Broadfield v. Fosdic
Filing
32
OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 09/06/2017. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Defendants' motion to supplement their summary judgment motion with a signed version of Defendant McGrath's affidavit is granted (d/e 22 ). Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendants' affidavits is denied (d/e 26 ). Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part (d/e 23 ). Summary judgment is denied to Defendant Inman on the Plaintiff's deliberate ind ifference to serious mental needs claim and is granted to the other Defendants on that claim. Summary judgment is denied to Defendants McGrath, Durham and Long on Plaintiff's excessive force claim. This case is referred to the Magistrate Judge for a settlement conference. Final pretrial and trial dates will be set if no settlement is reached. The clerk is directed to terminate Defendant Fosdick and to notify the Magistrate Judge of the referral for a settlement conference. (DM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 06 September, 2017 04:41:50 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
BRIAN BROADFIELD,
Plaintiff,
v.
LOGAN FOSDIC,
STUART INMAN,
JASON DURHAM, and
BRIAN MCGRATH,
Defendants.
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16-CV-1202
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in Pekin Federal Correctional
Institution, proceeds pro se on a claim for deliberate indifference to
his serious mental health needs and excessive force during his
detention in the Livingston County Jail.1 Plaintiff maintains that
Defendants delayed putting Plaintiff in a restraint chair and then
prematurely removed Plaintiff from the restraint chair, causing
1
The excessive force claim was not specifically identified in the merit review order or the 7/13/16 text order
adding Defendants. However, Plaintiff did plead an excessive force claim in his motion to add defendants (d/e 6,
p.2), and the parties have addressed the excessive force claim on its merits.
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Plaintiff to harm himself. Plaintiff also maintains that excessive
force was used to transfer Plaintiff from the restraint chair to a cell.
Defendants move for summary judgment. For the reasons
below, summary judgment is denied to Defendant Inman on the
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim but granted to the other
Defendants. Summary judgment is denied to Defendants McGrath,
Durham and Long on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
Summary Judgment Standard
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A movant may demonstrate the absence of a material
dispute through specific cites to admissible evidence, or by showing
that the nonmovant “cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the [material] fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(B). If the movant
clears this hurdle, the nonmovant may not simply rest on his or her
allegations in the complaint, but instead must point to admissible
evidence in the record to show that a genuine dispute exists. Id.;
Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 649 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2011).
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At the summary judgment stage, the evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant, with material factual
disputes resolved in the nonmovant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of
material fact exists when a reasonable juror could find for the
nonmovant. Id.
Analysis
On October 23, 2015, Plaintiff, a federal detainee, was
detained at the Livingston County Jail. That morning, Plaintiff was
reassigned to a different cell due to an altercation with another
inmate. Plaintiff refused and became angry, threatening a hunger
strike. He was placed in a holding cell pending his reassignment,
whereupon he “flipped out” and started hitting himself in the face
and hitting his face against the wall. Plaintiff told Defendant
Fosdick over the intercom that Plaintiff was hurting himself and
needed to put in a restraint chair. Defendant Fosdick was in the
master control room at the time. (Defs.’ Undisputed Facts 8-12.)
Officer Fosdick avers that he told Defendant Durham about
Plaintiff’s threats of self-harm. Plaintiff disputes this but he does
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not explain how he knows what Officer Fosdick did since Officer
Fosdick was in the control room and not in Plaintiff’s line of sight.
In any event, at 10:00 a.m., about 45 minutes after Plaintiff
was placed in the holding cell, Defendant Durham visited Plaintiff’s
cell. Plaintiff again said he needed to be put in a restraint chair
because he was hurting himself. Defendant Durham informed
Defendant Inman, who was an Assistant Superintendent.
Defendant Inmate ordered that Plaintiff be placed on suicide watch
in a padded cell, issued a suicide proof smock, and monitored every
15 minutes. (Defs.’ Undisp. Fact. 21.) Plaintiff continued to hurt
himself, hitting himself in the face and hitting his head on the doors
and walls. At about 10:45 a.m., Plaintiff kicked and broke the cell
window. (Defs.’ Undisp. Fact 22.)
Defendant Inman then directed that Plaintiff be placed in a
restraint chair, where Plaintiff remained for about six and ½ hours.
According to Plaintiff, he continued to try to hurt himself in the
restraint chair by pulling and twisting on the restraints. (Pl.’s Dep.
