Young v. Melvin et al
Filing
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MERIT REVIEW OPINION (Rule 16 Deadline 9/25/2017.) - Entered by Judge Sara Darrow on 7/26/2017. 1) Attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the standard procedures; 2)Set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of this order for the court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines; and, 3) Enter the Court's standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Lastly, it is ordered that if a Defendant fail s to sign and return a waiver of service for the clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshal's Service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2). (LN, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 26 July, 2017 10:59:03 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
BRYAIN YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.
MELVIN, et al.
Defendants.
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17-1269
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center,
brings the present lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging violation of his Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. The matter comes before this Court for
merit review under 28 U.S.C. §1915A. In reviewing the complaint, the Court takes all factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d
645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough
facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. U.S.,
721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted).
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff was, at all relevant times, incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center
(“Pontiac”) located in Pontiac, Illinois. Defendants were employed at Pontiac in the following
capacities: Defendant Melvin was the warden; Defendant Prentice was a correctional major;
Defendant Meister was a correctional sergeant; Defendant Tilden was the medical director;
Defendants Jade and Tracey were nurses; and, Defendant Chrissie was a medical techinician.
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Plaintiff alleges the showers at Pontiac contained insects, mildew, lime soaps (“soap
scum”), trash, human saliva, urine, and excrement. In addition, he alleges the showers did not
drain properly because the drains were covered with blankets and replete with hair and debris.
(Doc. 1 at 27-29). Plaintiff alleges the showers were seldom, if ever, cleaned between 2015 and
2017, despite Pontiac’s policy requiring both the use of bleach solution to clean all high-traffic
areas and the availability of spray bottles with the bleach solution to clean showers between uses.
(Doc. 1 at 10, 29).
Plaintiff alleges that prisoners, on multiple occasions, brought their sanitation concerns to
the attention of prison officials to no avail. (Doc. 1 at 24-25, 27, 30-31). Plaintiff alleges that
when he and other prisoners requested spray bottles to clean the showers themselves, prison
officials told them that there were none or to file a grievance. (Doc. 1 at 6, 24). Plaintiff also
filed grievances about the conditions, but the process yielded no results.
Plaintiff alleges he developed fungal infections on his feet and groin, blackened toenails,
and dry feet as a result of the alleged shower conditions. 1 When he sought medical treatment in
December 2016, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Jade prescribed tolnaftate powder, an anti-fungal
medication. 2 Plaintiff applied the medication to no avail. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Tracey then
prescribed tolnaftate cream; the results were the same.
On February 21, 2017, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Chrissy referred him to Defendant
Tilden. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Tilden prescribed him tolnaftate cream for three months and
1
The fungal infections on Plaintiff’s feet and groin are more commonly known as “athlete’s foot” and “jock itch,”
respectively. See Mayo Clinic, “Athlete’s foot,” http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/athletesfoot/home/ovc-20235864 (last visited July 19, 2017); Mayo Clinic, “Jock itch,” http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/jock-itch/home/ovc-20229519 (last visited July 19, 2017).
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“Tolnaftate belongs to the group of medicines called antifungals. It is used to treat some types of fungus infections.
It may also be used together with medicines taken by mouth for fungus infections.” Mayo Clinic, “Tolnaftate
(Topical Route),” http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/tolnaftate-topical-route/description/drg-20068886
(last visited July 19, 2017).
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informed Plaintiff that he should have been prescribed the same regimen initially. Plaintiff
alleges he received his tolnaftate prescription monthly—but only enough to last a week.
ANALYSIS
The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects prisoners from prison conditions that
cause ‘the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain,’ Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981), including both hazardous prison conditions, see Farmer v.
Brennan, 411 U.S. 825, 832 (1994), and grossly inadequate medical care, see
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges hazardous prison conditions and inadequate medical care against certain Pontiac
staff.
I.
Hazardous Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Melvin, Prentice, and Meister violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by ignoring the filthy condition of Pontiac’s showers, or otherwise allowing
the conditions to persist. To implicate a violation of the Eighth Amendment for hazardous
conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must allege that the prison officials “deliberately ignored a
prison condition that presented an objectively, sufficiently serious risk of harm.” Id. at 409
(citing Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008)). That is, the official must “know
of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Plaintiff’s allegation that the showers contained human excrement and urine for
approximately two years allows for a plausible inference that he was subjected to an objectively
serious risk of harm. See Morris v. Ley, 331 F. App’x 417, 420 (7th Cir. 2009); Norfleet v.
Stroger, 297 F. App’x 538, 540 (7th Cir. 2008); see also DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974
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(10th Cir. 2001) (“Exposure to human waste…evokes both the health concerns emphasized in
Farmer, and the more general standards of dignity embodied in the Eighth Amendment.”).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Melvin knew about and “turned a blind eye” to the
showers’ condition, and that Defendants Prentice and Meister “ignored” the shower conditions.
(Doc. 1 at 8). Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Melvin knew of the shower conditions via
inspection and prisoners’ grievances, and responded with no ameliorative efforts sufficiently
state a constitutional claim. See Pyles, 771 F.3d at 410; Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 782
(7th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants Prentice and Meister ignored the showers’
condition are also sufficient, even if these defendants were not directly involved with the alleged
deprivation. See Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2017); Pyles, 771 F.3d at 410.
