Young v. Peoria County, Illinois et al
Filing
30
ORDER & OPINION granting in part and denying in part 25 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and granting 23 Motion to Dismiss. (Amended Pleadings due by 9/20/2017.) Entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 8/30/2017. See full written Order.(VH, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 30 August, 2017 01:55:54 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
JASON YOUNG, as Administrator of the )
Estate of Tyler. D. Young, Deceased,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
)
PEORIA COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
MICHEAL MCCOY, Peoria County
)
Sheriff, BRIAN ASBELL, Corrections
)
Superintendent, MORGAN HANSE,
)
)
ALEC MICHEL, MICHAEL SMITH,
STAN KESTER, OLIVIA RADCLIFF)
TISH, CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE )
COMPANIES (CHC), CORRECT CARE )
SOLUTIONS, LLC,
)
)
Respondent.
Case No. 1:16-cv-01367-JBM
ORDER & OPINION
The matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. (Docs. 23
and 25). For the reasons explained below, Defendants Radcliff-Tish, Correctional
Healthcare Companies, and Correct Care Solutions, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
23) is granted. Defendants Peoria County, Peoria County Sheriff, McCoy, Asbell,
Sheriff Officers Hanse, Michel, Smith, and Kester’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25) is
granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff has twenty-one days to file a second
amended complaint to cure the deficiencies as noted.
BACKGROUND1
Tylor Young was a twenty-two year old prisoner at the Peoria County Jail in
Peoria, Illinois from October 6, 2014 until October 12, 2014, when Mr. Young
committed suicide in his cell.2 At the time, Mr. Young was a serious drug addict, who
was participating in an active methadone treatment program and/or a narcotic
treatment program (“NTP”) for his heroin and opioid addiction.
This was not Mr. Young’s first visit to the Peoria County Jail, as he had cycled
in and out of it for several years before his death. During prior visits, Mr. Young was
placed on suicide watch.
During his last booking on October 6th, 2014, Defendants performed physical,
mental, and psychiatric examinations of Mr. Young which indicated that he was an
opioid addict, was actively engaged in NTP and/or a methadone program, and was
suffering from a mental health disability and drug addiction. Despite this, Mr. Young
was placed into the general population, in the F-Pod unit, which was not suicideproof.
For purposes of the Motions to Dismiss, the Court accepts the following facts alleged
by Plaintiff as true. See Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618
(7th Cir. 2007). All facts come from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (Doc. 19).
1
Plaintiff does not identify Mr. Young’s status for incarceration whether it be as a
convicted prisoner, a pretrial detainee, or a hybrid form. The status of Mr. Young’s
incarceration determines which Constitutional Rights Mr. Young had. The Eighth
Amendment applies to convicted prisoners. See Estate of Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d
544, 544 n.1 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475
(2015)). The Fourteenth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees. Id. Because the
language of the Clauses differs, the nature of the claims often differs. Id. It appears
based on Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, which alleges a violation of Mr. Young’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights, that Mr. Young was a pretrial detainee. (Doc. 19 at
1.) None of the Defendants argues otherwise.
2
2
On October 12, 2014, Mr. Young hanged himself in his cell by looping his
bedsheet through a metal fixture.
On September 30, 2016, Plaintiff, Mr. Young’s estate, filed suit against
Defendants. On December 7, 2016, Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended
Complaint. (Doc. 19). Plaintiff alleges three counts against all Defendants: a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to protect in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment; a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 12132; and a wrongful death claim under Illinois law. Additionally,
Plaintiff alleged a claim of respondeat superior against Peoria County and the Peoria
County Sheriff.
On January 25, 2017, Defendants Radcliff-Tish, Correctional Healthcare
Companies, and Correct Care Solutions (collectively the “Medical Defendants”) filed
a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Doc. 23). The Medical Defendants argue
that Plaintiff failed to state a claim because he alleged generic allegations against all
of the defendants and gave no indication which individual acts or omissions he alleged
that the Medical Defendants committed. The Medical Defendants also argue that
there is no personal liability under Title II of the ADA. Lastly, the Medical
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim was too general to meet
pleading standards.
