Seale v. MEDSOURCE
Filing
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ORDER & OPINION entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 4/28/2017. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 4) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court will allow Plaintiff to move the Court for le ave to file an amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days. An amended complaint shall be attached to the motion as an exhibit. Defendants shall have an opportunity to respond and the Court will assess whether the amended complaint will be allowed or whether such amendment would be futile.If Plaintiff opts to proceed solely on her retaliation claim, she should notify the Court of her intention to do so as soon as practicable in a written status report and the matter will be referred to Magistrate Judge Jonathan Hawley for discovery and other pretrial proceedings. SO ORDERED. (Amended Pleadings due by 5/19/2017.)See full written Order.(VH, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 28 April, 2017 01:35:29 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
DARLENE L. SEALE,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEDSOURCE, LLC,
Defendant.
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Case No. 17-cv-1072
ORDER & OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint. (Doc. 4). The motion has been fully briefed and is ready for decision. For
the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
LEGAL STANDARDS
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), “the court must treat all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” In re marchFIRST Inc., 589 F.3d 901,
904 (7th Cir. 2009). The pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive
a motion to dismiss, the challenged pleading must contain sufficient detail to give
notice of the claim, and the allegations must “plausibly suggest that the [non-movant]
has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level.’ ” EEOC v.
Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The plausibility standard requires
enough facts “to present a story that holds together,” but does not require a
determination of probability. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir.
2010). Though detailed factual allegations are not needed, a “formulaic recitation of
a cause of action's elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. Lastly, when a
plaintiff pleads facts demonstrating that he has no claim, dismissal of the complaint
is proper. McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2006).
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1
Plaintiff is an African-American woman. She was employed by Defendant on
or about May 16, 2016. On and prior to August 25, 2016, Plaintiff opposed acts of
racial discrimination asserted against her and others in the workplace by senior
management personnel, supervisory personnel and human resource personnel
employed by Defendant. That same day, Plaintiff submitted an employee grievance
advising Defendant of the alleged acts of racial discrimination and her opposition to
such acts. Defendant investigated the grievance and found it to be unfounded.
Plaintiff later filed a charge of discrimination against Defendant with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The allegations in the charge
were terse. (See Doc. 5-1). Plaintiff alleged she was subjected to different terms and
condition of employment including, but not limited to, being denied an opportunity to
interview for a promotion. She also alleged that she believed she was discriminated
against because of her race. After an investigation, the EEOC was unable to conclude
that the information obtained through its investigation established the violation of
any law. It nevertheless issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter. (Doc. 1-1).
These facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are assumed true for
purposes of this motion.
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2
On or around November 13, 2016, the EEOC investigator provided Defendant
with a copy of the Right to Sue letter. On January 12, 2017, Plaintiff was terminated
by Defendant on the basis that the company was undergoing a reduction in workforce.
She alleges that at all times relevant she was meeting Defendant’s legitimate
business expectations. This action was filed on February 10, 2017.
DISCUSSION
The Complaint alleges that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff on
account of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. The Complaint is poorly drafted and does not clearly set
out the claims. However, the parties seem to agree there are two separate claims: a
racial discrimination claim as to the conditions of employment and a retaliation claim
for filing an EEOC complaint regarding the racial discrimination claim. Defendant
argues that the Complaint should be dismissed because first, the retaliation claim
was not presented to the EEOC before this suit was initiated, and second, the racial
discrimination claim does not allege sufficient facts to make it plausible that Plaintiff
suffered an adverse employment action due to her race. The Court disagrees with the
Defendant’s first argument but agrees with its second argument.
I.
Retaliation Claim
Defendant argues that the retaliation claim should be dismissed because
Plaintiff did not present it to the EEOC before initiating this lawsuit. A federal
employment discrimination plaintiff generally is limited in a Title VII action to
pursuing only the claims she made before the EEOC. Teal v. Potter, 559 F.3d 687, 691
(7th Cir. 2009) (citing Cheek v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500
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(7th Cir. 1994); Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992)). This
requirement’s purposes are “to promote resolution of the dispute by settlement or
conciliation and to ensure that the sued employers receive adequate notice of the
charges against them.” Id. Plaintiffs are also able, though, to pursue claims that are
“like or reasonably related to the allegations of the [administrative] charge and
growing out of such allegations.’” Id. at 691-92. (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut.
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) (alteration in original)). This inquiry
turns on whether “there is a reasonable relationship between the allegations in the
charge and those in the complaint, and the claim in the complaint could reasonably
be expected to be discovered in the course of the EEOC’s investigation.” Id. at 692
(citing Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500).
An alleged incident of retaliation that occurred after a plaintiff has already
filed an EEOC complaint can serve as the basis for a Title VII claim. McKenzie v. Ill.
Dept. of Transp., 92 F.3d 473 482-82 (7th Cir. 1996). In situations where the alleged
retaliation arose after the EEOC charge was filed, only the single previous filing is
necessary to comply with Title VII, “a double filing ‘would serve no purpose except to
create additional procedural technicalities.’” Id. citing Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins.
Co., 859 F.2d 534, 545 (7th Cir. 1988).
