS
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “the court must treat all well-pleaded allegations as
true and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” In re marchFIRST
Inc., 589 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2009). The complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint must contain sufficient
detail to give notice of the claim, and the allegations must “plausibly suggest that the
plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level.’”
EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The plausibility standard
requires enough facts “to present a story that holds together,” but does not require a
determination of probability. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir.
2010). Though detailed factual allegations are not needed, a “formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.
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Rule 19(a) “addresses persons required to be joined if feasible.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
19(a). It instructs that:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party
if:
(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete
relief among existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the
person’s absence may:
(i)
(ii)
Id. at 19(a)(1).
as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s
ability to protect the interest; or
leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
DISCUSSION
Peoria County argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against it under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Illinois Human Rights Act
(“IHRA”) because it was not Plaintiff’s employer. (Doc. 6 at 2). It further argues that
Plaintiff’s allegation that it may need to indemnify the Chief Judge, who is Plaintiff’s
employer, is too conclusory to pass muster. (Id. at 2-3). Therefore, it argues that
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against it upon which relief can be granted. (Id.
at 3). In response, Plaintiff does not address whether Peoria County was his employer
for purposes of ADA and IHRA liability. Rather, he argues that Peoria County is a
necessary party to the litigation.
A county may be a necessary party in a lawsuit brought against an official in
his official capacity. In Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 243 F.3d 379 (7th Cir.
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2001) (“Carver I”), the Seventh Circuit requested that the Supreme Court of Illinois
determine who is responsible for paying an official-capacity judgment against an
independently elected county officer. The Supreme Court of Illinois accepted the
certification, and answered:
[U]nder Illinois law, a sheriff, in his or her official capacity, has the
authority to settle and compromise claims brought against the sheriff’s
office. Because the office of the sheriff is funded by the county, the county
is therefore required to pay a judgment entered against the sheriff’s
office in an official capacity. . . .
Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 787 N.E.2d 127, 141 (Ill. 2003) (Carver II).
Based on this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit held that “a county in Illinois is a
necessary party in any suit seeking damages from an independently elected county
officer . . . in an official capacity.” Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324 F.3d 947,
948 (7th Cir. 2003) (Carver III).
The rule announced in Carver III was limited to those cases in which a plaintiff
sues an independently elected county officer in his official capacity.1 However in
Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh Circuit extended
it to cases in which a plaintiff sues an Illinois judge in his official capacity.2 In
Robinson, a former employee of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Macon County, Illinois
sued two judges on the circuit court for sexual harassment. Id. at 319. She also named
The term “independently elected county officer” is a term of art that is defined by
the Illinois Constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 4(c) (including among the
ranks of independently elected county officers sheriffs, county clerks, and county
treasurers).
2 Circuit judges, including Chief Judge Kouri, are state officials, and are not
independently elected county officers as defined by the Illinois Constitution. See Ill.
Const. 1970, art. VII, § 4(c) (defining independently elected county officer); Id., art.
VI, §§ 12(a), 14 (describing elections of and funding for judges in Illinois).
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Macon County as a defendant, and argued that it was her joint-employer. See id. at
338. While not rejecting the joint employment argument, the court concluded
independently that Macon County was a necessary party to the action. Id. at 338-39
(citing Carver III, 324 F.3d at 948). The court reasoned that Macon County, which
has the responsibility for maintaining and funding the Macon County Circuit Court,
also had the responsibility under Illinois law “for the payment of expenses and
judgments emanating from the workings of that court.” Id. at 339. As such, it was an
indispensable party because it had a financial interest in the outcome of the action.
See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B).
In this case, Plaintiff has sued his former employer, the Chief Judge of the
Tenth Judicial Circuit in Peoria County, Illinois, in his official capacity, for disability
discrimination. He has sued Peoria County, not as an employer but instead as a
potential indemnifier. As Peoria County may need to indemnify the Chief Judge, it
has a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation and is a necessary party
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). See Carver III, 324 F.3d at 948;
Robinson, 351 F.3d at 338-39. Therefore Peoria County’s motion to dismiss must be
denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Peoria County’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 5) is
DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Entered this 19th day of July, 2016.
s/Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge
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