3
On January 25, 2017, Defendants Peoria County, Peoria County Sheriff
Michael McCoy, 3 Corrections Superintendent Brian Asbell, Officer Morgan Hanse,
Officer Alec Michel, Officer Michael Smith, and Officer Stan Kester (collectively the
“Correctional Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
(Doc. 25). The Correctional Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to state a claim
because he alleged generic allegations against all of the defendants and gave no
indication which individual acts or omissions he alleged that the Correctional
Defendants committed. The Correctional Defendants also argue that there is no
personal liability under Title II of the ADA. The Correctional Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim was too general to meet pleading standards. The
Correctional Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim via
respondeat superior. Additionally, the Correctional Defendants argue that Illinois’s
Tort Immunity Act provides tort immunity. Lastly, the Correctional Defendants
Although Plaintiff does not explicitly name the Peoria County Sheriff as a
Defendant, he does name Peoria County Sheriff McCoy in what appears to be his
official capacity. (Doc. 19 at 3). “[Section] 1983 suits against sheriffs in their official
capacities are in reality suits against the county sheriff’s department rather than the
county board.” Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the
Court presumes that Plaintiff’s allegations against Sheriff McCoy in his official
capacity are actually allegations against the Peoria County Sheriff.
In order to be able to distinguish between claims against Sheriff McCoy in his
official and individual capacities, the Court will use “Peoria County Sheriff” for claims
brought against the Peoria County Sheriff in his official capacity and “Defendant
McCoy” for claims brought against Defendant Sheriff McCoy in his individual
capacity. If Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, the Court advises
Plaintiff to clearly identify whether he is bringing claims against the Peoria County
Sheriff in his official capacity, individual capacity, or both.
3
4
argue that an applicable Illinois statute of limitations makes Plaintiff’s claim
untimely.
Plaintiff has responded to each motion and they are ready for a decision.4
Because the first three issues of each Motion to Dismiss are identical, the Court will
address them together. Then, the Court will also address the Correctional
Defendants’ final arguments.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “the court must treat all well-pleaded allegations as
true and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” In re marchFIRST
Inc., 589 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2009). The complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). Furthermore, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the
. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint must contain sufficient
detail to give notice of the claim, and the allegations must “plausibly suggest that the
plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level.’”
The Court notes that both of Plaintiff’s Responses (Docs. 27 and 28) are in violation
of the 15 page limit of Local Rule 7.1(B)(4)(a). See CDIL-7.1(B)(4)(a). It appears that
neither of Plaintiff’s memorandums violate the Local Rule’s type volume limit of 7,000
words (although Plaintiff’s response to the Correctional Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 28) is only a couple words shy of that limit). However, the Local Rules
require Plaintiff’s Counsel to submit a certificate of compliance with the type volume
limitations. CDIL-7.1(B)(4)(c). Plaintiff’s Counsel has not done so. The Court
admonishes Plaintiff’s Counsel to consult the Local Rules and be in compliance with
all of them before filing any future material with the Court.
4
5
EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The plausibility standard requires enough facts to
“present a story that holds together,” but does not require a determination of
probability. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). Though
detailed factual allegations are not needed, a “formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted in part, denied in part. Because
they address numerous issues, the Court will identify each and briefly discuss them.
First, Plaintiff has improperly pled claims against Peoria County. Plaintiff cannot
bring claims directly against Peoria County; rather, Peoria County may only be
maintained as a necessary party because it must indemnify the Peoria County Sheriff
for any monetary damages imposed against Peoria County Sheriff. Second, Plaintiff
has not sufficiently pled facts in order to provide any of the individual defendants
(Medical or Correctional) notice of what action or inaction they personally performed
that resulted in a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Third, Plaintiff
cannot maintain an ADA claim against an individual defendant or a private company;
therefore, all ADA claims, except for that against Peoria County Sheriff, must be
dismissed. Fourth, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled an ADA claim against Peoria County
Sheriff; therefore, that claim survives. Fifth, Plaintiff’s claims under Illinois’s
Wrongful Death Act against Peoria County Sheriff and his employees (Defendants
McCoy, Asbell, Hanse, Michel, Smith, and Kester) are untimely and must be
dismissed. Sixth, Plaintiff’s claims under Illinois’s Wrongful Death Act are
6
insufficiently pled to give notice to Defendants Radcliff-Tish, Correctional Healthcare
Companies, and Correct Care Solutions, LLC, of their action or inaction. Finally,
because Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are insufficiently pled, the Court will not address
the Correctional Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by qualified
immunity. These seven issues are discussed in further detail below.
