Mojapelo v. Avis Car Rental

Filing 58

ORDER entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 9/4/2019. IT IS ORDERED: Plaintiff's Request to Amend Complaint (Doc. 56 ) is DENIED. SEE FULL WRITTEN ORDER. (JRK, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 04 September, 2019 11:40:36 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
CHARLES MOJAPELO,
Plaintiff,
v.
AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL, LLC,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:18-cv-1029

ORDER & OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Charles Mojapelo’s Request to
Amend Complaint (Doc. 56). Defendant Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC, has responded
(Doc. 57) and the matter is ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s
request is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
A full background of this matter may be found in the Court’s Order & Opinion
on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 52). A brief sketch of the dispute
is all that is necessary here. Plaintiff was hired by Defendant to work as a shuttler
in 2012. He claims he then worked four days a week for several weeks before being
fired and never received compensation. Defendant says Plaintiff never worked: when
he was hired, his work authorization was pending, and when it was not resolved
within a month, he was terminated pursuant to internal procedures.
Plaintiff commenced the instant action in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit in McLean County, Illinois, in 2017. He initially alleged only a claim

for unpaid wages. In December 2017 and January 2018, he filed First and Second
Amended Complaints, adding claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Illinois Constitution; the Title VII and Illinois
Constitution claims alleged he was discriminated against on the basis of age and
national origin. Defendant removed the suit to this Court, and Plaintiff filed a Third
Amended Complaint.
The Court granted in part and denied in part a motion for summary judgment
by Defendant. (Doc. 52). Only the unpaid wage claim survived. The Court entered an
Order resetting the Final Pretrial Conference for August 7, 2019, but keeping a
previously set September 9, 2019, trial date; the Order also set a pretrial schedule.
(Doc. 53). The parties filed an agreed motion requesting all pretrial deadlines be
stayed and a telephonic settlement conference be set. (Doc. 54). That motion was
granted by Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley (Minute Entry dated 7/10/2019). A
settlement conference was subsequently held, but no settlement reached (Minute
Entry dated 8/20/2019). The day after the settlement conference, the Court received
the instant request. Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add a claim for unfair
dismissal “to make sure that this important issue is not lost but addressed fairly in
the settlement.” (Doc. 56 at 1).
LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instruct courts to “freely give leave [to
amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “District courts,
nevertheless, ‘have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue

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delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue
prejudice to the defendants, or where the amendment would be futile.’ ” Right Field
Rooftops, LLC v. Chi. Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, 870 F.3d 682, 693 (7th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008)). The Court notes
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. “Allegations in pro se pleadings are to be construed
liberally, applying substantially less stringent standards than those applied to
pleadings drafted by professional counsel.” Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 598 (7th
Cir. 1992).
DISCUSSION
After nearly two years of litigation, three amended complaints, and a decision
on summary judgment, Plaintiff sought leave to amend his complaint yet again less
than a month before the trial date. Defendant argues leave to amend now would
unfairly prejudice it. (Doc. 57 at 3-4). The Court agrees.
Particularly persuasive is Defendant’s citation to Murphy v. White Hen Pantry
Co., 691 F.2d 350, 353–54 (7th Cir. 1982). (Doc. 57 at 3-4). In that case, the Seventh
Circuit held a motion for leave to amend filed six weeks prior to the trial date, two
years after the commencing the action, and several months after discovery was
complete “clearly would have prejudiced the defendant, who, having successfully
defended against the initial allegations, may have been forced to duplicate its efforts
if discovery were reopened.” Id. at 353. As here, the plaintiffs in that case “offered no
explanation for their delay in seeking to amend the complaint” and the proposed new
theory of liability “was not novel and did not depend on facts discovered late in the

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discovery process.” Id. at 353–54. In those respects, Murphy is essentially identical
to the instant situation.
The Court finds Defendant would suffer undue prejudice by allowing
amendment at this late hour. The trial date—already delayed to October 28, 2019
(Text Order dated 08/28/2019)—would likely need to be further delayed, as Defendant
would doubtlessly file a motion to dismiss the new claim (see Doc. 57 at 4 (asserting
Plaintiff “does not articulate an actionable cause of action” in his request to amend))
and if that failed, a motion for summary judgment. New discovery would potentially
be required depending on the precise theory Plaintiff seeks to proceed under, which
is not clear from his request. All of this would result in costs to Defendant for a claim
that could have been included in any of Plaintiff’s four versions of his complaint. The
Court will not permit amendment under these circumstances.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Request to Amend Complaint (Doc. 56) is
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Entered this 4th day of September 2019.
s/ Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge

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