II.
Inadequate Medical Care
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Tilden, Jade, Tracey, and Chrissy violated his Eighth
Amendment right by failing to provide adequate medical care. To implicate a violation of the
Eighth Amendment for inadequate medical care, the plaintiff must allege that the prison official
acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105
(1976). “A medical condition is objectively serious if a physician has diagnosed it as requiring
treatment, or the need for treatment would be obvious to a layperson.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409
(citing Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009)).
The Court can reasonably infer from the diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff’s fungal
infections that medical staff at Pontiac thought the conditions warranted treatment. Moreover, the
Court cannot foreclose the possibility that Plaintiff’s infections were so severe that a layperson
would see a need for treatment. Ultimately, Plaintiff may not be able to show that he suffered
from an objectively serious medical need, see Roberts v. Dawalibi, No. 14 C 4719, 2017 WL
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926772, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2017) (finding that some fungal infections, including typicalsymptom athlete’s foot and jock itch, did not constitute sufficiently serious medical needs), but
that determination should be made upon a more developed record. At this stage, Plaintiff’s
allegations that he developed fungal infections in his foot and groin plausibly allege objectively
serious medical needs. See Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409; King, 680 F.3d at 1018.
The plaintiff must also allege that prison medical staff was deliberately indifferent.
Treatment decisions made by medical professionals are entitled to deference, Zaya v. Sood, 836
F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016), and to constitute deliberate indifference the decision must be
“such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision on sound judgment.” Petties v.
Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1578 (2017)
(internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted). This may be demonstrated through evidence
showing, among other things, persistence in course of treatment known to be ineffective,
inexplicable delay of treatment that serves no penological interest, and choice of an “easier and
less efficacious treatment without exercising professional judgment.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 729-30
(quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 n.10) (citing Conley v. Birch, 796 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir.
2015)) (internal quotations omitted). But showing mere negligence or malpractice is not enough.
Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (citing Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008)); see
Petties, 836 F.3d at 728.
Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that the Defendants failed to provide
treatment sufficient to remedy his condition, persisted in a treatment known to be ineffective, or
chose an easier and less efficacious treatment for reasons not related to the sound exercise of
medical discretion. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts supporting
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claims of inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment against Defendants Jade,
Tracey, Chrissie, and Tilden.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Pursuant to its merit review of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court
finds the Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment claim for inhumane conditions of
confinement against Defendants Melvin, Prentice, and Meister and an Eighth
Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against
Defendants Jade, Tracey, Chrissy, and Tilden. The remaining defendants shall be
dismissed. Any additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at the
Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
2) This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel
has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, in order to give Defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature.
Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless otherwise
directed by the Court.
3) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing each Defendant a waiver
of service. Defendants have 60 days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants
have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of
this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After
Defendants have been served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and
dispositive motion deadlines.
4) With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by
Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall
provide to the Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said
Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used only for
effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only
by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the
Clerk.
5) Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is sent by the
Clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all
defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent
pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an
answer sets forth Defendants' positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of
those positions unless and until a motion is filed by Defendants. Therefore, no
response to the answer is necessary or will be considered.
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6) Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need not send copies of his
filings to that Defendant or to that Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file
Plaintiff's document electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense
counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on Defendants
pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on Defendants is not available,
Plaintiff will be notified and instructed accordingly.
7) Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of
confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.
8) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing
address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in
mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with
prejudice.
9) Within 10 days of receiving from Defendants’ counsel an authorization to release
medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization to
Defendants’ Counsel.
10) Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Counsel [5] is DENIED with leave to renew. Plaintiff
has no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in this case. In considering the
Plaintiff’s motion, the court asks: (1) has the indigent Plaintiff made a reasonable
attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2)
given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it
himself? Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007), citing Farmer v. Haas,
990 F.2d 319, 322 (7th Cir.1993). Plaintiff has not shown that he made a reasonable
effort to obtain counsel on his own. A plaintiff usually does this by attaching copies
of letters sent to attorneys seeking representation and copies of any responses
received. Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the first prong, the Court does not
address the second.
11) Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting the Court to Direct the Defendant’s Agency to
Comply [6] is DENIED. Per the Court’s Text Order entered June 12, 2017, officials
at Plaintiff’s place of incarceration are required to send 20 percent of preceding
month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s account to the Clerk until the filing fee is paid
in full. According to the CDIL Finance Department, the Court has only received
$0.02 from Plaintiff towards his initial filing fee. The exhibit Plaintiff provided
suggests that officials at his place of incarceration have restricted the availability of
funds credited to Plaintiff’s account in July 2017 to ensure that the funds are
available to send to the Clerk in compliance with the Court’s Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO:
1) Attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the standard procedures;
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2) Set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of this order for the court to
check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines; and,
3) Enter the Court's standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
Lastly, it is ordered that if a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service
for the clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the court will take appropriate
steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshal’s Service on that Defendant
and will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
ENTERED this 26th day of July, 2017.
s/Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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