A. PLAINTIFF IMPROPERLY PLED CLAIMS AGAINST PEORIA COUNTY
Plaintiff has improperly pled claims against Peoria County. Under Illinois law,
county sheriffs are agents of the county sheriff’s department, not the county.
Franklin, 150 F.3d at 685-86; see also Moy v. Cty. of Cook, 640 N.E.2d 926, 929-31
(Ill. 1994); Dawson v. Carter, No. 15-C-4321, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102922, at *7-8
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2016). Therefore, Peoria County cannot be held liable for actions of
the Peoria County Sheriff under § 1983 or a respondeat superior theory. See Franklin,
150 F.3d at 685-86; Ryan v. Cty. of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995);
Wallace v. Masterson, 345 F. Supp. 2d 917, 921-22 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
However, Peoria County is a necessary party in any suit seeking damages from
an independently elected county officer in an official capacity. Carver v. Sheriff of
LaSalle Cty., 324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003). This is because Illinois state law
requires the county to pay for any judgment entered against the county sheriff in an
official capacity. Id. (citing Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle Cty., 787 N.E.2d 127 (Ill.
2003)). Therefore, Plaintiff should bring suit against Peoria County as an indemnifier
of the Peoria County Sheriff; however, Plaintiff may not bring suit directly against
Peoria County for the Sheriff’s policies and procedures under a § 1983 claim or a
respondeat superior theory of liability. See, e.g., Brandon v. Smith, No. 06-1316, 2008
7
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24885, at *13-14 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2008) (“These six claims go well
beyond what Carver requires, asserting various civil rights claims directly against
the County based, for example on jail policy, for which the County has no authority.”).
To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to bring these claims against Peoria County
directly, they are dismissed. Plaintiff has twenty-one days to file a second amended
complaint and properly plead Peoria County as a defendant for indemnification
purposes only.
B. PLAINTIFF FAILED
CLAIM
TO
PLEAD ENOUGH INFORMATION
TO
STATE
A
§ 1983
Plaintiff has failed to plead enough information to provide each Defendant
notice of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides that:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States Supreme Court expanded § 1983 to apply to
municipalities, if the violation resulted from the execution of one of its policies. Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In order to allege a Monell claim, a
plaintiff must allege: 1) an express policy that caused the constitutional deprivation;
2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express
municipal policy, is so well settled and permanent; or 3) that the constitutional injury
was caused by a person with final policymaking authority. Lewis v. City of Chi., 496
F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2007). Medical providers, who contract with jails to perform
the public function of providing medical services, like mental health services, to
8
inmates are treated the same as municipalities for the liability purposes of a § 1983
claim. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 832 (7th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim against the individual named
Defendants McCoy, Asbell, Hanse, Michel, Smith, Kester, and Radcliff-Tish.
Furthermore, plaintiff must plead that a defendant personally participated or caused
the unconstitutional action in order to bring a § 1983 claim against an individual.
Alejo v. Heller, 328 F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Marshall v. Buckley, 644 F.
Supp. 2d 1075, 1080 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Brown v. State Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 318 F. Supp.
2d 696, 700 (N.D. Ill. 2004). Plaintiff only alleges, both generically and collectively,
that “Defendants each” performed actions like: failed to properly supervise Mr.
Young, failed to monitor Mr. Young, failed to remove reasonably foreseeable
dangerous items from Mr. Young’s cell, failed to handle and screen prisoners who
were known to pose a risk of committing suicide, failed to have sufficiently staff the
jail, failed to properly screen opioid-addicted inmates, and were deliberately
indifferent to the health, life, safety, and welfare of Mr. Young. (Doc. 19 at 8-11).
Although Plaintiff must only plead a “short and plain statement,” it is clear that it
must be more detailed than this in order to provide proper notice to Defendants.
Plaintiff fails to plead when each of these individuals may have interacted with
Mr. Young or how each individually participated or caused the unconstitutional
action. Mr. Young was booked on October 6th, but did not commit suicide until
October 12th. That is a span of seven days and countless time for interactions with
the individual defendants. Plaintiff has not provided any facts that touch upon how
the individual Defendants’ actions, or inactions, would give rise to his § 1983 claim.
