Doe-2 et al v. White et al

Filing 121

OPINION denying 117 118 Motions for Sanctions entered by Judge Michael P. McCuskey on 4/5/13. See written Opinion. (KM, ilcd)

E-FILED

Friday, 05 April, 2013 11:42:17 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
JANE DOE - 2, a Minor through her
mother and next Friend, JULIE DOE - 2, and
JULIE DOE - 2,

)
)
)
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Plaintiffs,
)
v.
)
)
JON WHITE, URBANA SCHOOL DISTRICT )
116 BOARD OF DIRECTORS, et al.,
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)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 08-CV-2169

OPINION

This case is before the court for ruling on the Motions for Sanctions (#117, #118) filed
by Defendants McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors, Jim Braksick, Alan
Chapman, Edward Heineman and John Pye. After careful consideration, this court agrees
with Plaintiffs’ argument that sanctions are not warranted in this case. Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions under 28. U.S.C. § 1927 (#117) and Defendants’ Motion
for Sanctions under Rule 11 (#118) are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On January 30, 2013, this court entered an Opinion (#116) and denied the Motion for
Relief from Judgment (#112) filed by Plaintiffs, Jane Doe-2, through her mother and next
friend Julie Doe-2, and Julie Doe-2. This court concluded that Plaintiffs’ request for relief
under Rule 60(b) based on newly discovered evidence was untimely. In addition, this court
concluded that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) based upon a post-

judgment change of law. This court concluded that there was nothing “unjust” about the
underlying judgment which was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit even though the Illinois
Supreme Court subsequently ruled differently. Therefore, this court concluded that this case
did not present extraordinary circumstances which outweighed the strong policy favoring the
finality of judgments.
MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS
On February 19, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion for Sanctions under 28 U.S.C. §
1927 and Memorandum of Law (#117). Defendants argued that sanctions were warranted
because Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief from Judgment was “so lacking in merit . . . that its
pursuit by the plaintiff indicates a motive to harass,” citing Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 920
(7th Cir. 2010). Defendants argued that those who create unnecessary costs must also bear
them, citing Riddle & Assocs., P.C. v. Kelly, 414 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2005). Defendants
argued that Plaintiffs’ position that the judgment should be reopened was not supported by
Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any case law interpreting that provision.
Defendants also argued that Plaintiffs’ Motion did not cite or make any attempt to distinguish
Seventh Circuit precedent holding that a change in decisional law is not an extraordinary
circumstance that allows opening a judgment. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ conduct
caused them to incur significant legal fees and expenses so that sanctions are warranted.
Also on February 19, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Memorandum of Law (#118). Defendants argued that

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sanctions were warranted under Rule 11 because Plaintiffs’ position that the judgment should
be reopened was not supported.
On March 7, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Response to Motion for Sanctions under 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (#119) and a Response to Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11 (#120).
Plaintiffs argued that their attorney had not been shown to have acted “vexatiously” under
28 U.S.C. § 1927. They argued that the Motion for Relief from Judgment was filed after
reasonable inquiry and was not interposed for any improper purpose. Plaintiffs argued that
their attorney’s conduct was proper and in good faith. Plaintiffs also argued that sanctions
were not warranted under Rule 11 because Defendants did not follow the applicable safe
harbor provision. Plaintiffs attached the Affidavit of Professor James E. Pfander, dated
March 6, 2013, to their Responses.
In his Affidavit, dated March 6, 2013, Professor Pfander stated that he is a Professor
of Law at Northwestern University School of Law and teaches and conducts legal research
in the fields of civil procedure and federal jurisdiction. Professor Pfander stated that, after
reviewing relevant documents, he concluded that Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) Motion did not
constitute unreasonable or vexatious litigation worthy of sanctions under § 1927 or Rule 11.
Professor Pfander set out a detailed explanation for this conclusion.
After careful consideration, this court agrees with Plaintiffs that, although the Motion
for Relief from Judgment was denied, it was filed after reasonable inquiry, was not
interposed for any improper purpose and was not frivolous. Accordingly, this court
concludes that sanctions are not warranted.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Defendants’ Motions for Sanctions (#117,
#118) are DENIED.
ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2013
s/ Michael P. McCuskey
MICHAEL P. McCUSKEY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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