Blakley v. Krueger

Filing 12

ORDER entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 5/16/2018. Petition (D. 1) is DENIED and this matter is terminated. See full written Order.(VH, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 16 May, 2018 09:28:09 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
NATHAN BLAKLEY,
Petitioner,
Case No. 1:16-cv-01492-JES
v.
STEVE KALLIS,
Respondent.

ORDER
Before the Court are the Petitioner, Nathan Blakley’s, pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (D. 1) 1 and the Government’s Response (D. 6). For the
reasons set forth below, the Petition (D. 1) is DENIED and this matter is terminated.
In December 2016, the Petitioner filed his petition, arguing that, pursuant to Mathis v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), his sentence was calculated using improper predicates to
enhance his sentence and qualify him as a career offender pursuant to United States Sentencing
Guidelines § 4B1.1. Id. at pp. 7-9. Given two decisions from the Seventh Circuit, Hawkins v.
United States, 706 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hawkins I) and Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d
915 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hawkins II), the Petitioner is precluded from obtaining relief.
Together, Hawkins I and Hawkins II hold that a petitioner may not seek on collateral review
to revisit a district court’s calculation of an offender’s advisory guidelines range. Given the interest
in finality of criminal proceedings, in Hawkins I the Seventh Circuit held an erroneous
interpretation of the guidelines should not be corrigible in a postconviction proceeding so long as

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Citations to the Docket in this case are abbreviated as “D. __.”

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the sentence actually imposed was not greater than the statutory maximum. Hawkins I, 706 F.3d
at 823-25. It specifically distinguished the advisory guidelines from the mandatory system in place
at the time of Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding Narvaez’s improper
sentence under the mandatory guidelines constituted a miscarriage of justice). Hawkins moved
for rehearing in light of Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013), in which the Supreme
Court held the Guidelines were subject to constitutional challenges “notwithstanding the fact that
sentencing courts possess discretion to deviate from the recommended sentencing range.” Peugh,
133 S. Ct. at 2082.
The Seventh Circuit denied rehearing because Peugh was a constitutional case whereas
Hawkins I involved a miscalculated guidelines range, the legal standard in Peugh was lower than
that required for postconviction relief, and Peugh’s retroactivity was uncertain. Hawkins II, 724
F.3d at 916-18 (“[I]t doesn’t follow that postconviction relief is proper just because the judge,
though he could lawfully have imposed the sentence that he did impose, might have imposed a
lighter sentence had he calculated the applicable guidelines sentencing range correctly.”).
Petitioner’s claim is thus untenable. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Petitioner’s petition (D.
1). This matter is now terminated.
It is so ordered.
Entered on May 16, 2018

_s/ James E. Shadid_
James E. Shadid
Chief United States District Judge

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