9
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is self-contradictory because he brings
these allegations against the Defendants as a collective but tries to identify each
Defendant as part of the collective by saying “Defendants each.” For example, the
Court doubts that Nurse Radcliff-Tish, a contract nurse, was involved in the failure
to “have adequate, proper, and sufficient jail officer staffing levels so as to provide
adequate and proper monitoring and supervision of prisoners and inmates.” (Doc. 19
at 10). Yet, by stating “Defendants each,” Plaintiff is making that allegation against
all Defendants, including Defendant Radcliff-Tish. While pleading generally
“Defendants each” might be simpler for the Plaintiff to do, it is insufficient to give
each Defendant notice of their personal actions or inactions. Therefore, it is clear that
Plaintiff has not provided enough notice to each individual defendant as to their
individual action or inaction to state a § 1983 claim. Therefore, the § 1983 claims
against the individual Defendants McCoy, Asbell, Hanse, Michel, Smith, Kester, and
Radcliff-Tish are dismissed without prejudice. Because these are flaws that can be
cured by adequate factual pleading, Plaintiff is given twenty-one days to file a second
amended complaint to cure them.
Plaintiff has also failed to state a § 1983 claim under Monell against the Peoria
County Sheriff, Correctional Healthcare Companies or Correct Care Solutions.
Plaintiff does not identify what practices, policies, and procedures the Peoria County
Sheriff is responsible for compared to what is the responsibility of the private contract
medical companies. Plaintiff’s allegations are a myriad of conclusory statements
about the “policies, practices, procedures, and rules” for handling, screening
evaluating, examining, identifying, supervising, monitoring, and treating inmates.
10
(Doc. 19 at 9-11). However, these allegations are a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a Monell claim followed by virtually all the activities that a local jail
performs and most of its contact with inmates. These broad allegations, coupled with
not identifying which particular defendant is responsible for which policies, practices,
procedures, or rules, fail to provide sufficient notice of a § 1983 Monell claim. See, e.g.,
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581-82 (7th Cir. 2009); Dennis v. Curran, No. 16-C6014, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7978, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2017); Armour v.
County Club Hills, No. 11-C-5029, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1849, at *20-24 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 8, 2014). Plaintiff must provide allegations that are specific and sufficient for
the Office of the Peoria County Sheriff and each of the medical companies to be put
on notice as to the policies or customs personal to them that Plaintiff claims are a §
1983 violation under Monell. Because Plaintiff has failed to do so, Plaintiff’s
remaining § 1983 claims against them must be dismissed. Because these deficiencies
may be cured, this dismissal is without prejudice. Plaintiff will have twenty-one days
to file an amended complaint curing these deficiencies.5
C. PLAINTIFF CANNOT BRING A CLAIM OF DISCRIMINATION
THE ADA AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS.
UNDER
TITLE II OF
Plaintiff cannot bring a claim of Discrimination under Title II of the ADA
against Individual Defendants or any of the Medical Defendants. Title II provides
that:
Because the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for failing to plead
with enough particularity to provide notice, the Court will not address the Medical
Defendants’ and the Correctional Defendants’ second argument: that Plaintiff failed
to plead actual knowledge and intentional disregard. However, Plaintiff should use
his opportunity to amend to cure all deficiencies that he is made aware of, even if the
Court does not address them.
5
11
“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12132. Furthermore, Title II defines a “public entity” as:
“a)
b)
c)
any State or local government;
any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and
the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter
authority”
42 U.S.C. § 12131. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
explained that because the ADA forbids discrimination by a public entity that the
proper defendant is the public entity. Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346 (7th Cir.
2000) (abrogated on other grounds by Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001) (allowing claims for prospective injunctive relief against individuals in
their official capacity)).
Because a Title II discrimination claim must be brought against a public entity,
a claim seeking damages against an individual cannot be maintained. Id.; see also
Boston v. Dart, No. 14-cv-8680, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101348, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
4, 2015) (citing Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634, 644
(7th Cir. 2015)); Sallenger v. City of Springfield, No. 03-3093, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18202, at *86-88 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2005); Doe v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 429 F.
Supp. 2d 930, 940 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Novak v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., No. 12-cv-7JPG, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149697, at *22 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2012). Therefore, as
Plaintiff ultimately admitted, the ADA claim against Defendants McCoy, Asbell,
Hanse, Michel, Smith, Kester, and Radcliff-Tish in their individual capacities must
be dismissed with prejudice.
