Nelson v. Illinois Department of Corrections et al

Filing 11

MERIT REVIEW and CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 7/20/2017. See full written Order.(VH, ilcd)

E-FILED

Thursday, 20 July, 2017 03:21:40 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JAMES NELSON,
Plaintiff,

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants

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Case No. 17-1182

MERIT REVIEW AND CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER
The Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, has filed a complaint, [1]; two motions for
appointment of counsel, [5, 6]; and a motion for a temporary restraining order. [9]. The
Court is required by 28 U.S.C. §1915A to “screen” the Plaintiff’s complaint, and through
such process to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if
warranted. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A.
Plaintiff has named five Defendants including the Illinois Department of
Corrections, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Sergeant Baylor and Lieutenant Bennett.
Although Plaintiff has included a lengthy grievance in the middle of his filing, (Comp.,
p. 5-15), the Court will only consider the claims clearly stated in the body of Plaintiff’s
complaint. (Comp., p. 16-18). Plaintiff says on August 24, 2016, John Doe #1 and John
Doe #2 handcuffed him from behind and took him to the dining room during an
apparent search of Pontiac Correctional Center. Plaintiff informed the officers he was

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a 66-year-old inmate with degenerative joint disease, and asked the officers to handcuff
him in the front. The officer’s refused and Plaintiff was forced to sit in excruciating pain
for two hours. When Plaintiff began to moan, the officers told him to stop. Plaintiff
explained he was in pain and again asked to be cuffed in the front. When Plaintiff
continued to moan, the officers forced him face first into a wall and ordered him to his
knees. Plaintiff says the officers continued to use their bodies to push him into the wall
until he could no longer breathe and he passed out.
The next thing Plaintiff remembers is yelling for help, but he was moved to a seat
and forced to continue sitting, handcuffed from behind, and in extreme pain. Plaintiff
says Defendants Sergeant Baylor and Lieutenant Bennett saw the entire incident, but
did not intervene.
Plaintiff has adequately alleged Defendants John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 used
excessive force against him on August 24, 2016, and Defendants Baylor and Bennett
failed to intervene to stop the use of excessive force. However, Plaintiff has not
articulated an official capacity claim or a claim against the Illinois Department of
Corrections.
The Court notes it is unclear if Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative
remedies for his allegations. The Administrative Review Board returned his grievance
claiming it was untimely, but the Plaintiff claims he filed an emergency grievance and
Defendants refused to provide a response. This is not an issue that can be addressed
based on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint. See Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009-10
(7th Cir. 2002) (dismissal is appropriate “when the existence of a valid affirmative
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defense is so plain from the face of the complaint that the suit can be regarded as
frivolous”).
Plaintiff has also filed a motion for an emergency temporary restraining order
and a preliminary injunction. [9]. A temporary restraining order (TRO) can be issued
without notice to the party to be enjoined, but it may last no more than fourteen days.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). A court may only grant the motion if “specific facts in an
affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate or irreparable injury, loss,
or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in
opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). This relief is warranted “to prevent a substantial
risk of injury from ripening into actual harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845
(1994). A TRO is an “emergency remedy” designed to “maintain the status quo until a
hearing can be held on an application for a preliminary injunction.” Crue v. Aiken, 137
F.Supp.2d 1076, 1082 (C.D.Ill. April 6, 2001).
On the other hand, a preliminary injunction can be issued only after the adverse
party is given notice and an opportunity to oppose the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(a)(1). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is
in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)
(citations omitted). See also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013); Woods v.
Buss, 496 F.3d 620, 622 (7th Cir. 2007); Cooper v. Salazar, 196 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 1999).

