Mojapelo v. Avis Car Rental
Filing
72
ORDER & OPINION entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 10/30/19. Defendant's motions 63 and 64 are GRANTED. The practical consequence of this ruling is that Plaintiff's potential recovery is limited to those damages allowed in the stat ute, and does not include punitive damages, damages for emotional distress, or attorney's fees. Plaintiff's motions 65 and 66 are DENIED. His request to find certain documents admissible and his hearsay objection to the reasons for his termination are denied without prejudice and may be raised at trial. The misfiled 69 is STRICKEN AS IMPROVIDENTLY FILED.SEE FULL WRITTEN ORDER. (FDS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 30 October, 2019 02:33:19 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
CHARLES MOJAPELO,
Plaintiff,
v.
AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL, LLC,
Defendant.
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Case No. 1:18-cv-1029
Order & Opinion
This matter is before the Court on motions in limine by both parties. (Docs. 63,
64, 65, 66). Defendant has responded to Plaintiff’s motions (Docs. 70, 71),1 but
Plaintiff has failed to timely respond to Defendant’s motions. For the reasons stated
herein, Defendant’s motions (Docs. 63, 64) are GRANTED and Plaintiff’s motions
(Docs. 65, 66) are DENIED.
I.
Defendant’s Motions
Defendant has moved to bar evidence offered to prove emotional distress or
otherwise seek punitive damages (Doc. 63) and evidence offered on the time and effort
Plaintiff has spent litigation the case (Doc. 64). As Plaintiff failed to respond to either
motion before the deadline—or, indeed, at all—these motions are presumed
unopposed. CDIL-LR 7.1(B)(2).
Defendant inadvertently filed one response as a motion before refiling it as a
response; the misfiled Doc. 69 is STRICKEN AS IMPROVIDENTLY FILED.
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This Court is unable to find any precedent suggesting the Illinois Wage
Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS 115/3, under which this action is
brought, would support a claim for emotional distress or punitive damages. As
Defendant correctly points out, the Northern District has held IWPCA “does not
provide for punitive damages.” Saribekian v. Concrete Drilling & Sawing Co., Inc.,
1990 WL 133431, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 13, 1990). In the absence of any argument why
the Court should find otherwise, the Court holds these damages are not available
and, consequently, evidence offered for the purpose of proving emotional distress or
as a basis for punitive damages would not be relevant and would be unfairly
prejudicial. Thus, such evidence is barred under Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and
403.
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court have
held pro se plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney’s fees under even statutes which
explicitly allow recovery of attorney’s fees. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991);
Hamer v. Lentz, 132 Ill.2d 49, 63 (1989). Having not filed a response, Plaintiff gives
the Court no reason to believe an award of attorney’s fees would be appropriate in
this case; he is proceeding pro se. Therefore, any evidence regarding the time and
effort he spent litigating the case, which does not bear on his right to relief under the
statute, would be irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial; such evidence is excluded under
Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403.
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II.
Plaintiff’s Motions
Plaintiff’s surviving motions in limine2 ask the Court to rule on the
admissibility of certain documents (Doc. 65) and exclude certain evidence as hearsay
or for lack of authentication (Doc. 66). Defendant timely responded. (Docs. 70, 71).
The first motion appears to be a revival of a motion Plaintiff filed during the
briefing on summary judgment (Doc. 47). (Doc. 65 at 1). For clarity of the record, that
motion was not denied because the Court accepted Defendant’s argument that the
exhibit should be excluded due to discovery issues, as Plaintiff suggests (Doc. 65 at 12; see Doc. 50 at 1-2). Rather, the Court found the proffered exhibit was unnecessary
to consider at the time and therefore denied the motion as moot. (Doc. 52 at 9).
However, the Court agrees with Defendant the request is premature. The
exhibits may be admissible or not depending on what occurs at trial and how a
foundation is provided. The Court cannot say at this early juncture whether or not
they are admissible. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED without prejudice.
In his second motion, Plaintiff takes issue with three portions of a proposed
final pretrial order: (1) “Plaintiff never reported to work when [Margina] Arbuckle
attempted to call him in from the on-call list”; (2) “Mark Hutchins subsequently
instructed Arbuckle to stop attempting to schedule Plaintiff for work because he did
not have the proper work authorization paperwork. Hutchins instructed Arbuckle
that Plaintiff could not work until Plaintiff resolved his work authorization issues”;
and (3) “On June 25, 2012, Hutchins terminated Plaintiff’s employment because
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One of Plaintiff’s motions (Doc. 67) was denied as untimely filed. (Doc. 68).
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Plaintiff was never available to work.” (Doc. 66 at 1). Plaintiff contends these
statements are hearsay and the evidence regarding the calls should be excluded as
Defendant has not produced phone records showing those calls.
Hearsay refers to “out-of-court statements made by non-witnesses that are
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” United States v. Taylor, 569 F.3d
742, 749 (7th Cir. 2009). The first two statements are clearly not hearsay. Arbuckle
will be a witness at trial, and as such any testimony she provides that Plaintiff did
not report to work when called will be an in-court statement made by a witness.
Hutchins’s instructions to Arbuckle are not relevant on the issue of whether Plaintiff
had the proper work authorization permit, but rather have relevance in their effect
on Arbuckle’s behavior. Therefore, they are not hearsay. United States v. Marchan,
935 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2019); Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2). With regard to the final
statement, whether it will constitute hearsay depends on how evidence is offered of
Hutchins’s reasons for terminating Plaintiff’s employment and the purpose of that
offering. The Court will deny the hearsay objection without prejudice as to the third
statement, and Plaintiff may reraise that objection at trial. But nothing indicates the
evidence is fundamentally hearsay and should be excluded at this time; it will depend
on the method of introduction at trial.
Plaintiff has provided no legal basis for his assertion that Defendant must
produce authenticated phone records in order for a witness to testify that a phone call
occurred. Nor has he argued such records were requested in discovery but not
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produced. The Court therefore has no basis to grant his motion on that ground.
Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 66) is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motions (Dos. 63, 64) are GRANTED. The practical consequence
of this ruling is that Plaintiff’s potential recovery is limited to those damages allowed
in the statute, and does not include punitive damages, damages for emotional
distress, or attorney’s fees. Plaintiff’s motions (Docs. 65, 66) are DENIED. His request
to find certain documents admissible and his hearsay objection to the reasons for his
termination are denied without prejudice and may be raised at trial. The misfiled
Doc. 69 is STRICKEN AS IMPROVIDENTLY FILED.
SO ORDERED.
Entered this 30th day of October 2019.
s/ Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge
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