12
Likewise, based on the statute, a Title II ADA discrimination claim cannot be
maintained against the Medical Defendants, because they do not meet the statutory
definition of a “public entity.” Although the Seventh Circuit has not addressed this
issue, several other circuits courts and district courts—including one of our sister
courts in this circuit—have found that “a private company does not become a public
entity for Title II purposes merely because it has a business or contractual
relationship with a public entity.” Maxwell v. South Bend Work Release Ctr., 787 F.
Supp. 2d 819, 822 (N.D. Ind. 2011); see also Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1310
(11th Cir. 2010) (“[a] private contractor does not, . . . become liable under Title II
merely by contracting with the States to provide governmental services, essential or
otherwise”); Phillips v. Tiona, 508 F. App’x 737, 748-49 & 754 (10th Cir. 2013)
(collecting case and joining “the overwhelming majority of other courts that have
spoken directly on the issue, and hold[ing] that Title II of the ADA does not generally
apply to private corporations that operate prisons.”). Furthermore, Plaintiff does not
contest this. Therefore, Plaintiff’s ADA claims against the Medical Defendants, as
well as all of the individual Defendants, must be dismissed with prejudice.
D. PLAINTIFF’S ADA CLAIM AGAINST THE PEORIA COUNTY SHERIFF SURVIVES
Plaintiff has sufficiently pled an ADA claim against the Peoria County
Sheriff’.6 In order to plead a failure to accommodate claim, Plaintiff need only to
In his Response to the Medical Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27), Plaintiff
states that he is asserting his ADA claim against Peoria County Sheriff in his official
capacity, the Corrections Superintendent in his official capacity, and Peoria County.
Additionally, because the Correctional Superintendent is hired and fired by the
Peoria County Sheriff, suing the Correctional Superintendent in his official capacity
is equivalent to bringing a suit against the Peoria County Sheriff. See Moy, 640
N.E.2d at 929. Likewise, as previously discussed, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim
6
13
allege: 1) that Mr. Young was a qualified individual with a disability, 2) that
Defendant was aware of his disability, and 3) that Defendant failed to reasonable
accommodate Mr. Young’s disability. Hooper v. Proctor Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d
846, 852 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 759
F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2014)). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads an
ADA claim.7 See, e.g., Brandon, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24885, at *10-11.
E. PLAINTIFF’S WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM
DEFENDANTS IS UNTIMELY
AGAINST
THE
CORRECTIONAL
Plaintiff’s Illinois Wrongful Death claim against Peoria County Sheriff and his
employees is untimely. Under Illinois law,8 “[n]o civil action . . . may be commenced
in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is
commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received of the cause
of action accrued.” 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/8-101(a).9 A local public entity includes a
county sheriff. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle Cty., 787 N.E.2d 127, 136 (Ill. 2003).
Therefore, Plaintiff had one year to file any Illinois tort cause of action against the
directly against Peoria County for the denial of access to a program or activity at the
Peoria County jail; rather the proper defendant is the Peoria County Sheriff.
7 However, if Plaintiff choses to file a Second Amended Complaint to cure the
deficiencies in his § 1983 claims, he should correct his ADA pleading to clearly
indicate that the ADA claim is being brought against the Peoria County Sheriff in his
official capacity.
A federal court applies the same statute of limitations to state law claims as a state
court would. See, e.g., Harrell v. Sheahan, 937 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Ellis v.
City of Chi., No. 2000-C-2457, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17827, at *18-21 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
30, 2000).
8
An Illinois statute does provide a two year limit for claims arising from “patient
care.” 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/8-101(b). However, that subsection does not apply
because Plaintiff has not alleged any injuries arising from patient care.
9
14
Peoria County Sheriff or his employees from Mr. Young’s suicide on October 12, 2014.
See Long v. Williams, 155 F. Supp. 2d 938, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (applying a two-year
statute of limitations to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and the one year statute of
limitations under § 10/8-101(a) to plaintiff’s state tort claims); Am. Nat’l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Town of Cicero, No. 01-C-1395, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21469, at *43-46
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2001) (finding similarly); Jackson v. City of Joliet, No. 03-C-4088,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12007, at *10-12 (N.D. Ill. May, 19, 2005) (finding similarly).
