O'Bannon v. Caterpillar Inc
Filing
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OPINION entered by Chief Judge Michael P. McCuskey on 8/1/2011. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 18 is GRANTED. This case is terminated. See written order. (JMW, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 01 August, 2011 10:18:32 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
_____________________________________________________________________________
MICHAEL O’BANNON,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
Case No. 10-CV-2106
)
CATERPILLAR INC.,
)
)
Defendant.
)
_____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
_____________________________________________________________________________
This case is before the Court for ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment (#18) filed
by Defendant, Caterpillar Inc. (Caterpillar). Pro Se Plaintiff, Michael O’Bannon, has not filed a
response to the Motion for Summary Judgment (#18). This Court has carefully considered
Defendant’s arguments and exhibits. Following this careful and thorough review, Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (#18) is GRANTED.
FACTS1
Caterpillar requires that applicants for manufacturing, distribution center, and other nonmanagement positions pass an aptitude test known as the Non-Management Selection Process
(CNSP). The CNSP is administered and scored by a third party, AON. At the conclusion of the
test, Caterpillar is told whether an applicant passed or failed. Caterpillar has never hired an
applicant who has failed the CNSP.
In the fall of 2005, Plaintiff passed the CNSP exam and was selected to begin a five day
1
This statement of facts is based upon the Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts
and the exhibits the Defendant has provided to this Court, including the transcript of Plaintiff’s
deposition taken June 1, 2011.
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orientation program on January 9, 2006. Halfway through orientation, the Plaintiff was arrested
for an outstanding bench warrant stemming from a 2005 theft charge. Unable to post bond, the
Plaintiff spent twenty-five days in jail. During the Plaintiff’s imprisonment, Caterpillar
terminated the Plaintiff’s employment due to his failure to return to work or report his absence.
In addition, pursuant to Caterpillar’s employment policies, the Plaintiff’s personnel record was
marked “not eligible for rehire.”
On October 12, 2007, the Plaintiff once again applied to work for Caterpillar and was
scheduled to participate in CNSP testing on October 14, 2007. However, prior to his test date,
AON realized that the Plaintiff had previously tested with Caterpillar and was not eligible for
rehire. AON subsequently contacted the Plaintiff and told him not to come in for testing.
Incensed that Caterpillar refused to allow him to re-test, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination
with the Illinois Department of Human Rights alleging that he was discriminated against on
October 12, 2007, due to his race and arrest record.
On March 13, 2008, Caterpillar received Plaintiff’s initial charge of discrimination. In
response Kimberly Croxton, Caterpillar’s EEO Manager, requested that the Plaintiff be allowed
to re-test. On March 24, 2008, the Plaintiff once again took the CNSP. However, this time the
Plaintiff failed the CNSP because he failed to complete the final portion of the test. A few days
later, on March 26, 2008, Caterpillar mailed the Plaintiff a letter stating that he failed the test and
was eligible to take another test in one year.
On April 17, 2008, Plaintiff filed a charge of retaliation in violation of Title VII with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On May 20, 2010, Plaintiff filed his Complaint
(#1) alleging that Caterpillar retaliating against him for filing his initial charge with the Illinois
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Department of Human Rights by refusing to re-hire him. On June 30, 2011, Defendant filed its
Motion for Summary Judgment (#18) arguing that the Plaintiff failed to satisfy the prima facie
for retaliation. Also on June 30, 2011, a Notice (#19) was sent to the Plaintiff telling him that he
had 21 days to respond to the Motion (#18). The Plaintiff was also notified that, if no response
was filed, the Motion could be granted and the case terminated without a trial. The Plaintiff has
not filed a Response to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
ANALYSIS
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 7.1(D)(2) of the Local Rules of the Central District of Illinois provides:
Within 21 days after service of a motion for summary judgment, any
party opposing the motion shall file a response. A failure to respond
shall be deemed an admission of the motion.
The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that such a rule is “entirely proper.” Doe v.
Cunningham, 30 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 1994). Further, when the non-movant does not respond
to the movant’s statement of facts, the non-movant concedes the movant’s version of the facts.
Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994); Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. Landa, 974 F. Supp. 1, 3 (C.D. Ill. 1997). However, a party’s failure to submit a
timely response to a motion for summary judgment does not automatically result in summary
judgment for the moving party. LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 392 (7th Cir.
1995). It remains “the movant’s burden to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact
exists and that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Doe, 30 F.3d at 883.
Accordingly, the district court must make the further finding that summary judgment is proper as
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a matter of law. LaSalle Bank, 54 F.3d at 392.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a district court must “grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, a district court has one task and one task only: to decide, based upon the
evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact requiring a trial. Waldridge, 24
F.3d 920.
II. DEFENDANT’S MOTION
In this case, Defendant has provided a detailed statement of undisputed material facts
with supporting documentation. Defendant has also provided supporting authority for his
argument that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation.
An employee can support a Title VII claim for retaliation by using the direct method or
the indirect, burden shifting method. Nichols v. Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville, 510
F.3d 772, 784-85 (7th Cir. 2007). Under the direct method, the Plaintiff must prove that: (1) he
engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) his exercise of protected activity was known to
the Defendant; (3) Defendant thereafter took an adverse employment action against him; and (4)
a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
Nichols, 510 F.3d at 785. Under the indirect, burden shifting method the Plaintiff must prove
that (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he met Caterpillar’s legitimate
expectations; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) he was treated less
favorably than similarly situated employees who did not engage in a protected activity. Nichols,
510 F.3d at 785. This Court agrees with Defendant that the undisputed facts show that under the
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direct method, the Plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between filing his charge with
the Illinois Department of Human Rights and failing the CNSP. Especially since a third party,
AON, conducted and graded the examination. Further, this Court agrees that the undisputed
facts show that under the indirect theory, the Plaintiff cannot identify similarly situated white
applicants who failed the CNSP but were hired by Caterpillar anyway.
This Court has carefully reviewed all of the documentation submitted by Defendant as
well as Defendant’s citations of authority. Following this careful review, this Court concludes
that Defendant has met its burden to show that no genuine dispute as to any material fact exists.
Based upon the undisputed facts and the applicable case law, this Court agrees with Defendant
that it is entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#18) is GRANTED. Judgment is
entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.
(2) The final pretrial scheduled for September 23, 2011, and the jury trial set for October
3, 2011, are hereby vacated.
(3) This case is terminated.
ENTERED this 1st day of August, 2011
s/ Michael P. McCuskey
MICHAEL P. McCUSKEY
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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