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A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not
be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
In addition, in the context of prisoner litigation, the Prisoner Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) places further restrictions on courts' remedial power. See Westefer v. Neal,
682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012); Johnson v. Lashbrook, 2017 WL 958509, at *1–2 (S.D.Ill.
March 13, 2017). Pursuant to the PLRA, preliminary injunction relief “must be
narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds
requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that
harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683 (the PLRA “enforces a
point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging prison conditions:
prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the
institutions they manage”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff repeats the claims in his complaint. However, Plaintiff also says he has
asked Medical Director Dr. Tilden to approve a front cuff permit on multiple occasions,
but each request was denied. In addition, Plaintiff says the Illinois Department of
Corrections has a practice of condoning the use of excessive force and torture. Plaintiff
asks for an immediate order directing officers to use front cuffs when handcuffs are
necessary for Plaintiff.
Based on Plaintiff’s motion, it appears an inmate needs medical approval for a
front cuff permit. Plaintiff admits he did not have this approval during the incident
alleged in his complaint. If true, the John Doe Defendants would not be required to put
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Plaintiff in front cuffs when they first took him from his cell. However, Plaintiff claims
after two hours, he told the officers he was in extreme pain. The Defendants responded
by violating his Eighth Amendment rights when they refused to remove the cuffs and
applied additional force causing him to pass out.
If medical approval is needed for a front cuff permit, then none of the named
Defendants could provide the action requested by Plaintiff in his motion for injunctive
relief. In addition, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that he suffers from degenerative
joint disease, nor that it is serious enough to warrant a front cuff permit. Finally,
Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege a pattern and practice of using excessive force.
Instead, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges one incident of excessive force which occurred
nearly one year ago. Plaintiff has not met his burden for either a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction and his motion is denied.[9]
Finally, Plaintiff has filed two motions for appointment of counsel. [5, 6]. Plaintiff
has no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel. In addition, the Court cannot
require an attorney to accept pro bono appointment in a civil case. The most the Court
can do is ask for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071
(7th Cir. 1992). In considering Plaintiff’s motion, the Court must ask two questions: “(1)
has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been
effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does
the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th
Cir. 2007), citing Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322 (7th Cir. 1993).

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Plaintiff claims he has written to four different law firms, but has not received a
response. [5, 6]. Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force and failure to protect
from the use of excessive force are not complex. Plaintiff’s complaint demonstrates he
is capable of explaining what happened including the Defendants’ actions, and the
impact on Plaintiff. In addition, once the Defendants are served, the Court will enter a
Scheduling Order with information to assist a pro se litigant and requiring the parties to
provide initial, relevant discovery. Based on the information available to the Court,
Plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel are denied. [5, 6].
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1.

Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff

alleges Defendants John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 used excessive force against him
August 24, 2016, and Defendants Baylor and Bennett failed to intervene to stop the use
of excessive force. This case proceeds solely on the claims identified in this paragraph.
Any additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion
on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15.
2.

This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, in order to give
Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed
before Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as
premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless
otherwise directed by the Court.
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3.

The Court will attempt service on Defendants by sending each Defendant

a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from the date the waiver of service is sent
to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel
within 90 days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the
status of service. After counsel has appeared for Defendants, the Court will enter a
scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.
4.

With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided

by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall
provide to the Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said
Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating
service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk
and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
5.

Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the day the waiver of

service is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should
include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent
pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Opinion.
6.

Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need not send copies

of his filings to that Defendant or to that Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will
file Plaintiff's document electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense
counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on Defendants pursuant
to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on Defendants is not available, Plaintiff will be
notified and instructed accordingly.
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7.

Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at

Plaintiff's place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the
deposition.
8.

Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in

his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a
change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with
prejudice.
9.

If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the clerk within

30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal
service through the U.S. Marshal's service on that Defendant and will require that
Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(2).
10. The Plaintiff is advised that he must identify the names of his Doe Defendants in
order to effect service on them. The Marshals cannot serve unidentified Defendants. If
the Plaintiff does not know the name of a Defendant, he must discover it by filing a
discovery request upon the known Defendants after they have been served, or, if those
Defendants do not provide an answer, a motion to compel with the Court. Failure to
timely identify and serve the Doe Defendants may result in their dismissal from the
case. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(m).
11.

Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is

denied. [9].

12.

Plaintiff’s two motions for appointment of counsel are denied. [5, 6].
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13.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order

pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
14.

The Clerk is directed to attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the

standard procedures.
Entered this 20th day of July, 2017.

s/ James E. Shadid
_________________________________________
JAMES E. SHADID
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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