However, Plaintiff’s Complaint was not filed until September 30, 2016. (See
Doc. 1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Illinois Wrongful Death claims against the Peoria
County Sheriff, directly, and Defendants McCoy, Asbell, Hanse, Michel, Kester, and
Smith, individually,10 are untimely and must be dismissed. See Holliman v. Cook
Cty., No. 15-C-9050, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120279, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2016)
(“Although affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, are not usually
resolved through a motion to dismiss, if the plaintiff’s complaint contains facts that
on their face demonstrate the suit is time-barred, it may be disposed of under [Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6)” (citing Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc.,
67 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff’s § 1983 and ADA claims were not time-barred. The Correctional
Defendants also appear to argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and ADA claim are timebarred. However, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are governed by the two-year statute of
limitations, which is equivalent to the general statute of limitations for personal
Because Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Correctional Defendants are all
untimely, there is no respondeat superior liability that can be asserted against the
Peoria County Sheriff.
10
15
injury claims in Illinois pursuant to 735 Illinois Compiled Statutes § 5/13-202. Ashafa
v. City of Chi., 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1998) (“This circuit has consistently held
that the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 cases filed in Illinois is two years
as set forth in 735 [Illinois Compiled Statutes] § 5/13-202.”) (citations omitted).
Likewise, because the ADA does not have its own statute of limitations, it uses
Illinois’s two year personal injury limitation. Winfrey v. City of Chi., 957 F. Supp.
1014, 1023 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing Cheeney v. Highland Cmty. Coll., 15 F.3d 79, 81-82
(7th Cir. 1994)). Therefore, because Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on September 30,
2016, his § 1983 and ADA were not time-barred.
F. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PLEAD ENOUGH INFORMATION TO STATE A WRONGFUL
DEATH CLAIM
Like Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim deficiencies, Plaintiff fails to plead enough facts
to give Defendants notice of what the actions or inactions allegedly support his
wrongful death claim. Plaintiff alleges an Illinois wrongful death claim against all
Defendants pursuant to 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 180/1 (2012). Under Illinois law, a
plaintiff must show: 1) that defendant owed a duty to the deceased; 2) that defendant
breached the duty; 3) that the breach caused the decedent’s death; and 4) that
monetary damages resulted to persons designated under the Act. Lough v. BNSF Ry.
Co., 988 N.E.2d 1090, 1094 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013). Just as in his § 1983 claim, Plaintiff
uses generic “Defendants each” language throughout the allegations relation to the
wrongful death claims. Such language is not sufficient to put the individual Medical
Defendants on notice of what duties they each allegedly breached and how their
individual actions caused Plaintiff’s death.
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G. ILLINOIS’S SUICIDE RULE DOES NOT DEFEAT PLAINTIFF’S ILLINOIS
WRONGFUL DEATH ACT
The Medical Defendants argue that based on Illinois’s “suicide rule,” Plaintiff
cannot recover under the Wrongful Death Act because “[i]t is well established under
Illinois law that a plaintiff may not recover for a decedent’s suicide following a
tortious act because suicide is an independent intervening event that the tortfeasor
cannot be expected to foresee.” Crumpton v. Walgreen Co., 871 N.E.2d 905, 910 (Ill.
Ct. App. 2007). However, several courts, including this Court, have noted that “a
‘jailer owes a general duty of due care to his prisoner’” and that “the Illinois Supreme
Court has never determined whether this general duty of care nullifies the suicide
rule.” Perks v. Cty. of Shelby, No. 09-3154, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77575, at *13 (C.D.
Ill. Aug. 31, 2009) (quoting Dezort v. Vill. of Hinsdale, 342 N.E.2d 468, 472-73 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1976)). Additionally, the “suicide rule” has not been recognized in situations
where the defendant had a duty to the decedent to prevent the suicide. Turcois v.