This situation falls squarely into the exception carved out in McKenzie and
Steffen cited above. Plaintiff is claiming that she was retaliated against for filing the
EEOC claim. Forcing her to file yet another EEOC claim would be a pointless
procedural hurdle that serves no other purpose. Steffen, 859 F.2d at 545. Thus, the
latter retaliation claim is clearly reasonably related to the underlying racial
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discrimination claim included in the EEOC complaint enough to proceed in this
Court. 2
There are only three simple things a plaintiff needs to plead to make out a
plausible retaliatory discharge claim. A plaintiff must show: 1) that he engaged in
statutorily protected activity; 2) he suffered an adverse action; and 3) there is a causal
link between the protected activity and the adverse action. Essex v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 111 F.3d 1304, 1309 (7th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff alleges she filed a complaint
of racial discrimination with the EEOC. That is unquestionably statutorily protected
activity. Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[Plaintiff] clearly
engaged in protected expression by filing the EEOC complaints.”). She alleges she
was terminated. Termination is an adverse employment action. Crady v. Liberty Nat’l
Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) (a “materially adverse change
might be indicated by a termination of employment...”). Lastly, she alleges she was
terminated for filing the EEOC complaint. Although she presents no actual evidence
of this, evidence is not required at this stage of the litigation. All that is required is a
plausible allegation of causality. As pled, it is plausible that Plaintiff was terminated
because her EEOC complaint. Plaintiff alleges Defendant was notified of the EEOC
complaint and terminated her after it became aware of it. Although at the summary
judgment stage, temporal proximity will not be enough to sustain an inference of
causality, see Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utilities Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th
Cir. 2002) (“we remind that mere temporal proximity between the filing of the charge
This is so even though the underlying racial discrimination claim itself is
inadequately pled and will not be allowed to go forward. See infra Section II.
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of discrimination and the action alleged to have been taken in retaliation for that
filing will rarely be sufficient in and of itself to create a triable issue.”), at this
pleading stage, the Court will allow the claim to proceed.
For the foregoing reasons, the retaliation claim survives and the motion to
dismiss is denied as to this claim.
II.
Racial Discrimination Claim
Although the retaliation claim survives, the underlying racial discrimination
claim itself must be dismissed as it has failed to meet minimal pleading standards.
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Nothing in the
Complaint shows Plaintiff is entitled to relief on her racial discrimination claim.
The Complaint provides that Plaintiff “opposed acts of racial discrimination
asserted against her and others in the workplace” by senior management personnel,
supervisory personnel and human resource personnel employed by Defendant. The
Complaint does not describe these alleged acts of racial discrimination. The EEOC
complaint is similarly vague and conclusory. It contained the following information:
Plaintiff was subjected to different terms and conditions in employment including,
but not limited to, being denied an opportunity to interview for a promotion. Later, it
states that Plaintiff believed she was discriminated against because of her race. 3
Plaintiff should understand that there is ample legal precedent in the Seventh
Circuit that mere subjective belief that she was discriminated against on the basis of
race will not be enough to survive summary judgment. E.g., Kizer v. Children’s
Learning Ctr., 962 F.2d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[A] subjective belief of
discrimination no matter how genuine, cannot be the sole basis for a finding of
discrimination.”).
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The Court agrees with Defendant that the Complaint fails to allege that race
was the reason for any adverse employment action taken against her. Simply stating
that Defendant engaged in “acts of racial discrimination” or that she “was subjected
to different terms and conditions of employment” without identifying a comparator is
insufficient pleading. Similarly, pleading that she was denied the opportunity to
interview for a promotion, means little in light of the fact that Plaintiff has not pled
who, if anyone, was given the opportunity to interview nor pled any allegations that
such denial was attributable to her race.
In attempting to convince the Court to not dismiss her racial discrimination
claim, Plaintiff wrote:
In the case at bar, [Plaintiff] pleaded that she experienced racial
discrimination by her supervisors at Medsource, that she submitted an
internal employee grievance as a result of the racial discrimination that
she experienced at Medsource, that she filed an EEOC charge against
Medsource by virtue of the racial discrimination that she experienced,
and that [she] was terminated in retaliation for filing the
aforementioned EEOC charge. . . . To be certain, [Plaintiff] would not
have been terminated had she not first (1st) complained of the
discrimination she had experienced by virtue of her race.
(Doc. 9 at 6-7).
This is assuredly a garbled response. It actually makes the Court wonder
whether Plaintiff is asserting a stand-alone racial discrimination claim. Propping up
retaliation as the defense of a racial discrimination claim that purportedly stands
apart from the retaliation claim makes little sense. The upshot of Plaintiff’s standalone racial discrimination is Plaintiff’s purported “racial discrimination by her
supervisors.” Unfortunately, Plaintiff has not bothered to allege any details of the
purported “racial discrimination by her supervisors.” Her allegations are so meager
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and deficient that the Court finds they do not provide the Defendant with a
meaningful understanding of what it is supposed to be defending itself against. In
short, the Complaint provides no connection between racial animus and the
Defendant’s actions towards Plaintiff.
For these reasons the Court will grant the motion to dismiss as to the racial
discrimination claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Doc. 4) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court will allow
Plaintiff to move the Court for leave to file an amended complaint within twenty-one
(21) days. An amended complaint shall be attached to the motion as an exhibit.
Defendants shall have an opportunity to respond and the Court will assess whether
the amended complaint will be allowed or whether such amendment would be futile.
If Plaintiff opts to proceed solely on her retaliation claim, she should notify the Court
of her intention to do so as soon as practicable in a written status report and the
matter will be referred to Magistrate Judge Jonathan Hawley for discovery and other
pretrial proceedings. SO ORDERED.
Entered this 28th day of April, 2017.
s/ Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge
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