71.) At around 5:35 p.m., Defendant Inman ordered that Plaintiff
be moved to a cell because he believed that continued confinement
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in the restraint chair was counter-productive and could increase
the risks to Plaintiff. Defendants McGrath, Durham, and Long then
tried to move Plaintiff from the restraint chair into the cell.
According to Defendants, Plaintiff was combative and
uncooperative, requiring the use of a wrist lock and carrying
Plaintiff in “hog tied” fashion to his cell. Plaintiff counters that he
was not unable to cooperate because of the position of his arms and
that McGrath unnecessarily twisted Plaintiff’s arm and tried to force
Plaintiff’s arm into position to be handcuffed. According to Plaintiff,
his wrist was “severely bruised” for days because “every time
[McGrath] tried to twist it, I twisted back because he was hurting
my elbow. He just kept twisting, and as I said, it severely bruised
my wrist.” (Pl.’s Dep. 70.) Plaintiff also asserts that his throat was
pressed up against concrete while the handcuffs were being
removed and that he could not breathe. (Pl.’s Dep. 71.)
Analysis
Drawing inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff was having a
mental health crisis or breakdown on October 23, 2015. The
question is whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent. The
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deliberate indifference standard applies on the mental needs claims
even though Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee. Estate of Clark v.
Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2017). Deliberate
indifference is the conscious disregard of a known and substantial
risk of serious harm. Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Serv.,
675 F.3d 650, 665 (7th Cir. 2012)("An official is deliberately
indifferent when he is subjectively aware of the condition or danger
complained of, but consciously disregards it.").
A juror certainly could conclude that Defendants responded
reasonably to Plaintiff’s mental health crisis, doing their best in an
impossible situation. Plaintiff argues that he should have been
placed in the restraint chair sooner and kept there until the crisis
passed, but he does not have the right to dictate Defendants’
response. Anyway, Plaintiff continued to hurt himself after he was
placed in the restraint chair, so the chair did not help much,
though at least he could not bang or hit his head.
However, accepting that Plaintiff was experiencing a mental
health crisis, a mental health professional was arguably the one
with the expertise to decide how Plaintiff should be handled.
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Defendants did not have that training. No mental health expert was
called to see Plaintiff that day. Defendant Durham avers that he
had another correctional officer call a crisis counselor, Keri Daniels,
who purportedly advised that Defendants continue to monitor
Plaintiff. (Durham Aff. ¶ 35-36.) This is hearsay, however, and not
a proposed fact.
On this record, the Court cannot rule out an inference of
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious mental health needs on
October 23, 2015. However, the record shows that Defendant
Inman was in charge of how this incident was handled. The other
Defendants were simply following Defendant Inman’s orders, which
is not a basis for liability. The claims proceeds against only
Defendant Inman.
Moving to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, again a juror
certainly could find for Defendants. The video evidence does not
suggest that excessive force was used, and Plaintiff himself seems
to admit that he was uncooperative at points. However, the video
evidence does not show all of the force used which Plaintiff calls
excessive. And, particularly in light of the objective standard
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established in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (2015), the
Court cannot rule out a reasonable inference that excessive force
was used.
Defendants also assert qualified immunity, but, looking at the
facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants failed to
obtain mental health care for Plaintiff by a mental health
professional in a situation clearly requiring that expertise. Further,
accepting Plaintiff’s version, Defendants had no objective need to
severely twist Plaintiff’s wrist, carry him hog-tied, and press his
neck on the concrete so hard that he could not breathe. Qualified
immunity is not appropriate on this record.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1.
Defendants’ motion to supplement their summary
judgment motion with a signed version of Defendant McGrath’s
affidavit is granted. (d/e 22.)
2.
Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendants’ affidavits is
denied. (d/e 26.)
3.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in
part and denied in part. (d/e 23.) Summary judgment is
denied to Defendant Inman on the Plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference to serious mental needs claim and is granted to
the other Defendants on that claim. Summary judgment is
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denied to Defendants McGrath, Durham and Long on Plaintiff’s
excessive force claim.
4.
This case is referred to the Magistrate Judge for a
settlement conference. Final pretrial and trial dates will be set
if no settlement is reached.
5.
The clerk is directed to terminate Defendant Fosdick and
to notify the Magistrate Judge of the referral for a settlement
conference.
ENTERED: 09/06/2017
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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