DeBruler, 32 N.E.3d 1117, 1124 (Ill. 2015) (citations omitted). This is because
“[w]here the duty of care breached is the duty to protect against what would otherwise
be an unforeseeable consequence, that consequence becomes foreseeable to the
defendant, and the breach of the duty to protect against it can result in negligence
liability. So, for example, ‘a hospital that fails to maintain a careful watch over
patients known to be suicidal is not excused by the doctrine of supervening cause
from liability for suicide.’” White v. Watson, No. 16-cv-560-JPG-DGW, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 149111, *20-21 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2016) (quoting Jutzi-Johnson v. United
States, 263 F.3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 2001)). Therefore, it is clear that the applicability
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is determined by whether Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care and whether the
consequences were foreseeable. Given the inadequate pleadings and the early stage
of these proceedings, the Court cannot currently declare that Illinois’s Suicide Rule
prevents Plaintiff from bringing a Wrongful Death Claim. The Medical Defendants
are entitled to renew this argument if Plaintiff files a second amended complaint
alleging Wrongful Death Claims against them.
H. THE COURT CANNOT ADDRESS
IMMUNITY ARGUMENT
THE
CORRECTIONAL DEFENDANTS’ TORT
Because of the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s § 1983 pleadings, the Court cannot,
and will not, address the Correctional Defendants’ tort immunity claim. The
Correctional Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by qualified
immunity.11 Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). In order to determine qualified immunity, the Court considers: “(1) whether
the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant
violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the constitutional right was clearly
The Correctional Defendants also assert that the Local Governmental and
Government Employees Tort Immunity Act provides immunity for failing to furnish
medical care for a prisoner unless the employee acts with willful and wanton conduct.
See 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 10/4-105. However, State tort law immunity is only
applicable to state tort law claims and the Court has already found that Plaintiff’s
state tort law claims against the Correctional Defendants are untimely. Therefore,
this argument is moot and the Court need not address it.
11
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established at [that] time.” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232)).
In order to analyze the first component of qualified immunity, the Court must
determine whether Plaintiff has shown that Mr. Young had a serious medical
condition that posed a substantial risk and that the Correctional Defendants knew
about the risk and acted or failed to act in disregard of that risk. See Estate of Ryan
L. Clark, 865 F.3d at 544 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994)).
However, as discussed in the analysis of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims in § III.B, Plaintiff
has not pled facts as to what an individual defendant knew or did. Therefore, the
Court cannot perform a qualified immunity analysis. If the Plaintiff files amended §
1983 claims, then Defendants are entitled to reassert this argument.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
1) Plaintiff has incorrectly pled claims against Peoria County. All claims made
directly against Peoria County are dismissed. Peoria County may be
repleaded as a necessary party as an indemnifier of the Peoria County
Sheriff, the proper defendant.
2) Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently pled a § 1983 claim against any
Defendant; therefore, all claims are dismissed. Plaintiff has twenty-one
days to file a second amended complaint curing his deficiencies.
3) Plaintiff has sufficiently pled an ADA claim against the Peoria County
Sheriff. Plaintiff’s ADA claims against all other defendants are dismissed
with prejudice.
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4) Plaintiff’s claim under Illinois’s Wrongful Death Act against Peoria County
Sheriff and Defendants McCoy, Asbell, Hanse, Michel, Smith, and Kester
are dismissed as untimely and may not be repleaded.
5) Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently pled a claim under Illinois’s Wrongful
Death Act against Defendants Radcliff-Tish, Correctional Healthcare
Companies, and Correct Care, Solutions, LLC. Plaintiff has twenty-one
days to file a second amended complaint curing his deficiencies.
Therefore, the Medical Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) is granted.
Plaintiff has twenty-one days to file a second amended complaint curing his § 1983
and Wrongful Death Act claims against Defendants Radcliff-Tish, Correctional
Healthcare Companies, and Correct Care, Solutions, LLC.
The Correctional Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25) is granted in part,
denied in part. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims is granted.
Plaintiff has twenty-one days to file a second amended complaint curing his § 1983
deficiencies against Defendants Peoria County Sheriff, McCoy, Asbell, Hanse, Michel,
Smith, and Kester. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claims is granted
in part and the ADA claims against Defendants McCoy, Asbell, Hanse, Michel, Smith,
and Kester are dismissed. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim is
denied in part as to Defendant Peoria County Sheriff; this claims survives. Lastly,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Illinois Wrongful Death claims is granted;
Plaintiff’s Illinois Wrongful Death claims against Defendants Peoria County Sheriff,
McCoy, Asbell, Hanse, Michel, Smith, and Kester are dismissed.
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Entered this __30th__ day of August, 2017.
s/ Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge
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