Andrews v. Rauner et al
Filing
105
OPINION entered by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins. Defendants' Emergency Motion for Protective Order 103 is ALLOWED in part. See written order. (LB)
1:18-cv-01101-SEM-TSH # 105
Page 1 of 7
E-FILED
Friday, 07 January, 2022 04:56:45 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, PEORIA DIVISION
KELLI ANDREWS,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRUCE RAUNER, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 18-cv-1101
OPINION
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Emergency
Motion for Protective Order (d/e 103) (Motion). For the reasons set forth
below, the Motion is ALLOWED in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Kelli Andrews (Andrews) is the mother and administrator of
the estate of her deceased daughter, Tiffany Rusher, (Rusher). Rusher
was mentally ill and was incarcerated in the Defendant Illinois Department
of Correction’s (Department or IDOC) Logan Correctional Center (Logan)
from March 2013 until May 2016. Andrews alleges that the Defendants
knew Rusher needed inpatient mental health treatment, but consciously
chose to deny her that care. Instead, the Defendants subjected Rusher to
repeated and extended periods of solitary confinement. The solitary
Page 1 of 7
1:18-cv-01101-SEM-TSH # 105
Page 2 of 7
confinement included eight months in a crisis cell under constant, around
the clock, observation. The crisis cell had only a metal toilet and a raised
cement slab on which to sleep, but no furniture. While in the crisis cell
Rusher had only a smock to wear with no other clothing. Andrews alleges
that throughout the solitary confinement and confinement in the crisis cell,
Rusher was not allowed to participate in services provided to other
inmates. The lack of medical care, repeated solitary confinement, extended
confinement in the crisis cell, and denial of participation in services at
Logan is hereinafter referred to as the Mistreatment. Andrews alleges that
the Mistreatment caused Rusher’s mental condition to deteriorate and
resulted in repeated episodes of self-harm and attempted suicides. See
First Amended Complaint (d/e 76), ¶¶ 17-31. Andrews alleges claims
against the individual Defendants former Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner,
Acting Director of the Department John R. Baldwin, Department Central
Regional Psychologist Supervisor Jeff Sim, Logan Chief Psychologist Dr.
He Yuan, and Logan Mental Health Professional Brian Richardson;
Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (Wexford), Department’s contractor to
provide medical care at Logan; and the Department. First Amended
Complaint, ¶¶ 11-17. Andrews alleges § 1983 claims against Rauner,
Baldwin, Sim, Yuan, Richardson, and Wexford for violation of Rusher’s
Page 2 of 7
1:18-cv-01101-SEM-TSH # 105
Page 3 of 7
Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. Andrews
brings the § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants in their
individual capacities. First Amended Complaint, Count I. Andrews alleges
claims against Rauner, Baldwin, and the Department for violations of
Rusher’s rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 (Count II) and Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Count III).
Andrews brings the claims in Counts II and III against Rauner and Baldwin
in their official capacities. Complaint Counts II and III. Current Illinois
Governor J.B. Pritzker and current Department Director Rob Jeffreys are
also proper party defendants to the claims brought against Rauner and
Baldwin, respectively, in their official capacities. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); see
Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (d/e 55), at
1 n.1. The State of Illinois (State) and the Department are the real
Defendants in Counts II and III because actions against a state official in
his official capacity is an action against the entity of which the officer is an
agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). In this case,
Governor Rauner was the highest official of the State, and Baldwin was the
highest official in the Department. Andrews also brings state law medical
negligence claims against Yuan, Richardson, and Wexford. First Amended
Complaint, Count IV.
Page 3 of 7
1:18-cv-01101-SEM-TSH # 105
Page 4 of 7
Andrews alleges § 1983 claims against Governor Rauner, Director
Baldwin, and Chief Sim (Management Defendants) for causing Rusher to
be subjected to the Mistreatment in violation of her rights. To prevail on
such a claim against each Management Defendant, Andrews must show
that: (1) each implemented policies and procedures at Logan that created a
substantial risk that the Mistreatment would occur; (2) each personally
knew that such policies and procedures at Logan created a substantial risk
that the Mistreatment would occur; and (3) each acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind, “[I]t is enough to show that the defendants knew of
a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.” Roe v.
Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)). The ADA and RA claims for damages
against the Department and the State require proof that the Department
and the State were deliberately indifferent to subjecting Rusher to the
Mistreatment. Andrews must prove that these Defendants knew a harm to
a federally protected right was substantially likely and failed to act upon that
likelihood. Lacy v. Cook County, 897 F.3d 847, 862-63 (7th Cir. 2018).
Andrews has requested a deposition of non-party Dr. Melvin Hinton,
M.D., Chief of Mental Health for the Department. The deposition is
scheduled for January 11, 2022. Defendants ask the Court to enter a
Page 4 of 7
1:18-cv-01101-SEM-TSH # 105
Page 5 of 7
protective order to limit the areas of inquiry in Dr. Hinton’s deposition to “the
mental health treatment of Tiffany Rusher while she was in the custody of
the Illinois Department of Corrections and the mental health treatment
policies and procedures in place when Ms. Rusher was in the Illinois
Department of Corrections, from January 2010 through May 3, 2016.”
Motion, attached Proposed Protective Order. Andrews opposes the
Motion.
ANALYSIS
This Court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense. Such protective orders may require parties to limit their inquiry to
certain areas. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(D). Defendants ask the Court to
limit the scope of inquiry because questioning beyond Rusher’s treatment
and policies during the time of Rusher’s confinement with the Department
are not relevant. Relevant evidence for purposes of discovery is
information that would be likely to lead to relevant evidence and is
proportional to the needs of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); NDK
Crystal, Inc. v. Nipponkoa Ins. Co., Ltd., 2011 WL 43093, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
January 4, 2011). The Court agrees that current policies regarding the
Department’s treatment of mentally ill inmates in 2022 is not proportional to
Page 5 of 7
1:18-cv-01101-SEM-TSH # 105
Page 6 of 7
the needs of this case since Rusher was released from custody in 2016.
The Court, therefore, will limit the inquiry to the Department’s mental health
treatment policies and procedures in place from January 2010 through
December 2016 (Relevant Time).
The Defendants further ask the Court to limit the inquiry to the
treatment of Rusher. The Court denies this request. A central issue is the
knowledge of the Defendants about the risk of harm of Department’s
mental health treatment policies on mentally ill persons in the custody of
the Department during the Relevant Time. The effect of Department
policies on other persons in custody during the Relevant Time may lead to
relevant evidence of the Defendants’ knowledge of whether the Department
policies created a substantial risk of harm on other persons in custody such
as Rusher. In particular, Dr. Hinton’s knowledge concerning the treatment
of other persons in custody from other litigation covering the Relevant
Time, such as class action case Rasho v. Baldwin, et al., C. D. Ill. Case No.
07-1298, may lead to relevant evidence of the Department’s knowledge of
the risk of harm to Rusher from Department policies for purposes of Counts
II and III. The inquiry concerning other inmates, including other litigation,
will be limited to the Relevant Time, but the Court will not bar inquiry into
the treatment of other persons in Department custody.
Page 6 of 7
1:18-cv-01101-SEM-TSH # 105
Page 7 of 7
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Emergency Motion
for Protective Order (d/e 103) is ALLOWED in part. Plaintiff’s inquiries of
Dr. Melvin Hinton, M.D. at his deposition regarding mental health treatment
of Tiffany Rusher and others who were in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections and the mental health treatment policies and
procedures of the Illinois Department of Corrections shall be limited to the
time period from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2016. Plaintiff shall not
inquire about the Illinois Department of Corrections’ mental health
treatment policies and procedures in effect outside of this time period and
shall not inquire about the treatment of persons in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections outside of this time period. The Motion is
otherwise denied.
ENTER: January 7, 2022
s/ Tom Schanzle-Haskins
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Page 7 of 7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?