Clifton v. Brown et al

Filing 8

MERIT REVIEW ORDER entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 11/17/2017. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) The Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. Section 1 915A. This case is closed. All pending motions are denied as moot. [5, 6]. 2) This dismissal shall count as one of the Plaintiff's three allotted strikes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g). The clerk of the court is directed to record the Pla intiff's strike in the three-strike log. 3) If the Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice of appeal with this court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pa uperis MUST set forth the issues the Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If the Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See full written Order.(VH, ilcd)

E-FILED

Friday, 17 November, 2017 11:34:28 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MELVIN CLIFTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MAJOR CHAD BROWN, et al.,
Defendants

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No. 17-1341

MERIT REVIEW ORDER
This cause is before the Court for merit review of the Plaintiff’s complaint. The
Court is required by 28 U.S.C. §1915A to “screen” the Plaintiff’s complaint, and through
such process to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if
warranted. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A.
Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, claims Defendants Major Chad Brown, Kendra Wolf,
Grievance Officer Simpson and Intelligence Officer Guy Pierce violated his
constitutional rights at Pontiac Correctional Center. Plaintiff says on November 2, 2016,
he received a disciplinary ticket and appeared before the Adjustment Committee six
days later on November 8, 2016. Plaintiff submitted a written statement denying all
claims.
On November 18, 2016, Plaintiff received a second disciplinary report regarding
the same charges. Plaintiff appeared before the Adjustment Committee again on

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December 7, 2016. This time Plaintiff submitted two written statements to Defendants
Brown and Wolf.
On December 20, 2016, Plaintiff received the Adjustment Committee final report
which noted there was a delay in the hearing while committee members waited for
finalization of one of two disciplinary reports from internal affairs. (Comp., Ex. D).
Plaintiff was found guilty of Gang or Unauthorized Organization Activity and Abuse of
Privileges. The committee based its decision on a month’s long internal affairs
investigation of Plaintiff involving three confidential informants and audio surveillance.
Plaintiff was found to be a high ranking member of the Gangster Disciples gang who
had ordered members to assault an inmate. (Comp., Ex. D). Plaintiff received one year
in segregation and lost one year of good time credits.
Plaintiff says the final report indicated Plaintiff had requested a lie detector test,
but the report made no mention of Plaintiff’s claim that the hearing was held in
violation of Sections 504.80 and 504.90 of the Illinois Administrative Code. Plaintiff says
if Defendants Brown and Wolf had considered his claim, they “would have no other
option than to dismiss said disciplinary report.” (Comp, p. 5). Therefore, Defendants
violated his due process rights.
The relevant section of the Administrative Code states the “Adjustment
Committee hearing shall be convened, but need not be concluded, within 14 days after
the commission of the offense by an offender or its discovery, whenever possible, …..”
20 Il.Adm.Code 504.80. The section clearly does not require a hearing within 14 days
and the Seventh Circuit has expressly held “there is no protected liberty interest in
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having a hearing within eight days. Without a liberty interest, there can be no
procedural due process violation.” Martin v. Peters, 1995 WL 10739, at *1 (7th Cir. 1995).
In addition, Section 504.90 pertains to situations in which a Warden remands the
decision of the Adjustment Committee for new hearing if the proceedings are found to
be defective and therefore the section is not applicable to Plaintiff. 20 Il.Adm.Code
504.90. Plaintiff has not articulated a due process claim, nor any other constitutional
violation based on the disciplinary hearing.
Plaintiff next outlines repeated problems he had filing a grievance pertaining to
the disciplinary hearing. For instance, Plaintiff submitted a grievance, but received no
response from Officer Simpson. Plaintiff then submitted his grievance to the Warden,
but received it back directing him to forward his grievance with the grievance officer.
Plaintiff resubmitted his grievance, but again did not receive a response.
Plaintiff then details several steps he took to process his grievance including
sending several request slips to the grievance officer. The grievance officer ultimately
claimed she had previously returned two grievances to Plaintiff because he had not
signed them. Plaintiff says he never received any of his grievances back and no
signature is required. Plaintiff adds Defendant Pierce was responsible for monitoring
his ingoing and outgoing mail including his grievances. Therefore, Plaintiff says
Defendants Simpson and Pierce “deliberately sabotaged the completion and the process
of plaintiff’s grievance.” (Comp., p. 7).
Plaintiff has again failed to state a violation of his constitutional rights. “Prison
grievance procedures are not mandated by the First Amendment and do not by their
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very existence create interests protected by the Due Process Clause” of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir.2011) (citations omitted). The
Constitution requires no procedure at all, and the failure of state prison officials to
follow their own procedures does not, standing alone, violate the Constitution. Maust v.
Headley, 959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir.1992); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100–01 (7th
Cir.1982). In addition, Plaintiff was not denied meaningful access to the Courts as he
was able to file his complaint in this lawsuit.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) The Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A. This case
is closed. All pending motions are denied as moot. [5, 6].
2) This dismissal shall count as one of the Plaintiff’s three allotted strikes
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g). The clerk of the court is directed to record
the Plaintiff’s strike in the three-strike log.
3) If the Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice of appeal
with this court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A
motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST set forth the issues the Plaintiff
plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If the Plaintiff does
choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505 appellate filing fee irrespective of
the outcome of the appeal.
Entered this 17th day of November, 2017.

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s/ James E. Shadid
_________________________________________
JAMES E. SHADID
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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